Morningstar v. Aguilera

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

SOUTH BEND DIVISION

LANCE MORNINGSTAR,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 1:22-cv-273-HAB

ALEXIS AGUILERA, FWPD #1997f,

Officer, in official and individual capacities,

et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Lance Morningstar, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case

against Officer Alexis Aguilera, Officer Michael Bodeker, and Officer Whitney A.

Woods “in their individual capacities for compensatory and punitive damages for

subjecting him to excessive force on October 5, 2020, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment[.]” ECF 18 at 5. The defendants moved for summary judgment. ECF 45.

Morningstar filed a response, and the defendants filed a reply. ECF 54, 55, 56. The

summary judgment motion is now fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate “if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The party seeking summary judgment “bears

the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying” the evidence that “demonstrate[s] the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Substantive law

determines which facts are material; that is, which facts might affect the outcome of the

suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all facts in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in

that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). The court will not

“make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to

draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.” Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770

(7th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial on the merits or a

vehicle for resolving factual disputes. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920

(7th Cir. 1994). Instead, the court’s sole task in ruling on a motion for summary

judgment is “to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material

dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Payne, 337 F.3d at 770. If a reasonable factfinder

could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment may not be granted. Id.

Excessive-force claims that occur during the course of an arrest or apprehension

of a suspect “are governed by the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ standard,

which turns on the totality of the circumstances confronting [the officers] viewed from

the perspective ‘of a reasonable officer on the scene . . ..” Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d

458, 464 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 396 (1989)). “Whether a

particular use of force was objectively reasonable ‘is a legal determination rather than a

pure question of fact for the jury to decide.’” Id. (quoting Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678

F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2012)). In analyzing these claims, the court must “consider the

facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and whether he was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Bayon v. Berkebile, 29 F.4th 850, 854 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Even the use of deadly force may be reasonable if an officer has

probable cause to believe the suspect is armed and poses a threat of physical harm or is

about to escape. See Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2020); Weinmann v.

McClone, 787 F.3d 444, 450 (7th Cir. 2015) (“a suspect has a constitutional right not to be

shot by an officer unless he ‘reasonably believes that [the suspect] poses a threat to the

officer or someone else.’”). The perspective as viewed from a reasonable officer on the

scene is critical. Siler, 957 F.3d at 759.

[A] court must consider the amount and quality of the information known

to the officer at the time. In seeking to understand the perspective of the

officer on the scene, we must consider: the information known to the

officer at the time of the encounter; the duration of the encounter; the level

of duress involved; and the need to make split-second decisions under

intense, dangerous, uncertain, and rapidly changing circumstances. Law

enforcement officers on the scene do not have the luxury of knowing the

facts as they are known to us, with all the benefit of hindsight, discovery,

and careful analysis. Officers must act reasonably based on the

information they have. We must always keep in mind that encounters in

the field require officers to make split-second decisions of enormous

consequence. If a reasonable officer in [the defendant’s] shoes would have

believed that [the plaintiff] posed an imminent threat of serious physical

harm, or that he had committed a crime involving serious physical harm

and was about to escape, the Officer’s use of force was reasonable.

Id. (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

The defendants provide their own affidavits, in which they attest to the

following facts: On October 5, 2020, Officer Aguilera was at a hotel completing a report

for an armed robbery that had occurred when he received a report that another armed

robbery had just occurred across the street at the Travel Lodge motel. ECF 45-1 at 1.

Officer Aguilera drove his police vehicle to the Travel Lodge motel and saw an

employee and the manager on the second floor of the motel. Id. at 2. The employee and

manager shouted to Officer Aguilera that a man who just robbed someone with a gun

was in Room 237. Id.1 The manager advised Officer Aguilera the suspect was a white

male. Id. Officers Whitney Woods, Craig Walters, and Michael Bodeker arrived on scene

and the officers made their way to the second floor. Id. An employee had his foot in the

door to Room 237 and advised the officers the suspect was in there. Id. The officers then

heard the voice of a man they were familiar with, known as Chase, coming from the

bottom of the stairs. Id. They went downstairs to speak to Chase, and Chase informed

them the man that had robbed him with a gun was up in that room. Id. at 3. At that

point, the manager yelled down to the officers, “Hey, this guy just ran out of the room!”

Id. Officer Aguilera saw a white male, later identified as Morningstar, running out of

the doorway. Id. Officer Aguilera made eye contact with Morningstar and began

chasing him across the parking lot. Id.

Morningstar ran from the police officers across the parking lot while looking

back at them. ECF 45-1 at 3. The officers chased Morningstar, believing him to be the

armed robbery suspect. Id. Morningstar was holding his mid-section with his right

hand, causing Officer Aguilera to believe he was grabbing or holding a weapon in his

1 The Travel Lodge manager and employee’s statements are not hearsay because they are not

being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show the defendants’ knowledge at

the time of the incident.

waistband. Id. Officer Aguilera unholstered his firearm. Id. During the foot pursuit, the

officers yelled at Morningstar, identifying themselves as police and ordering him to

stop and put his hands into the air. Id. Morningstar did not comply and continued to

run. Id. Morningstar then tripped and fell. Id. As Morningstar attempted to get back up,

Officer Aguilera caught up to him and pushed against his back, forcing him to lay flat

on his stomach. Id. Morningstar put his hands beneath him while Officer Aguilera

pushed down on him. Id. at 3-4. His right hand was at his midsection. Id. at 4. Officer

Aguilera tried to push down on Morningstar so he could not pull anything out from

underneath him, but he still was moving his right arm trying to tug on something. Id.

The officers all were yelling at Morningstar to stop resisting and show his hands.

ECF 41-1 at 4. Morningstar ignored their commands, continued to actively resist, and

kept both of his hands beneath him. Id. Officer Aguilera could see Morningstar’s right

hand tugging at his waistband. Id. During the struggle, Officer Bodeker saw

Morningstar had a black firearm in his hand, and yelled “Gun!” ECF 45-2 at 2. Officer

Bodeker then yelled out “Taser!” and deployed his taser against Morningstar’s back

side, but it was not effective. Id. Almost simultaneously after the taser made contact,

Morningstar began firing shots from his gun, which was still underneath him. Id.; ECF

45-1 at 4. The bullets were going in the direction of Officer Bodeker, and he could feel

the snap of the bullets go by his leg. Id. Officer Aguilera, fearing for his life and the lives

of the other officers and bystanders, used his firearm and shot Morningstar on the right

shoulder blade side of his back. ECF 45-1 at 4-5. Officer Aguilera then manipulated

Morningstar’s left arm and handcuffed his left wrist. Id. at 5. Officer Aguilera tilted

Morningstar to his right side and saw a black handgun with his fingers still wrapped

around it. Id. He manipulated Morningstar’s fingers off the handgun and placed his

right arm in handcuffs. Id. The officers immediately administered medical assistance to

Morningstar until medics arrived. Id.

In his deposition, Morningstar testified to a different version of the facts: On

October 5, 2020, Morningstar was visiting a friend in a room at the Travel Lodge motel.

ECF 49 at 20. He had a gun with him. Id. At some point, Morningstar left the motel

room, went downstairs to the parking lot, and began jogging across the parking lot to

the gas station. Id. at 21-22. He was carrying a fanny pack with drugs and was holding

his gun in his hand inside of his hoodie. Id. at 22, 31. While Morningstar was jogging

across the parking lot, he heard a bunch of yelling behind him, got shot with a taser, fell

down, and got shot with a bullet through the back. Id. at 24, 32. He was unaware he was

being chased by police officers, never looked back at the police officers while they were

chasing him, and never heard the police officers give him any orders or say anything to

him. Id. at 24-27, 33. He was clutching the gun underneath his body while he was laying

on the ground, and the gun likely discharged because his muscles involuntarily

constricted when he was tased and shot. Id. at 26-27.2

The defendants argue summary judgment is warranted in their favor because

(1) they did not use excessive force against Morningstar but rather used only a

2 Morningstar testified in his deposition that his gun likely discharged because his muscles

contracted when he was shot in the shoulder by Officer Aguilera, but he now concedes in his response to

the summary judgment motion that his gun began firing when he was tased by Officer Bodeker. ECF 54

at 6. He does not dispute that his gun fired before he was shot by Officer Aguilera. See id.

reasonable amount of force to effectuate his arrest and, regardless, (2) they are entitled

to qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights. ECF 46 at 10-13. In his response, Morningstar argues the

defendants used excessive force against him because they chased him across the

parking lot, tased him, tackled him, and shot him in the shoulder despite the fact that he

was not involved in the armed robbery investigation and was at most a suspect for a

misdemeanor for fleeing law enforcement. ECF 55 at 5-8.

Here, the defendants used force against Morningstar on two occasions by:

(1) tasing and tackling him to the ground; and (2) shooting him in the shoulder once he

was on the ground. Each use of force must be examined individually.

First, no reasonable jury could conclude the defendants used excessive force

against Morningstar by tackling and tasing him while he ran through the parking lot.

Specifically, it’s undisputed that the defendants: (1) received a report of an armed

robbery; (2) were informed by the Travel Lodge manager that the suspect, a white male,

was in Room 237; (3) were informed by the Travel Lodge manager that “this guy” had

just run out of Room 237; (4) saw Morningstar running across the parking lot with his

hand at his waistband; and (5) yelled out to Morningstar to stop but he continued

running.3 Accepting as true Morningstar’s assertions that he was not involved in the

armed robbery and was tased and tackled by the defendants before he even realized he

3 Morningstar testified in his deposition that he did not look at the defendants or hear them say

anything to him while he was running through the parking lot, but he concedes he heard “a bunch of

yelling” and “a commotion” behind him while he was running through the lot. ECF 49 at 24; ECF 54 at 2.

was being pursued, the defendants’ conduct of tackling and tasing Morningstar was

nevertheless a reasonable amount of force given the fact that he was actively running

away from the scene of an armed robbery with his hand in his waistband, the Travel

Lodge manager identified Morningstar as having run out of the room where the armed

robbery suspect was hiding, and Morningstar continued running and did not respond

to their commands to stop and put his hands up. See Abbott v. Sangamon Cty, Ill., 705

F.3d 706, 727 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Courts generally hold that the use of a taser against an

actively resisting suspect either does not violate clearly established law or is

constitutionally reasonable”); United States v. Norris, 640 F.3d 295, 303 (7th Cir. 2011)

(use of a taser was reasonable where the suspect had “displayed an unwillingness to

accede to reasonable police commands, and his actions suggested an intent to use

violence to fend off further police action”). While Morningstar testified he did not hear

the defendants’ commands, he does not dispute that the commands were given, and a

reasonable officer could have concluded Morningstar “displayed an unwillingness to

accede to reasonable police commands” by continuing to run through the parking lot.

See id. Considering the totality of the circumstances, no reasonable jury could conclude

the defendants used more force than was reasonably necessary to effectuate

Morningstar’s arrest by tackling and tasing him while he ran across the parking lot with

his hand in his waistband and ignored their commands to stop fleeing.

Moreover, even if a reasonable jury could conclude the defendants used

excessive force against Morningstar by tasing and tackling him under these conditions,

the defendants are nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity for this conduct.

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability when performing

discretionary functions so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). To overcome a qualified immunity defense, “a plaintiff must show the

deprivation of a constitutional right, and must also show that the right was clearly

established at the time of the violation.” Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.

2002) (citing Alvarado, 267 F.3d at 652). “A right is clearly established when existing

precedent has ‘placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’” Howell

v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012)). The United States Supreme Court has clarified the definition of a “clearly

established right” in the context of excessive force cases:

Under our cases, the clearly established right must be defined with

specificity. This Court has repeatedly told courts not to define clearly

established law at a high level of generality. That is particularly important

in excessive force cases, as we have explained: Specificity is especially

important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has

recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how

the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual

situation the officer confronts. Use of excessive force is an area of the law

in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case, and thus

police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent

squarely governs the specific facts at issue. It does not suffice for a court

simply to state that an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive

force, deny qualified immunity, and then remit the case for a trial on the

question of reasonableness. An officer cannot be said to have violated a

clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently

definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have

understood that he was violating it.

City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42-43 (2019) (quotation marks, ellipsis,

citations, and brackets omitted).

Here, Morningstar has not identified, and independent research has not

uncovered, any caselaw finding a Fourth Amendment violation where a suspect was

tased and tackled under circumstances similar to those here. See Bell v. Grooms, No. 3:16-

cv-254-JD, 2019 WL 3499394, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 2019) (“the court has researched the

cases of the United States Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit, the district courts in

Indiana, and the Indiana appellate courts” and “[n]o cases were found which held

[using a taser on a fleeing misdemeanant who was a suspect in a weapons case] would

constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.”). Therefore, the undisputed facts show the

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for this conduct.

Second, no reasonable jury could conclude Officer Aguilera used excessive force

against Morningstar by shooting him in the shoulder after Morningstar’s handgun

began firing from beneath his body. Specifically, it’s undisputed Morningstar was

holding his handgun in his hand and it began firing bullets in the direction of the police

officers such that Officer Bodeker could feel the “snap” of the bullets moving past his

legs. Accepting as true Morningstar’s assertion that he was involuntarily firing his

weapon because his muscles contracted when he was tased, Officer Aguilera still had

probable cause to believe Morningstar was armed and posed a threat of physical harm.

See Siler, 957 F.3d at 759; Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1988) (When an

officer reasonably believes an assailant’s actions place “him, his partner, or those in the

immediate vicinity in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury, the officer can

reasonably exercise the use of deadly force”) (emphasis omitted). Considering the

information known to Officer Aguilera at the time – namely, that Morningstar was

tackled fleeing from the scene of an armed robbery, was holding a handgun beneath his

body, and was firing the handgun in the direction of Officer Bodeker – a reasonable

officer in Officer Aguilera’s shoes would have believed Morningstar posed an imminent

threat of serious physical harm. See Siler, 957 F.3d at 759.4

Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances known to the defendants at

the time of each use of force, no reasonable jury could conclude they used greater force

than necessary to effectuate Morningstar’s arrest. Summary judgment is therefore

warranted in favor of the defendants.

For these reasons, the court:

(1) GRANTS the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF 45); and

(2) DIRECTS the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendants and against

Lange Morningstar and to close this case.

SO ORDERED on February 20, 2025.

s/ Holly A. Brady

CHIEF JUDGE HOLLY A. BRADY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4 Because it’s clear from the undisputed facts that Officer Aguilera did not use excessive force

against Morningstar by shooting him in the shoulder, the court does not reach the defendants’ alternative

argument that Officer Aguilera is entitled to qualified immunity for this conduct.