PRICE v. DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

DR. MONICA A. PRICE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23cv1102

)

DURHAM PUBLIC SCHOOLS, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case comes before the undersigned United States

Magistrate Judge for a recommendation on the “Motion to Dismiss

Complaint” (Docket Entry 9)1 (the “Dismissal Motion”) filed by

Durham Public Schools (the “Defendant”). For the reasons that

follow, the Court (i) should deny the Dismissal Motion and

(ii) will deem the “Complaint for a Civil Case” (Docket Entry 1)

(the “Complaint”) amended to include the allegations in the

response to the Dismissal Motion (Docket Entry 14) (the

“Response”).

BACKGROUND

Alleging violations of “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964” (“Title VII”), the “Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967” (the “ADEA”), and “The Civil Rights Act of 1991” (Docket

1 For legibility reasons, this Opinion omits bold, all-cap,

and underscored font in all quotations from the parties’ materials.

Entry 1 at 3),2 Dr. Monica A. Price (the “Plaintiff” or “Dr.

Price”) sued Defendant, her former employer. (See id. at 1-6.)

According to the Complaint:

[Plaintiff] began working for [Defendant] on or

about September 16, 2022, as a Student Success Coach and

Testing Coordinator. Student Success Coach and Testing

Coordinator is the most recent position [Plaintiff] held.

For the duration of [her] employment, [Plaintiff]

feel[s] as though [she] ha[s] been treated less favorably

and subjected to different terms and conditions of

employment because o[f her] race, Black, and [her] age

(54). In or around October, November, and December 2022,

[Plaintiff] made several complaints to Human Resources

about the discriminatory treatment toward [Plaintiff].

In or around January, February, March, and May of 2023,

[Plaintiff] made additional complaints to Human

Resources. [Plaintiff] do[es] not believe [her]

allegations have been investigated and [Plaintiff] was

continually being treated differently. On or about April

24, 2023, [Plaintiff] received a negative review.

[Plaintiff] believe[s she] was reviewed negatively in

retaliation for [her] aforementioned complaints regarding

discrimination. In or around June 2023, [Plaintiff’s]

contract was not renewed. [Plaintiff] appealed the

decision to not renew [her] contract through the Durham

County School Board and the decision was upheld.

[Plaintiff] believe[s her] contract was not renewed

because of [her] aforementioned complaints, as well as

[her] age and race.

(Id. at 6.) The Complaint further asserts:

The wrongs against . . . Plaintiff[] are continuing

until this date being that [Plaintiff] continue[s] to

have to report to other educational entities that [her]

contract was non-renewed due to [Plaintiff] being accused

of being a non-diversity friendly employee. [Plaintiff]

was recommended for several positions, but at the point

that [a] reference was requested from [Defendant], the

employment opportunity was denied. The actual damages on

2 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’s

pagination.

2

[Plaintiff’s] personal property, pain and suffering,

reputation, [sic] are still being accrued and

[Plaintiff’s] personal property loss is still of issue.

(Id. at 4.)

Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint “pursuant to Rule

12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (the “Rules”).

(Docket Entry 9 at 1.) Per the Dismissal Motion, “Plaintiff has

failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and has failed to

state any claims upon which relief may be granted. As a result,

Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).”

(Id.) Notably, ignoring the Complaint’s assertions regarding

retaliation and violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991

(see Docket Entry 1 at 3-4, 6), Defendant’s memorandum in support

of the Dismissal Motion maintains that “Plaintiff’s Complaint

attempts to allege two claims (1) race discrimination in violation

of Title VII and (2) age in discrimination in violation of the

[ADEA]” (Docket Entry 10 at 1). Defendant accordingly limits its

dismissal arguments to Plaintiff’s claims for race and age

discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. (See, e.g., id. at 4-

7 (arguing for dismissal of Plaintiff’s VII and ADEA discrimination

claims).)

Less than twenty-one days after Defendant filed the Dismissal

Motion, Plaintiff filed the Response. (Compare Docket Entry 9 at

2, with Docket Entry 14 at 1.) Addressing the challenged claims,

the Response provides significant factual detail in support of

3

Plaintiff’s ADEA and Title VII discrimination claims. (See Docket

Entry 14 at 1-7.) For instance, the Response explains “that the

prejudicial behavior of [Plaintiff’s] principal Mrs. Crystal

Medlin[] interfered with [Plaintiff’s] work and ultimately led to

her dismissal” from her remote position at Ignite Online Academy

notwithstanding that Plaintiff “is an expert on the digital divide

and online learning.” (Id. at 3.) According to the Response, Mrs.

Medlin, inter alia, docked Plaintiff’s pay and “presented

information to Human Resources to support [Mrs. Medlin’s] efforts

to remove Dr. Price from her job,” an act “in congruence with what

is believed to be Mrs. Medlin’s overall desire to replace Dr. Price

with a Caucasian, female colleague” (id.; see also id. at 5

(discussing said colleague)). (See id. at 3-4.) The Response

further asserts that “a warning letter was placed in Dr. Price’s

personnel file” (id. at 3) and that Plaintiff remained subject to

an “incorrect performance rubric” that “did not seem to correspond

with Dr. Price’s duties as Student Success Coach and Testing

Coordinator” (id. at 4).

Moreover, per the Response, “[s]hortly after Dr. Price had to

go to DPS Human Resource for help, Mrs. Medlin began to get Dr.

Price’s African American colleagues to take over her work without

her knowing[,] interfering with testing reporting duties.” (Id. at

5.) The Response additionally identifies as “just a few of the

specific examples of the prejudicial and inappropriate behavior by

4

Mrs. Medlin” (id. at 4) the following allegations related to

Plaintiff’s age and race discrimination claims:

There are multiple, documented occasions where Dr.

Price’s actions were reprimanded, and her Caucasian

colleagues’ same actions were allowed and praised.

Specifically, her Caucasian colleagues were allowed to

conduct surveys to receive feedback, but when Dr. Price

did the same, she was strongly reprimanded by Mrs.

Medlin.

Mrs. Medlin asked Dr. Price to present in a faculty

learning community meeting and in the middle of the

meeting, she told Dr. Price that she would not be using

her data, would be taking over the meeting, and would be

using the data of the Caucasian counterpart instead.

However, Mrs. Medlin did not know that the data was

practically identical except for a different color scheme

change for organization and updates. Mrs. Medlin said in

front of the group that Dr. Price’s presentation was

“colorful” but the Caucasian colleague’s information was

the one that she would use as correct.

*****

Mrs. Medlin stated that one of Dr. Price’s Caucasian

colleagues had done a great job with assisting with

testing when Dr. Price had to be away on an occasion.

She stated that the colleague had just had a baby and

insinuated that the position would be good for her to

work from home in the presence of Dr. Price.

Dr. Price is not of the traditional child-bearing

age, so Mrs. Medlin valued the colleague’s age and

childcare needs more than the need to have the

flexibility to take care of Dr. Price’s elderly parents.

Dr. Price believes that skin color allowed Mrs.

Medlin to identify who should be prioritized. She valued

higher the needs of the Caucasian colleague to have Dr.

Price’s job. She has prejudicial beliefs that Dr. Price

should not be in leadership, that Dr. Price’s supposed

inferiority would be the blame if things went wrong, and

that Dr. Price should do as she was told even if it was

untruthful.

(Id. at 4-5 (internal paragraph lettering omitted).)

5

In reply, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff’s claims remain

subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. (See Docket Entry 15 (the “Reply”) at 1-2.) The Reply

further asserts that “[t]he additional factual allegations raised

for the first time in Plaintiff’s Response still do not state a

colorable claim under Title VII or the ADEA.” (Id. at 2.)

Defendant thus urges the Court to grant the Dismissal Motion. (See

id. at 3.)

DISCUSSION

I. Relevant Standards

A. Rule 12 (b) (6)

A Rule 12 (b) (6) motion “tests the sufficiency of a complaint,”

but “does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of

a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Republican Party of

N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis

added) .° Accordingly, in reviewing a Rule 12(b) (6) motion, the

Court must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and

construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of App., 626 F.3d 187, 189 (4th Cir. 2010),

aff’d sub nom., Coleman v. Court of App. of Md., 566 U.S. 30

(2012). The Court must also “draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon

3 As such, “claims lacking merit may be dealt with through

summary judgment under Rule 56” rather than through a Rule 12 (b) (6)

motion. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).

Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Moreover, a pro se complaint must “be liberally

construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the Court

“will not accept legal conclusions couched as facts or unwarranted

inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” United States

ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda Pharms. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455

(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008)

(explaining that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth

Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermine [the] requirement that

a pleading contain more than labels and conclusions” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). The Court can also “put aside any naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” SD3, LLC v.

Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 422 (4th Cir. 2015), as

amended on reh’g in part (Oct. 29, 2015) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

To avoid Rule 12(b) (6) dismissal, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual allegations “to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). To qualify as plausible, a claim needs sufficient factual

content to support a reasonable inference of the defendant’s

liability for the alleged misconduct. See id. The complaint need

not contain detailed factual recitations, but must provide the

defendant “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation

marks and ellipsis omitted). Thus, although a plaintiff must

allege sufficient facts “to state all the elements of her claim,”

Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d Jol, 765 (4th Cir.

2003), she need not plead facts constituting a McDonnell Douglas

prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss,

see Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 514-15 (2002)

(analyzing Title VII and ADEA claims).

B. Title VII Standards

Under Title VII, it constitutes “an unlawful employment

practice for an employer,” inter alia, “to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual

with respect to hl[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or

privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1).* For Title VII purposes, liability

attaches if “race .. .was a motivating factor” for the challenged

“employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the

practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see also Kortor v. Forest at

Duke, No. 1:23cv834, 2024 WL 4367185, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 30,

4 Title VII “also prohibits retaliation against persons who

assert rights under [Title VII].” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587

U.S. 541, 543 (2019).

2024) (“An employer will be held liable for racial . . .

discrimination if ‘a protected characteristic [is] a “motivating

factor” in an employment decision.’” (brackets in original)

(quoting E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S.

768, 773 (2015))). Accordingly, to state a Title VII

discrimination claim, a “plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to

raise a plausible inference that h[er] employer discharged [or

otherwise treated her adversely in the terms or conditions of

employment] because of h[er] race,” Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th

293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022) (analyzing Title VII unlawful discharge

claim). See, e.g., Rageh v. University of N.C., No. 1:24cv336,

2024 WL 5056448, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2024) (analyzing Title

VII discrimination claim and concluding that plaintiff “alleged

sufficient facts to state a Title VII national origin

discrimination claim to the extent that he bases his claim on

denial of training opportunities”).

C. ADEA Standards

The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge

any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual

. . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). For

an “age discrimination claim, [a plaintiff] must allege facts

plausibly supporting the inference that (1) [s]he was ‘over the age

of 40,’ (2) [s]he ‘experienced discrimination by an employer,’ and

(3) the discrimination was ‘because of h[er] age.’” Rageh, 2024 WL

9

5056448, at *2 (quoting Tickles v. Johnson, 805 F. App’x 204, 207

(4th Cir. 2020)). Moreover:

Age must be the but-for cause of an adverse employment

action, Palmer v. Liberty Univ., Inc., 72 F.4th 52, 67

(4th Cir. 2023), but a plaintiff “need not establish

but-for causation to survive a motion to dismiss.”

Lattinville-Pace v. Intelligent Waves LLC, No. 22-1144,

2024 WL 1756167, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 24, 2024). “[A]

plaintiff need only plead sufficient facts to plausibly

support a claim of discrimination.” Id.

The adverse employment action does not need to be

significant. Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346,

355 (2024). Rather, a plaintiff need only allege “some

injury respecting her employment terms or conditions.”

Id. at 359 (stating employee’s allegations that she was

transferred and given fewer responsibilities would

constitute an adverse employment action even though her

rank and pay remained the same); see also Grant v. N.C.

Dep’t of Transp., No. 23-CV-702, 2024 WL 2789388, at *3

(E.D.N.C. May 30, 2024) (applying Muldrow to an ADEA

claim).

Rageh, 2024 WL 5056448, at *2-3.

II. Analysis

A. Amendment

As an initial matter, Plaintiff filed the Response, which

contains additional factual information regarding her Title VII and

ADEA discrimination claims (see Docket Entry 14 at 1-7), less than

twenty-one days after Defendant moved to dismiss those claims for

lack of supporting factual allegations (see Docket Entry 10 at 5-

7). (Compare Docket Entry 9 at 2, with Docket Entry 14 at 1.)

Pursuant to Rule 15, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a

matter of course no later than,” as relevant here, “21 days after

service of a motion under Rule 12(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P.

10

15(a)(1)(B). Given that Plaintiff (i) possessed the right to amend

her pleadings at the time she filed the Response and (ii) proceeds

pro se, the Court will deem the Complaint amended to include the

factual allegations in the Response.

Amending a complaint “normally moots a pending motion to

dismiss.” Flanagan v. Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC, No. 1:17cv202,

2017 WL 3328168, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 3, 2017). Here, however,

Defendant addressed the Response in its Reply, arguing that the

facts set out in the Response do not impact resolution of the

Dismissal Motion. (See Docket Entry 15 at 2.) “Under the

circumstances, the Court will ‘consider the Dismissal Motion as

being addressed to the [Complaint as deemed amended by the

Response].’” Flanagan, 2017 WL 3328168, at *2 (brackets omitted)

(quoting 6 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2017)); see also Brumfield v. McCann, No.

2:12cv1481, 2013 WL 943807, at *2-3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 11, 2013)

(granting motion to amend complaint, but concluding that court

could still consider pending dismissal motions, and collecting

cases).

B. Administrative Exhaustion

Turning to the Dismissal Motion, Defendant asserts that the

Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination

11

claims for lack of administrative exhaustion. (See, e.g., Docket

Entry 10 at 5.)° This argument misses the mark.

“As a precondition to the commencement of a Title VII action

in court, a complainant must first file a charge with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission” (the “EEOC”), Fort Bend Cnty. v.

Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543 (2019); “[h]owever, ‘[p]rerequisites to

suit like Title VII’s charge-filing instruction are not’

jurisdictional; rather, ‘they are properly ranked among the array

of claim-processing rules that must be timely raised to come into

play,’” Bush v. Frederick Cnty. Pub. Schs., No. 23-1127, 2024 WL

639255, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024) (quoting Davis, 587 U.S. at

5 Rather than restricting its argument to the assertion that

Plaintiff’s pleadings did not mention or otherwise evidence the

filing of a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(the “EEOC”), Defendant’s memoranda repeatedly maintain that

“Plaintiff has not filed a charge of discrimination before the

EBEROC” (Docket Entry 15 at 2; see also Docket Entry 10 at 5

(“Plaintiff filed her Complaint alleging claims under Title VII and

the ADEA without first raising her claim before the EEOC.”)) and

that, “‘[b]ecause Plaintiff failed to file a charge of

discrimination’ with the EEOC, her Title VII and ADEA claims ‘must

be dismissed with prejudice’” (Docket Entry 10 at 5; accord Docket

Entry 15 at 3). Notably, though, after Defendant filed the Reply,

Plaintiff filed a copy of a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC dated

long before Defendant filed the Dismissal Motion, addressed to

Plaintiff with a “Cc:” to Defendant’s address. (See Docket Entry

16 at 1-5; see also Docket Entry 1 at 2.) Although consideration

of the Dismissal Motion will remain focused on the Complaint as

amended by the Response, see, e.g., E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 448,

this filing calls into serious question the veracity of Defendant’s

assertion that “Plaintiff has not filed a charge of discrimination

before the EEOC” (Docket Entry 15 at 2). Defendant’s counsel

should take care to ensure the accuracy of representations made to

the Court. See Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508,

519 (4th Cir. 2018).

12

543-44).6 “That is, a defendant must raise this issue as an

affirmative defense.” Id. Moreover, “the burden of establishing

the affirmative defense rests on the defendant.” Goodman v.

Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Importantly, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “generally cannot reach

the merits of an affirmative defense.” Id. Thus,

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which addresses the

sufficiency of the complaint, generally does not enable

the [C]ourt to determine whether the exhaustion

requirement has been satisfied or whether it has been

waived or should be excused, because exhaustion is

treated as an affirmative defense. When, however, facts

sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense[,] such as

exhaustion[,] are alleged in the complaint, the defense

may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule

12(b)(6). But this principle applies only in the

relatively rare circumstances when all facts necessary to

the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the

complaint. And even to succeed in these rare

circumstances, the defendant must show that the

plaintiff’s potential response to the affirmative defense

was foreclosed by the allegations in the complaint.

L.N.P. v. Kijakazi, 64 F.4th 577, 585-86 (4th Cir. 2023) (brackets,

citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the Complaint and Response lack any information

regarding whether Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC. (See

Docket Entries 1, 14.) Accordingly, the Court does not confront

“the relatively rare circumstance[] where . . . . all facts

necessary to the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of

6 “Courts in the Fourth Circuit have applied Davis to the

ADEA, which has a similar administrative exhaustion requirement.”

Yang v. Lai, No. 1:22cv5, 2022 WL 2440834, at *3 (M.D.N.C. July 5,

2022).

13

the complaint,” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original), precluding Rule

12(b)(6) relief on this ground, see id. at 466. The Court should

therefore reject Defendant’s administrative exhaustion argument.

C. Discrimination Claims

Defendant also contends that “Plaintiff fails to state . . .

colorable [Title VII and ADEA discrimination] claim[s].” (Docket

Entry 10 at 5.) In particular, Defendant asserts that “the

Complaint is entirely devoid of any allegations of a connection

between any alleged discriminatory treatment and any alleged

adverse employment action.” (Id. at 6.) As discussed above,

Plaintiff responded to this contention by offering additional

factual allegations in support of the challenged claims. (See

Docket Entry 14 at 1-7.) Nevertheless, the Reply maintains that

“[t]he additional factual allegations raised for the first time in

Plaintiff’s Response still do not state a colorable claim under

Title VII or the ADEA.” (Docket Entry 15 at 2.) This argument

falls short.

As an initial matter, Defendant fails to develop its argument

regarding the Response’s purported deficiencies. Instead, as the

final paragraph in its “Argument” section, which (i) contains a

singular heading proclaiming that “Plaintiff’s Response to the

[Dismissal Motion] does not address her failure to exhaust

administrative remedies” (id. at 1) and (ii) otherwise focuses

14

exclusively on administrative exhaustion (see id. at 1-2), the

Reply asserts:

The additional factual allegations raised for the

first time in Plaintiff’s Response still do not state a

colorable claim under Title VII or the ADEA. Even if

they could establish such a claim, which they cannot,

they are allegations that must be brought before the EEOC

before Plaintiff may file suit in federal court. Walton

v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 172 (4th Cir. 2022) (“It is well

settled that before filing suit under Title VII or the

ADEA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative

remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC.” (citing 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d))).

(Docket Entry 15 at 2.)

“It is not the Court’s job to undertake the analysis and legal

research needed to support a perfunctory argument, nor should a

party expect [the C]ourt to do the work that [the party] elected

not to do.” Hill v. Carvana, LLC, No. 1:22cv37, 2022 WL 1625020,

at *5 (M.D.N.C. May 23, 2022) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The failure to develop this argument alone

justifies its denial. See, e.g., Sanders v. Colvin, No. 1:14cv163,

2015 WL 471588, at *8 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 4, 2015) (observing that,

because party failed to develop argument, “[t]he Court could deny

relief on that ground alone,” and collecting cases), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:14cv163, 2015 WL 12564213 (M.D.N.C.

Mar. 6, 2015); see also Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d

307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives an argument . . . by

failing to develop its argument — even if its brief takes a passing

15

shot at the issue.” (brackets and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

In any event, construed liberally in light of Plaintiff’s pro

se status, see Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and with all reasonable

inferences drawn in her favor, see E.I. du Pont, 637 F.3d at 440,

the Complaint as deemed amended by the Response plausibly alleges

Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims. The Complaint identifies

Plaintiff as a “Black” woman aged “54” who worked “as a Student

Success Coach and Testing Coordinator” for Defendant between

September 2022 and June 2023, when “[her] contract was not

renewed.” (Docket Entry 1 at 6.) According to the Response, her

role at Ignite Online Academy allowed Plaintiff, “an expert on the

digital divide and online learning,” “to work remotely” until “the

prejudicial behavior of her principal Mrs. Crystal Medlin[]

interfered with [Plaintiff’s] work and ultimately led to her

dismissal.” (Docket Entry 14 at 3.) As examples of this conduct,

the Response asserts that, on multiple occasions, Plaintiff’s

“actions were reprimanded,” but “her Caucasian colleagues’ same

actions were allowed and praised,” including specifically on the

use of “surveys to receive feedback.” (Id. at 4.) The Response

further asserts that, in the middle of Plaintiff’s presentation at

a faculty learning community meeting, Mrs. Medlin “told [Plaintiff]

that [Mrs. Medlin] would not be using [Plaintiff’s] data, would be

taking over the meeting, and would be using the data of the

16

Caucasian counterpart instead,” even though “the data was

practically identical except for a different color scheme change

for organization and updates.” (Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 5

(“Mrs. Medlin said in front of the group that [Plaintiff’s]

presentation was ‘colorful’ but the Caucasian colleague’s

information was the one that she would use as correct.”).)

Moreover, per the Response, Mrs. Medlin (i) praised the work

of one of Plaintiff’s “Caucasian colleagues” who “assist[ed] with

testing when [Plaintiff] had to be away on an occasion” and

(ii) “stated that the colleague had just had a baby and insinuated

that [Plaintiff’s] position would be good for [the colleague] to

work from home in the presence of [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 5.) The

Response maintains that, as Plaintiff “is not of the traditional

child-bearing age, . . . Mrs. Medlin valued the colleague’s age and

childcare needs more than [Plaintiff’s] need to have the

flexibility to take care of [her] elderly parents.” (Id.)

Additionally, according to the Response, Mrs. Medlin “presented

information to Human Resources to support her efforts to remove

[Plaintiff] from her job,” an action “in congruence with what is

believed to be Mrs. Medlin’s overall desire to replace [Plaintiff]

with [that] Caucasian, female colleague.” (Id. at 3.)

“These allegations plausibly allege that Plaintiff’s race and

[age] directly resulted in her being treated differently from other

employees and that she was specifically targeted for adverse

17

treatment because of these characteristics, resulting eventually in

her termination . . . .” Kortor, 2024 WL 4367185, at *4; see

also Rageh, 2024 WL 5056448, at *3 (concluding that the plaintiff

“alleged sufficient facts to state an ADEA discrimination claim

based on denial of training opportunities,” where “[h]e alleges

that he was over 40 years old during his fellowship, and that Dr.

Zhang, who supervised [the plaintiff] on behalf of [the defendant],

provided him with fewer training opportunities than younger

residents, eventually refusing to train him,” after “express[ing]

concerns about [the plaintiff’s] age before his fellowship even

started” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Title VII

and ADEA discrimination claims survive Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6)

challenge. The Court should therefore deny the Dismissal Motion.

See, e.g., Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299 (vacating Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissal of unlawful termination claim, “find[ing] the[ alleged]

facts sufficient to raise the inference of a Title VII violation

above a speculative level,” even though “[the] complaint [wa]s thin

on facts (as opposed to conclusions) suggesting racial motivation,”

as “[its] pretext allegations . . . support[ed] an inference of

race discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

CONCLUSION

Given the timing of Plaintiff’s assertion of additional

factual allegations and her pro se status, the Court will deem her

pleadings amended. Given that amendment, Plaintiff plausibly

18

alleges Title VII and ADEA claims for race and age discrimination.

Additionally, Defendant’s administrative exhaustion argument fails

at this stage of the proceedings.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Complaint (Docket Entry 1) is

DEEMED AMENDED to include the factual allegations in the Response

(Docket Entry 14).

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court deny the Dismissal Motion

(Docket Entry 9).

This 18th day of February, 2025.

/s/ L. Patrick Auld

L. Patrick Auld

United States Magistrate Judge

19