KING v. BLACKWOOD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TIFFANY ADELE KING, as )

Administratrix of the Estate of Maurice )

Antoine King, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:21-CV-383

)

CHARLES S. BLACKWOOD, in his )

official capacity as Sheriff of Orange )

County, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge.

In 2020, Maurice King was in federal custody at the Orange County jail. After he

pled guilty but before he was sentenced, inmates assaulted and killed him. The

administratrix of his estate sued the Sheriff and detention officers for violation of his

constitutional rights. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment.

The Court previously resolved the motions as to all claims and defendants except

for one aspect of the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim against defendants Berry and

Linster: whether they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions and inactions

from the time Mr. Berry first failed to look into Mr. King’s cell while performing a

security check after the assault through the time Mr. Berry finally entered Mr. King’s cell

to check on him. Because the evidence creates disputed questions of material fact, this

claim will proceed to trial.

I. Deliberate Indifference and Qualified Immunity

As summarized by the Magistrate Judge and adopted in the Court’s earlier

summary judgment order, the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the deliberate

indifference claims against Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster, Doc. 124 at 18; Doc. 132 at 4, and

the evidence is sufficient to show a Fourteenth Amendment violation on this point. Doc.

124 at 36–40; Doc. 132 at 2.

Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability unless the official

violated a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right[] of which a reasonable

person would have known.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 264–65 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); accord Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 735 (2011). As the Magistrate Judge stated without objection, in 2020, the

defendants would have reasonably believed that the Eighth Amendment applied to the

conduct at issue. Doc. 124 at 19. So, despite the applicability of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the merits of the § 1983 claims, qualified immunity is evaluated under the

Eighth Amendment standard because that was the law at the time of the events at issue.

“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s cruel-and-unusual-punishment

clause when they are deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to an inmate’s safety or

medical needs.” Riley, 76 F.4th at 264; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828,

837 (1994). An Eighth Amendment violation requires a showing that the defendant

subjectively knew of and disregarded “an objectively serious condition, medical need, or

risk of harm.” De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

Subjective knowledge of a risk can be shown by an official’s “refus[al] to verify

underlying facts that he strongly suspected to be true” or “to confirm inferences of risk

that he strongly suspected to exist.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8. In other words,

“contrived obliviousness to a medical need” can constitute subjective knowledge. Brice

v. Va. Beach Corr. Ctr., 58 F.3d 101, 106 (4th Cir. 1995).1

As the Magistrate Judge stated without objection, qualified immunity here turns on

whether a reasonable official in the defendants’ shoes would have understood that he was

violating both the objective and subjective standard. Doc. 124 at 19, 30 n.22 (citing

Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 301–02 (4th Cir. 2021)). So, the first issue for the Court

is whether there is a disputed question of material fact as to whether Mr. Berry and Mr.

Linster had subjective knowledge that Mr. King had an objectively serious medical need

and that their response was inadequate. If so, the second issue is whether a reasonable

officer objectively would have known that their failure to act was an Eighth Amendment

violation. As is always appropriate at summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, here, the plaintiff. Bandy v. City of Salem,

59 F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).

II. Defendants’ Subjective Knowledge of Mr. King’s Need

“A plaintiff can meet the subjective knowledge requirement through direct

evidence of a prison official’s actual knowledge or circumstantial evidence tending to

1 See also Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 544–45 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting a criminal

law treatise and noting that deliberate indifference is equivalent to criminal recklessness which

“may consist of intentional failure to take care in disregard of the probable harmful consequences

to [another] or of [another’s] right to care. What must be intended is the conduct, not the

resulting harm.”).

establish such knowledge,” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 2016), and,

of course, the requirement can be met by a combination of the two. Mr. Berry and Mr.

Linster, unsurprisingly, do not admit that they had subjective knowledge of Mr. King’s

serious medical need and the inadequacy of their response. But there is enough evidence

to allow a jury to so find, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff

and resolving all factual disputes in her favor.

During the relevant time, Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster knew Mr. King was in a high-

security segregation pod with violent inmates and a high risk of inmate-on-inmate

violence. Doc. 104 at ¶ 10; Doc. 105 at ¶ 10; see Doc. 124 at 37. They knew it was

important for detainee safety to look into cells on a regular basis and to keep an eye on

the pod through video monitors in the control room. Doc. 107-2 at 62, 100–101; Doc.

107-35 at 47, 57.2 They knew detainees had a constitutional right to be supervised in

order to protect them from known risks of assault and a constitutional right to have

emergency medical needs met with a timely response. Doc. 107-24 at 90–91. They

knew Mr. King had asthma and serious mental health issues. Doc. 107-5 at 216; see Doc.

124 at 9 n.10.3 They knew they had repeatedly failed to look into Mr. King’s cell during

their rounds despite clear policy requiring them to do so. See Doc. 124 at 7–8, 37–38; see

2 Citations use the pagination appended by the CM/ECF system, not any internal pagination

that may be included in exhibits.

3 The Magistrate Judge stated that “there is no evidence” that Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster

“even knew of Mr. King’s . . . medical history,” Doc. 124 at 21, but that conclusion does not

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The Sheriff testified that detention

officers knew of Mr. King’s health issues from his booking report. Doc. 107-5 at 216.

also Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 613 (4th Cir. 2023) (noting that under the Eighth

Amendment test, violation of a policy is relevant). They knew they were not monitoring

the pod common area through windows or video cameras, again in violation of policy. 4

See Doc 124 at 38–39. Rather, they were “cutting up” in the control room. Doc. 107-51

at 122–23.

On Mr. Linster’s second round during the relevant time, he heard a concerning

sound from Mr. King’s cell. See Doc. 124 at 8. Even though he knew he had not looked

into Mr. King’s cell on his previous round, even though he knew he was required to look

into Mr. King’s cell regardless of whether he heard concerning sounds, and even though

he knew that he and Mr. Berry had not been observing the pod at all in between rounds,

he did not look into Mr. King’s cell after hearing the sound. See id. at 8, 37–38.5

Instead, Mr. Linster returned to the control room and mentioned the concerning

sound to Mr. Berry. See id. at 8. The two turned on the audio system in Mr. King’s cell

and heard other sounds of distress, described variously as moans, groans, or labored

breathing, see id. at 8–9 & n.9, which caused them additional concern. Doc. 107-36 at

141. They intentionally delayed checking on Mr. King for some twenty minutes in order

to avoid extra paperwork, see Doc. 124 at 39, despite knowing that no one had looked

into Mr. King’s cell or monitored the video for well over an hour. When Mr. Berry

4 If they had looked, they would have seen highly suspicious comings-and-goings in and out

of Mr. King’s cell by inmates known to be violent. See Doc. 124 at 39.

5 If he had looked, he would have seen Mr. King was in distress; this eventually happened

when Mr. Berry finally went into the cell. See Doc. 124 at 9.

finally went to Mr. King’s cell, he first obtained an inhaler from the nurse to take to the

cell, showing that he knew that medical care was needed. See id. at 9.6

In interviews with investigators the next day, both officers stated or at least

implied that after they heard sounds coming from Mr. King’s cell, they suspected he had

been assaulted. Doc. 107-3 at 5:44–5:45 (Berry telling investigators that when he

checked on Mr. King, “It wasn’t nothing to where I could have said somebody hit him in

the face. That was what I was looking for when we went in there, I was looking for some

kind of, like, injuries.”); Doc. 107-37 at 5:45 (Linster telling investigators that in the

control room after turning on the intercom, “I said, ‘Berry, when you make the

round . . . ,’ cause I want to be for sure before, you know, cause I don’t want to make no

mistake, cause I don’t want to accuse nobody of something they ain’t done.”).7

Additionally, Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster both made inconsistent and arguably false

material statements in their reports, interviews, depositions, and declarations, all tending

to indicate they knew they had violated Mr. King’s rights. They each made multiple

contradictory statements about what sounds they heard coming from Mr. King’s cell,

including someone talking to Mr. King, Mr. King asking for soap, labored breathing, and

a moan or groan. See Doc. 124 at 9 n.9. Mr. Linster said in his declaration that he saw

Mr. King sitting on his bed during his first round, despite the video showing that he did

not look in the cell. See id. at 8 n.8. And in his deposition, Mr. Linster said that he saw

6 Mr. Linster told investigators the next day that he knew that Mr. King would need a

wheelchair for transport if he was having an asthma attack. Doc. 107-37 at 5:45.

7 Citations to video exhibits use the timestamp on the video footage.

Mr. King and another inmate each sitting on a different bed in Mr. King’s cell, even

though the cell only had one bed and video showed the other inmate had left the cell. See

id. Also in his deposition, Mr. Linster stated that he told an inmate that he would look in

Mr. King’s cell and that he did so, but he admitted that he did not put this in his report the

day after the incident. Doc. 107-36 at 119–21. Mr. Berry stated multiple times that he

retrieved Mr. King’s inhaler after first checking on him, despite the video showing that he

brought the inhaler on his first visit to Mr. King’s cell. See Doc. 124 at 9 n.10. Mr.

Linster also reported this course of events multiple times. Doc. 105 at ¶ 29 (deposition);

Doc. 107-38 (report); Doc. 107-37 at 5:45 (interview).

All of this evidence, if taken together and credited, would allow a jury to find that

Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster delayed Mr. King’s access to needed medical care, knowing

that they heard concerning sounds from his cell while they were in the pod and the

control room, knowing that they had been ignoring Mr. King for over an hour despite the

known dangers in the pod, knowing that he had asthma and was moaning, and actually

suspecting he had been assaulted. A jury could further infer from Mr. Berry’s admission

of delay to avoid paperwork that their inaction was not “accidental or inadvertent,” see

Anderson v. Kingsley, 877 F.3d 539, 544 (4th Cir. 2017), and from their inconsistent and

arguably false statements after the incident that they knew their response to Mr. King’s

medical need was inadequate.

The Court concludes that this evidence is sufficient to meet the Eighth

Amendment standard for deliberate indifference. A jury could find facts supporting an

inference that these two officers subjectively knew of and disregarded an objectively

serious condition, medical need, or risk of worsening harm to Mr. King. See De’lonta,

708 F.3d at 525; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8.

III. A Reasonable Officer’s Knowledge of the Constitutional Violation

The second question is whether the violated right was “clearly established.” See

Riley, 76 F.4th at 264–65 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818). “Eighth Amendment cases

exist on a spectrum of intent and harm.” Pfaller v. Amonette, 55 F.4th 436, 446 (4th Cir.

2022). At one end of that spectrum, the “clearly established” prong is unnecessary:

The Fourth Circuit has carved out a class of deliberate-indifference

claims to treat differently. Acknowledging that qualified immunity

does not protect officials who knowingly disregard the law, we have

reasoned that officials who are aware that their conduct is

constitutionally deficient cannot rely on the clearly established prong.

We have said that, sometimes, context makes the violation “obvious”

and case law is thus not needed to establish this awareness. So when

a defendant knows her conduct does not pass constitutional muster,

we do not look to see if she violated clearly established precedent.

Instead, we ask only if her actions violated the Eighth Amendment.

Riley, 76 F.4th at 265 (cleaned up) (summarizing relevant holdings in Pfaller and Thorpe

v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926 (4th Cir. 2022)). Only if the official “did not know her actions

violated the Eighth Amendment” is she “entitled to the same two-pronged, qualified-

immunity approach as every other government official.” Id.

As discussed supra, there is a genuine dispute as to the officers’ subjective

knowledge, and there is evidence from which a jury could infer that the officers knew

they were violating Mr. King’s rights. If a jury resolves that factual dispute to conclude

that Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster ignored obvious risks to Mr. King’s health for over an

hour and then, upon realizing that he was in urgent need of medical care, continued to

ignore him for twenty minutes to avoid extra paperwork, that would be an obvious

constitutional violation. Under that version of the facts, the officers would not have

needed case law directly on point to tell them that their conduct was unconstitutional, and

the Court would not need to conduct the “clearly established” inquiry to determine that

Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Even if the Court were required to determine that the right violated on these facts

was clearly established, the conclusion is the same. It has long been established that

adequate medical care is a basic condition of humane confinement, Farmer, 511 U.S. at

832, and that a prison official’s “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of

prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the

Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (cleaned up). The

Fourth Circuit has recently denied qualified immunity for a violation of a prisoner’s

clearly established “right to adequate medical care and freedom from deliberate

indifference to medical needs.” Pfaller, 55 F.4th at 453–54 (quoting Scinto, 841 F.3d at

236);8 accord Tarashuk v. Givens, 53 F.4th 154, 164 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Jehovah v.

Clarke, 798 F.3d 169, 181–82 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that a failure to treat an inmate’s

known symptoms is deliberate indifference). And, as the Supreme Court and the Fourth

8 In defining this right broadly, the Pfaller court noted that “the Supreme Court has not

demanded the same level of specificity in Eighth Amendment cases” that it has in Fourth

Amendment cases. 55 F.4th at 453. In Riley, the Fourth Circuit held that inmates did not have a

“clearly established right to properly conducted security checks.” 76 F.4th at 265–68. Here, the

alleged misconduct goes well beyond a failure to protect Mr. King from violence by failing to

conduct security checks and well beyond the claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs

alleged in Riley. See id. at 268–69. Riley did not overrule, question, or undermine the holding in

Pfaller, and indeed quoted from it with approval. See id. at 265–66.

Circuit noted decades ago, “contrived obliviousness to a medical need” is deliberate

indifference. Brice, 58 F.3d at 106; Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8; see discussion supra.

There is a genuine dispute here as to whether Mr. Berry and Mr. Linster were

deliberately indifferent to Mr. King’s medical needs. See discussion supra. So, there 1s

likewise a genuine dispute as to whether they violated Mr. King’s clearly established

rights.

IV. Conclusion

Because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Mr. Berry and

Mr. Linster knowingly violated the Eighth Amendment, a trial is required. The Court will

deny summary judgment to defendants Berry and Linster as to the § 1983 claim. This

claim will go to trial with its scope limited to deliberate indifference to Mr. King’s

medical needs from the time defendant Berry first failed to look into Mr. King’s cell

while performing a security check after the assault through the time defendant Berry

finally entered Mr. King’s cell to check on him.

Itis ORDERED that the motion for summary judgment, Doc. 87, is DENIED as

to the § 1983 claim against defendants Berry and Linster as narrowed herein.

This the 13th day of February, 2025.

bk be

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10