Jones v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr.

[Cite as Jones v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 2025-Ohio-517.]

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

KIMBERLY JONES Case No. 2023-00266JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler

Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

v.

DECISION

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

WEXNER MEDICAL CENTER

Defendant

{¶1} On September 12, 2024, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

pursuant to Civ.R. 56(B), asserting that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

because Plaintiff cannot prevail on her claims of unlawful age and sex discrimination.

Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition, and Defendant filed a reply in support.

Pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D), the Motion for Summary Judgment is now fully briefed and is

before the Court for a non-oral hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Standard of Review

{¶2} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in

Civ.R. 56(C), which states, in part:

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in

the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule.

“[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court of the basis

for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the trial court which

Case No. 2023-00266JD -2- DECISION

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the

nonmoving party’s claim.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996).

{¶3} To meet this initial burden, the moving party must be able to point to

evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292-293. If the moving party

meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R.

56(E), which provides that “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise

provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.”

{¶4} When considering the evidence, “[a]ny doubt must be resolved in favor of the

non-moving party.” Pingue v. Hyslop, 2002-Ohio-2879, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). It is well-

established that granting summary judgment is not appropriate unless, construing the

evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party: (1) there is no genuine issue of

material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and

(3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to

the nonmoving party. Robinette v. Orthopedics, Inc., 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2038, 7 (10th

Dist. May 4, 1999).

Statement of Facts

{¶5} Plaintiff was hired in 2017, at the age of 48, as Director of Central Sterile

Supply (CSS) by Defendant. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) As Director, Plaintiff oversaw the surgical

instrument decontamination and sterilization process which serviced the entirety of OSU’s

healthcare system. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) At the time of Plaintiff’s hiring, her direct supervisor

was Armin Rahmanian, Administrator of Perioperative Services and Critical Care.

(Complaint, ¶ 11; Jones Deposition, p. 19.)

{¶6} In 2017, while under Rahmanian’s supervision, Plaintiff attended many

meetings to discuss surgical instruments that some of Defendant’s providers found to be

unsanitary, which resulted in surgeries being delayed. (Jones Deposition, pp. 25-26.)

Plaintiff routinely sparred with stakeholders, pushing back on what she felt were non-

evidence-based approaches utilized by physicians. (Id.) After these meetings, multiple

complaints were filed against Plaintiff for her demeanor and body language. (Id.) After

Case No. 2023-00266JD -3- DECISION

one such meeting, Brenda Kendall, Administrator of Surgical Services, suggested

professionalism coaching. (Id. at pp. 32-35.) In response to these complaints and her

experience in these meetings, Plaintiff requested and received coaching from a

professionalism coach who worked in Defendant’s human resources department. (Id. at

pp. 18, 26.)

{¶7} In February 2021, Defendant opened a new offsite processing center to

service newly incorporated facilities, and some of CSS’s work shifted to that building, but

according to Plaintiff CSS did not have the budget to adequately staff its operations. (Id.

at pp. 2, 29, 52-53.) By May 2021, CSS was experiencing high employee turnover and

overtime rates and CSS “began to see the operations start to fall apart in May of ‘21.” (Id.

at pp. 24, 62.) Rahmanian, Plaintiff’s supervisor, resigned in June 2021. (Id. at p. 24.)

Plaintiff then temporarily reported to Rahmanian’s supervisor, Dennis Delisle, who put

together a team of stakeholders to address issues with CSS and directed Plaintiff to hire

traveling staff and provided other assistance. (Id. at p. 62.)

{¶8} In August 2021, Defendant hired Benjamin Lawler as Business Operations

Manager for CSS. (Complaint, ¶ 14.) Lawler reported to and was under the supervision

of Plaintiff. Id. On December 6, 2021, Defendant hired Calen Bowshier as Administrator

for Perioperative Services, and he became Plaintiff’s direct supervisor at that time.

(Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 4.) It is undisputed that in August 2022, Bowshier gave Plaintiff a

less favorable performance evaluation than she had received in the past from

Rahmanian, and on October 11, 2022, Defendant placed Plaintiff on a Performance

Improvement Plan (PIP). There is no dispute that Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s

employment as Director of CSS on October 27, 2022, and rather than appointing anyone

to the position of Director of CSS, Defendant subsequently promoted Lawler, a male, who

was 33, to Interim Director of Business Operations for CSS, and promoted Jennifer

Baughman, a woman, who was 40, to Interim Associate Director of Clinical Operations

for CSS (Lawler Deposition, p. 15; Baughman Deposition, p. 35.)

{¶9} On April 6, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this action asserting claims of age

discrimination under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.

620, et seq., and R.C. 4112.14, as well as sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and R.C. 4112.02.

Case No. 2023-00266JD -4- DECISION

Law and Analysis

{¶10} “The ADEA prohibits an employer from discharging an individual ‘because

of such individual’s age.’ 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Section 4112.14 of the Ohio Revised

Code provides that no employer shall ‘discharge without just cause any employee aged

forty or older who is physically able to perform the duties and otherwise meets the

established requirements of the job.’” Blizzard v. Marion Tech. College, 698 F.3d 275,

282-283 (6th Cir. 2012), quoting R.C. 4112.14(A). “Age discrimination claims brought

under the Ohio statute are ‘analyzed under the same standards as federal claims brought

under the [ADEA].’” Id. at 283, quoting Wharton v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 309 F. Appx. 990,

995 (6th Cir. 2009).

{¶11} “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from

discriminating against any employee with respect to her terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment, because of the employee's sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).” Million v.

Warren Cty., 440 F.Supp.3d 859, 869 (S.D.Ohio 2020).

{¶12} Similarly, R.C. 4112.02 provides, in pertinent part, that:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For any employer,

because of the . . . sex . . . of any person, to discharge without just cause,

to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with

respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or

any other matter directly or indirectly related to employment.

In Ohio, “federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section

2000(e) et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged

violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.” Little Forest Med. Ctr. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 61

Ohio St.3d 607, 609-610 (1991); see also Laderach v. U-Haul, 207 F.3d 825, 828 (6th

Cir. 2000) (“the elements and legal standards for establishing unlawful sex discrimination

are the same under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02 and under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2”).

{¶13} “‘To prevail in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove

discriminatory intent’ and may establish such intent through either direct or indirect

methods of proof.” Dautartas v. Abbott Labs., 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), quoting

Ricker v. John Deere Ins. Co., 133 Ohio App.3d 759, 766 (10th Dist. 1998).

Case No. 2023-00266JD -5- DECISION

{¶14} “[D]irect evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion

that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s

actions.” Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods. Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926

(6th Cir.1999). Direct evidence “does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in

order to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part

by prejudice against members of the protected group.” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d

858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003). In order for a statement to be evidence of an unlawful

employment decision, plaintiff must show a nexus between the improper motive and the

decision making process or personnel. Birch v. Cuyahoga Cty. Probate Court., 2007-

Ohio-6189, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). “Accordingly, courts consider: (1) whether the comments

were made by a decision maker; (2) whether the comments were related to the decision

making process; (3) whether they were more than vague, isolated or ambiguous; and (4)

whether they were proximate in time to the act of alleged discrimination.” Id. “[S]tray

remarks, remarks by non-decision makers, comments that are vague, ambiguous, or

isolated, and comments that are not proximate in time to the act of termination” do not

constitute direct evidence. Johnson v. Kroger Co., 160 F. Supp.2d 846, 853 (S.D.Ohio

2001), rev’d on other grounds, 319 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2003).

{¶15} Plaintiff does not argue that there is direct evidence of age or sex

discrimination in this case. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that her claims of unlawful

discrimination on the basis of age and sex can be demonstrated through the indirect

method of proof. (Response, p. 16.) See Geller v. Henry Cty. Bd. of Ed., 613 Fed.Appx.

494, 499 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Geller does not argue that he has direct evidence of age

discrimination. Accordingly, his case is reviewed under the standard for circumstantial

evidence.”).

{¶16} Establishing discriminatory intent through the indirect method of proof is

subject to the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Nist v. Nexeo Solutions, LLC, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31 (10th

Dist.). In addition to applying the McDonnell Douglas framework to discrimination claims

under Title VII, “Federal courts also have adapted the McDonnell Douglas Corp.

framework to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

Case No. 2023-00266JD -6- DECISION

("ADEA"), 81 Stat. 602, as amended, Section 621 et seq., Title 29, U.S.Code.” Coryell v.

Bank One Trust Co. N.A., 2004-Ohio-723, ¶ 10.

{¶17} “Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first present evidence from which

a reasonable [trier of fact] could conclude that there exists a prima facie case of

discrimination.” Turner v. Shahed Ents., 2011-Ohio-4654, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). “In order to

establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she: (1) was a

member of the statutorily protected class, (2) suffered an adverse employment action, (3)

was qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by a person outside the protected

class or that the employer treated a similarly situated, non-protected person more

favorably.” Nelson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2017-Ohio-514, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.). “If the plaintiff

meets her initial burden, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer ‘evidence of a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for’ the adverse action . . . . If the defendant meets

its burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s

proffered reason was actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Turner at ¶ 14.

{¶18} Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the fourth prong of the

McDonnell Douglas framework, since, according to Defendant, Plaintiff was not replaced.

Rather, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s job duties were redistributed between Lawler

and Baughman. (Motion, p. 12.) In response, Plaintiff points to case law establishing

that replacement can be shown even when duties are split among existing employees.

(Response, p. 23.) However, Defendant additionally argues that, even if Plaintiff were

able to make out a prima face, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis

that Plaintiff cannot present evidence to support a finding that Defendant’s reasons for

terminating her employment were pretext for discrimination on the basis of age of

sex. (Motion, p. 12.)

{¶19} Upon review, the Court need not resolve whether Plaintiff can establish a

prima facie case, as Defendant’s latter argument is dispositive since Plaintiff does not

meet the ultimate burden of demonstrating pretext in this case. See Tanksley v. Howell,

2020-Ohio-4278, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.) (finding no need to address plaintiff’s prima facie case

as plaintiff did not meet the ultimate burden of demonstrating pretext). There is no

question of material fact that Defendant had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

Case No. 2023-00266JD -7- DECISION

terminating Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff cannot show that Defendant’s proffered

reasons were pretext for discrimination on the basis of age or sex. Id.

{¶20} Defendant asserts that it terminated Plaintiff’s employment based on her

“Unsatisfactory Job Performance”, as related to Plaintiff in a letter from Defendant’s

Human Resources department formally notifying Plaintiff of the termination on

October 27, 2022. (Jones Deposition, Exhibit H.)

{¶21} There is no dispute that in her most recent annual performance evaluation,

in August 2022, Plaintiff was rated lower than she had been in previous evaluations, and

received a two percent salary increase indicative of being a “low performer.” (Jones

Deposition, p. 125.) There is also no dispute that, even if Plaintiff’s former supervisor,

Rahmanian, had given her more favorable evaluations than did her new supervisor,

Bowshier, Plaintiff had been at odds with stakeholders in other departments of

Defendant’s healthcare system from early on in her tenure and CSS “began to see the

operations start to fall apart in May of ‘21”, shortly before Rahmanian resigned. (Id. at p.

24.) Defendant submitted an affidavit from Bowshier in which he avers, in part:

6. After Ms. Jones’ performance evaluation in August of 2022, I began

receiving reports from key stakeholders (surgeons, department leaders, and staff)

that CSS was struggling. It concerned me that these other leaders were reporting

concerns directly and bypassing Ms. Jones.

7. On September 13, 2022, Ms. Jones did not attend a previously-scheduled

meeting with OSUWMC HR Consultant Kelly Robertson and me, and did not

promptly respond to my attempts to reach her. The meeting was to discuss Senior

and Lead OC positions.

8. My overarching concern with Ms. Jones’ performance was her lack of

effective leadership, poor communication, and failure to proactively and

strategically address the root causes of recurring issues and ongoing

dissatisfaction with CSS from within perioperative services at large and CSS itself.

9. To address ongoing performance issues, I placed Ms. Jones on a

performance improvement plan (“PIP”).

(Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 6-9.)

Case No. 2023-00266JD -8- DECISION

{¶22} Bowshier goes on to state that when he met with Plaintiff on October 11,

2022, to discuss the need for the PIP, Plaintiff “did not take any accountability for the

failures in her department”, and instead blamed others and expressed disbelief that

Bowshier had received complaints from stakeholders. (Id. at ¶ 10; Exhibit A.) Bowshier

avers that, following the implementation of the PIP, he “continued to receive complaints

and concerns about performance issues with CSS”, and he kept a detailed log of these

communications. (Id. at ¶ 12.) For example, among other things, Bowshier noted

instances of perioperative leadership bypassing Plaintiff to report issues such as

contaminated surgical instruments directly to him, Plaintiff failing to notify him of staff

leaving CSS, and negative feedback he received directly from CSS staff. (Bowshier

Affidavit, Exhibit B, p. 3.)

{¶23} In addition to these concerns, Bowshier avers, “CSS was experiencing high

turnover rate among managers, supervisors, and frontline staff” and in his view Plaintiff

“did not demonstrate that she would address concerns with her performance, including

her lack of effective leadership, poor communication, and failure to proactively and

strategically address the root causes of recurring issues and ongoing dissatisfaction with

CSS from within perioperative services at large and CSS itself.” (Bowshier Affidavit, ¶

13-14.)

{¶24} Bowshier states in his affidavit that “[a]s a result of the compounding

problems at CSS and high turnover rate under Ms. Jones’ directorship, I recommended

she be terminated.” (Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 16.) In a letter to the human resources

department formally requesting that Plaintiff’s employment be terminated, Bowshier gave

a detailed explanation as to why he felt Plaintiff fell below expectations in several areas,

including her relationship management with the Supply Chain and Hospital Pavilion

Perioperative departments; her execution of projects and initiatives; not sharing

information with leadership and staff; not sharing information with Bowshier about

leadership changes in CSS including the loss of managers, supervisors, and frontline

staff; not escalating key issues to Bowshier; not proactively addressing department

challenges; and, Bowshier also noted negative feedback and concerns he received from

key stakeholders, as well as his belief that Plaintiff was not addressing the focus areas in

Case No. 2023-00266JD -9- DECISION

her PIP confidentially. (Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 16, Exhibit C.) It is undisputed that

Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment on October 27, 2022.

{¶25} The Court finds that Defendant has presented evidence that its termination

of Plaintiff’s employment was for legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, i.e.

unsatisfactory job performance. See Brown v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 814 Fed.Appx. 72, 80

(6th Cir. 2020) (poor job performance is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for an

adverse employment action); Brown v. Ohio State Univ., 616 F.Supp.2d 740, 751

(S.D.Ohio 2009) (“Reasons such as lack of leadership and management skills, the failure

to accept problems within her responsibility . . . and poor communication are legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons for an employee's demotion or termination.”). The burden

therefore shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether Defendant’s proffered reason for terminating her employment was merely

pretext for discrimination on the basis of age or sex.

{¶26} To establish pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the proffered reason

(1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s challenged conduct,

or (3) was insufficient to warrant the challenged conduct. Dews v. A.B. Dick Co., 231

F.3d 1016, 1021 (6th Cir. 2000). “Regardless of which option is used, the plaintiff retains

the ultimate burden of producing ‘sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably

reject [the defendants’] explanation and infer that the defendants intentionally

discriminated against [her].’” Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003),

quoting Braithwaite v. Timken Co., 258 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2001). A reason cannot

be proved to be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was

false, and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502, 515 (1993); see also Knepper v. Ohio State Univ., 2011-Ohio-6054, ¶ 12 (10th

Dist.). “The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Texas Dept. of

Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

{¶27} In her response, Plaintiff argues that insofar as Bowshier’s affidavit in

support of the Motion for Summary Judgment identified “three ‘overarching’ performance

reasons for [her] termination”, those reasons “are not factual, were not motivat[ion for]

Jones’ termination, and were insufficient to motivate Jones’ termination.” (Response, p.

Case No. 2023-00266JD -10- DECISION

22.) Specifically, in his affidavit Bowshier explained that before deciding to put Plaintiff

on a PIP, his “overarching concern with [Plaintiff’s] performance was her lack of effective

leadership, poor communication, and failure to proactively and strategically address the

root causes of recurring issues and ongoing dissatisfaction with CSS from within

perioperative services at large and CSS itself.” (Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 8.)

{¶28} According to Plaintiff, her “leadership was not a problem.” (Response, p.

23.) As evidence, Plaintiff points to an email that a subordinate of hers, Lead Inventory

Analyst Tiffanie Winston, wrote to Bowshier and Dennis Delisle in connection with her

resignation from CSS, which in Plaintiff’s view “detailed the positive changes [Plaintiff]

made to CSS and how [Plaintiff] acted as a mentor to her.” (Response, p. 23; Exhibit 9.)

But the statements Plaintiff points to in the email are hearsay when offered for the truth

of the matters asserted. Moreover, the email refers to Winston believing there was

“turmoil and sabotage” within CSS and other negative issues, and it was written in

connection with Winston leaving CSS, thus corroborating the evidence that Bowshier

received reports of CSS being in turmoil and that CSS had a worsening problem with

employee turnover. Plaintiff also points to portions of the depositions of Lawler and

Baughman, but Lawler and Baughman simply testified in those portions that they met with

Plaintiff regularly or were in regular communication with her during her tenure; this

testimony does not contravene the evidence that Bowshier believed Plaintiff’s leadership

was ineffective.

{¶29} As to Bowshier’s concern over “poor communication”, Plaintiff points to

evidence that she regularly communicated with her subordinates and held meetings with

Bowshier and others. But even if there is some evidence of Plaintiff communicating, this

does not contravene Defendant’s evidence of poor communication on her part. For

example, Bowshier averred that on September 13, 2022, plaintiff failed to attend a

previously scheduled meeting with an HR consultant and himself and did not promptly

respond to his attempts to reach her. (Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 7.) And in Bowshier’s letter

requesting to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, one of the specific reasons he identified

for doing so was that she was increasingly failing to notify him of key issues that he felt

she should have communicated to him, such as “CWA employee behavior challenges,

increased turnover in staffing, and alcohol/tobacco related complaints filed regarding a

Case No. 2023-00266JD -11- DECISION

former manager”, but Bowshier instead learned of such information from other

stakeholders. (Bowshier Affidavit, Exhibit C.) The “[f]ailure to accurately communicate

with leadership regarding employee status” was one of the areas of improvement

identified in the PIP, yet on October 20, 2022, after the PIP went into effect, Bowshier

documented Plaintiff still failing to communicate with him about such matters, including

Winston’s resignation. (Bowshier Affidavit, Exhibit B.) Bowshier avers that amid this and

other documented complaints and issues arising during the pendency of the PIP, it

became apparent that Plaintiff would not address his concerns about her poor

communication and other issues. (Bowshier Affidavit, ¶ 12-14.) Bowshier related his

concerns about communication problems and other issues to the human resources

department, and noted his belief that CSS was “declining at a rapid pace”, when

requesting that Plaintiff be removed before the expiration of the 30-day PIP. See

Reynolds v. Extendicare Health Servs., 2006 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 81007, *13-14 (S.D.Ohio

Nov. 1, 2006) (“the fact that Reynolds was fired one week before the thirty-day PIP

expired . . . does not throw into question Defendants’ proffered explanation for her

dismissal. The evidence shows Reynolds was working under a PIP because her

performance needed improvement, and that she was not progressing.”).

{¶30} As to Bowshier’s concern that Plaintiff failed “to proactively and strategically

address the root causes of recurring issues and ongoing dissatisfaction with CSS from

within perioperative services at large and CSS itself”, Plaintiff asserts that she “created a

three-year strategic plan for CSS” and “also created the REDcap tool to identify and

remedy the root cause of contaminated trays in the OR”, and that she “identified multiple

staffing issues and submitted requests for additional FTEs to address the staffing issue.”

(Response, pp. 23-24.) But Plaintiff admitted that the three-year strategic plan was

Lawler’s idea. (Jones Deposition, 72:10-24.) Plaintiff also admitted that it was Dennis

Delisle who directed her to hire traveling workers “to stabilize” staffing problems after CSS

operations “started to fall apart in May of ’21.” (Jones Deposition, pp. 24, 62.) And

Plaintiff admitted that after she decided to develop the REDcap tool, three years passed,

and it was only completed “once Delisle got involved” with it in 2021 amid the deterioration

of CSS operations. (Jones Deposition, 66-67.) The evidence cited by Plaintiff does not

demonstrate that she proactively and strategically addressed the root causes of recurring

Case No. 2023-00266JD -12- DECISION

issues and ongoing dissatisfaction with CSS from within perioperative services at large

and CSS itself.

{¶31} Plaintiff also argues there is a factual dispute insofar as Bowshier noted in

his affidavit and in his letter requesting the termination of her employment that he believed

she did not keep her PIP confidential. Whether or not Plaintiff specifically told others that

she was on a PIP, Bowshier noted in his letter requesting the termination that he had had

conversations with others which led him to have a genuine belief that Plaintiff was not

keeping their PIP discussions confidential, which in his view “erodes trust not only

between [Plaintiff] and I, but throughout the entire department.” (Bowshier Affidavit,

Exhibit C.) In response, Plaintiff argues that Bowshier pointed to three statements made

by individuals in which none of them explicitly stated that Plaintiff had discussed her PIP

with them directly. (Response, p. 24-25). However, Plaintiff admittedly told at least one

other employee of Defendant that she was on a PIP. (Jones Deposition, p. 153.)

Regardless, Plaintiff’s argument does not identify evidence that creates a factual dispute

as to whether Bowshier’s honest belief was that Plaintiff was discussing her PIP with other

employees, and that this was creating discord in the organization. See Wigglesworth v.

Mettler Toledo Intl., Inc., 2010-Ohio-1019, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.).

{¶32} Plaintiff also argues that pretext is shown because Lawler and Baughman

replaced her and have “engaged in the exact same conduct”. (Emphasis original.)

(Response, p. 14.) Specifically, according to Plaintiff, after her termination “CSS did not

change and [key performance indicators] did not decrease.” (Response, p. 14.) But the

issue is not whether Plaintiff’s termination improved the performance metrics of CSS or

was otherwise a sound business decision, it is whether her termination was based on age

or sex. See Lawroski v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 981 F.Supp.2d 704, 714 (S.D.Ohio

2013). Nor does Plaintiff point to evidence that Lawler or Baughman have engaged in

substantially the same conduct that Bowshier explained in detail to have led him to

recommend terminating Plaintiff’s employment; for example, failing to notify him of key

issues that should have been communicated to him.

{¶33} Finally, Plaintiff argues that “Bowshier deemed [her] processes ‘archaic’” and

that this constituted “a jab at her age because he was constantly asking her to come up

with innovative methods for CSS . . . .” (Response, p. 26.) But Plaintiff does not point to

Case No. 2023-00266JD -13- DECISION

any evidence that Bowshier or others involved in the decision to terminate her

employment, or anyone specifically, ever used the word ‘archaic’, nor that the word was

used in connection with her termination or close in time to her termination. Rather,

Plaintiff cites deposition testimony in which she stated that some unidentified person or

persons at some point during her tenure with Defendant used the word ‘archaic’ to

describe some of the recordkeeping practices previously used in CSS. (Jones

Deposition, 168:5-14.) Earlier in her deposition, however, Plaintiff herself described such

practices, including one that involved “collect[ing] volumes of paper”, as indeed being

“archaic”. (Jones Deposition, 156:1-3.) The vague evidence that Plaintiff points to about

the use of this word is ambiguous at best, has little probative value, and does not suggest

an age-based animus. See Brehm v. MacIntosh Co., 2019-Ohio-5322, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.),

quoting Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir. 1993), quoting Gagne v.

Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir. 1989) (“‘[i]solated and ambiguous

comments “are too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a

finding of age discrimination.”’”).

{¶34} In viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Defendant met its

burden of proffering evidence that its termination of Plaintiff’s employment was for

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, i.e. unsatisfactory job performance. Defendant

put forward evidence that there was a genuine belief on the part of Bowshier that Plaintiff’s

leadership and communication were poor, that Plaintiff was not addressing the root

causes of recurring issues at CSS, that the high staff turnover and other problems at CSS

were compounding, and that Plaintiff did not demonstrate that she would address

Bowshier’s concerns with her performance. Plaintiff did not meet her reciprocal burden

of coming forward with evidence that Defendant’s proffered reasons for terminating her

employment were pretextual, and that discrimination on the basis of age or sex was the

real reason. Accordingly, reasonable minds can therefore only conclude that Plaintiff

cannot prevail on her claims of employment discrimination.

Conclusion

Case No. 2023-00266JD -14- DECISION

{¶35} Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that there are no genuine

issues of material fact, and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment shall be GRANTED.

LISA L. SADLER

Judge

[Cite as Jones v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 2025-Ohio-517.]

KIMBERLY JONES Case No. 2023-00266JD

Plaintiff Judge Lisa L. Sadler

Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck

v.

JUDGMENT ENTRY

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

WEXNER MEDICAL CENTER

Defendant

IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO

{¶36} A non-oral hearing was conducted in this case upon Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth in the Decision filed concurrently herewith,

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Judgment is rendered in favor

of Defendant. All previously scheduled events are VACATED. Court costs are assessed

against Plaintiff. The Clerk shall serve upon all parties notice of this judgment and its

date of entry upon the journal.

LISA L. SADLER

Judge

Filed January 29, 2025

Sent to S.C. Reporter 2/18/25