Logue v. The Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES F. LOGUE

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-00535

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

YORK COUNTY

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant York County Court of

Common Pleas (“York CCP”). (Doc. 50). This is a civil rights action initiated upon the filing

of a complaint by Plaintiff James F. Logue (“Logue”) on March 27, 2023. In the operative

second amended complaint, filed on April 22, 2024, Logue re-alleged that York CCP violated

his civil rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) by discriminating against him based upon his disability and added

allegations of Fourteenth Amendment violations based upon York CCP’s denying Logue due

process. (Doc. 46, at 14-15). On May 20, 2024, York CCP filed its motion to dismiss Logue’s

second amended complaint. (Doc. 50). For the following reasons, York CCP’s motion to

dismiss will be GRANTED. (Doc. 50).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from Logue’s second amended complaint. (Doc.

46). Logue filed his second amended complaint on April 22, 2024. (Doc. 46). In his second

amended complaint, Logue begins by re-alleging much of his previous allegations. (Doc. 46,

¶¶ 1-65). Logue suffers from alcohol use disorder (“AUD”). (Doc. 46, ¶ 8). Logue was pulled

over and charged with a second DUI on May 18, 2020. (Doc. 46, ¶ 21). After his second DUI,

Logue was given a SCRAM alcohol monitoring bracelet and applied for York CCP’s DUI

Program. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 27-28).

Logue tested positive for alcohol on a random urine screening on August 11, 2022,

just over a week before he was scheduled to graduate from the DUI Program on August 23,

2022. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 34, 38-39). Logue denies that he drank alcohol and argues that his positive

test resulted from a throat spray. (Doc. 46, ¶ 41). Due to the positive alcohol test, Logue was

not permitted to graduate from the DUI Program as scheduled. (Doc. 46, ¶ 44). Logue

requested that this decision be reconsidered, but Officer Forry, the lead Adult

Probation/Parole Supervisor for the DUI Program denied the request. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 14, 45).

After failing to graduate from the DUI Program, Logue began reporting increases in anxiety

and depression to the DUI Program team, which did not respond but referred him to a mental

healthcare specialist. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 46-49).

On September 21, 2022, York County probation officers arrived at Logue’s home and

required that he take a breathalyzer test, which Logue admits to failing due to consumption

of wine. (Doc. 46, ¶ 50). Officer Forry told Logue that he would not arrest him and would

instead get a psychological referral in motion. (Doc. 46, ¶ 52). On September 23, 2022, Logue

received an e-mail requiring Logue to report to court on September 28, 2022 based on his

failed breathalyzer test. (Doc. 46, ¶ 54). Logue responded, copying Officer Forry, asking why

he had not received a psychological consult referral, and later that day, Logue successfully

scheduled a psychological evaluation on September 28, 2022. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 55-57). Logue

forwarded his evaluation results, which recommended immediate treatment, to Officer Forry.

(Doc. 46, ¶ 59). When Logue arrived to his 4:00 PM DUI Court session, no judge was present.

Instead, Officer Forry was present and informed Logue that he would be detained as a result

of his failed breathalyzer test. (Doc. 46, ¶ 60). In his second amended complaint, Logue

alleges for the first time that while incarcerated, Logue continued to express his intent to

remain in the DUI Program and in DUI Court and “even reached out to the lead District

Attorney of York County, David Sunday, a personal acquaintance, to see if he could offer

any assistance.” (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 65-68). Logue also alleges for the first time that County officials

ignored his requests and that he was advised that “Defendants were not happy with Plaintiff

because he ‘made too much noise.’” (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 67, 69).

Logue was issued a probation violation due to his failed breathalyzer test and was told

that “the only way that the probation team would let him out of jail was if he was willing to

‘waive’ his objection to York County probation’s recommendation of removal from DUI

Court.” (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 70-72). Logue felt he had no choice and agreed. After being released,

Logue spoke with the director of York County sobriety program, who expressed shock that

he was not offered in-patient treatment as a “last resort” with the DUI Court Team, as that

was protocol. (Doc. 46, ¶ 74).

At Logue’s probation hearing, Officer Forry recommended six months of

incarceration in a county prison and additional six months of urine testing. (Doc. 46, ¶ 76).

The District Attorney, meanwhile, “scoffed” at this recommendation and recommended only

three months of “some sort of incarceration.” (Doc. 46, ¶ 77). The Judge ultimately ordered

three months of house arrest and continuous SCRAM monitoring. (Doc. 46, ¶ 77).

In the second amended complaint, Logue includes additional novel allegations that

York County has discriminated against other individuals with disabilities. (Doc. 46, ¶ 81). He

names five individuals who failed drug tests and were not permitted to continue in the DUI

Program. (Doc. 46, ¶ 81). Logue also alleges that unlike himself, and the five individuals

named, “younger participants of the DUI Court program were given chances of rehabilitation

even after multiple positive alcohol/drug tests.” (Doc. 46, ¶ 82). Logue alleges for the first

time that the older participants were “told things such as: grow up; you’re too old for this;

and you can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” (Doc. 46, ¶ 84). Logue contends that he was

removed from the program due to personal animus and manifestation of his disability. (doc.

46, ¶ 85).

Logue commenced this action by filing a complaint on March 27, 2023. He filed an

an amended complaint on July 19, 2023, which was dismissed with leave to amend by Judge

Rambo.1 (Doc. 44). Logue filed his operative second amended complaint on April 22, 2024,

in which he includes nearly identical factual allegations.2 In his second amended complaint,

Logue re-asserts his ADA and RA claim in Count I, without any additional allegations other

than those outlined above, and asserts for the first time in Count II a Fourteenth Amendment

violation for denial of due process by removing Logue from the DUI Program. (Doc. 46, at

14-15). On May 6, 2024, York CCP filed a motion to dismiss Logue’s complaint, and on May

20, 2024, filed a brief in support. (Doc. 50; Doc. 55). On June 17, 2024, Logue filed his brief

in opposition. (Doc. 62). In his brief in opposition, Logue withdraws his claim for injunctive

1 In her dismissal, Judge Rambo notes that “Logue’s official capacity suit against

Officer Forry is to be treated as against York CCP, who is already a party, and therefore the

court will proceed to address the claim as brought against York CCP only.” (Doc. 44, at 1

n.1). Accordingly, this Court will once again address Logue’s claim as brought against York

CCP only. See Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding that an official capacity suit

is treated as a suit against the entity “in all respects other than name”).

2 Any new allegation that Logue makes in his second amended complaint is pointed

out in this factual summary.

relief and withdraws his claim for age discrimination.3 (Doc. 62, at 21). The motion to dismiss

is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. (Doc. 50; Doc. 55; Doc. 62). On August 30, 2024, this

matter was reassigned to the undersigned district judge.

II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

that are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the complaint’s

factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal claim. Burtch

v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,

the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents

incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial

notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements that make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

3 There is no claim for age discrimination alleged in Logue’s operative second

amended complaint.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal conclusions’. . . ”

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting In re Burlington Coat

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a court assume that a

plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v.

Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

III. DISCUSSION

York CCP moves to dismiss Logue’s second amended complaint for three reasons: (1)

because Logue has not pled intentional discrimination to show an ADA or RA violation (2)

because treatment court decisions made in individual cases are subjected to judicial immunity;

and (3) because the Eleventh Amendment bars Logue’s claims against York CCP. (Doc. 55,

at 11-26).

A. ADA AND RA CLAIMS

York CCP submits that Logue fails to state a claim for violation of the ADA or RA

because he does not allege intentional discrimination. (Doc. 55, at 11). Specifically, York

CCP contends that Logue fails to show intentional discrimination because he does not aver

that there was a pattern of York CCP treating individuals with similar disabilities to his

differently than non-disabled individuals such that York CCP would be aware that a federally

protected right was likely to be violated due to its conduct. (Doc. 55, at 12-16). York CCP

further argues that Logue never alleges that he attempted to secure an accommodation for his

disability such that he was denied a federally protected right. (Doc. 55, at 16). Logue responds

that he indeed alleges intentional discrimination with the inclusion of his new allegations that

other individuals were also removed from the DUI Program for consuming alcohol while

some younger participants were not. (Doc. 62, at 19-20).

To state a claim under either the ADA or the RA,4 Logue must allege that he is a

qualified individual with a disability who was precluded from participating in a program,

service, or activity, or otherwise was subject to discrimination, by reason of his disability.

Furgess v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2019). “[C]laims for

compensatory damages under [. . .] the ADA also require a finding of intentional

discrimination,” which requires alleging deliberate indifference, S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d

4 The Court considers the ADA and RA claims together because “the substantive

standards for determining liability are the same.” See McDonald v. Com. of Pa., Dep't of Pub.

Welfare Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995).

at 261-63. Deliberate indifference may be pleaded by alleging that the defendant failed to

“adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiff['s],” Beers-

Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 136 (3d Cir. 2001). A plaintiff can meet his obligation to

establish deliberate indifference in two different ways:

first, by alleging facts suggesting that the existing policies caused a failure to

“‘adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the

plaintiffs,’” or, second, by alleging facts indicating that she could prove “that

the risk of ... cognizable harm was ‘so great and so obvious that the risk and the

failure ... to respond will alone’ support finding” deliberate indifference. Beers-

Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Sample v. Diecks,

885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989)); see S.H. ex rel. Durrell, 729 F.3d at 263 n.23

(noting that the standard for proving deliberate indifference being adopted for

the ADA context “is consistent with our standard of deliberate indifference in

the context of § 1983 suits by prison inmates”).

Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 181-82 (3d Cir. 2018).

Presuming that Logue’s diagnosis with AUD is a qualifying disability, Logue has not

pled facts demonstrating that he has been precluded from any program, service, or activity

because of his disability such that York CCP’s actions amount to deliberate indifference to

his disability. Logue objects to his removal from the DUI Program, but the second amended

complaint does not support an inference that he was removed from the DUI Program because

he is disabled. Rather, Officer Forry allegedly revoked his participation in the DUI Program

because Logue tested positive for alcohol on a breathalyzer test. (Doc. 46, ¶ 44). Even

assuming that the removal based upon his alcohol-related infraction was sufficiently related

to his AUD diagnosis, Logue cannot show that York CCP failed to “‘adequately respond to

a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiffs.’” Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181–82

(quoting Whetzel, 256 F.3d at 136-37) (citations omitted). Logue’s new allegations that list

other individuals who were removed from the DUI Program do not specify whether those

individuals also suffered from AUD, another disability, or no disability whatsoever. (Doc. 46,

¶ 81). Therefore, the Court cannot determine if these individuals were sufficiently similar to

Logue. Further, Logue also fails to allege that there was an obvious risk of cognizable harm

so great that the risk alone amounts to deliberate indifference when York CCP removed

Logue from the program. Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181–82. While sympathetic to Logue’s

situation, the Court also cannot think of a situation in which York CCP’s removal of Logue

from the DUI Program would risk such great cognizable harm on its face as to amount to

deliberate indifference. According to the second amended complaint, it seems that Logue set

up mental healthcare appointments with individuals who could assist him in dealing with his

disability, and that those appointments were not disturbed by his removal from the DUI

Program. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 57-60, 73). Logue was also able to participate in the “Freedom

Program,” a volunteer-based sobriety program while housed in the York County Prison, also

unrelated to his DUI Program participation. (Doc. 46, ¶ 64).

While not explicitly alleged, even if Logue objects to his removal from the DUI

Program based on a denial of an ADA accommodation, such as leniency for DUI Program

participants who suffer from AUD and drink alcohol, Logue would have needed to allege

that he requested such an accommodation and that York CCP failed to engage in an

“interactive process” to find reasonable accommodations. Neither the ADA nor the RA

requires an “interactive process”; that term is typically used in the employment context as one

way to determine whether an employee with a disability can work for a particular employer.

See Shapiro v. Twp. of Lakewood, 292 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(o)(3)). Other than generally stating that Logue’s “AUD is a physical and/or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” (Doc. 3, ¶ 8), Logue

has not explained why he requires disability accommodations and what such

accommodations would be, so the defendants' failure to explore those with him does not

support an ADA or RA claim.

Accordingly, York CCP’s motion to dismiss Logue’s ADA and RA claims is

GRANTED. (Doc. 50).5

B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM

York CCP contends that Count II should be dismissed because the Eleventh

Amendment bars Logue’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, and that the allegations Logue

makes do not state a Fourteenth Amendment claim. (Doc. 55, at 22-26). In response, Logue

asserts that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to his claims because “the source of the

discriminatory treatment was Seth Forry – not the underlying judge,” thus neutralizing any

sovereign immunity issue. (Doc. 62, at 21). Logue further lists the allegations in his second

amended complaint and concludes that such allegations amount to a denial of Logue’s due

process rights. (Doc. 62, at 19-20).

As a preliminary matter, Logue does not identify a basis for the Court's jurisdiction.

(Doc. 46, at 15-16). Plaintiffs must assert federal civil rights claims using 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

which provides a private cause of action for violations of federal constitutional rights. The

statute provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

5 Additionally, Logue’s request for punitive damages in Count I is also dismissed with

prejudice as punitive damages may not be awarded in private suits against the ADA. Barnes

v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002); (Doc. 46, at 16).

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for rights

established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To succeed on

a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant, acting under color of state

law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark v. Borough

of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). Logue fails to properly to assert his Fourteenth

Amendment claim in his second amended complaint. (Doc. 46, at 15). Even if Logue had

properly asserted his Fourteenth Amendment claim using § 1983, the vehicle by which federal

constitutional claims may be brought in federal court, he has failed state a claim because (1)

York CCP is immune under the Eleventh Amendment and (2) his allegations do not

adequately show that he was deprived his due process rights. (Doc. 46).

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Assuming arguendo that Logue properly sought to impose liability under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against Officer Forry, Logue’s suit is still barred by the Eleventh Amendment. To the

extent Logue seeks to assert liability for Officer Forry’s actions, Logue brought suit against

Officer Forry in his official capacity, and such claims will fail on the basis of sovereign

immunity. As explained supra n.1, a suit against a state government official in his official

capacity is really a suit against the state. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989). By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity come to court as individuals. Hafer

v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991). Officer Forry was the lead Adult Probation/Parole Supervisor

for the DUI Program of the York County Court of Common Pleas, which is an entity of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 301(4). Thus, suing Officer Forry

in his official capacity is considered a suit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See

Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668 (3d Cir. 2000).

Logue’s claims against Officer Forry in his official capacity, or the York CCP, are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. In this regard, the

withdrawal of jurisdiction in the Eleventh Amendment confers upon the individual states

immunity from suit in the federal courts. This grant of sovereign immunity encompasses not

only suits in which a state is a named defendant but also extends to suits brought against state

agents and state instrumentalities that have no existence apart from the state. See Regents of the

University of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978).

Thus, such immunity applies to suits brought by citizens of the defendant state as well. See

Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).

Notwithstanding, the immunity provided in the Eleventh Amendment is not absolute.

A state may expressly waive its grant of sovereign immunity by state statute or constitutional

provision. In addition, Congress can abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity

through a statute enacted under constitutional authority granting Congress the power to

regulate the activities of the states. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15

(1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). However, Congress must

express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the

statute itself. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996); Atascadero, 473 U.S. at

246. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its grant of sovereign immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment. In fact, the Commonwealth specifically has reserved its

immunity against federal suits in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8521(b), which provides that “[n]othing

contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth

from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States.” None of the exceptions to sovereign immunity contained in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522

are applicable to Logue’s allegations. (Doc. 46); see 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522. Moreover, the federal

courts repeatedly have held that Congress did not abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment

immunity when it enacted the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at

66 (“Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but

it does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged

deprivations of civil liberties.”); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979); Boykin v. Bloomsburg

Univ. of Pa., 893 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (holding that states’ immunity has not been

abrogated for actions brought under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986), aff'd, 91 F.3d 122 (3d

Cir. 1996). Consequently, Logue’s Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed. Accord

Benn v. First Judicial Dist., 426 F.3d 233, 239-40 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Chilcott v. Erie

County Domestic Relations, 283 F. App'x 8, 10 (3d Cir. 2008).

2. Failure to State a Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Even if Logue were correct that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply, the

allegations in his second amended complaint do not properly allege a due process violation.

(Doc. 46). While it is well established that many individuals involved in the legal system, from

detainees and prisoners to those who are involuntary committed to mental institutions

maintain a “fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts” embodied in the First

and Fourteenth Amendments, no constitutional violation occurs when “access to the courts

is impeded by mere negligence[. . . ]” Johnson v. United States, No. CIV.A. 3:03-0756, 2005

WL 2736512, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2 4, 2005), aff'd sub nom. Johnson v. Atty. Gen. of U.S., 187

F. App'x 154 (3d Cir. 2006); Tucker v. I'Jama, 361 F. App'x 405, 407 (3d Cir. 2010); U. S. ex

rel. Mayberry v. Prasse, 225 F. Supp. 752, 754 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (“reasonable access to the courts

is a right given to prospective litigants by the due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.”); Pressley v. Huber, 562 F. App'x 67, 71 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Simkins v. Bruce,

406 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005)); Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 291 n. 11 (7th Cir. 2004);

Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 76 (4th Cir. 1995); Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dep't Law & Pub.

Safety Div., 411 F.3d 427, 445 (3d Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Dique v. N.J. State

Police, 603 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2010). Thus, claims based on access to the courts “cannot be

initiated based on negligent denials of access.” Tucker, 361 F. App'x at 407. Rather, “an

official may be liable only if [] he acts ‘wrongfully and intentionally.’” Tucker v. Arnold, 361

F. App'x 409, 410 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gibson, 411 F.3d at 445). Here, Logue has failed to

assert a plausible due process claim, as the complaint lacks sufficient non-conclusory facts

demonstrating that an intentional and deliberate refusal to remove Logue from the DUI

Program after he failed a breathalyzer test impeded his access to the courts.6

C. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment unless an amendment

6 Judge Rambo noted in her dismissal of Logue’s first amended complaint that “the

complaint does not allege any violation of Logue’s due process rights, (See generally Doc. 31),

and instead avers that Logue both accessed and participated in the court’s DUI Program. He

was later was only removed after repeated infractions and following a hearing before a judge.

Thus, York CCP is entitled to sovereign immunity.” (Doc. 44, at 13). None of Logue’s new

allegations in his second amended complaint resolve this deficiency. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 65-69, 81-

86, 95-99). Again, Logue alleges that he accessed and participated in the DUI Program and

was only removed from the DUI Program after infractions and a hearing. (Doc. 46, ¶¶ 27-28,

50-60, 70-72).

would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.

2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000). The Third Circuit has also

acknowledged that a district court has “substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave

to amend.” Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court does not find, at this

juncture, that amendment should be granted. Logue has previously attempted to amend his

complaint on two prior occasions, one attempt taking place after Judge Rambo explained

specifically where his allegations were lacking, and Logue has failed to cure any deficiencies.

(Doc. 44, at 10-13).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 50) is GRANTED.

Logue’s second amended complaint is DISMISSED. (Doc. 46). The Clerk of Court will be

directed to CLOSE this case.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Karoline Mehalchick

Dated: February 14, 2025

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge