a plaintiff’s burden on this element is “relatively modest at [the pleading] stage of litigation”
How later courts described this case
- a plaintiff’s burden on this element is “relatively modest at [the pleading] stage of litigation”
- “It is clear that pleadings may incorporate earlier pleadings by reference”
- noting that the “federal courts will not invent legal arguments for litigants”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
IN RE: HAIR RELAXER MARKETING MDL No. 3060
SALES PRACTICES AND PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION Master Docket No. 23-cv-0818
Judge Mary M. Rowland
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Advanced Beauty Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Advanced
Beauty”) Motion to Dismiss Under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative,
Strike Certain Allegations Under Rule 12(f).1 [752, 753]. For the reasons stated
herein, Advanced Beauty’s motion is denied.
I. Background2
The factual allegations from the Master Long Form Complaint brought against
Advanced Beauty ([675], (“Master Complaint”)) and Short Form Complaint ([175-1],
(“SFC”)) are accepted as true for the purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Lax v.
1 Advanced Beauty’s brief in support of its Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike is twenty
pages. Under Local Rule 7.1, parties may not file briefs more than 15 pages without prior
approval of the Court and briefs that do not comply with this rule may be stricken by the
Court. Advanced Beauty did not move for leave to file an oversized brief. The Court declines
to strike Advanced Beauty’s brief and considers the arguments set forth in full.
2 The Court incorporates the Background section of its Memorandum Opinion and Order
[291] granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss and
Defendant McBride’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Master Long Form Personal Injury
Complaint [106].
Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178, 1181 (7th Cir. 2021).3
On May 15, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Master Long Form Complaint against
numerous other Defendants (“Phase I Defendants”), not including Advanced Beauty,
in this multidistrict litigation. [106]. Plaintiffs alleged they suffered personal injuries
and death as a result of their use of defective hair relaxers designed, manufactured,
sold, distributed, and marketed by the Defendants named in the May 15, 2023 Master
Long Form Complaint. Id. ¶¶ 5, 10. The Phase I Defendants argued the Master Long
Form Complaint did not state any claim and moved to dismiss the complaint in its
entirety. [142]. Although the Court dismissed claims of negligent misrepresentation,
fraud/fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and fraud-based claims
of deceptive acts or practices under consumer law statutes, Plaintiffs’ remaining 12
claims were permitted to proceed. [291].
On May 28, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the Master Complaint against Advanced
Beauty after multiple individual Plaintiffs identified on their SFCs that they use or
used Advanced Beauty’s hair relaxer products. [675]. The Master Complaint states
Advanced Beauty’s hair relaxer products include “Cantu Advanced Clinical
Straightening No-Lye Relaxer System” and “Cantu Shea Butter No-Lye Conditioning
Crème Relaxer System.” Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs allege their frequent use of Advanced
Beauty’s hair-relaxing products caused them to develop ovarian cancer, uterine
3 The Court adopted the short form complaint on August 3, 2023. Pursuant to the Court’s
Case Management Order (“CMO”) No. 7, “[f]or each action in the MDL, subject to this Order,
the Master Complaint, together with the Short Form Complaint shall be deemed the
operative complaint.” [175] at 1. This opinion sometimes refers to the Master Complaint and
SFC together as the “Complaint.”
cancer, or endometrial cancer. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6–7, 9. The Master Complaint brings the same
surviving claims as the May 15, 2023 Complaint and avers substantially similar
contentions. Compare [106] with [675]. As of July 5, 2024, approximately 40
individual Plaintiffs from 18 U.S. states brought claims against Advanced Beauty.
[753-1]. Before the Court now is Advanced Beauty’s motion to dismiss the complaint
in its entirety or, in the alternative, to strike certain allegations.4 [752]; [753].
II. Standard
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with its explanation of the
standards for Rule 12(b)(6) motions set forth in its first motion to dismiss opinion.
See [291] at 5.
III. Analysis
a. Motion to Dismiss
Advanced Beauty moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendant argues
Plaintiffs failed to plead facts sufficient to establish Article III standing. Advanced
Beauty also moves to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety because the allegations do
not state any claim. The Court denies Advanced Beauty’s motion to dismiss on both
grounds.
i. Article III Standing
Advanced Beauty asserts that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts demonstrating
4 Defendant claims it “has not been in the hair relaxer marketplace since before 2015” and
therefore denies it continues to misrepresent the health impacts of hair relaxer use and that
it owed a continuing duty to recall hair relaxer products in 2024. [753] at 6 n.2. In support,
Advanced Beauty cites dismissed Defendant Parfums de Coeur, LTD d/b/a PDC Brand’s L.R.
56.1 statement submitted in support of summary judgment. [136] ¶ 23. Advanced Beauty will
have the opportunity to present this evidence at a later stage of litigation.
that they have Article III standing. To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that she “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a
favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016); Fox v.
Dakkota Integrated Sys., LLC, 980 F.3d 1146,1151 (7th Cir. 2020).
“In evaluating a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the court must first
determine whether a factual or facial challenge has been raised.” Silha v. ACT, Inc.,
807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015). There are two types of standing challenges: “A
facial challenge attacks standing on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff lacks
standing even if the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are taken as true. A
factual challenge, by contrast, asserts that there is in fact no standing.” Flynn v. FCA
U.S. LLC, 39 F.4th 946, 952 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Here, Advanced Beauty
raises no external facts to question the Court’s jurisdiction, see Apex Digital, Inc. v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2009), but instead contends
Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pleaded facts to establish Article III standing. See
[753] at 10–14. Thus, the Court treats Defendant’s motion as a facial challenge, not
a factual challenge.
“[I]n evaluating whether a complaint adequately pleads the elements of
standing, courts apply the same analysis used to review whether a complaint
adequately states a claim: ‘Courts must accept as true all material allegations of the
complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.’” Silha,
807 F.3d at 173 (alterations accepted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501
(1975)). “[W]hen evaluating a facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under
Rule 12(b)(1), a court should use Twombly–Iqbal’s ‘plausibility’ requirement, which
is the same standard used to evaluate facial challenges to claims under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Id. at 174.
Advanced Beauty contends Plaintiffs have failed to plead how their injuries
are fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and thus, cannot establish Article III
standing. [753] at 10–14. Traceability examines the causal relationship between the
allegedly unlawful conduct and the asserted injury. Taylor v. Salvation Army Nat’l
Corp., 110 F.4th 1017, 1025 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
753 n.19 (1984)). The threshold for adequately alleging traceability is not high.
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 171 (1997) (a plaintiff’s burden on this element is
“relatively modest at [the pleading] stage of litigation”). Defendant’s conduct need not
be the immediate cause, or even a proximate cause, of a plaintiff’s injuries to satisfy
the traceability element. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118, 134 n.6 (2014). But where the causal chain is “attenuated,” traceability
cannot be established. Allen, 468 U.S. at 757. In short, a plaintiff must show only a
“meaningful [] connect[ion]” between the aggrieved injury and defendant’s conduct.
Dep’t of Ed. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551, 568 (2023).
Defendant contends the Complaint fails to establish the causal connection
between Plaintiffs’ alleged uterine and ovarian cancer injuries and Defendant’s
alleged misrepresentation of and failure to disclose the alleged health risks of the
chemicals in its hair relaxer products.5 [753] at 11–12. Furthermore, Advanced
Beauty argues Plaintiffs did not identify: the health risks of hair relaxer products,
how or when Advanced Beauty learned of the health risks, the specific ingredients
that were contained in Advanced Beauty’s products and how Advanced Beauty
learned of the specific ingredients contained in their own products, when and how
often Plaintiffs used Advanced Beauty’s products, or how the known health risks
caused uterine and ovarian cancer in Plaintiffs.6 Id.
Plaintiffs allege Defendant “systematically misrepresented and continues to
misrepresent the significant health impacts of hair relaxer use,” and failed to
“disclos[e] the risks” or “warn[] women and children” about its “brutally toxic
products,” “all while having knowledge that the hair relaxer products they designed,
manufactured, advertised, and sold contained toxic carcinogens.” Id. ¶¶ 6–8.
According to Plaintiffs, Advanced Beauty led “consumer[s] to believ[e] these hair
relaxer products are safe when in fact they are not.” Id. ¶ 44; see also id. ¶ 43
(explaining Defendant intentionally labeled its products as “pure shea butter” and
with “deep conditioning” to falsely suggest these “natural” hair relaxer products are
5 As Plaintiffs explain, the claims in the Complaint include several theories of liability and
are not limited to allegations of misrepresentation and failure to warn. [823] at 5. Defendant
does not address other theories of liability.
6 Advanced Beauty cites one example of a SFC that names Defendant as a party but fails to
identify any of Defendants’ products. [753] at 13 (citing Case No. 1:23-cv-05696, [1]).
Plaintiffs must identify which hair relaxer products they used. Plaintiffs who have not
identified specific hair relaxer products are granted leave to amend their SFCs to make the
required identification. Failure to identify any product manufactured by a particular
defendant is a basis to dismiss that defendant without prejudice after completing the CMO
No. 9 [343] compliance process.
safer or less toxic than alternatives). Plaintiffs explain that endocrine-disrupting
chemicals (“EDCs”) are chemicals, or chemical mixtures, that interfere with the
normal activity of the endocrine system. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. They allege that natural and
synthetic EDCs are present in some of Defendant’s hair relaxer products as
“fragrance” and “perfumes,” and enter the body when the products are applied to the
hair and scalp. Id. ¶ 64. One of the EDCs, phthalates, are harmful because it
interferes with individuals’ natural hormone production and degradation. Id. ¶ 65.
Studies cited by Plaintiffs show higher rates of uterine and ovarian cancer among
women who frequently used hair relaxers. Id. ¶¶ 70–85. Plaintiffs pled Advanced
Beauty “was aware or should have been aware of both the potential for harm and the
increased risk of developing uterine and ovarian cancer from the use of the hair
relaxer products . . . due to the harmful, toxic, and carcinogenic ingredients in their
hair relaxer products.” Id. ¶¶ 58–59. These allegations read as a whole give rise to
the inference that Defendant’s conduct is meaningfully connected to Plaintiffs’
claimed injuries. More is not needed at this stage of litigation.
Advanced Beauty’s cases do not require a different outcome. In Department of
Education v. Brown, the Supreme Court held the plaintiff-respondents’ alleged
injury—not receiving student loan relief under a specific statute—was not traceable
to the government’s action—adopting a loan relief plan promulgated under a different
law. 600 U.S. at 564–67 (“[T]he Department’s decision to give other people relief
under a different statutory scheme did not cause [plaintiffs] not to obtain the benefits
they want.”). It was too speculative to tie the decision not to grant the desired loan
relief to the decision to grant the ultimately adopted relief, especially since the two
statutes affording potential relief operate independently. Id. at 567. Similarly, the
plaintiffs in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) could only speculate
the Government would imminently target their communications under the statute at
issue given a lack of evidence and speculate the communications would be intercepted
under the statute at issue as opposed to another authority. Id. at 413. See also Baysal
v. Midvale Indem. Co., 78 F.4th 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2023), reh’g denied, No. 22-1892,
2023 WL 6144390 (7th Cir. Sept. 20, 2023) (whether plaintiffs’ injury was traceable
to the asserted wrong was too speculative where plaintiffs did not even try to explain
how, if at all, unlawful disclosure of a driver’s license number could have contributed
to an unemployment insurance scam). As described above, the alleged causal chain
differs here differs from the attenuated claims in Department of Education, Clapper,
and Baysal. The Court previously held substantially similar contentions sufficiently
alleged hair relaxer products like Defendant’s proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.
[291] at 10–11; Haymarket DuPage, LLC v. Village of Itasca, No. 22-CV-160, 2024 WL
809110, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2024) (“traceability is a watered-down version of
causation”).
Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy Article III’s requirement of a “causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Brown, 600 U.S. at 561 (quoting
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
ii. Sufficiency of the Allegations
Advanced Beauty asserts Plaintiffs only plead conclusory allegations and thus
all 12 of Plaintiffs’ claims fail to plausibly state a claim. [753] at 15. As an initial
matter, Advanced Beauty’s motion suffers from a glaring error: rather than grapple
with the well-pleaded contentions set forth in the Complaint, Defendant ignores all
but 10 paragraphs of the 235 paragraph Master Complaint and 2 paragraphs in the
SFC. [753] at 14–16. All the allegations in the Master Complaint, even if they do not
mention Advanced Beauty by name, relate to Advanced Beauty and its conduct.
Focusing solely on the allegations that address Advanced Beauty by name is
improper. See Fernandes v. Rosalind Franklin Univ. of Med. & Sci., No. 19 CV 50337,
2021 WL 269879, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2021) (“A motion to dismiss does not allow
a defendant to simply ignore unfavorable allegations in the complaint.”).
The Court finds Defendant’s arguments undeveloped and unpersuasive. With
one exception,7 Advanced Beauty does not address (much less differentiate between)
the elements for each cause of action and provides no substantive legal authority for
its conclusion. Defendant claims it need not differentiate between the requirements
for each cause of action. [862] at 6. The Court will not develop the missing links in
Defendant’s argument. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1335
(7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the “federal courts will not invent legal arguments for
litigants”); Nilssen v. Gen. Electric, Co., 06 C 04155, 2011 WL 633414, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 11, 2011) (observing that in our adversarial system, “judges are not to supplant
lawyers and perform their job of crafting and developing arguments”).
7 Advanced Beauty lists the elements of an unjust enrichment claim under Illinois law and
contends the Complaint is devoid of allegations to establish liability. [753] at 15–16 (citing
Lindquist Ford, Inc. v. Middleton Motors, Inc., 557 F.3d 469, 477 (7th Cir. 2009)). Consistent
with its order on the motion to dismiss the May 15, 2023 Master Complaint, the Court does
not find it appropriate at this stage to rule on a casewide basis in an MDL that no plaintiff
may pursue an unjust enrichment claim. [291] at 20–21.
The facts alleged in the Complaint are substantially the same as those the
Court previously held were well-pleaded and provided fair notice of the same 12
claims Plaintiffs now bring against Advanced Beauty. See [106, 291]; see also [823] at
9. Defendant provides no reason why the Court should deviate from its prior ruling.
Accordingly, the Court denies Advanced Beauty’s motion to dismiss the Complaint in
its entirety.
b. Motion to Strike
In the event the Court finds Plaintiffs have stated a claim against Advanced
Beauty, Defendant alternatively moves to strike sections of the Complaint. The Court
“may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial or
scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). A district court has “considerable discretion”
in deciding a Rule 12(f) motion. Delta Consulting Grp., Inc. v. R. Randle Constr., Inc.,
554 F.3d 1133, 1141 (7th Cir. 2009). “Motions to strike are generally disfavored
because such motions often only delay the proceedings.” Kesterke v. BCD White Inc.,
2018 WL 3343079, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 9, 2018). A motion to strike “should not be
granted unless [ ] the language in the pleading has no possible relation to the
controversy and is clearly prejudicial.” Volling v. Antioch Rescue Squad, 999 F. Supp.
2d 991, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (quotations omitted). Striking a portion of a pleading is
considered a “drastic remed[y]”. Volling, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. On a Rule 12(f)
motion, the movant bears the burden to demonstrate “that the challenged allegations
are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of
consideration, and unduly prejudicial.” Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. & Health
Care Ctrs, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (citing Talbot v. Robert Matthews
Distrib. Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992)).
i. Incorporation of the Master Long Form Personal Injury
Complaint [106]
The Master Complaint against Advanced Beauty “adopt[s] and incorporate[s]
by reference the Facts Common To All Counts contained in paragraphs 33–114 of the
Master Long Form Complaint filed on May 15, 2023.” [675] at 5 n.1 (citing [106]).
Advanced Beauty contends there are two issues created by incorporation: the
allegations relate to other Defendants and are duplicative of allegations in the Master
Complaint. Advanced Beauty also asserts the allegations were improperly
incorporated. None of these issues warrant striking the allegations.
First, some of the incorporated paragraphs allege facts specific to other
individual defendants. E.g. [106] ¶¶57, 59. Advanced Beauty argues it should not
speculate as to how allegations pertaining to other defendants relate to it and cannot
answer allegations related to other defendants. [753] at 18. Plaintiffs respond that
Advanced Beauty’s lack of knowledge is not a basis for striking the allegations and
submit Defendant may answer by stating it “lacks knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief.” [823] at 11 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(5)). But Advanced
Beauty complains the reasonable inquiry undertaken before providing such an
answer is too burdensome.8 [862] at 7. Second, some paragraphs are duplicated
8 Advanced Beauty also contends it should not be required to investigate matters that took
place “before it even came into existence or decades before it purportedly sold a hair relaxing
product.” [862] at 7 (citing [675] ¶ 36 (“In approximately 2009, Advanced Beauty Inc.
launched its Cantu Shea Butter No-lye Deep Conditioning Crème Relaxer System.)).
Defendant did not move to strike this allegation, and it is unclear to the Court how this
verbatim or near verbatim in both complaints. E.g., compare [106] ¶¶ 48–52 with
[675] ¶¶ 31–35 and compare [106] ¶¶ 63–114 with [675] ¶¶ 47–103. Advanced Beauty
asserts it should not be required to answer the same paragraphs twice. [753] at 18.
Plaintiffs argue these contentions are all relevant to its claims against Advanced
Beauty and Defendant has not met the high standard of a Rule 12(f) motion. [823] at
11–12.
The Court declines to strike the challenged statements. Although the
incorporated allegations address the conduct of other MDL Defendants and are
repetitive, Advanced Beauty has not met its burden to show “that the challenged
allegations are so unrelated to plaintiff’s claim as to be devoid of merit, unworthy of
consideration, and unduly prejudicial” to justify wielding the drastic remedy of
striking them. Vakharia, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
Finally, Advanced Beauty challenges—for the first time in its reply brief—
whether the incorporation of allegations from one complaint into another through a
footnote is proper.9 [862] at 7. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) permits adoptions
of statements in a pleading by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in any
other pleading. See also Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525, 528 (7th Cir. 1977) (“It is
clear that pleadings may incorporate earlier pleadings by reference”). Although Rule
argument is germane to its consideration of whether to strike the paragraphs incorporated
from the May 15, 2023 Master Long Form Complaint. Advanced Beauty must answer the
allegations in Paragraph 36 of the Master Complaint and similar allegations.
9 Parties waive arguments raised for the first time in a reply. See, e.g., Argyropoulos v. City
of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2008); Empire Elecs., Inc. v. D&D Tooling & Mfg., Inc.,
No. 13 C 376, 2014 WL 5819728, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2014). Nevertheless, the Court
addresses Defendants’ argument.
10(c) allow incorporation by reference, this privilege is not without limits. Excessive
incorporation by reference, such as incorporating approximately 80 paragraphs here,
may “prevent the opposing party from reasonably being able to prepare a response or
simply make the burden of doing so more difficult.” 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur
R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1326 (4th ed.). Plaintiffs’ footnote is a misuse of
the Rule 10(c) privilege. The Court will not consider the incorporated allegations, and
Advanced Beauty need not answer them.
ii. Filing “on Behalf of all Plaintiffs”
In the Complaint against Advanced Beauty, Plaintiffs state, “This Master
Complaint is filed on behalf of all Plaintiffs whose claims are subsumed within MDL
3060. Plaintiffs in these individual actions have suffered personal injuries and death
as a result of their use of the Defendant’s hair relaxer products.” [675] ¶10, see also
¶11. Advanced Beauty argues these contentions are not allegations of fact, are
improper, and should be stricken. [753] at 18–19. Defendant also muses whether the
statement implies that every individual Plaintiff in this MDL can “boot strap on to
this filing” and evade the requirement to file a short form complaint against Advanced
Beauty or is a class allegation. Id.
Defendants’ objections are misguided for at least two reasons. First, these are
allegations of fact. Defendant may disagree with the assertions, but a Rule 12(f)
motion is not the proper vehicle to challenge the merits. Second, similar allegations
are common in MDLs. MDL transferee courts routinely order a “master complaint”
to be filed on behalf of all, or a subset, of plaintiffs asserting claims in an MDL.
Individual plaintiffs then file short-form complaints to provide basic, uniform
information about the plaintiff and her alleged injuries. So too here. The Master
Complaint alleges facts common to all claims against Advanced Beauty brought by
any existing or future individual Plaintiff.10 But individual Plaintiffs must comply
with CMO 7 [175] and CMO 8 [249] and file Short Form Complaints naming
Advanced Beauty. The contested allegations in the Complaint do not overcome the
Court’s orders. Accordingly, the Court declines to strike the challenged allegations.
iii. Reference to Statutory Provisions of All States
Count V (Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability/Fitness for Particular
Use), Count VI (Breach of Implied Warranty under state law and the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.), and Count VII (U.S. State and Territory
Statutory Consumer Protection and Unfair or Deceptive Trade Practices Claim) of
the Master Complaint cite statutes from all 50 states and multiple U.S. Territories.
Without citation to any authority, Advanced Beauty argues pleading violations of law
in states or territories where no current Plaintiff resides is improper.
Master complaints are judicial tools that permit judges and parties to
efficiently manage complex multi-district litigation. For the same reasons that it is
permissible to lodge a master complaint on behalf of prospective plaintiffs, it is also
permissible to allege violations and causes of action that may only apply to a subset
of current or prospective plaintiffs. To require otherwise would mean amending the
Master Complaint every time a Plaintiff from a new jurisdiction filed a claim. As
Defendants argue, this would defeat the purpose of crafting master long form and
10 The Master Complaint plainly states “not all Plaintiffs in these proceedings have claims
against Defendant Advanced Beauty, Inc.” [675] ¶ 1.
short complaints and negate the intended efficiencies. See [823] at 13-14 (citing In re
Nuvaring Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 4:08MD1964 RWS, 2009 WL 4825170, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 11, 2009)). The Court denies Advanced Beauty’s request to strike allegations
in Paragraphs 163, 184, and 194. Defendant must answer the allegations in the
Master Complaint and individual Plaintiffs must adopt and incorporate applicable
causes of action in their Short Form Complaints. [175-1].
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Advanced Beauty’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, Strike Certain Allegations Under Rule
12(f) [752, 753] is denied.
ENTER:
Dated: February 19, 2025 Mug Vf Le
“MARYM.ROWLAND
United States District Judge
15