Lawrence v. St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

____________________________________________

PATRICK LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff,

vs. 8:24-CV-656

(MAD/DJS)

DETECTIVE SHATTICK, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

PATRICK LAWRENCE

24-B-3717

Cape Vincent Correctional Facility

Route 12E

PO Box 739

Cape Vincent, New York 13618

Plaintiff, Pro se

Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 14, 2024, pro se Plaintiff Patrick Lawrence commenced this action against

Defendants Detective Shattick, St. Lawrence County Correctional Facility ("St. Lawrence

C.C.F."), St. Lawrence County Sheriff's Department (the "Sheriff's Department"), Deputy

Yerdon, Deputy Tate, Deputy Merria, Deputy Bundette, Sgt. G. Anderson, James Mcgahan,

Bradford Reindeau, Thomas Farrell, Greg Storie, Brooks Bigwarfe, Peggy Harper, Tim Amos,

Nurse Kerrigan, Chief Nurse Mayo, Chief Nurse Anita Scott, Sgt. Clary, Nurse 1-100,

Correctional Officer 1-100, Kim Richards, K. Hillbourne, Yolanda Thompson, Sara Charpentier,

Allison Applebe, and Deputy 1-100 (collectively, "Defendants"), bringing claims for violations of

his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act1 ("ADA") and Rehabilitation Act2 ("RA"), as well as state law

claims. See Dkt. No. 1.

On September 23, 2024, Magistrate Judge Daniel Stewart issued a Report-

Recommendation and Order ("R&R"), recommending that (1) "Plaintiff's Complaint be

DISMISSED with prejudice as to Plaintiff's fourth, fifth, seventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and

seventeenth causes of action, as well as, all Eighth Amendment claims, and Defendants Storie,

Charpentier, Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan, and [St. Lawrence C.C.F.]"; (2) "Plaintiff's sixth,

eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, [twelfth], and thirteenth causes of action be DISMISSED with leave

to amend"; and (3) Plaintiff's first, second, third, and sixteenth causes of action be permitted to

proceed and Defendants be directed to respond." Dkt. No. 11 at 14 (emphasis omitted).

Magistrate Judge Stewart also denied Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel. See id. at 12-

14. On December 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R, which he labels "Amendments

and Objections." Dkt. No. 14.3 On December 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed exhibits and medical

records in support of his "Amendments and Objections." See Dkt. Nos. 15, 16. For the reasons

that follow, the R&R is adopted as modified herein.

II. BACKGROUND

1 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213.

2 See 29 U.S.C. § 794.

3 Plaintiff's objections are sixty pages. See Dkt. No. 14. Local Rule 71.2(c) instructs that

"[o]bjections may not exceed twenty-five (25) pages without the Court's prior approval."

N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c). The Court will consider the entirety of Plaintiff's objections because he is

proceeding pro se. However, the Court warns Plaintiff that future compliance with the Federal

Rules, the Court's Local Rules, and the undersigned's Individual Rules is required.

For a recitation of the background, the parties are referred to the R&R. See Dkt. No. 11 at

4.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the

district court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed

findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However,

when a party files "[g]eneral or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite the same

arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge," the court reviews those recommendations

for clear error. O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,

2011) (citations and footnote omitted). The district court may also, in its discretion, review

recommendations de novo even when a party has failed to object or merely asserts general or

conclusory objections. See U.S. v. Male Juvenile (95-CR-1074), 121 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1997)

("Although [the] defendant did not object to the magistrate judge's recommendation, . . . [t]he

record indicates that the district court made a de novo determination of the Report and

Recommendation . . . . The court's review was well within its discretion") (citing Grassia v.

Scully, 892 F.2d 16, 19 (2d Cir. 1989)). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

"[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than

that accorded to 'formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289,

295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (other citations

omitted). The Court is obligated to "make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from

inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training." Id. (quoting

Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).

In general, a court should not dismiss a pro se litigant's complaint without granting leave

to amend at least once "when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid

claim might be stated." Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotations

and citation omitted). In addition, the court should exercise "extreme caution . . . in ordering sua

sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and both parties

(but particularly the plaintiff) have had the opportunity to respond." Anderson v. Coughlin, 700

F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983). An opportunity to amend, however, is not required where "the

problem with plaintiff's cause of action is substantive such that better pleading will not cure it."

Townsend v. Pep Boys, Manny Moe and Jack, No. 1:13-CV-293, 2014 WL 4826681, *2

(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000))

(internal quotations marks omitted).

B. Amendment

Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends granting Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint as

to his sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action. See Dkt. No.

11 at 14. Plaintiff asserts that, through his objections, he amends some or all of these causes of

action. See Dkt. No. 14. A plaintiff may not amend his or her factual allegations though

objections to an R&R. See Lombardi v. Choices Women's Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 15-CV-05542,

2017 WL 1102678, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017) ("Plaintiff cannot assert a new argument or

amend her factual allegations through objections to an R & R") (citing Yao Wu v. BDK DSD,

2015 WL 5664534, *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015)). Therefore, although Plaintiff will be granted

leave amend his complaint for the reasons discussed below, the Court declines to consider the

proposed amendments contained within Plaintiff's objections.

C. Plaintiff's Objections

Plaintiff does not object to Magistrate Judge Stewart's recitation of the allegations set forth

in Plaintiff's complaint. See Dkt. No. 14. The Court finds no clear error in the factual

background set forth in Magistrate Judge Stewart's R&R and will rely on it throughout this Order.

See Dkt. No. 11 at 4.

Throughout his objections, Plaintiff reiterates and expands upon his factual allegations,

however, he fails to specifically object to many of the procedural deficiencies identified by

Magistrate Judge Stewart. See Dkt. No. 14. Thus, the majority of the R&R is subject to review

for clear error because Plaintiff's objections are conclusory and general. See Brown v. Peters, No.

95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997), aff'd, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir.

1999) ("Even affording the objections the liberal reading required for pro se pleadings, I find that

these objections fail to state any basis whatsoever, much less a specific one, for the court not to

adopt the magistrate judge's rulings. They simply re-state the relief sought and the facts on which

[the plaintiff] grounds his complaint and conclude that the magistrate judge's conclusions are

wrong. When the parties make only frivolous, conclusive, or general objections, the court

reviews the report-recommendation for clear error") (collecting cases). The Court, however, will

exercise its discretion to review the R&R de novo. See Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 384 F. Supp.

3d 254, 263 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), aff'd, 815 Fed. Appx. 612 (2d Cir. 2020) ("[T]he Court, in its

discretion, may also review [sections of an R&R not objected to] de novo") (citing Mathews v.

Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976)).

D. Eighth Amendment Claims

Magistrate Judge Stewart first recommends dismissing, with prejudice, Plaintiff's claims

purportedly brought pursuant to the Eighth Amendment because Plaintiff's allegations pertain to

his detention without a conviction and, therefore, do not implicate the Eighth Amendment. See

Dkt. No. 11 at 5. Plaintiff does not raise specific objections to this recommendation. See Dkt.

No. 14. Nevertheless, even reviewing the recommendation de novo, the Court finds no error.

Indeed, "the Eighth Amendment does not apply 'until after conviction and sentence.'"

Wright v. N.Y. City, No. 09-CV-2452, 2012 WL 4057958, *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2012) (quoting

United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff's claims are premised on

allegations related to a traffic stop, arrest, detainment, and pre-conviction court proceedings, see

Dkt. No. 11 at 4, and, therefore, to the extent Plaintiff states claims pursuant to the Eighth

Amendment, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation that such claims be

dismissed with prejudice, see id. at 5.

E. Immunity and State Action

1. Judicial Immunity

Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissing all claims asserted against Defendant

Storie because he is immune from suit for actions taken in the performance of his judicial duties.

See id. Plaintiff objects to the application of judicial immunity to his claims against Defendant

Storie, arguing that Defendant Storie violated the constitution throughout Plaintiff's criminal court

proceedings. See Dkt. No. 14 at 54-57 (asserting that Defendant Storie, among other things, "lied

on the 730 order" and "silenced [Plaintiff] in his court room in violation of the [First]

Amendment"). Plaintiff's arguments merely rehash the allegations in his complaint. See Dkt. No.

1 at 19-20.

Exercising its discretion to review this section of the R&R de novo, the Court finds no

error. "'[J]udges generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their

judicial actions' and 'even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.'"

Tewari v. Sattler, No. 23-36-CV, 2024 WL 177445, *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2024) (quoting Bliven v.

Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2009)). "Judges enjoy absolute immunity from personal liability

for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction . . . . The absolute immunity of a judge

applies however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it

may have proved to the plaintiff." Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (quotations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Defendant Storie's alleged actions fall squarely within acts undertaken within his

judicial jurisdiction and Plaintiff's claims are, thus, barred by judicial immunity. See Tewari,

2024 WL 177445, at *1 (affirming application of judicial immunity to claims against a defendant

state court judge for alleged violation of the plaintiff's "constitutional rights in connection with

various rulings she made during the course of the proceedings"). Accordingly, the Court adopts

Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation that the claims against Defendant Storie be dismissed

with prejudice. See Dkt. No. 11 at 5-6, 14.

2. Prosecutorial Immunity

Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissal of the claims against Defendant

Charpentier, on the basis of prosecutorial immunity, because "Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Charpentier violated his rights during the presentation of [Plaintiff's criminal] case to the grand

jury and in court proceedings." Id. at 6 (citing Dkt. No. 1 at 12-15). Plaintiff asserts objections to

Defendant Charpentier's dismissal at various points in his sixty-page filing, including, as to his

fourth cause of action for "conspiracy," that Defendant Charpentier should not be dismissed

because she "attempted to take advantage of [Plaintiff's] mental health disorders and poverty

when [she] did conspire to deprive [Plaintiff] of his right to freedom, travel, life, liberty, property,

equal protection of the law, and due process," and because Defendant Charpentier lied to, and

fabricated evidence presented to, the grand jury. Dkt. No. 14 at 35-39. 4 Despite Plaintiff's policy

arguments regarding the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity, all of Defendant Charpentier's

alleged conduct occurred while she performed her duties as a prosecutor. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at

12-15.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that the claims against Defendant

Charpentier are barred by prosecutorial immunity because this immunity extends to "prosecutors

performing prosecutorial activities that are 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process.'" Ying Jing Gan v. City of N.Y., 996 F.2d 522, 530 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). "A plaintiff's allegations that a prosecutor

violated speedy trial rights, withheld exculpatory evidence, charged a defendant without probable

cause, and engaged in prosecutorial misconduct have all been found to be actions that fall within

the scope of prosecutorial immunity." Ramsey v. Smith, No. 1:19-CV-54, 2020 WL 4053728, *3

(S.D. Miss. July 20, 2020) (citations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he presentation of a case to a grand

jury falls squarely within the prosecutor's traditional function and is thus subject to absolute

4 Plaintiff also "urges the Honorable Court to remember that[,] due to the overwhelming

evidence[,] 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not allow unconstitutional conduct to go unchecked." Dkt. No.

14 at 35. Plaintiff mentions 18 U.S.C. § 242 at other points in his objections, including in his

objection to the dismissal of Defendant Storie. See id. at 54-57. However, 18 U.S.C. § 242 is a

federal criminal statute that does not create a private right of action. See Robinson v. Overseas

Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 511 (2d Cir. 1994). Therefore, Plaintiff is advised that he

cannot bring a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242. Plaintiff also mentions other criminal statutes

throughout his objections, such as New York State Penal Law § 20.20. See Dkt. No. 14 at 3.

Plaintiff is advised that he cannot bring civil causes of action pursuant to federal or state criminal

statutes and that, if he includes such claims in any amended pleading, they will be subject to

dismissal. See Ming v. Brouillete, No. 6:23-CV-0086, 2023 WL 5779558, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5444485 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2023)

("There is no private right of action to enforce state or federal criminal statutes") (collecting

cases).

immunity." Maglione v. Briggs, 748 F.2d 116, 118 (2d Cir. 1984). Plaintiff's allegations

regarding conspiracy between Defendant Charpentier and other defendants does not overcome

Defendant Charpentier's prosecutorial immunity, as "a conspiracy claim also falls within the

ambit of absolute prosecutorial immunity." Soley v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 18-CV-377, 2022 WL

2954055, *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2022); see Hill v. City of N.Y., 45 F.3d 653, 661 (2d Cir. 1995)

(holding that a prosecutor was absolutely immune from suit for "conspiring to present falsified

evidence to . . . a grand jury").

For these reasons, the Court finds no error in, and adopts, Magistrate Judge Stewart's

recommendation that the claims against Defendant Charpentier be dismissed with prejudice.

F. Section 1983

1. State Action

Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against Defendants

Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan and Applebe (hereinafter the "Defense Counsel Defendants"), who

acted as counsel for Plaintiff during his criminal proceedings, because the Defense Counsel

Defendants are not state actors. See id. at 6-7.5 Plaintiff argues that the Defense Counsel

Defendants should not be dismissed because "[h]ad it not been for a proceeding brought by the

'People of the State of New York' [he] never would have come across these individuals[, t]hey are

licensed to 'practice' by the State Bar Association[, t]hey draw their funds and fees from State

backed support[, and t]hey are regulated by the State 'Rules of Professional Conduct.'" Dkt. No.

5 Magistrate Judge Stewart also recommends dismissal of the fourteenth cause of action, brought

against the Defense Counsel Defendants, because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle

to bring a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See Dkt. No. 11 at 7. The Court agrees.

See Welch v. Schenectady Cnty., No. 1:22-CV-9, 2022 WL 3904113, *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,

2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3908798 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022) ("In

addition, a section 1983 action 'is not the appropriate vehicle to raise a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel'") (quotation omitted).

14 at 53. Plaintiff argues that, for these reasons, "how anyone can come up with [']Public

Defenders are not state actors['] is far reaching for a man of reasonable understanding." Dkt. No.

14 at 53 (quotation marks omitted).

Courts routinely dismiss claims against public defenders and public defenders' offices

because they are not state actors or persons under Section 1983. See Tapp v. Champagne, 164

Fed. Appx. 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2006) ("A 'public defender does not act under color of state law

when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal

proceeding'") (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981)); Shorter v. Rice, No. 12-

CV-0111, 2012 WL 1340088, *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2012) ("[I]t is axiomatic that neither public

defenders, such as Legal Aid Attorneys, nor court-appointed counsel, nor private attorneys, act

under the color of state law merely by virtue of their position").

Plaintiff alleges that that the Defense Counsel Defendants violated the Sixth Amendment

because they failed to provide him with adequate representation and violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by conspiring to present fabricated evidence to the grand jury in his criminal

proceeding. See Dkt. No. 1 at 12-15, 22. The Defense Counsel Defendants are not state actors

and, thus, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation that the claims against

these defendants, brought pursuant to Section 1983, be dismissed with prejudice.6

2. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

6 Specifically, the fourteenth cause of action is dismissed, as it alleges Sixth Amendment

violations by the Defense Counsel Defendants. See Dkt. No. 1 at 22. Additionally, Defendants

Charpentier, Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan and Applebe are the only defendants named in the fourth

and fifth causes of action. See Dkt. No. 1 at 12-15. Because the claims against all of these

attorney defendants are dismissed, as Defendant Charpentier is entitled to prosecutorial immunity

and the Defense Counsel Defendants are not state actors, the fourth and fifth causes of action,

which allege conspiracy to present false evidence to the grand jury, are also dismissed.

Plaintiff's first and second causes of action allege that Defendants Shattick, Yerdon, Tate,

Merria, Burdette, Anderson, and Bigwarfe violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable search and seizure, and that such defendants failed to intervene in the Fourth

Amendment violations. See Dkt. No. 1 at 7-10. Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends that

Plaintiff's first and second causes of action survive initial review and should be permitted to

proceed. See Dkt. No. 11 at 7-8. The parties do not object to this recommendation and the Court,

finding no error, adopts Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation that the first and second

causes of action survive initial review.

3. Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff's third and sixteenth causes of action allege that Defendants Shattick, Yerdon,

Tate, Merria, Burdette, Anderson, Bigwarfe, Harper, Amos, Mayo, Scott, Clancy, Kerrigan, and

Nurse 1-100 were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Dkt. No. 1 at 10-11, 22-23.

Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends that Plaintiff's third and sixteenth causes of action survive

initial review and should be permitted to proceed. See Dkt. No. 11 at 8. The parties do not object

to this recommendation and the Court, finding no error, adopts it.

4. Municipal Liability

Plaintiff alleges, through what is labelled his sixth cause of action, that the Sheriff's

Department and St. Lawrence C.C.F. are subject to municipal liability, pursuant to Monell v.

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Dkt. No. 1 at 15. Magistrate Judge Stewart

recommends that: (1) St. Lawrence C.C.F. be dismissed with prejudice, as the correctional facility

is not a distinct entity from the County, and, thus, is not a proper party to a Section 1983 claim;

and (2) because Plaintiff has not identified a purported policy, practice, or custom which caused

his alleged constitutional violations, that the sixth cause of action be dismissed with leave to

replead against St. Lawrence County. See Dkt. No. 11 at 9, n.5. Through his objections, Plaintiff

seeks to amend his sixth cause of action. See Dkt. No. 14 at 1-14.

For the reasons previously discussed, Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint through his

objections to the R&R. See Lombardi, 2017 WL 1102678, at *3. As for Magistrate Judge

Stewart's recommendation that the sixth cause of action be dismissed with leave to replead as

against St. Lawrence County, the Court reviews the recommendation de novo and adopts it as

modified as follows.

To hold a municipality liable, a plaintiff "must show the following: '(1) actions taken

under color of law; (2) deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; (3) causation; (4)

damages; and (5) that an official policy of the municipality caused the constitutional injury.'"

Maddox v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:14-CV-1068, 2017 WL 680439, *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2017)

(quoting Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir 2008)) (additional citation omitted).

However, absent an independent constitutional violation, a municipality cannot be held liable

under § 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 ("A local government may not be sued under § 1983 .

. . [unless the] official policy [is] . . . the moving force of the constitutional violation"); City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) ("Thus, our first inquiry in any case alleging

municipal liability under §1983 is the question whether there is a direct causal link between a

municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation").

Federal courts apply state law to determine whether an entity has capacity to be sued. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b). "Under New York law, a county is a municipal corporation capable of

bringing suit and being sued." Baker v. Willett, 42 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing

N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2)). However, a sheriff's department or a police department is an

administrative arm of the municipal corporation and does not have a separate identity from the

municipality. See id.; Long v. City of Orleans, 540 F. Supp. 3d 344, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 2021).

Because a sheriff's department "does not exist separate and apart from the municipality and does

not have its own legal identity," it cannot sue or be sued. Baker, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 198; see

Jenkins v. Onondaga Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 5:12-CV-855, 2012 WL 4491134, *2 (N.D.N.Y.

June 28, 2012) ("[U]nder New York law, departments, like the Onondaga County Sheriff's

Department, that are merely administrative arms of a municipality, do not have a legal identity

separate from the municipality and may not sue or be sued"). For these same reasons, a county

correctional facility cannot be sued under Section 1983. See Miles v. Albany Corr. Facility, No.

9:09-CV-1279, 2010 WL 3946956, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2010), report and recommendation

adopted, 2010 WL 3940956 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010) (finding that "the Albany Correctional

Facility cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"). Therefore, the causes of action brought against

the Sheriff's Department and St. Lawrence C.C.F. are dismissed with prejudice.

Furthermore, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that, in his complaint,

Plaintiff fails to clearly identify an unconstitutional policy that would support a claim for

municipal liability. See Dkt. No. 11 at 9; Dkt. No. 1. Now, in his objections, Plaintiff raises

various conditions that he believes constitute unconstitutional policies, practices, or customs of St.

Lawrence County. See Dkt. No. 14 at 8-14 (alleging unconstitutional use of certain restraints,

unlawful administration of controlled substances to incarcerated individuals, deprivation of

outdoor recreation for pre-trial detainees, "toxic gas" emanating from shower drains at the

correctional facility, and arbitrary and extended periods of segregated confinement). Plaintiff

argues that these alleged policies violate New York Correction Law §§ 500-c and 137, Article 1 §

6 and § 11 of the New York State Constitution, and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. See id. However, Plaintiff's new and re-hashed

allegations do not present cognizable objections to the R&R. See Ross v. Dempsey Unif. & Linen

Supply, No. 3:16-CV-1208, 2017 WL 1207832, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017), aff'd, 739 Fed.

Appx. 59 (2d Cir. 2018) (finding objections insufficient to alter report and recommendation

because the "plaintiff simply states general legal principles, and repeats his allegations against the

named defendants"). Accordingly, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation

that the sixth cause of action be dismissed without prejudice, that St. Lawrence C.C.F. and the

Sheriff's Department be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiff be granted leave to amend his

municipal liability allegations as against St. Lawrence County. See Dkt. No. 11 at 9.

5. Supervisory Liability

The seventh cause of action in Plaintiff's complaint seeks to hold Defendants Brook,

Bigwarfe, Anderson, Harper, and Amos liable because "holding and acting in their respective

positions as supervisors[, they] were aware of each constitutional violation and chose not to act."

Dkt. No. 1 at 16. Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends that the seventh cause of action be

dismissed because these Defendants "cannot be held liable simply by virtue of their supervisory

position . . . [and] each is named as a Defendant with respect to their own involvement in

individual events." Dkt. No. 11 at 10. Plaintiff objects to the dismissal of and "re-pleads and

seeks reinstatement" of his seventh cause of action. Dkt. No. 14 at 15. After conducting its own

de novo review of this section of the R&R, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart.

"It is well settled in this Circuit that 'personal involvement of defendants in alleged

constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983.'"

Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d

496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)). "'To establish a violation of [Section] 1983 by a supervisor, as with

everyone else, . . . the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act on the part of the

defendant to violate the plaintiff's legal rights.'" Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d

Cir. 2020) (quoting Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (10th Cir. 2010)). "[T]here is no

special rule for supervisory liability. Instead, a plaintiff must plead and prove 'that each

Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).

With this well-established legal principle in mind, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge

Stewart's recommendation that Plaintiff's seventh cause of action, which alleges only that the

named Defendants should be held liable by virtue of their positions as supervisors, should be

dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff may include allegations regarding any of the Defendant's own

individual violations of his constitutional rights in his amended pleading.

G. The ADA and RA

Plaintiff alleges, in his eighth cause of action, that seventeen individual Defendants acted

in violation of the ADA and RA. See Dkt. No. 1 at 17-18. Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends

that this cause of action "be dismissed with prejudice as to the individual Defendants, but that

Plaintiff be permitted to replead those claims against a proper party." Dkt. No. 11 at 10-11.

Plaintiff "seeks the Court's help in identifying the appropriate defendant for this claim." Dkt. No.

14 at 43.7

Neither the ADA nor the RA "provides for individual liability." Dees v. Zurlo, No. 1:24-

CV-1, 2024 WL 2291701, *16 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024) (quotation and quotation marks

7 Plaintiff also requests that the Court subpoena evidence from "the Global Tel Link messaging

app" and recorded phone calls. Dkt. No. 14 at 41. Now is not the appropriate time to exercise the

Court's subpoena powers. Plaintiff will have the opportunity to engage in the discovery process

in due course.

omitted). Indeed, "'[i]t is well-established that there is no individual liability under the ADA or

the [RA], whether the individual is sued in their official or individual capacity.'" Goe v. Zucker,

43 F.4th 19, 35 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Perros v. Cnty. of Nassau, 238 F. Supp. 3d 395, 402 n.3

(E.D.N.Y. 2017)).

"Title II of the ADA prohibits a 'public entity' from discrimination against a 'qualified

individual with a disability.'" Pascual v. N.Y. State, No. 2:24-CV-6723, 2024 WL 5046675, *5

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2024) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). "A 'public entity' includes 'any State or

local government.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)). Accordingly, counties have been

found to be public entities capable of being sued under the ADA. See id. (finding Suffolk County

to be a public entity as defined by the ADA).

For these reasons, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Stewart's recommendation that the

seventh cause of action be dismissed as against the individual Defendants and Plaintiff is granted

leave to replead his ADA and RA claims as against a proper party.

H. Sections 1985 and 1986

Plaintiff brings his ninth and tenth causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and

1986, alleging that certain Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. See Dkt. No. 1 at 19-21. Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissal

of the ninth and tenth causes of action, with leave to amend, because Plaintiff has failed to state a

claim. See Dkt. No. 11 at 11. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissal

because Plaintiff does not allege that the conduct by Defendants was motivated by racial or other

class-based animus, as required to state a claim under Section 1985 and, as a result, Plaintiff has

also failed to state a claim pursuant to Section 1986 because such claim must be predicated on a

valid Section 1985 claim. See id. Plaintiff asserts no specific objection this recommendation and

merely states that his tenth cause of action "should not be dismissed" because he "needs attorney

to assist him in prosecuting" his fourth (as well as his tenth) cause of action. Dkt. No. 14 at 39.

Exercising its discretion to review this section of the R&R de novo, the Court adopts the

recommendation that the ninth and tenth causes of action be dismissed with leave to amend.

To state a valid conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show:

(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or

indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of

the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3)

an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is

either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Britt v. Garcia, 457

F.3d 264, 270 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006)). "Further, a plaintiff must allege . . . that the conspiracy was

motivated by some class-based animus." L.K. v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 641 Fed.

Appx. 56, 59 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing Cine SK8, Inc., 507 F.3d at 791). And, because Section 1986

claims are predicated on a valid Section 1985 claim, courts evaluate these claims together. See id.

(citing Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000)).

There are no allegations in Plaintiff's complaint that Defendants' alleged conduct was

motivated by some class-based animus. See Dkt. No. 14. Therefore, the Court adopts Magistrate

Judge Stewarts recommendation that the ninth and tenth causes of action, brought pursuant to

Sections 1985 and 1986, be dismissed with leave to amend. See Dkt. No. 11 at 11.

I. State Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts, against all Defendants, claims under New York law for negligent

infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence—his

eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action. See Dkt. No. 1 at 21. Magistrate Judge Stewart

recommends dismissal of these causes of action, with leave to replead, because Plaintiff has not

made the proper showing, pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Dkt. No. 11 at 12. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissal because "the

broad assertion that all [Defendants] are liable for these state law torts without any explanation of

how each is alleged to have committed the torts is not permissible." Id. Plaintiff objects to the

dismissal of his state law claims, requests the appointment of pro bono counsel, and seeks to

amend his eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action through his objections to the R&R.

See Dkt. No. 14 at 46-53.

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading which sets forth a

clam for relief shall contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "The purpose of this Rule 'is to give fair

notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a

responsive answer [and] prepare an adequate defense.'" Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 CIV. 4768, 1998

WL 832708, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D.

15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)) (other citations omitted).

Plaintiff has failed to show how each Defendant is liable for the state law claims alleged.

See Dkt. No. 1 at 22. As Magistrate Judge Stewart notes, "[t]he various Defendants are accused

of a variety of misconduct over a span of time elsewhere in the Complaint and the broad assertion

that all are liable for these state law torts without any explanation of how each is alleged to have

committed the torts is not permissible." Dkt. No. 11 at 12. For these reasons, the Court adopts

the recommendation that the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action be dismissed with

leave to replead. See id.

J. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Magistrate Judge Stewart denied Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of counsel, with

leave to renew at a later stage of this action. See id. at 12-14. Throughout Plaintiff's objections,

he requests that the Court alter Magistrate Judge Stewart's denial of his motion and appoint him

counsel. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 14 at 39, 46.

"Unlike criminal defendants, IFP plaintiffs bringing civil actions have no constitutional

right to the appointment of counsel." Brown v. Utica Police Dep't, No. 6:17-CV-1190, 2017 WL

5514518, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) (citing Wali v. One Source Co., No. 07-7550, 2009 WL

3170110, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009)). "'Appointment' of counsel in a civil action involves the

court requesting an attorney to represent an IFP party pro bono under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)."

Id. (citation omitted). In determining whether to make such a request for the indigent party,

courts carefully consider a number of factors. See id. (citing Terminate Control Corp. v.

Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994)).

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart's denial of Plaintiff's motion to appoint

counsel, particularly in light of the early stage of this action. See Dkt. No. 11 at 12-14; see also

Gervasio v. Diaz, No. 9:20-CV-0346, 2020 WL 3496423, *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2020) ("The

Court is still not aware of any special reason why appointment of counsel at this early stage of the

proceeding would be more likely to lead to a just determination of this litigation").

K. Leave to Amend

Finally, Magistrate Judge Stewart recommends dismissing, with prejudice, the claims

against Defendants Storie, Charpentier, Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan, and St. Lawrence C.C.F., as

well as Plaintiff's fourth, fifth, seventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth causes of action, and

all Eighth Amendment claims. See Dkt. No. 11 at 14. However, Magistrate Judge Stewart

recommends dismissing Plaintiff's sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth

causes of action with leave to amend. See id. The Court finds no error with this portion of the

R&R.

In Plaintiff's objections, he specifically asks the Court to allow him leave to amend his

complaint. See Dkt. No. 14 at 1, 58. It is true that "[w]hen a pro se complaint fails to state a

cause of action, the court generally 'should not dismiss without granting leave to amend at least

once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be

stated.'" Robinson v. Hallett, No. 5:19-CV-406, 2020 WL 1227142, *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2020)

(quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)). However, courts routinely deny

an opportunity to amend where a claim is barred on immunity grounds because amendment would

be futile. See Humphrey v. Ct. Clerk ex rel. U.S. Sup. Ct., No. 5:11-CV-938, 2011 WL 7112904,

*4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2011) ("Because the defendant would be entitled to absolute immunity,

this court recommends dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's action"). Similarly, where an entity

is not a person acting under the color of law, a Section 1983 claim cannot be stated. Guillory v.

Bishop Nursing Home, No. 5:21-CV-410, 2021 WL 2431259, *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 15, 2021)

("Because Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the named Defendants acted under color of state

law, Magistrate Judge Baxter correctly determined that the complaint fails to state any claims for

relief under Section 1983. . . . Moreover, Magistrate Judge Baxter correctly determined that leave

to re-plead should be denied").

As such, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that the claims against

Defendants Storie, Charpentier, Reindeau, Farrell, Mcgahan, and St. Lawrence C.C.F., along with

Plaintiff's fourth, fifth, seventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth causes of action, and all

Eighth Amendment claims, should be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. See

Dkt. No. 11 at 14. Additionally, the Court modifies the R&R, dismissing the claims against

Defendant Sheriff's Department, with prejudice and without leave to amend, for the reasons

previously stated. The Court also agrees that Plaintiff should have the opportunity to amend his

sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action because it is possible

that Plaintiff could cure deficiencies in his pleading. See id.

If Plaintiff decides to amend his complaint, he must clearly set forth the facts that give rise

to the claims, including, when possible, the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts,

as well as each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. The revised pleading

should allege facts demonstrating the personal involvement of any named Defendant. See Wright,

21 F.3d at 501. Finally, Plaintiff is informed that any amended complaint will replace the existing

complaint and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or

incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Jeanty v.

Sciortino, 669 F. Supp. 3d 96, 118-19 (N.D.N.Y. 2023).

IV. CONCLUSION

After carefully considering the R&R, the entire record in this matter, and the applicable

law, the Court hereby

ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Stewart's R&R (Dkt. No. 11) is ADOPTED as modified

herein; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's amended complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED without

prejudice and with leave to amend as to Plaintiff's sixth, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth,

and thirteenth causes of action; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Storie, Charpentier, Reindeau, Farrell,

Mcgahan, St. Lawrence C.C.F., and the Sheriff's Department are DISMISSED with prejudice

and without leave to amend; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff's fourth, fifth, seventh, fourteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth

causes of action, as well as, all Eighth Amendment claims, are DISMISSED with prejudice and

without leave to amend; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiffs first, second, third, and sixteenth causes of action survive initial

review and are permitted to proceed; and the Court further

ORDERS that Plaintiff shall file his amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the

date of this Order; and the Court further

ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision

and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2025 J} er D /

Albany, New York i Uy, 7 igs 4

Mae A. D’ Agostingo~/

U.S. District Judge

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