The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TRAVERSE CITY AREA CONVENTION FOR PUBLICATION
AND VISITORS BUREAU, doing business as February 13, 2025
TRAVERSE CITY TOURISM CORP., 2:46 PM
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,
v No. 365541
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
GOLDEN SWAN MANAGEMENT, LLC, LC No. 2022-036134-CZ
Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.
Before: PATEL, P.J., and MURRAY and YATES, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant/counterplaintiff, Golden Swan Management, LLC (defendant), appeals as of
right the trial court’s order granting two motions for summary disposition filed by
plaintiff/counterdefendant, Traverse City Area Convention and Visitors Bureau (plaintiff),
denying defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition, and directing that defendant pay
assessments, interest, delinquency charges, costs, and attorney fees under the Community
Convention or Tourism Marketing Act, MCL 141.871 et seq. (CCTMA). Because the plain
language of the CCTMA does not require that a combination of buildings be contiguous or in a
single location, and plaintiff substantially complied with the CCTMA’s notice requirement, we
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The CCTMA, enacted as 1980 PA 395 and amended by 1984 PA 59, was intended to
promote convention business and tourism within various Michigan municipalities. Under the act,
a qualifying nonprofit corporation may establish a convention and tourism marketing program and
impose an assessment upon owners of tourist lodging facilities to pay for the marketing program.
OAG, 1995-1996, No. 6867 (August 25, 1995).
Plaintiff filed a notice under the CCTMA to establish an assessment district for
municipalities “in and around Grand Traverse County,” which was approved and became effective
on April 1, 1985. Plaintiff originally charged owners of lodging facilities a 2% assessment of
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overnight room charges to pay for marketing activities. By 2021, this assessment had increased to
5%.
On May 22, 2021, Trevor Tkach, plaintiff’s president and chief executive officer, sent an
e-mail message to Katy Bertodotto, a managing member of defendant, stating that it appeared from
defendant’s internet site that defendant managed nearly 30 short-term rental units. Tkach noted
that the threshold for membership was 10 units, and referred Bertodotto to Whitney Waara,
plaintiff’s chief operating officer, to “facilitate the onboarding process.” Bertodotto asserted in
response that the properties defendant managed were individually owned, and that defendant was
“legally unable to lock their properties into a contract without their consent.” Waara explained
that the manager of 10 or more lodging rooms was an “owner” under the CCTMA, managers of
10 or more units were required to participate, and “with this notice, the requirement to begin
collecting the assessment is immediate.”
Plaintiff subsequently filed this action alleging that defendant was the “owner” of a
transient facility, as defined by MCL 141.872(k), because defendant managed a building or
combination of buildings that contained 10 or more rooms used in the business of providing
lodging to transient guests. Plaintiff alleged that it had demanded payment from defendant on May
25, 2021, but did not receive that payment, and requested that the trial court enter a judgment “for
the amount of the assessments due Plaintiff, for all months for which they are delinquent, including
the interest and delinquency charges set forth in the act, plus statutory costs, interest and attorney
fees,” and an order “requiring Defendant to supply its use tax returns to the Plaintiff’s accountant.”
Defendant then filed its own complaint (hereafter, counterclaim), in a separate case against
plaintiff (Case No. 2022-36170-CZ), asserting estoppel by laches and a violation of its equal
protection rights.1 Defendant later amended the complaint to include a request that the trial court
declare there was no benefit to defendant sufficient to support an assessment against defendant,
and the trial court entered an order consolidating the two cases “for trial purposes and all related
discovery thereto.”
After filing its counterclaim, defendant moved for summary disposition of plaintiff’s
complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(8), asserting that under the CCTMA, no assessment may be
imposed on the owner of a transient facility until notice of the marketing program has been mailed
to the owner by registered or certified mail. In response, plaintiff asserted that it had sent a copy
of the marketing notice to defendant by certified mail on April 28, 2022, and that MCL 141.873
refers only to mailing notice of the marketing program at the time that notice of a marketing
program is filed with the director for approval. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that
“the registered/certified mail requirement of the Act is intended to ensure actual receipt and not to
qualify the right to sue on manner of delivery or proof of delivery.” Because defendant did not
dispute that it had received actual notice, and presented no evidence of prejudice resulting from
1
This complaint is not included in the lower-court file. However, defendant’s answer, filed after
the two cases were consolidated, indicates that defendant sought a declaratory judgment and
alleged estoppel by laches and an equal-protection claim. We refer to this complaint as defendant’s
counterclaim, because the trial court and the parties treated it, and sometimes referred to it, as a
counterclaim.
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the manner of that notice, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had not failed to state a claim on which
relief can be granted.
Defendant then moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that
it was not required to collect or pay assessments under the CCTMA, and that the CCTMA was
void for vagueness. Four days after defendant filed that motion, plaintiff filed its own motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), contending that there were “no
questions of fact that the Act applies to Defendant and Defendant has been liable to pay the
assessment since May 2021.” And in a subsequent motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), plaintiff asserted that there were “no questions of fact that: 1. The Equitable
Doctrine of laches does not bar Plaintiff’s claim; and 2. The Equal Protection Clause does not
apply to this case.”
The trial court concluded that the plain language of the CCTMA supported plaintiff’s
interpretation: a “facility” may include a combination of buildings under common management,
and the CCTMA does not require combinations of buildings to be in the same location, as long as
they are located within the assessment district. The trial court therefore granted plaintiff’s first
motion for summary disposition and denied defendant’s request for declaratory relief. The trial
court also affirmed its earlier denial of defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(8), concluding that defendant had adequate notice of the marketing program and
did not demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the manner of notice. In addition, the trial court
found that the eight-month delay in plaintiff’s collection efforts was insufficient to warrant
application of the doctrine of laches, that defendant had failed to prove sufficient prejudice to
warrant application of laches, and that plaintiff was entitled to summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10).
In sum, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition and
granted plaintiff’s first and second motions pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). The court
ruled that defendant was liable for assessments beginning May 25, 2021, as well as interest,
delinquency charges, attorney fees, and court costs incurred in pursuing the assessments, and
ordered defendant to submit its use-tax returns for all quarters since May 25, 2021. The court
concluded that “[t]his order resolves all outstanding legal issues and closes the case.”
Defendant filed a claim of appeal in this Court. One week later, plaintiff moved for entry
of judgment in the trial court, explaining that it was able to “estimate” that $227,089.14 was due
for delinquent assessments, interest, and delinquency charges, and it had incurred $77,791.76 in
costs and attorney fees, for a total due of $304,880.90. Citing MCR 7.203 and 7.208(A), defendant
opposed the motion, contending, among other arguments, that once a claim of appeal has been
filed, the trial court loses operational jurisdiction over the substance of the appeal and may not
amend the judgment without leave of the appellate court, stipulation of the parties, or as otherwise
provided by law. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order holding plaintiff’s motion
for entry of judgment in abeyance pending the outcome of the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction that plaintiff had filed in this Court.
After the parties filed additional motions in the trial court related to payment of the
assessments, the trial court entered an order holding the motions “in abeyance until this case returns
from the Court of Appeals (COA Case No. 365541), if at all.”
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II. JURISDICTION
We first address plaintiff’s argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction over defendant’s
claim of appeal. Plaintiff moved to dismiss defendant’s appeal in this Court, asserting that the trial
court’s decision and order granting its motions for summary disposition was not a final order
appealable as of right because it did not adjudicate all the rights and responsibilities of the parties,
namely plaintiff’s actual damages or the amount of costs and attorney fees due. This Court denied
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss “because the claims pleaded in appellee’s complaint may properly be
considered as only requesting declaratory relief, not entry of a specific monetary judgment, and
because the March 30, 2023 order does not appear to contemplate further court proceedings as to
determining monetary damages.” Traverse City Convention & Visitors Bureau v Golden Swan
Mgt LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 1, 2023 (Docket No. 365541).
However, the order was entered without prejudice to plaintiff raising the issue in its brief for
consideration by the case call panel. Id.2
Plaintiff raises the issue again on appeal, explaining that its complaint did not seek
declaratory relief, but instead sought a monetary judgment in an unknown amount. Citing
Faircloth v Family Independence Agency, 232 Mich App 391; 591 NW2d 314 (1998), plaintiff
asserts that, in light of its request for a monetary judgment, the trial court’s statement that the
March 30, 2023 order resolved all outstanding legal issues does not control this Court’s
jurisdiction. Rather, because the order did not dispose of all the claims and did not adjudicate the
rights and liabilities of the parties, this Court lacks jurisdiction under MCR 7.203(A). We agree.
This Court has jurisdiction over an appeal of right from a “final judgment or final order of
the circuit court, or court of claims, as defined in MCR 7.202(6) . . . .” MCR 7.203(A)(1). A
“final order” is defined as “the first judgment or order that disposes of all the claims and
adjudicates the rights and liabilities of all the parties, including such an order entered after reversal
of an earlier final judgment or order . . . .” MCR 7.202(6)(a)(i). The trial court’s March 30, 2023
decision and order is not a final order because it does not dispose of plaintiff’s claim for entry of
a monetary judgment.
In Children’s Hosp of Mich v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 450 Mich 670, 671-674; 545 NW2d
592 (1996), the Supreme Court reviewed this Court’s decisions in two appeals in which the
plaintiffs sought both declaratory relief and money damages, the trial courts entered orders that
determined liability but did not include a determination of monetary damages, and this Court
dismissed the appeals because the amounts of damages had not been determined. The Supreme
Court affirmed, agreeing that the orders in question were not final judgments. Id. at 675.
Here it was defendant, not plaintiff, that asserted a claim for declaratory relief. The trial
court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff on this claim. Although plaintiff’s
complaint did not request a specific dollar amount as damages, it clearly asserted a claim for a
monetary judgment in the amount of delinquent assessments, delinquency charges, interest, costs,
2
This Court also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. Traverse City Convention &
Visitors Bureau v Golden Swan Mgt LLC, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June
29, 2023 (Docket No. 365541).
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and attorney fees. The trial court’s order did not include a determination of this amount. This case
is distinguishable from Children’s Hosp on the ground that the trial court orders in that case
contemplated further proceedings to determine the amounts due, Children’s Hosp, 450 Mich at
671-673, but the trial court’s failure to do so here should not transform the March 30, 2023 order
into a final order appealable as of right, nor should plaintiff’s failure to request a specific dollar
amount as damages. Plaintiffs seldom request precise dollar amounts in their complaints, and there
is no indication that the plaintiffs in Children’s Hosp did so. Notably, the March 30, 2023 order
states that it resolved all outstanding legal issues. However, the order clearly did not resolve all
factual issues.
To this point, in Children’s Hosp, 450 Mich at 677, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
in some cases, the calculation of damages should be postponed pending appellate review, but
concluded that “the existence of such a situation is a ground upon which to apply for leave to
appeal, not an exception to the rules governing appeals of right.” This is such a case. See City of
Highland Park v State Land Bank Auth, 340 Mich App 593, 608; 986 NW2d 638 (2022).
Accordingly, while we find that the March 30, 2023 decision and order of the trial court is not a
final order appealable as of right, in the interest of judicial economy, we will exercise our discretion
to address defendant’s appeal as on leave granted. See Schultz v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 212 Mich
App 199, 200 n 1; 536 NW2d 784 (1995).
III. CCTMA – TRANSIENT FACILITY
We now turn to defendant’s arguments. Defendant first asserts on appeal that the trial court
erred in granting plaintiff’s motions for summary disposition because it does not own or manage
a “transient facility” under the CCTMA. Specifically, defendant contends that the statutory
definition of “transient facility” is unambiguous and refers only to buildings in a single location.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Zaher
v Miotke, 300 Mich App 132, 139; 832 NW2d 266 (2013). The trial court granted summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the
legal sufficiency of a claim. A trial court reviewing such a motion must accept all factual
allegations as true and decide the motion on the pleadings alone. Summary disposition may be
granted only when a claim is so clearly unenforceable that no factual development could possibly
justify recovery. El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159-160; 934 NW2d 665
(2019).
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint in light
of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties.
Joseph v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 491 Mich 200, 206; 815 NW2d 412 (2012). “Summary disposition
is appropriate under MCR 2.116(C)(10) if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469
Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record
reveals an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ. Id. A party seeking summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) must support the motion with affidavits, depositions,
admissions, or other documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b). If the motion is properly
supported, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of disputed fact
exists. Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314 (1996). A reviewing
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court must consider the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Latham v Barton Malow Co, 480 Mich 105, 111; 746 NW2d 868 (2008).
The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law that this Court also reviews de
novo. Whitman v City of Burton, 493 Mich 303, 311; 831 NW2d 223 (2013).
Resolution of this appeal requires application of the rules of statutory construction to the
CCTMA:
The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the
intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute’s language. If the
statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature
intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In construing a
statute, this Court should give every word meaning, and should seek to avoid any
construction that renders any part of a statute surplus or ineffectual. It is well
established that to discern the Legislature’s intent, statutory provisions are not to
be read in isolation; rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be
read as a whole. Provisions not included by the Legislature should not be included
by the courts. [In re Casey Estate, 306 Mich App 252, 256-257; 856 NW2d 556
(2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
This Court may not read language into a statute that “is not within the Legislature’s intent as
derived from the language of the statute.” AFSCME v Detroit, 468 Mich 388, 400; 662 NW2d 695
(2003).
With the CCTMA, the Legislature determined that the “state can best undertake effective
tourism marketing through the coordinated efforts of existing state government agencies in tourism
promotion and private convention and tourism promotional bureaus . . . .” MCL 141.871a(1)(d).
To further this goal, the act authorizes a bureau3 to establish a marking program4 and an assessment
district5 by filing a marketing program notice with the director. MCL 141.873(1). A marketing
program and assessment take effect on the first day of the month that is 30 days after the director
certifies approval by a majority of the owners of transient facilities in the assessment district. MCL
141.873a(3). Effective on that date, “each owner of a transient facility in the assessment district
shall be liable for payment of the assessment . . . .” MCL 141.875(1).
This Court has interpreted the CCTMA sparingly since its passage, and none of these
decisions offers guidance on whether a combination of buildings must be contiguous or in a single
3
A “bureau” is “a nonprofit corporation existing to promote convention business or tourism within
this state or a portion of this state.” MCL 141.872(e).
4
A “marketing program” is “a program established by a bureau to develop, encourage, solicit, and
promote convention business or tourism within this state or a portion of this state within which the
bureau operates.” MCL 141.872(g).
5
An “assessment district” is “a municipality or combination of municipalities as described in a
marketing program. A combination of municipalities is not required to be contiguous.” MCL
141.872(b).
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location to qualify as a transient facility. The CCTMA, however, plainly defines a “transient
facility” as “a building or combination of buildings under common ownership, operation, or
management that contains 10 or more rooms used in the business of providing dwelling, lodging,
or sleeping to transient guests, whether or not membership is required for the use of the rooms.”
MCL 141.872(n). Nothing in that definition or in the text of the CCTMA as a whole suggests that
the Legislature intended to limit the definition of “transient facility” to a combination of buildings
that must be contiguous, and defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing.
The act explicitly provides that the definition of “transient facility” “does not include a
college or school dormitory, a hospital, a nursing home, or a facility owned and operated by an
organization qualified for an exemption from federal taxation under section 501(c) of the internal
revenue code.” Id. Defendant acknowledges that the statutory definition of transient facility refers
to a “combination of buildings,” but, applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,6 defendant
contends that the use of the words college, dormitory, or hospital “leads to the conclusion that the
Legislature intended for ‘transient facility’ to apply to a collection of buildings or structures in a
single, contiguous area that are related—not unrelated homes in multiple separate locations.” But
there is no indication that the legislative exclusion of these buildings was related to whether there
were multiple buildings or the location of those buildings. Rather, the overall purpose of the
CCTMA is tourism marketing. Reading this language in light of the statute’s context and overall
purpose, the obvious conclusion is that dormitories, schools, hospitals, and nursing homes were
excluded simply because they are unrelated to tourism.
Defendant’s argument that the CCTMA’s definition of “assessment district” supports its
proposed definition of “transient facility” is similarly unavailing. The act defines “assessment
district” as a “municipality or combination of municipalities as described in a marketing program.
A combination of municipalities is not required to be contiguous.” MCL 141.872(b). Defendant
reasons that the omission of similar contiguity language in the CCTMA’s definition of “transient
facility” indicates that the Legislature intended that a combination of buildings must be contiguous.
“Generally, when language is included in one section of a statute but omitted from another section,
it is presumed that the drafters acted intentionally and purposely in their inclusion or exclusion.”
People v Peltola, 489 Mich 174, 185; 803 NW2d 140 (2011). But an “assessment district” and a
“transient facility” are unrelated and independent entities. Thus, whether a combination of
municipalities need not be contiguous is irrelevant to the question whether a collection of buildings
must be contiguous. “Contiguous” means “[t]ouching at a point or along a boundary.” Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th ed). If the Legislature had intended the buildings to be contiguous, it would
simply have explicitly stated as much.
Nor does the statutory requirement that a marketing-plan notice must be sent to “the
transient facility of the owner,” MCL 141.875(5), support the conclusion that buildings which are
part of a “transient facility” must be contiguous. In its entirety, MCL 141.875(5) provides that
“[t]he owner of a transient facility shall not be liable for payment of an assessment until a
marketing program notice has been mailed to the transient facility of the owner pursuant to section
6
“This doctrine stands for the principle that a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or
setting.” Tyler v Livonia Pub Sch, 459 Mich 382, 391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999).
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3.” However, § 3 provides that the notice must be sent “to each owner of a transient facility located
in the assessment district specified in the notice, in care of the respective transient facility.” MCL
141.873(7). Thus, read in combination, § 5(5) and § (3)(7) simply require that the owners of
transient facilities receive notice sent to a transient facility, and do not define “transient facility.”
Citing MCL 141.878(1), defendant also asserts that the CCTMA, when viewed as a whole,
allows an owner to own or manage more than one transient facility in an assessment district.
Defendant reasons that, under the trial court’s interpretation of the CCTMA then, every owner or
manager with buildings in more than one location would be deemed to have only one transient
facility, thus conflicting with other portions of the CCTMA. This reasoning is also faulty. There
is nothing in our or the trial court’s interpretation that would prohibit an owner or manager from
operating more than one transient facility in an assessment district.
Because the plain language of the CCTMA does not require that “transient facilities” be
located on a single property or in a single location, the trial court correctly ruled that defendant
was required to pay assessments under the act. To interpret the CCTMA to require a combination
of buildings to be contiguous or in a single location improperly reads language into the CCTMA
that “is not within the Legislature’s intent as derived from the language of the statute.” AFSCME,
468 Mich at 400. As the plain language of the CCTMA is clear and unambiguous on this point,
we need not look beyond that language to determine the meaning of “transient facility.”
Accordingly, we decline to address defendant’s arguments using legislative history and other
means to ascertain legislative intent.
IV. CCTMA - NOTICE
Defendant also argues that even if it was considered a manager of a “transient facility,”
assessments could not be levied against it before the date plaintiff mailed the marketing program
notice by certified mail—April 28, 2022. The trial court held that under Pi-Con, Inc v AJ Anderson
Constr Co, 435 Mich 375; 458 NW2d 639 (1990), strict compliance was not required, and because
it was undisputed that defendant had actual notice, compliance with the statute was satisfied. We
agree with the trial court.
MCL 141.875(1) provides that, “[u]pon the effective date of an assessment under [MCL
141.873a], each owner of a transient facility in the assessment district shall be liable for payment
of the assessment . . . .” MCL 141.875(5) states, “The owner of a transient facility shall not be
liable for payment of an assessment until a marketing program notice has been mailed to the
transient facility of the owner pursuant to [MCL 141.873].” Under MCL 141.873(7),
“[s]imultaneously with the filing of the marketing program notice with the director, the bureau
shall mail a copy of the notice, by registered or certified mail, to each owner of a transient facility
located in the assessment district specified in the notice, in care of the respective transient facility.”
In Pi-Con, 435 Mich at 378-379, 387, the Supreme Court examined the public works bond
act (PWBA), MCL 129.207, which required notice by certified mail before a general contractor
could have a right of action upon a public works payment bond, and held that “the certified mail
requirement [was] intended to ensure actual receipt and not to qualify the right to sue on a manner
of delivery or proof of delivery,” thus “the plaintiff ha[d] a right to prove actual receipt of notice
by a preponderance of the evidence.” In so holding, the Court emphasized that the PWBA’s notice
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provision requires notice by certified mail, and not certified mail, return receipt requested, which
the Court found significant:
Had the Legislature desired a procedure whereby it could conclusively be
established that [the] defendant received [the] plaintiff’s notice, it would have
required notice be sent certified mail with return receipt requested. Certified
mailing alone does not guarantee the retention of records of delivery, because the
United States Postal Service retains such records for only two years. By requiring
notice be sent return receipt requested, on the other hand, the Legislature could have
ensured that all claimants on bonds always had proof of delivery. . . . The statute
at hand, however, regulates the manner of delivery, not the method of proof of
delivery. [Pi-Con, 435 Mich at 386.]
The same rationale applies here. First, here as in the PWBA, the statutory notice provision
does not require notice be provided by certified mail, return receipt. Instead, it requires the lesser
certified or registered mail, MCL 141.873(7), which under Pi-Con indicated a legislative intent
that notice be provided, not that there exists proof of actual notice, Pi-Con, 435 Mich at 386-387.
Second, as in Pi-Con, the notice provision at issue was a condition that had to be complied with,
yet still the Court held that strict compliance was unnecessary, as long as actual written notice was
timely provided and it was proven by a preponderance of the evidence that actual notice existed.
See id. at 382.7 And here, because it is undisputed that defendant had actual notice of the
assessment requirements, the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for summary
disposition as to notice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Sima G. Patel
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Christopher P. Yates
7
We recognize, as defendant points out, that other decisions have held that a notice provision must
be strictly complied with in order for a party to lawfully bring suit under the statute. See, e.g.,
Weingartz Supply Co v Salasco, Inc, 310 Mich App 226, 236-237; 871 NW2d 375 (2015). We
also realize that since Pi-Con, the Supreme Court has held that “substantial compliance” with
certain notice provisions is not sufficient absent statutory language indicating that. See, e.g.,
McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 746-747; 822 NW2d 747 (2012), Jakupovic v City of
Hamtramck, 489 Mich 939 (2011), and Rowland v Washtenaw Co Rd Comm, 477 Mich 197, 219;
731 NW2d 41 (2007). But we are an error correcting court, and we see what was at issue in Pi-
Con as being most analogous to the statutory notice provision within MCL 141.873(7).
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