Hannibal v. Harris County Constable Precinct One

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT February 18, 2025

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

HOUSTON DIVISION

CHARISMA HANNIBAL, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-01330

§

SHARMAYNE IVORY, §

§

Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In the early morning hours of December 26, 2021, what seemed to be a routine

traffic stop escalated rapidly into an intense, life-threatening confrontation lasting just

sixteen seconds. It started with Deputy Constable Sharmayne Ivory patrolling NRG

Stadium in Houston, Texas. Around 1:15 a.m., Deputy Ivory saw someone driving

erratically through NRG’s parking lots and tried to initiate a traffic stop. But Charisma

Hannibal, the driver, refused to pull over, triggering a pursuit that ended near the

Houston Livestock Rodeo Warehouse. A brief but intense stand-off followed, and within

sixteen critical seconds, Hannibal aggressively reversed her vehicle, prompting Deputy

Ivory to discharge her firearm. Hannibal continued forward and accelerated toward

Deputy Ivory and a nearby eyewitness, causing Deputy Ivory to fire several more rounds.

The Court must now decide whether Deputy Ivory’s actions are shielded by

qualified immunity. After reviewing the undisputed facts, the Court concludes that they

are. Pending before the Court is Defendant Ivory’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt.

No. 50). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND1

On Sunday, December 26, 2021, Deputy Constable Sharmayne Ivory was working

the night shift at NRG Stadium patrolling the parking lots. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2). No one

was supposed to be driving through the fenced-in lots, so Deputy Ivory settled in for

what she expected to be a quiet, uneventful shift. (Id.).

Around 1:15 a.m., a black 2019 Infiniti SUV sped through the parking lot. (Dkt.

No. 52 at 27, 30). Deputy Ivory observed that the driver was “driving erratically” and

“traveling at a high rate of speed.” (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2); (Dkt. No. 52 at 30).

Deputy Ivory turned on her overhead lights to conduct a traffic stop and pursued

the driver. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2); (Dkt. No. 52 at 30). The car briefly stopped in a parking

lot before speeding away. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2); (Dkt. No. 52 at 30). Because Deputy Ivory

was trained to recognize this kind of abnormal behavior as an indicator that a suspect

was likely to resist arrest and may have just committed a serious offense, she radioed

dispatch for backup. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2–3). She then chased the driver for several

minutes until the driver finally stopped in front of a garage-type entrance to the Houston

Livestock Rodeo Warehouse. (Id. at 3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 30); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:00–00:25).

Because the driver’s car was facing the entrance at this point, Deputy Ivory

positioned her patrol car behind the driver to prevent another pursuit. (Dkt. No. 52 at

30); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:00–00:25). While she waited for backup, Deputy Ivory

1 Except where noted, this section contains only undisputed facts, and all facts and

reasonable inferences have been construed in favor of the nonmovant. Renfroe v. Parker, 974 F.3d

594, 599 (5th Cir. 2020). The Court has not weighed evidence or made credibility findings. Id.

unholstered her weapon, opened her door, and stepped out of her car. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at

3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 30); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:00–00:25). Deputy Ivory used her car door as

cover and continued pointing her gun at the driver’s vehicle. (Dkt. No. 30 at 33); (Dkt.

No. 52-1 at 00:00–00:25).

Around this time, Gregory Schmid entered the scene on a golf cart. (Dkt. No. 52

at 33). Schmid was a security manager with ASM Global, an outside contractor that

provided security to NRG Park. (Dkt. No. 50-2 at 4). Schmid arrived on the scene because

he had received a radio call from Deputy Ivory informing him that she was pursuing an

erratic driver through the parking lots. (Id. at 5–6).

Once Deputy Ivory positioned herself, she ordered the driver to exit the vehicle.

(Id. at 7–8); (Dkt. No. 52 at 24). The driver refused. (Dkt. No. 50-2 at 8). After several

reiterations, (id.), the driver exited her vehicle and casually, yet quickly, walked toward

Deputy Ivory, (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3) (Dkt. No. 52-1at 00:25–00:30). That

driver was Charisma Hannibal. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2).

As Hannibal approached, Deputy Ivory noticed Hannibal’s left hand was in her

pocket. (Id. at 3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1at 00:30–00:33). Deputy Ivory told

Hannibal to remove her hand from her pocket. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 8);

(Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:33–00:34). Hannibal did not comply. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3); (Dkt. No.

52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:34–00:35). After Deputy Ivory asked again, Hannibal finally

took her hand out of her pocket. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 8); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at

00:35–00:38). Deputy Ivory instructed Hannibal to stop moving forward, but to no avail.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:38–00:51).

Deputy Ivory claims that Hannibal was staring at her firearm as she moved closer.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3). Fearing that Hannibal might take her weapon, Deputy Ivory backed

up to create distance and de-escalate the situation. (Id.); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-

1 at 00:46–00:51).

Hannibal then walked toward Deputy Ivory’s patrol vehicle and looked inside,

while Schmid moved the golf cart out of the way. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33);

(Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:50–00:52). Deputy Ivory believed Hannibal would get inside the

patrol car, so Deputy Ivory moved toward it. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 3–4); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33);

(Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:52–00:54).

After a short exchange with Deputy Ivory, Hannibal started returning to her own

vehicle. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 4); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 00:55–01:15). Deputy

Ivory followed her and told her not to move or get in the car. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 4); (Dkt.

No. 52 a 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:15–01:39). Hannibal ignored Deputy Ivory, entered her

vehicle, and shut the door. (Dkt. No. 52 a 33) (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:15–01:40). Deputy Ivory

told dispatch that Hannibal was not following instructions. (Dkt. No. 52 a 33); (Dkt. No.

52-1 at 01:23–01:27). Deputy Ivory moved closer to Hannibal’s vehicle while continuing

to aim her sidearm at Hannibal. (Dkt. No. 52 a 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:41–01:45).

Eventually, Deputy Ivory positioned herself right outside Hannibal’s driver-side door.

(Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:41–01:45).

Hannibal “suddenly put her vehicle in reverse [and] gunned the engine,” (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 4); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:45–01:49), and Deputy Ivory fired

one round in response. (Dkt. No. 52 at 33). With her car now facing Deputy Ivory, (Dkt.

No. 50-1 at 4–5); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33), Hannibal drove toward Deputy Ivory, and Deputy

Ivory fired eight more rounds at Hannibal, (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt.

No. 52-1 at 01:50–01:54).

The bullets did not stop Hannibal. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:50–

01:54). After Deputy Ivory’s shots, Hannibal turned left, drove over a curb, and moved

toward Schmid and Deputy Ivory’s patrol car. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33);

(Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:52–01:59).

Deputy Ivory told dispatch that shots were fired and then fired six more rounds

to stop Hannibal as she drove over the curb, but Hannibal escaped. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5);

(Dkt. No. 52 at 33); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 01:58–02:01). Sixteen seconds had elapsed from

Hannibal reversing her vehicle to Deputy Ivory firing the final six rounds. (Dkt. No. 52

at 33).

Deputy Ivory pursued Hannibal in her patrol car. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5); (Dkt. No.

52 at 33–34); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 02:02–02:55). That pursuit ended at Gate 12, an exit gate.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5); (Dkt. No. 52 at 34); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 02:55–02:56). Hannibal’s vehicle

faced the exit gate, so Deputy Ivory blocked it with her patrol car. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5);

(Dkt. No. 52 at 34); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 02:55–02:56).

Deputy Ivory next used her driver door as cover, pointed her gun at Hannibal’s

vehicle, and shouted for Hannibal to “[g]et out of the car” while she waited for backup.

(Dkt. No. 52 at 34); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 02:55–02:57). After Deputy Ivory repeatedly ordered

Hannibal to exit the vehicle, Hannibal opened her door. (Dkt. No. 52 at 34); (Dkt. No. 52-

1 at 02:57–05:23). But a few minutes later, Hannibal closed it and stayed in the vehicle.

(Dkt. No. 52 at 34); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 05:23–06:51).

The Houston Police Department arrived on the scene and repeatedly used the

police intercom to direct Hannibal to exit her vehicle. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5–6); (Dkt. No. 52

at 34); (Dkt. No. 52-1 at 07:35–10:58). Again, Hannibal refused. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5–6);

(Dkt. No. 52 at 34). The Houston Police Department conducted a felony take-down arrest,

and Emergency Medical Services transported Hannibal to the hospital. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at

6); (Dkt. No. 52 at 34).

In the aftermath of this event, investigators found five bullet holes in the driver’s

side door area, one bullet hole in the roof area near the sunroof, one bullet hole in the grill

area on the front passenger’s side, one bullet hole in the window trim on the rear

passenger’s side of the vehicle, one bullet hole in the center portion of the window on the

door of the front passenger’s side, four bullet holes in the front windshield area, and two

bullet holes in the hood. (Dkt. No. 52 at 27, 29). Five of these shots struck Hannibal. (Id.

at 1, 7, 25).

Because of these injuries, Hannibal’s parents2 originally sued (1) Deputy Ivory;

(2) Harris County Constable Precinct One; and (3) Harris County, Texas (collectively,

“Defendants”) in state court on April 8, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1-1). Their claims included

excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, assault, and emotional distress. (Id. at 4–5).

2 When the incident occurred, Hannibal was seventeen years old. (Dkt. No. 52 at 2).

Defendants subsequently removed the case to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1). This

Court dismissed Defendants Harris County Constable Precinct One and Harris County,

Texas, but allowed the excessive-force claim against Deputy Ivory to proceed. (Dkt. No.

24). Later, the Court dismissed Hannibal’s parents as plaintiffs because Hannibal turned

eighteen. (Dkt. No. 26). The Court also amended the case caption to reflect the partial

dismissal and ordered Hannibal to file a new complaint under her own name. (Id.).

Hannibal subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 23,

2022. (Dkt. No. 32). In this live complaint, Hannibal brings an action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 alleging that Deputy Ivory used excessive force in violation of Hannibal’s Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 3–4). Deputy Ivory moves for summary

judgment based on qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 50).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the suit’s outcome under governing law. Renwick

v. PNK Lake Charles, LLC, 901 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). And “[a] dispute about

a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-moving party.” TIG Ins. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.

2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510). The moving party “always

bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion”

and identifying the record evidence that “it believes demonstrate[s] the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548,

2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “If the moving party fails to meet [its] initial burden, the

motion [for summary judgment] must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant’s

response.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per

curiam).

If the movant meets this burden, the nonmovant must come forward with specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355–56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

The nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by [the nonmovant’s] own affidavits,

or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Nola Spice Designs, LLC v.

Haydel Enters., 783 F.3d 527, 536 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct.

at 2553). “The nonmovant must ‘identify specific evidence in the record and . . . articulate

the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim.’” Carr v. Air Line

Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 866 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (quoting Ragas v. Tenn. Gas

Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)), as revised (July 14, 2017). If evidence is

merely colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment is appropriate.

Parrish v. Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. at 2511).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the district court views the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Carr, 866 F.3d at 601. This means

that courts must resolve factual controversies in the nonmovant’s favor, “but only

when . . . both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little, 37 F.3d at

1075.

A qualified-immunity case changes the usual summary-judgment burden of

proof. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010). “Once an official pleads the

defense, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by

establishing a genuine fact issue as to whether the official’s allegedly wrongful conduct

violated clearly established law.” Id.

To overcome a qualified-immunity defense, a plaintiff must show that (1) the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was so “clearly

established” at the time of the challenged conduct that a reasonable officer would be on

notice that their conduct was against the law. Ramirez v. Killian, 113 F.4th 415, 421 (5th

Cir. 2024) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d

1149 (2011)); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)

(“Officers sued in a civil action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have the same right

to fair notice as do defendants charged with the criminal offense defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 242.”); see also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d

523 (1987).

A plaintiff cannot establish these two prongs at the summary-judgment stage

“with conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated assertions of wrongdoing.” Burke v.

Masters, 4:23-CV-00361, 2024 WL 1703085, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 14, 2024) (first citing

Mitchell v. Mills, 895 F.3d 365, 370 (5th Cir. 2018); and then citing Williams-Boldware v.

Denton Cnty., 741 F.3d 635, 643–44 (5th Cir. 2014)). Instead, a plaintiff “must point to

specific evidence in the record demonstrating a material fact issue concerning each

element of his claim.” Mitchell, 895 F.3d at 370.

And if a video recording is provided, courts should also “‘assign greater weight,

even at the summary judgment stage, to the . . . video recording[s] taken at the scene.’”

Baker v. Coburn, 68 F.4th 240, 244 (5th Cir. 2023) (alteration in original) (quoting Betts v.

Brennan, 22 F.4th 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2022)), as revised (May 19, 2023). If “the video ‘blatantly

contradict[s]’ either party’s account,” courts “‘view[] the facts in the light depicted by the

videotape.’” Macias v. Watkins, No. 23-40580, 2024 WL 3427047, at *2 (5th Cir. July 16,

2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81, 127 S.Ct. 1769,

1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)). Otherwise, courts draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s

favor. Id. (citing Brown, 623 F.3d at 253).

III. DISCUSSION

Hannibal alleges that Deputy Ivory used excessive force in violation of her Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Dkt. No. 32 at 3–4). Qualified immunity protects

government officials from civil liability to the extent that their conduct is objectively

reasonable in light of clearly established law. Crostley v. Lamar County, 717 F.3d 410, 422

(5th Cir. 2013) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73

L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The doctrine provides government officials with “breathing room to

make reasonable but mistaken judgments and protects all but the plainly incompetent or

those who knowingly violate the law.” Davidson v. City of Stafford, 848 F.3d 384, 391 (5th

Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). To overcome this defense, a plaintiff must plead facts showing

“(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was

‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 735, 131

S.Ct. at 2080 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738).

Deputy Ivory focuses on the second prong. (Dkt. No. 50 at 1, 10–14). “The ‘clearly

established’ prong is difficult to satisfy.” Cunningham v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 191 (5th

Cir. 2020). A right is “clearly established” if it is “sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Cope v. Cogdill,

3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308,

193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam)). This standard is met only if “‘the state of the law at

the time of the incident provided fair warning to the defendants that their alleged

[conduct] was unconstitutional.’” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016)

(alteration in original) (quoting Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188

L.Ed.2d 895 (2014)). Consequently, to establish that a constitutional right was “clearly

established,” a plaintiff must identify precedent that “‘squarely govern[s]’ the specific

facts at issue.” Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 337 (5th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 15, 136 S.Ct. at 310). Courts must ask “whether the violative

nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, 136 S.Ct. at

308 (emphasis in original) (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. at 2084). This

constitutional question must be framed “‘with specificity and granularity.’” Cunningham

v. Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 193 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874–

75 (5th Cir. 2019)). In other words, a plaintiff generally must “‘identify a case in which

an officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution’

and explain ‘why the case clearly proscribed the conduct of that individual officer.’”

Cope, 3 F.4th at 205 (cleaned up) (quoting Bartlett, 981 F.3d at 345). “While an exact case

on point is not required,” the specifics of the officers’ violation must be “‘beyond

debate.’” Id. (quoting Baldwin v. Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020)). Specifically,

“‘the right’s contours [must be] sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the

officer’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.’” Baker, 68 F.4th at 245–

46 (cleaned up) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188

L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014)). Broad, general propositions of law are not enough. Cope, 3 F.4th at

205; Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742, 131 S.Ct. at 2084 (“We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.”). Put simply, “the law must

be so clearly established that—in the blink of an eye, in the middle of a high-speed

chase—every reasonable officer would know it immediately.” Martin v. Petty, 699

F.Supp.3d 547, 557 (S.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting Morrow, 917 F.3d at 876).

Hannibal points to Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2018), as

the clearly established law governing this case. (Dkt. No. 52 at 9–10). According to

Hannibal, Peña held that using a taser on a fleeing and unarmed “non-suspect” clearly

violated that individual’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 9). Therefore,

Deputy Ivory’s use of force was “suspect” and “clearly unwarranted.” (Id. at 9–10).

The Court disagrees for multiple reasons. First, Peña did not hold what Hannibal

claims it did: that using a taser on a fleeing and unarmed “non-suspect” violated clearly

established law. In fact, Peña did not address qualified immunity at all. Peña instead

held that the plaintiff sufficiently pled Fourth Amendment violations under Section 1983

against two officers but specifically declined to “decide whether said violations were

clearly established at the time of the incident.” Peña, 879 F.3d at 618–21. Instead, Peña

remanded the entire issue of qualified immunity back to the district court to decide in the

first instance. Id. at 621.

Second, the facts in Peña are not similar enough to this case to “clearly establish”

that Deputy Ivory’s conduct was unconstitutional. See Cope, 3 F.4th at 205 (explaining

that the second prong requires a plaintiff to “identify a case in which an officer acting

under similar circumstances was held to have violated the Constitution, and . . . explain

why the case clearly proscribed the conduct of that individual officer” (brackets omitted)

(quoting Joseph ex rel. Est. of Joseph, 981 F.3d at 345)). In Peña, the officer tased an unarmed

individual who was fleeing on foot, who was not a threat to officers or third parties, and

who was not suspected of a crime. Peña, 879 F.3d at 616, 619. Not so here. Hannibal did

not flee on foot as Deputy Ivory approached but drove at Deputy Ivory with her car.

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 5–6); (Dkt. No. 52 at 25, 33). Hannibal, who was armed, posed a threat

to Deputy Ivory and Schmid when she drove her car—a potentially deadly weapon—in

a dangerous manner toward them.3 See Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1273–77

(5th Cir. 1992) (observing that a vehicle can be a deadly weapon and that if an officer

believes he or others around him are in danger from the vehicle, it can be reasonable to

use deadly force). Ignoring an officer’s commands to stop, Hannibal hit a curb, stopped

only briefly, drove over it, and continued toward Schmid and Deputy Ivory’s patrol car.

3 Indeed, Hannibal has been charged with Aggravated Assault against a public servant.

(Dkt. No. 52 at 25); see Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.01, 22.02 (defining Aggravated Assault in part as

“threaten[ing] another with imminent bodily injury” using “a deadly weapon”).

(Dkt. No. 50-1 at 4–5); (Dkt. No. 52 at 33). This erratic behavior posed a threat to anyone

in the car’s vicinity, including third parties such as Schmid. Finally, Hannibal was

suspected of a crime when she fled because she was “driving erratically” and “traveling

at a high rate of speed.” (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 2); (Dkt. No. 52 at 30). These facts distinguish

this case from Peña.

The caselaw from more similar encounters favors finding qualified immunity. For

instance, the Supreme Court held that an officer did not violate a clearly established right

when she shot the defendant in the back as he tried to flee by jumping into a car, starting

it, and driving away after evading on foot. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 194–97, 199–

201, 125 S.Ct. 596, 596–600, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam). More recently, the

Supreme Court relied on Brosseau in holding that officers were entitled to qualified

immunity when they fired fifteen shots to stop the individual from continuing to flee in

his car. Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 768–70, 778–81, 134 S.Ct. at 2016–18, 2022–24. And in line

with the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit has held that a police officer was justified in

using deadly force against an accelerating car when the officer was near the car and had

an “extremely brief period of time . . . to react” to the situation. Hathaway v. Bazany, 507

F.3d 312, 322 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Irwin v. Santiago, No. 21-10020, 2021 WL 4932988, at

*3 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2021) (determining that officers who shot at the individual’s vehicle

were entitled to qualified immunity when the individual ignored commands to stop, one

officer was standing toward the front of the vehicle as it started to move, and there was

only a “brief period of time” for the officers to react).

While this Court acknowledges that “absent any other justification for the use of

force, it is unreasonable for a police officer to use deadly force against a fleeing

[individual] who does not pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others,” Lytle

v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2009), that situation is not presented here. As

explained above, Hannibal posed a threat to Deputy Ivory and a third party. Ata

minimum, the safety of Deputy Ivory and others was not so certain as to render it

“beyond debate” that Duty Ivory violated Hannibal’s constitutional rights by treating

Hannibal’s actions as life-threatening. See Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. at 2083.

Accordingly, Deputy Ivory’s use of force did not violate clearly established law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Defendant Sharmayne Ivory’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, (Dkt. No. 50), is GRANTED.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed on February 14, 2025.

R J □

DREW B. TIPTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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