The opinion
USDC SDNY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED
ZEBONE BROWN, on behalf of herself and all DOC #:
others similarly situated, DATE FILED: ___2/18/2025
Plaintiffs,
-against- 24 Civ. 6344 (AT)
JENNIFER ADAMS BRANDS, INC., OPINION & ORDER
Defendant.
ANALISA TORRES, District Judge:
Defendant, Jennifer Adams Brands, Inc. (“Jennifer Adams”), moves to dismiss claims
brought by Plaintiff, Zebone Brown on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, for
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 ef seq., and
the New York City Human Rights Law (the “NYCHRL”), N-Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101 ef seq.
See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. For the reasons stated below, the motion 1s granted in part
and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Brown is visually impaired and legally blind. Jd. {2. Like many visually impaired
people, Brown uses screen-reading software to access web content on her computer. Jd. FJ 2, 31,
39. For the software to work, a website owner must make content on its website accessible, that
is, capable of being rendered into text. Jd. 4 33-34. The World Wide Web Consortium, the
web’s primary international standards organization, publishes guidelines for making websites
accessible to blind and visually impaired people. Jd. ¥ 34.
Jennifer Adams is an online store that purports to sell high-quality home textiles,
including bedding. Jd. § 23. On July 9, 2024, Brown visited Jennifer Adams’ website using
a screen reader, intending to purchase a set of 600-thread-count Egyptian cotton sheets. Jd.
¶¶ 20–21, 39, 41, 44. Brown was unable to complete the purchase because Jennifer Adams’
website contained multiple access barriers, including broken links, missing alt-text, hidden
elements on web pages, incorrectly formatted lists, unannounced pop-ups, unclear labels for
interactive elements, and the requirement that some actions be performed only with a mouse. Id.
¶¶ 24, 44–46.
In August 2024, Brown filed this action seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive
relief. See generally Compl. Before the Court is Jennifer Adams’ motion to dismiss the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Mot.; see also Def. Mem.,
ECF No. 15; Pl. Mem., ECF No. 16; Def. Reply, ECF No. 19.
DISCUSSION
I. Rule 12(b)(1)
“A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v.
United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). One component of subject matter jurisdiction is
constitutional standing. See Lowell v. Lyft, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 3d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). A
party possesses standing if (1) she has suffered an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” (2) the alleged injury is
“fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) it is “likely . . . that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)
(alteration adopted) (citations omitted). Furthermore, to demonstrate injury in fact sufficient for
injunctive relief in the ADA context, a plaintiff must show that (1) she suffered “past injury
under the ADA,” (2) “it was reasonable to infer that the discriminatory treatment would
continue,” and (3) “it was reasonable to infer, based on the past frequency of plaintiff’s visits and
the proximity of defendants’ businesses to plaintiff’s home, that plaintiff intended to return to the
subject location.” Calcano v. Swarovski N. Am. Ltd., 36 F.4th 68, 74 (2d Cir. 2022) (alteration
adopted) (quoting Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2013)).
The Court “must take all uncontroverted facts in the complaint . . . as true, and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party asserting jurisdiction.” Tandon v. Captain’s Cove
Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014).
Jennifer Adams argues that Brown has failed to plead a sufficient injury in fact. Def.
Mem. at 5–10. Asserting that the Second Circuit’s decision in Calcano v. Swarovski North
America Ltd. “raised the bar appreciably for adequately pleading standing to seek injunctive
relief in ADA cases,” Jennifer Adams contends that Brown’s complaint fails to “specifically
allege with sufficient detail . . . why [Brown] was interested in Defendant’s products” and “lacks
the requisite specificity regarding a purported intent to return to [Jennifer Adams’] [w]ebsite.”
Id. at 6–7 (quoting Rendon v. Berry Glob. Inc., No. 22 Civ. 10420, 2023 WL 3724795, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023)).
The Court disagrees. In her complaint, Brown states when she visited Jennifer Adams’
website (multiple times, but most recently on July 9, 2024); what she wanted to purchase (a set
of 600-thread-count Egyptian cotton sheets); and why she visited the site (she wanted “high-
quality sheets made from natural products” and chose Jennifer Adams “based on the bedding
community reviews” and because the website “offers free shipping”). Compl. ¶¶ 20, 22–23, 39–
44. Brown further alleges that she “intends to visit the Website in the near future if it is made
accessible.” Id. ¶ 48; see id. ¶ 29. Brown’s complaint is not replete with detail, but she alleges
all the facts necessary to establish injury in fact at the pleadings stage. See, e.g., Davis v. Wild
Friends Foods, Inc., No. 22 Civ. 4244, 2023 WL 4364465, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2023);
Loadholt v. Shirtspace, No. 22 Civ. 2870, 2023 WL 2368972, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2023);
Chalas v. Barlean’s Organic Oils, LLC, No. 22 Civ. 4178, 2022 WL 17156838, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 22, 2022).
Furthermore, it is “reasonable to infer” that Brown “intend[s] to return” to Jennifer
Adams’ website: Unlike in Calcano, Brown articulates the specific date she last visited the
website and why she wants to purchase a particular product. Calcano, 36 F.4th at 74, 76–77
(quoting Kreisler, 731 F.3d at 188); see Compl. ¶¶ 20, 23, 39–44. It is not Brown’s fault that she
cannot predict exactly when she will return—she has no reason to revisit the website until
Jennifer Adams fixes any accessibility issues preventing her from completing her purchase. See
Compl. ¶¶ 24, 29, 48. Her stated intent to return, combined with her expressed desire to
purchase a specific product for a specific reason, suffices for standing under the ADA. See id.
¶¶ 29, 48; Sanchez v. NutCo, Inc., No. 20 Civ. 10107, 2022 WL 846896, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
22, 2022); Davis, 2023 WL 4364465, at *6.
II. Rule 12(b)(6)
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must consider
whether a plaintiff’s complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Lively v. WAFRA Inv. Advisory Grp., 6 F.4th 293,
301 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010)). The Court
draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor and abstains from “weigh[ing] competing
allegations asserted by the moving party.” Id. In conducting its analysis, the Court considers
“the complaint, the answer, any written documents attached to them, and any matter of which the
court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.” L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old
Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Roberts v. Babkiewicz, 582 F.3d 418, 419
(2d Cir. 2009)).
A. The ADA
Title III of the ADA states that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182. To
state a claim under this provision, a plaintiff must allege “(1) that she is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA; (2) that [the] defendant[] own[s], lease[s], or operate[s] a place of public
accommodation; and (3) that [the] defendant[] discriminated against her by denying her a full
and equal opportunity to enjoy the services [the] defendant[] provide[s].” Camarillo v. Carrols
Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008).
Only the second requirement is in dispute here. Jennifer Adams asserts that Brown’s
claims fail because “a standalone website, without any public-facing physical location,” does not
constitute a place of public accommodation under the ADA. Def. Mem. at 11. The issue of
whether such a website qualifies as a place of public accommodation has generated a circuit
split, and the Second Circuit has not yet weighed in. Sookul v. Fresh Clean Threads, Inc., No.
23 Civ. 10164, 2024 WL 4499206, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2024). In the meantime, most of the
district courts in this Circuit have concluded that an online shop is a place of public
accommodation. See, e.g., Chalas v. Pork King Good, 673 F. Supp. 3d 339, 344 (S.D.N.Y.
2023); Barlean’s Organic Oils, 2022 WL 17156838, at *6; Del-Orden v. Bonobos, Inc., No. 17
Civ. 2744, 2017 WL 6547902, at *9–11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017). But see Mejia v. High Brew
Coffee Inc., No. 22 Civ. 3667, 2024 WL 4350912, at *3–6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024); Sookul,
2024 WL 4499206, at *6.
The Court agrees with the majority view in this District that a standalone website is a
place of public accommodation. The ADA’s text is ambiguous—the statute, which was passed
in 1990, does not specify whether a “place of public accommodation” includes online “places.”
But the law’s legislative history and “primary purpose” reflect an attempt to make everyday
commerce broadly accessible to people with disabilities. Castellano v. City of New York, 142
F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see Chalas, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 344. As the Second
Circuit held in Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Insurance Co., “Title III’s mandate that the disabled be
accorded ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods, [and] services . . . of any place of public
accommodation’ suggests . . . that the statute was meant to guarantee them more than mere
physical access.” 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999) (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(a)). The internet and its associated technologies have opened countless doors for people
with disabilities. “It would be a cruel irony” to find websites beyond the reach of the ADA,
“render[ing] the legislation intended to emancipate the disabled from the bonds of isolation and
segregation obsolete when its objective is increasingly within reach.” Andrews v. Blick Art
Materials, LLC, 268 F. Supp. 3d 381, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2017). Jennifer Adams’ website is a place
of public accommodation, so Brown has stated a claim under the ADA.
B. The NYCHRL
Jennifer Adams contends that, even if Brown’s ADA claim survives, her NYCHRL claim
requires dismissal because the NYCHRL does not authorize damages for private litigants, and
Brown fails to plead facts that would support the recovery of punitive damages. Def. Mem. at
12–13. Jennifer Adams is incorrect as to the first contention; the NYCHRL provides that “any
person claiming to be a person aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . shall have a
cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction for damages, including punitive damages,
and for injunctive relief and such other remedies as may be appropriate.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code
§ 8-502(a). As to Jennifer Adams’ second point, that Brown is not entitled to punitive damages,
“‘[a] motion to dismiss’ under Rule 12(b)(6) ‘is addressed to a “claim”—not to a form of
damages.’” OL USA LLC v. Maersk A/S, 730 F. Supp. 3d 66, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting
Amusement Indus., Inc. v. Stern, 693 F. Supp. 2d 301, 318 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)). Punitive
damages are a type of damages, not an independent cause of action, so the Court shall not
address that issue at this stage. Id. at 73; see also Henkels & McCoy Grp., Inc. v. Verizon
Sourcing, LLC, No. 21 Civ. 9576, 2022 WL 1185817, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2022).
Granted, a court may dismiss or strike requests for relief “where particular damages are
unavailable as a matter of law.” Id.; see Doe v. Indyke, 457 F. Supp. 3d 278, 283 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (collecting cases in which courts have dismissed requests for punitive damages where such
damages were unavailable as a matter of law); see also id. at 284–85 (describing the debate over
whether a request to dispense with a certain type of relief should be styled as a motion to dismiss
or a motion to strike). Here, punitive damages are clearly available under the NYCHRL, see
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(a), so the Court will not strike them from Brown’s prayer for
relief.
C. Declaratory Judgment
Finally, Jennifer Adams moves to dismiss Brown’s claim for a declaratory judgment that
Jennifer Adams owns and operates its website “in a manner that discriminates against the blind
and which fails to provide access for persons with disabilities,” in violation of federal and New
York law. Def. Mem. at 13–14; see Compl. ¶¶ 88–89. According to Jennifer Adams, this claim
cannot be maintained because it is duplicative of Brown’s other claims. Def. Mem. at 13–14.
“A claim is redundant when it seeks the same relief sought in other causes of action.”
Chalas, 673 F. Supp. 3d at 345. Because Brown’s declaratory judgment “seeks no relief that is
not implicitly sought in [her] other causes of action,” the Court dismisses the claim. Sofi Classic
S.A. de C.V. v. Hurowitz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 231, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Jennifer Adams’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to
Brown’s declaratory judgment claim and DENIED in all other respects. The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 14.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 18, 2025
New York, New York
ANALISA TORRES
United States District Judge