Mathis v. Rivello

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VAUGHN MATHIS, :

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-225

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

JOHN RIVELLO, Superintendent:

of SCI Huntingdon, eft al.,

Respondents

MEMORANDUM

This action originated with pro se Petitioner Vaughn Mathis (“Mathis”)’s

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in which he

challenged a May 2022 decision by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and

Parole (“Parole Board”) to deny him parole. Mathis has notified the Court that

the Parole Board has since twice denied him parole in August 2023 and

August 2024. The Court has construed Mathis’s notifications as motions to

amend his petition to challenge his most recent parole denials. The Court

will grant those motions only insofar as they relate to the August 2024 parole

denial. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below, the Court will deny

Mathis’s amended Section 2254 petition.

FILED

SCRANTON

FEB 18 202

ppr_ KO

DEPUTY CLERK

I. BACKGROUND

Mathis is serving an aggregate sentence of state incarceration for a

minimum of seventeen-and-a-half (17 72) years to a maximum of forty-four

(44) years arising from his multiple convictions in three (3) criminal cases in

the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in the late 1990s. (Docs. 1

at 1; 11-1 at 38-41.) The background of these cases and the aggregation of

Mathis’s sentences in each of them has been described as follows:

.. . At Allegheny County No. CC9309514, [Mathis] pled

guilty to violating the Uniform Firearms Act (VUFA) by carrying a

firearm without a license and altering or obliterating marks or

identification on a firearm.’ The trial court sentenced [Mathis] to

serve a two-year term of probation ending on February 4, 1996.

While still on probation, [Mathis] was charged with multiple

additional unrelated crimes.

A detainer was issued, and [Mathis] subsequently was

incarcerated pending disposition of the new charges. By this

time, [Mathis’s] original term of probation on the VUFA offenses

had expired. On December 4, 1997, [Mathis] was convicted of

the new charges (discussed below). Thereafter, the

Commonwealth brought [Mathis] before the trial court for a

probation violation hearing which resulted in revocation of

probation. The trial court then sentenced [Mathis] to two and one-

half to five years of incarceration on the VUFA charges. In an

unpublished memorandum filed September 8, 1999, th[e

Pennsylvania Superior] Court affirmed on direct appeal at No.

621 Pittsburgh 1998. [The Pennsylvania] Supreme Court denied

allowance of appeal on January 14, 2000. See Commonwealth

v. Mathis, 747 A.2d 416 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 561

Pa. 671, 749 A.2d 468 (2000) (unpublished memoranda).

118 Pa. C.S.A. §§6106 and 6117, respectively.

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On September 8, 1995, [Mathis] and his accomplice forced

their way into a woman's house at gunpoint. When the victim was

unable to satisfy the demands made of her, [Mathis’s]

accomplice pushed her down the cellar steps. [Mathis] pistol

whipped the victim, then held his weapon to the woman's head

while his accomplice literally ripped the clothing from her body

and sexually assaulted her. Before departing, [Mathis’s]

accomplice smashed the victim’s head against a set of concrete

steps. A jury convicted [Mathis] of aggravated assault, burglary,

recklessly endangering another person (REAP), unlawful

restraint and terroristic threats, at Allegheny County No.

9600306. On February 2, 1998, the trial court imposed an

aggregate term of imprisonment of six to twenty years, to be

served consecutively to the sentence imposed on the weapons

offenses discussed above. [The Superior Court] affirmed the

judgment of sentence on August 17, 2000, in an unpublished

memorandum filed at No. 453 Pittsburgh 1998. The

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on

March 27, 2001. See Commonwealth v. Mathis, 764 A.2d 1126

(Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 565 Pa. 667, 775 A.2d 804

(2001) (unpublished memoranda).

Tragically, while the above cases awaited disposition,

[Mathis] killed a fourteen-month-old baby. On January 11, 1997,

at approximately 8:50 p.m., [Mathis] fired his weapon into a

vehicle containing three people, striking a toddler in the head as

the young child sat beside his three-year-old brother in the back

seat of the parents’ automobile. [Mathis] was charged with

multiple offenses at Allegheny. County Nos. CC199701667 and

CC199701808. On September 17, 1997, a jury convicted

[Mathis] on one count each of involuntary manslaughter and

VUFA (carrying a firearm without a license), and three counts of

REAP (predicated on the fact that there were three people in the

vehicle and thus there were three separate victims).*

218 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 2702, 3502, 2705, 2902 and 2706, respectively.

318 Pa. C.S.A. §§2504, 6106 and 2705, respectively.

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On October 22, 1997, the trial court sentenced [Mathis] to

serve consecutive terms of imprisonment of two and one-half to

five years on the involuntary manslaughter conviction, three and

one-half to seven years for the VUFA conviction and one to two

years for each count of REAP. The aggregate sentence of nine

to eighteen years was imposed consecutively to the sentences

[Mathis] was already serving. Th[e Superior Court] affirmed the

judgment of sentence on September 7, 1999, at No. 2480

Pittsburgh 1997. [Mathis] did not file a cognizable petition for

allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court nor

did he pursue a writ of certiorari before the United States

Supreme Court.[]

(Id. (footnotes and bold text in original)). □

Mathis’s minimum sentence expired on July 23, 2014, and his

maximum sentence date is January 23, 2040. (Doc. 11-1. at 3.) Since the

expiration of his minimum sentence, the Parole Board denied Mathis parole

in 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. (/d. at 48-65.)

On May 4, 2022, the Parole Board again denied Mathis parole, and he

was listed for review on or after April 2023. (/d. at 66-68.) In denying Mathis

parole for the seventh time, the Parole Board listed the following reasons for

denying him parole:

YOUR RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INDICATING YOUR

LEVEL OF RISK TO THE COMMUNITY.

REPORTS, EVALUATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS/LEVEL OF

RISK INDICATES YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY.

THE NEGATIVE RECOMMENDATION MADE □□ □ THE

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY. ~— .

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(Id. at 67.) The Parole Board also indicated that it would consider whether

he maintained a favorable recommendation from the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and a clear conduct record

at his next parole interview. (/d.) .

Mathis challenged his May 2022 parole denial by filing a petition for

review with the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court on August 25, 2022. (/d.

at 71.) He then filed an amended petition for review with the Commonwealth

Court on November 8, 2022. (/d. at 74-118.)

In the amended petition for review, Mathis generally argued that the

Parole Board violated his substantive due process rights by arbitrarily and

capriciously denying him parole. (/d. at 75.) Mathis indicated that he believed

that Parole Board was improperly focusing on his “politically charged[] and

publicly inflamed” involuntary manslaughter conviction even though he had

only fired his gun in a “desparate [sic] attempt to ward off his assailants by

returning gun fire, and consequently (and most regrettably) a fragment from

a stray bullet fatally injured said innocent child.” (/d. at 75-76.) He also

asserted that he believed his sentences were “illegally aggregated since [he]

was not sentenced by the same court and the same judge.” (/d. at 77.)

Overall, Mathis contended as follows:

[T]he [Parole] Board is not exercising its discretion according to

statute, standard, and practices, but rather accommodating

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persuasions to allow victim's input in a case that has an expired

sentence. Essentially, the overlapping structure of [his] sentence

is being taken advantage [sic] where the [Parole] Board is

accommodating the circumvention of due process.

(Id. at 77-78.)

Mathis also criticized his parole denials prior to the May 2022 denial.

As to his parole denial in 2014, he argued that the Parole Board incorrectly

stated that “his institutional behavior, including reported misconducts at

minimum date review” was a reason to deny him parole, even though he

“had been free of misconducts for 13 years, which earned him housing on

an honor unit.” (/d. at 78 (capitalization omitted); see also id. at 49).

Concerning his 2016 denial of parole, Mathis asserted that the Parole Board

“conducted a bogus interview” and indicated as a reason for denying parole

that he lacked remorse even though he wrote letters to the victim’s family to

“express his deep remorse.” (/d. at 79.) Regarding his 2017 parole denial,

Mathis contended that during his parole interview, the interviewing Parole

Board member asked him questions about crimes he was either not charged

with or acquitted of, as such, “[t]he questioning . . . was based on

misinformation and/or diversionary in tactic and intent to arbitrarily deny [him]

parole.” (/d. at 79-80.) Turning to his 2018 parole denial, Mathis criticized

the Parole Board for listing the severity of the crime as a reason to deny

parole because his sentence for involuntary manslaughter should have

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expired at the time of his parole review. (/d. at 80.) In addition, the Parole

Board listed his unsatisfactory parole supervision history even though he

was never on parole; instead, he committed another offense while serving

probation. (/d.)

As for his 2019 parole denial, Mathis claimed that during his interview

with the Parole Board’s Chairman, the Chairman told Mathis that he was

ready for parole, but the other Board Members were unwilling to parole him

until he served twenty-five (25) years. (/d. at 81.) At the time, Mathis had

been incarcerated for twenty-two (22) years. (/d.) The Chairman also

proposed to Mathis that he could take a “1-year ‘hit’ or a 3-year ‘hit’, at which

time the Chairman would give [Mathis] his recommendation for parole.” (/d.)

Mathis claimed to have accepted the “3-year ‘hit” because he would need

another three (3) years to reach the twenty-five (25) years he needed so the

other Board Members would agree to parole him. (/d.) As a result, he was

denied parole in April 2019, with the Parole Board once again mistakenly

listing his parole supervision history as a reason to deny him parole. (/d.) The

Parole Board also listed the nature of the crime as a reason, which was

improper because only deliberate or planned conduct should be considered,

and his conduct was “circumstantial.” (/d. at 81-82.)

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Concerning his 2020 parole denial, Mathis complained that he was

“arbitrarily denied . . . a legitimate review” because the Board Member who

interviewed him told him that “the hearing is ‘unofficial.[’]” (/d. at 82-83.) The

Parole Board also gave “redundant reasons” for denying parole. (/d. at 83.)

When he addressed his May 2022 parole denial, Mathis indicated that

he had done what the Parole Board asked him to do insofar as he maintained

a favorable recommendation for parole from the DOC, a clear conduct

record, and waited the three (3)-year period recommended by the Chairman.

(Id. at 83, 86.) However, the Parole Board denied parole in part because the

Board recommended that he receive “educational/vocational programming,”

despite him maintaining a clear conduct record since 2001 and spending

over twenty (20) years in vocational training in various jobs while

incarcerated, such as a plumber, an HVAC technician, and power plant

mechanic. (/d. at 83 (capitalization omitted)). Mathis had also obtained

college credits from “Pitt University.” (/d.)

Additionally, even though Mathis was listed in the “low-medium” risk

range in the instrument the Parole Board uses to assess an inmate’s risk to

the community, the Parole Board listed his “level of risk to the community”

as a reason to deny him parole. (/d. at 86-87.) Mathis contended that this

reason was “unsubstantiated and meritless as a matter of fact” insofar as he

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successfully completed his programming and maintained his outside

clearance status, which is indicative that he is a low risk to the community.

(Id. at 87.) Mathis also asserted that he contacted the prosecuting attorney,

and the attorney's “response suggested that there was not a

recommendation made by her office.” (/d.) Therefore, Mathis believes that

the underlying, but unstated, reason why he was denied parole, was due to

his involuntary manslaughter conviction. (/d. at 87-88.)

On February 7, 2023, the Commonwealth Court dismissed Mathis’s

amended petition for review. (/d. at 120-21.) After pointing out that Mathis’s

contention that his sentences were illegally aggregated was incorrect, the

Commonwealth Court explained its reasons for dismissing the amended

petition for review as follows:

Petitioner fails to plead facts sufficient to establish a right to the

relief he requests. An inmate has no right to parole, and the

denial of parole is not subject to judicial review. Rogers v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d 319 (Pa. 1999); Weaver v. Pa.

Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 688 A.2d 766 (Pa. Cmwith. 1997). The

reasons set forth in the parole denial decisions were not only

permissible considerations, but statutorily required

considerations. 61 Pa. C.S. §6135; Weaver. The Court will not

look behind facially valid reasons stated in a parole denial

decision. Weaver. Petitioner fails to allege that the parole denial

was based on constitutionally impermissible criteria. Burkett v.

Love, 89 F.3d 135 (3d Cir. 1996); Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233

(3d Cir. 1980).

(Id. at 121.)

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Prior to the Commonwealth Court’s decision, on January 23, 2023,

Mathis filed the instant Section 2254 petition and a supporting memorandum

of law.* (Docs. 1, 2.) In the petition, Mathis raises three (3) claims challenging

the Parole Board’s denial of parole. First, he argues that the Parole Board

violated his substantive due process rights because it failed to follow the

“statutory standards” for considering parole insofar as it is primarily focused

on his involuntary manslaughter conviction instead of looking at the totality

of factors that should have been considered. (Docs. 1 at 5; 2 at 4-5.) Second,

he contends that the Parole Board’s denial of parole was arbitrary and

constitutionally impermissible because the Parole Board Chairman told him

that the other Board Members would not grant him parole until he reached

twenty-five (25) years’ incarceration and “allude[d] to the fact that the Board

[w]as essentially increasing [Mathis’s] punishment due to the nature and

circumstances’ of his involuntary manslaughter conviction. (Docs. 1 at 6-7;

2 at 6-7.) He also points out that the Parole Board filed preliminary objections

4 Although the Clerk of Court did not docket Mathis’s habeas petition

until February 7, 2023, Mathis declared that he placed it in the prison mail

system for mailing on January 23, 2023. (Doc. 1 at 14.) Pursuant to the

federal prisoner mailbox rule, the Court deems the petition to be filed as of

January 23, 2023. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988)

(concluding that prisoner's submission is deemed filed “at the time [the

prisoner] delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court

clerk”).

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to his petition for review in the Commonwealth Court in which the Board

referenced charges for which he was acquitted. (Doc. 2 at 8-9.) He believes

that this shows that the Parole Board is essentially punishing him for crimes

he did not commit. (/d. at 9.) Third, and finally, Mathis asserts that his

substantive due process rights “are being violated by the exercise of power

without reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental

objective” because the Parole Board keeps denying him parole in part

because of his negative supervision on parole, despite him having never

been on parole. (Docs. 1 at 8; 2 at 10-12.) He also believes that the Parole

Board’s reference him being a risk to the community is “unsubstantiated”

because his conduct and activities since his incarceration should “suggest

parole.” (Doc. 2 at 11.) Furthermore, Mathis believes that the victims from

his involuntary manslaughter conviction “have the political influence to sway

[Parole] Board decision[-]Jmakers in this particular case.” (/d.). Based on

these three (3) claims, Mathis seeks his immediate release from

incarceration because it will “ensure that [he] is not subjected to further

arbitrariness or vindictiveness.” (Docs. 1 at 14; 2 at 12.)

On April 4, 2023, the Court issued an Order directing Respondents to

file a response to Mathis’s habeas petition. (Doc. 5.) After receiving an

extension of time, Respondents filed their response in opposition to the

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habeas petition on May 16-17, 2023. (Docs. 10, 11.)° In their response,

Respondents contend that (1) the Court should dismiss the petition due to

Mathis’s failure to exhaust his state-court remedies insofar as he did not

appeal from the Commonwealth Court's dismissal of his petition for review

to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (Docs. 11 at 3-6; 11-2 at 3-6); (2)

Mathis has failed present a viable procedural due process claim because he

does not possess a liberty interest in parole (Docs. 11 at 7-9; 11-2 at 6-8);

and (3) Mathis has failed to demonstrate a substantive due process right

because he has not included any factual allegations showing that the Parole

Board relied on anything outside of the Prisons and Parole Code (61 Pa.

C.S. §6135) in denying him parole or “that can otherwise be described as

‘conscience shocking” (Docs. 11 at 9-11; 11-2 at 9-11).

Mathis filed a reply brief to Respondents’ response in opposition to his

habeas petition, which the Clerk of Court docketed on June 2, 2023. (Doc.

12.) Approximately two-and-a-half (2 %) months later, Mathis filed an

“Addendum in Support of Writ of Habeas Corpus Proceeding Under 28

U.S.C. §2254,” in which he, inter alia, indicated that the Parole Board had

denied him parole on August 1, 2023. (Doc. 13 at 2, 8.) Mathis also

challenged this parole denial in his submission. (/d. at 1-7.)

5 It appears that Respondents docketed their response twice.

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On October 28, 2024, Mathis filed a “Motion for Judicial Review

Pursuant to the Administration [sic] Procedure Act 5 U.S.C.S. §702,” in which

he informed the Court that the Parole Board denied him parole again on

August 20, 2024. (Doc. 16 at 2, 7.) He also attached a copy of the Parole

Board’s written decision, which stated as follows:

FOLLOWING AN INTERVIEW WITH YOU AND A REVIEW OF

YOUR FILE, AND HAVING CONSIDERED ALL MATTERS

REQUIRED PURSUANT TO THE PRISONS AND PAROLE

CODE, THE PAROLE BOARD, IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS

DISCRETION, HAS DETERMINED AT THIS TIME THAT: YOU

ARE DENIED PAROLE/REPAROLE. THE REASONS FOR THE

BOARD’S DECISION INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

REPORTS, EVALUATIONS AND ASSESSMENTS/LEVEL OF

RISK INDICATES YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY.

THE NATURE OF YOUR CRIME.

YOU ARE TO BE REVIEWED IN OR AFTER SEPTEMBER

2025.

AT YOUR NEXT INTERVIEW, THE BOARD WILL REVIEW

YOUR FILE AND CONSIDER:

WHETHER YOU HAVE MAINTAINED A FAVORABLE

RECOMMENDATION FOR PAROLE FROM THE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.

WHETHER YOU HAVE MAINTAINED A CLEAR CONDUCT

RECORD.

(Id. at 6.) Mathis challenges this denial of parole based on his previously

asserted arguments concerning the Parole Board’s inaccurate risk

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assessment and over-emphasis on the nature of his “crime,” which he

interprets as a reference to his involuntary manslaughter conviction. (/d. at

1-4.)

li. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Challenges to Parole Denials Under Section 2254

A challenge to the denial of parole is cognizable under Section 2254.

See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (determining that

jurisdiction to entertain state prisoner’s habeas petition challenging denial of

parole lies under Section 2254 and not 28 U.S.C. §2241). However, a federal

district court may not grant parole or determine parole eligibility. See Billiteri

v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 541 F.2d 938, 944 (2d Cir. 1976). Instead, “[t]he only

remedy which the court can give is to order the Board to correct the abuses

or wrongful conduct within a fixed period of time, after which, in the case of

non-compliance, the court can grant the writ of habeas corpus and order the

prisoner discharged from custody.” /d.; see also Bridge v. U.S. Parole

Comm'n, 981 F.2d 97, 105 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that “the relief a court

may grant [from a parole denial] is limited”).

B. Due Process Challenges to Parole Denials

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

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amend. XIV § 1. “[T]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted

person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,”

nor has the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created such a right. Greenholiz

v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979); see also

Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing general

principle that Pennsylvania’s parole statute does not create a liberty interest

in the right to be paroled); Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 289 (Pa. 2001)

(It is undisputed that [an inmate] does not have a clear legal right to the

grant of parole, nor does the board have a corresponding duty to grant the

same.”). .

“Since a discretionary decision of the Parole Board denying an inmate

early parole does not implicate any constitutionally [or state] protected liberty

interest, the scope of federal judicial review of these decisions is necessarily

quite limited.” Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 13-cv- 2302,

2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 7, 2014). The role of a federal court

is confined to reviewing the substance of the state parole decision to

determine whether the Parole Board exercised its authority in an arbitrary

and capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner. See Block v.

Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980).

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To show a violation of substantive due process, a habeas petitioner

must demonstrate that: (1) they were arbitrarily denied parole due to

impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or political beliefs, and/or (2)

the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in reaching its

determination to deny parole. See id. at 236; Bonsall v. Gillis, 372 F. Supp.

2d 805, 807 (M.D. Pa. 2005). “However, federal courts are not authorized by

the due process clause to second-guess parole boards and the requirements

of substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged

decision.” Coady, 251 F.3d at 487. The “relevant level of arbitrariness

required to find a substantive due process violation involves not merely

action that is unreasonable, but, rather, something more egregious, which

we have termed at times ‘conscience shocking’ or ‘deliberately indifferent.”

Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

lil. DISCUSSION

Mathis generally argues that the Parole Board violated his substantive

due process rights in denying him parole on several occasions. In resolving

Mathis’s claims, the Court will first discuss how the Parole Board’s two (2)

decisions to deny Mathis parole occurring after he filed his petition in this

case, impact this case, as well as Mathis's apparent request to amend his

petition to include a challenge to these most-recent denials of parole. The

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Court will then address Respondents’ argument that Mathis failed to exhaust

his administrative remedies. Finally, the Court will address the merits of

Mathis’s claims.

A. The Impact of the Parole Board’s Denials of Parole

Occurring After Mathis Filed His Section 2254 Petition in

. This Case

Since Mathis filed his habeas petition in this case, the Parole Board

denied him parole on August 1, 2023, and August 20, 2024. Due to the

Parole Board’s August 20, 2024 denial of parole, Mathis’s challenges to his

denials of parole from 2014 through 2023 are moot. See Pullium v. Bd. of

Prob. and Parole, No. 1:22-cv-140, 2024 WL 3445462, at *2 (W.D. Pa. June

26, 2024) (“In many habeas cases, the crucial issue with respect to mootness

is whether ‘some concrete and continuing injury other than the now-ended

incarceration or parole’ might still be amenable to remedy. Spencer v.

Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)]. In other words, there still may be a case or

controversy before the court — even if the injury that a complaining party

seeks to remedy through litigation no longer exists — if there is a ‘collateral

injury’ that is ‘likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’ /d.

(quoting Lewis[ v. Cont’! Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)]); Burkey v.

Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 147-51 (3d Cir. 2009)]. This is not the case,

however, in the context of a parole denial or calculation. Rather, because the

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only relief that a court can grant in such circumstances is a new parole

hearing, a subsequent hearing held by the Parole Board renders an inmate's

challenge to the prior parole decision moot.”); Sims v. Mahally, No. 3:17-cv-

1647, 2018 WL 5718498, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018) (“The Parole Board

has issued its most recent decision to deny Petitioner parole on January 11,

2017; therefore, to the extent that Petitioner challenges the Parole Board’s

decisions to deny him parole [in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and

2015], these claims have been rendered moot.” (citations omitted)); Brown

v. Kauffman, No. 18-cv-89, 2018 WL 4087551, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2018)

(“[S]ince the appropriate remedy would have been a new hearing before the

Board, and because Brown has since had another hearing, any challenge to

the prior denial is now moot.” (citations omitted)), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4054329 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2018).

Nevertheless, the Court has construed Mathis’s “Motion for Judicial Review

Pursuant to the Administration [sic] Procedure Act 5 U.S.C.S. §702” (Doc.

16) as a motion to amend his habeas petition to include a challenge to the

Parole Board’s August 20, 2024 denial of parole. The Court concludes that

the interests of justice warrant granting this motion because, inter alia,

dismissing the instant case and requiring Mathis to start again with a new

habeas petition would not be judicially efficient and Mathis’s arguments and

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Respondents’ responses thereto (insofar as Mathis repeats arguments he

made in his original habeas petition) are already part of the record. See Miller

v. Zaken, No. 1:21-cv-2130, 2024 WL 1621902, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15,

2024) (“Amendment of habeas corpus petitions is governed by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 15.”); 28 U.S.C. §2242 (providing that habeas applications

“may be amended or supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure

applicable to civil actions”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely

give leave when justice so requires.”).

B. Failure to Exhaust

Respondents argued that the Court should dismiss Mathis’s original

habeas petition because he did not fully exhaust his state-court remedies

before filing it insofar as he did not file a petition for allowance of appeal to

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court following the Commonwealth Court's

dismissal of his petition for review. The circumstances have changed

somewhat regarding Mathis’s August 20, 2024 denial of parole because

Mathis does not allege that he filed a challenge to the denial with the

Commonwealth Court. Despite these changed circumstances, the Court's

resolution of Respondents’ argument does not change because Mathis did

not have an obligation to exhaust state-court remedies prior to filing his

Section 2254 petition in this Court.

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While a Pennsylvania state prisoner filing a habeas petition under

Section 2254 is ordinarily required to fully exhaust their state-court remedies

prior to filing their petition, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in DeFoy v.

McCollough, concluded that a state prisoner challenging the denial of parole

on constitutional grounds, other than asserting an ex post facto claim, is not

required to exhaust state-court remedies prior to filing a habeas petition. See

393 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e conclude that claims of constitutional

violations in the denial of parole in Pennsylvania need not be presented to

the state courts via a petition for writ of mandamus in order to satisfy the

requirement of exhaustion.”). In DeFoy, the Third Circuit determined that the

Commonwealth Court's decision in Weaver v. Pennsylvania Board of

Probation & Parole, 688 A.2d 766, 771-72 (Pa. Commw. 1997), which “held

that mandamus is not available to a prisoner denied parole based upon a

constitutional error by the parole board,” was “the best indication of how the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court would resolve the issues” raised in the case.

Id. at 444. Respondents argue that this Court should no longer follow DeFoy

because since that decision, the Commonwealth Court has issued numerous

decisions stating that state prisoners can file constitutional challenges to

Parole Board denials of parole in mandamus actions in the Commonwealth

Court’s original jurisdiction. See (Doc. 11-2 at 4-5 (citing cases)). The most

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recent of those cases appears to be Toland v. Pennsylvania Board of

Probation and Parole, where the Commonwealth Court held that “under [its]

precedent, both ex post facto and due process challenges [to the Parole

Board’s denial of parole] may be raised in a mandamus action.” 263 A.3d

1220, 1233 (Pa. Commw. 2021). Respondents also point out that Mathis

challenged his May 2022 parole denial by filing a petition for review with the

Commonwealth Court, which addressed it, even though it was ultimately

dismissed. (/d. at 6.)

This Court recognizes that some district courts in the Third Circuit have

questioned “[t]he continuing validity of DeFoy.” Begandy v. Pa. Bd. of Prob.

and Parole, No. 19-cv-639, 2021 WL 1986415, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2021)

(citing Bradley v. Wingard, No. 15-cv-235, 2017 WL 11476608, at *2 (W.D.

Pa. Oct. 12, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL

10150909 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018)); see also Purcell v. Pa. Parole Bd., No.

3:23-cv-311, 2024 WL 5340671, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2024) (indicating

that habeas petitions challenging denials of parole “are unexhausted and can

be dismissed on that ground alone [under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases] because [DeFoy] is no longer good law”), report and

recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 240959 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 17, 2025). In

doing so, those district courts essentially follow the same reasoning as

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Respondents’ argument here, i.e., DeFoy no longer applies because the

Pennsylvania caselaw it relied upon in concluding that there was no

mandamus remedy for constitutional challenges has changed to the contrary

over the almost twenty (20) years since it was decided. See, e.g., Bowman

v. Brittan, No. 23-cv-2092, 2024 WL 5050028, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21,

2024) (“Based upon Toland, which DeFoy could not consider since it had yet

been decided, it is clear that Petitioner had an available state court remedy;

hence, he was required to comply with the exhaustion requirement.”).

While these other decisions choosing not to follow DeFoy are possibly

correct concerning the change in Pennsylvania law recognizing that

Pennsylvania inmates now have a state-court remedy they can exhaust

concerning their parole-denial claims because the Commonwealth Court has

recognized that constitutional claims, including due process challenges, can

be raised through a petition for a writ of mandamus, the fact remains that

DeFoy is a precedential Third Circuit decision that remains binding on this

Court under principles of vertical stare decisis. See Pease v. Lycoming

Engines, No. 4:10-cv-843, 2011 WL 6339833, at *22 n.35 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19,

2011) (“Stare decisis requires district courts to follow the binding precedents

of higher courts.”); Hernandez v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., No. 19-

cv-15679, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2023) (“As this is a federal district court in

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New Jersey, it is duty-bound to follow precedent set forth by the Third Circuit,

the federally recognized circuit in which this Court sits.” (citations omitted));

UTI Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 362, 379 (D.N.J. 1995)

(‘[A]s a federal district court, we are bound by the pronouncements of the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals.”); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375

(1982) (“[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial

system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal

courts... .”); ef. United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 2011)

(“[N]either this court, nor any other court, can tolerate a situation where a

judge decides to follow his/her own custom and concepts of justice rather

than the precedent of the applicable appellate court or the United States

Supreme Court. Ours is a nation of laws, not judges.”), abrogated on other

grounds by Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019). In addition, in 2012,

the Third Circuit recognized that the Commonwealth Court had “adjudicated

mandamus actions involving parole denials by the Board and [had]

considered constitutional claims other than ex post facto claims,” and yet still

decided that “to the extent there has been any shift in Pennsylvania law, we

cannot comfortably say that it is clear enough to alter our decision in DeFoy.”

Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2012).

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In deciding not to disturb DeFoy, the Third Circuit explained that:

The availability of Pennsylvania mandamus review for inmates

challenging the denial of their parole on non-ex post facto

grounds remains unsettled. Though certain courts since DeFoy

have demonstrated some willingness to consider constitutional

claims outside the ex post facto context, none have addressed

or acknowledged the language that drove our reading of Coady.

See Nieves v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 995 A.2d 412, 418 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2010) (substantive due process and ex post facto);

Wilson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 942 A.2d 270 (Pa. Cmwith.

Ct. 2008) (Fifth Amendment in context of sexual offender

rehabilitation program); Dodgson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,

922 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (due process,

equal protection, Fifth Amendment, court access and ex post

facto), Nickson v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 880 A.2d 21, 23 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2005) (Eighth Amendment). But see Nieves, 995

A.2d at 421-22 (Leavitt, J., concurring) (citing Coady for the

proposition that “mandamus will not lie” in challenges to the

denial of parole and arguing that the court need not have

considered the claims before it at all).

Id. at 209 n.4.

This Court recognizes that the Roman Court also did not have the

benefit of Toland and other Commonwealth Court decisions in determining

not to overrule DeFoy. Nevertheless, a federal district court cannot decide to

not follow appellate court precedent simply because it may be wrong. To the

contrary, “[rlespecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong decisions.

The doctrine rests on the idea, as Justice Brandeis famously wrote, that it is

usually ‘more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it

be settled right.” Kimble v. Marvel Entmt., LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015)

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(quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 52 S.Ct. 443,

76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (dissenting opinion)).

In conclusion, if the Court were to not follow DeFoy, Mathis’s habeas

claims pertaining to his parole denial in May 2022 would be dismissed for

the failure to exhaust because he did not file a petition for allowance of

appeal from the Commonwealth Court's decision to the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court. See, e.g., Williams v. Wynder, 232 F. App’x 177, 181 (3d

Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (concluding that, to fully exhaust a challenge to the

Parole Board’s decision to revoke parole, a habeas petitioner must seek

allowance of appeal in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after an adverse

decision by the Commonwealth Court). In addition, Mathis’s other parole

denials prior to August 2024, to the extent they are not moot, would also be

dismissed for the failure to exhaust because Mathis never filed a petition for

mandamus with the Commonwealth Court. For the same reason, Mathis’s

challenge to his August 2024 parole denial would be dismissed for his failure

to petition for mandamus with the Commonwealth Court before filing his

amended habeas petition. Nonetheless, as this Court must follow DeFoy,

Mathis did not need to fully exhaust his challenges to his parole denials

through the state courts, and the Court will consider the merits of his

challenge to his August 2024 parole denial here.

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C. The Merits

Mathis has not established that the August 20, 2024, denial of parole

amounted to an unreasonable exercise of the Parole Board’s discretion.

Although Mathis argues that the Parole Board acted arbitrarily, he has not

shown that it based its decision on arbitrary or impermissible criteria in

violation of his substantive due process rights. Instead, Mathis is merely

arguing that he disagrees with the grounds upon which the Parole Board

relied to deny him parole.

The Parole Board has vast discretion to refuse or deny parole. See 61

Pa. C.S. §6137(a) (stating that, inter alia, the Parole Board “may release on

parole any offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the board by

this chapter, ... whenever in its opinion: (i) The best interests of the offender

justify or require that the offender be paroled. (ii) It does not appear that the

interests of the Commonwealth will be injured by the offender’s parole”). The

record clearly reflects that the Parole Board based its parole determination

on factors that it is statutorily required to consider in accordance with 61 Pa.

C.S. §6135; see McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 277 (1973) (holding that

there is a “legitimate desire of the state legislature to afford state prison

officials an adequate opportunity to evaluate both an inmate’s conduct and

□□ -

his rehabilitative progress before he is eligible for parole”). Under Section

6135, the Parole Board must consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed.

(2) Any recommendations made by the trial judge and

prosecuting attorney.

(3) The general character and background of the inmate.

(4) Participation by an inmate sentenced after February 19, 1999,

and who is serving a sentence for a crime of violence as defined

in 42 Pa. C.S. §9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and

subsequent offenses) in a victim impact education program

offered by the Department of Corrections.

(5) The written or personal statement of the testimony of the

victim or the victim's family submitted under section 6140

(relating to victim statements, testimony and participation in

hearing).

(6) The notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any,

together with such additional information regarding the nature

and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence

was imposed as may be available.

(7) The conduct of the person while in prison and his physical,

mental and behavioral condition and history, his history of family

violence and his complete criminal record.

61 Pa. C.S. §6135(a)(1)-(7).

Mathis has not directed the Court to any factor relied upon by the

Parole Board that could be described as conscience shocking or

deliberatively indifferent. Mathis disputes the Parole Board’s risk assessment

and argues that it is “unfounded, miscategorized, and unproven.” (Doc. 16 at

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2.) He points to aspects of his incarceration such as his ability to work outside

the prison, his remaining misconduct free for two (2) decades, and the DOC’s

recommendation that he be paroled since 2014. (/d. at 2-3.) He also claims

to have received an “independent merit system” score that “suggests parole.”

(Id. at 3.) Although these points are surely commendable and indicative of

an individual moving in the right direction, they do not show that the Parole

Board violated Mathis’s due process rights in denying parole.

The Court recognizes that the Parole Board may not base its decision

upon an inaccurate factual predicate. See Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156,

162 (3d Cir. 1998) (concluding that United States Parole Commission did not

have rational basis to find, as ground for denying parole, that prisoner

seeking parole was a member of an organized crime family simply because

of a familial-relationship between the applicant and organized crime family

member (citing Campbell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 704 F.2d 106,

109 (3d Cir. 1983))); Campbell, 704 F.2d at 109 (“[t]he Commission may not

base its judgment as to parole on an inaccurate factual predicate.”).

However, Mathis has not shown that the Parole Board's risk assessment was

factually incorrect. Instead, he has identified the reasons why he disagrees

and disputes its risk assessment. Even his references to his “independent

merit system” score does not definitively state he needed to be paroled,

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instead it only “suggests parole.” (Doc. 16 at 2-3.) As such, Mathis has failed

to show that the Parole Board’s reference to his risk to the community is

conscience shocking.

Mathis’s challenge to the Board’s reference to the nature of the crime

as areason to deny parole is also unavailing. In the first instance, the Board's

consideration of the nature and circumstances of Mathis’s crimes is not only

permissible but required. See 61 Pa. C.S. §6135(a)(1). Additionally, even if

Mathis is correct that his involuntary manslaughter sentence had expired, he

has not demonstrated that his involuntary manslaughter conviction is the

“crime” mentioned in the Parole Board’s denial. Instead, he is purely

speculating that the Parole Board denied parole because of that conviction.

Moreover, he ignores the facts of the other offenses to which he was found

guilty. Nonetheless, to the extent that the Parole Board implicitly referenced

his involuntary manslaughter conviction, Mathis has not shown that doing so

was improper or rises to the level of conscience-shocking behavior that could

give rise to a substantive due process claim. See Ralston v. Dep't of Parole

Prob., No. 12-cv-1844, 2015 WL 1542480, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2015)

(citing Gordon v. Wenerowicz, No. 10-cv-1257, 2011 WL 5509538, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2011)). Therefore, because Mathis has failed to meet his

burden of demonstrating that the Parole Board violated his constitutional

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rights in denying parole in August 20, 2024, the Court will deny the instant

Section 2254 petition ° .

D. Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A), unless a circuit justice or judge

issues a certificate of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from

a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §2254. A COA may issue only

if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this

standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the

district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could

conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to

proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Because

reasonable jurists could not disagree with the resolution of this petition, there

is no basis for the issuance of a COA. Thus, the Court will decline to issue a

certificate of appealability, as Mathis has failed to demonstrate “a substantial

8 To the extent that Mathis’s challenges to the prior denials of parole

were not mooted by subsequent parole hearings and determinations, Mathis

also failed to show the Parole Board violated his substantive due process

rights as to those denials.

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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2); see

also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).’ □

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the Court will permit Mathis to amend

his Section 2254 petition to include a due process challenge to his August

20, 2024 parole denial. The Court will also deny Mathis’s habeas petition and

decline to issue a certificate of appealability. An appropriate Order follows.

. United States District Judge

pate: 2/#/2©

23-0225-01

’ There is also no basis to hold an evidentiary hearing because Mathis

has not met the requirements for a hearing established in Section 2254(e)(2).

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