NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots v. NetJets, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NETJETS ASSOCIATION OF SHARED

AIRCRAFT PILOTS,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action 2:14-cv-2487

v. District Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

NETJETS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Partial Seal Its Motion to Enforce

Settlement Agreement and for Permanent Injunction, (Doc. 158). Because Plaintiff does not meet its

high burden to seal, the Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a labor organization representing approximately 3,000 pilots employed by Defendant

NetJets Aviation, Inc., filed this action on December 2, 2014. (See Doc. 1; Doc. 136 at 1–2

(summarizing the factual background of the case)). Plaintiff describes the case as one that “revolves

around labor relations in the airline industry, specifically efforts to block unionizing at NetJets or

otherwise impair [Plaintiff’s] operations.” (Doc. 158 at 4). In particular, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Todd Weeber and various John Doe Defendants “gained unauthorized access to a

confidential Union message board and obtained private Union communications.” (Doc. 136 at 1–2).

Further, Defendants NetJets Aviation, Inc., and NetJets, Inc., allegedly “used social media to: coerce,

intimidate, and retaliate against Union members for supporting the Union; interfere with the Union’s

internal election procedures; and ultimately undermine the Union’s ability to represent its members.”

(Id. at 2).

After years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement agreement and stipulated to the case’s

dismissal. (Doc. 143; Doc. 144 (retaining jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement)).

But that resolution did not last. On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed several motions in this action,

all of which arise out of ongoing litigation in the Delaware County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. See

Alan Bobo v. NetJets Ass’n of Shared Aircraft Pilots, No. 23 CV H 09 0662 (Delaware C.P. Sept. 15,

2023). In that case, Alan Bobo, the Chief Operating Officer for Defendant NetJets, Inc., brings a

defamation claim against Plaintiff based on allegedly false statements made about Mr. Bobo. (Doc.

149-2 at 2). During discovery, Mr. Bobo requested materials sent through Plaintiff’s email listserv and

postings published on Plaintiff’s website. (Id. at 4). In response, Plaintiff asserted that the settlement

agreement reached in this case prohibited Plaintiff from disclosing those materials. (Id.). Ultimately,

the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas ordered the materials be disclosed. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff

then sought a temporary restraining order from this Court to prevent those disclosures. (See Doc. 148).

The Court denied that request. (Doc. 153).

Now, Plaintiff intends to file a motion to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement and obtain a

permanent injunction. (Doc. 158). But first, Plaintiff seeks the Court’s leave to file portions of that

motion under seal. (Id.). The Court has reviewed the materials at issue in camera, and the matter is

ripe for review. (Id. (unopposed motion to seal); Doc. 159 (ordering Plaintiff to send its proposed

redactions to the Court for in camera review)).

II. STANDARD

Courts distinguish between limiting public disclosure of information during discovery versus

the adjudicative stage of a case. See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299,

305 (6th Cir. 2016). “The line between these two stages, discovery and adjudicative, is crossed when

the parties place material in the court record.” Id. (citing Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d

544, 545 (7th Cir. 2002)). “Unlike information merely exchanged between the parties, ‘[t]he public

has a strong interest in obtaining the information contained in the court record.’” Id. (quoting Brown

& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)). For this reason, the

moving party has a “heavy” burden of overcoming a “‘strong presumption in favor of openness’ as to

court records.” Id. (quoting Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179).

“[I]n civil litigation, only trade secrets, information covered by a recognized privilege (such as

the attorney-client privilege), and information required by statute to be maintained in confidence (such

as the name of a minor victim of a sexual assault), is typically enough to overcome the presumption of

access.” Id. at 308 (citation and quotations omitted). “[T]he seal itself must be narrowly tailored to

serve” the reason for sealing, which requires the moving party to “analyze in detail, document by

document, the propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations.” Id. at 305–06 (quotation

omitted). Ultimately, the movant must show that “disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious

injury . . . . And in delineating the injury to be prevented, specificity is essential.” Id. at 307–08 (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

In sum, to overcome the “strong presumption in favor of openness,” parties who move to seal

documents must demonstrate the three elements laid out in Shane Group: “(1) a compelling interest in

sealing the records; (2) that the interest in sealing outweighs the public’s interest in accessing the

records; and (3) that the request is narrowly tailored.” Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x

635, 637 (6th Cir. 2019). And the parties seeking to seal documents must demonstrate “document-by-

document, line-by-line” why they meet their burden to seal. Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 308.

Importantly, the Court’s obligation to explain its reasoning for sealing records “is independent of

whether anyone objects to it.” Id. at 306 (citing Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1176).

III. DISCUSSION

Before undertaking the Shane Group analysis, the Court addresses two preliminary matters.

First, Plaintiff says it seeks to redact from its forthcoming motion to enforce (1) the entirety of the

parties’ settlement agreement and (2) any references to its “substantive contents.” (Doc. 158 at 1).

Upon review of Plaintiff’s proposed redactions, however, the Court sees that Plaintiff also wants to

redact information related to litigation in this Court and the Delaware County Court of Common

Pleas—most of which is publicly available. (See Unredacted Motion at 1, 2–3, 19–20 (reviewed in

camera)). Plaintiff offers no compelling reason why the Court should do so. (See generally Doc. 158

(discussing why the settlement agreement should be sealed only)). As such, the Court DENIES these

proposed redactions.

Second, Plaintiff suggests that since the Court has sealed confidential business information in

this case before, the Court should grant Plaintiff’s instant Motion to seal as well. (Doc. 158 at 4; Doc.

97 (sealing confidential business information within a motion to enforce an oral settlement agreement)).

But the two requests are not similar. For instance, the Court previously allowed the parties to redact

“operational data about . . . flight operations, customer relationships, and labor relations” and found

that disclosure would harm NetJets’ competitive standing. (Doc. 97 at 1–2). The Court did not seal

anything else. (Id.; see also Doc. 115 at 3 (noting that only “a small amount of information from one

document” was sealed from the public docket)). In its instant Motion, Plaintiff does not say that the

settlement agreement contains any of this data. (Cf. Doc. 158 at 5 (comparing the two request to seal

by saying the settlement agreement does not contain information relevant “to the facts underlying this

litigation”)). Therefore, the reasons that justified sealing in the first request are not present here, and

the Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s Motion on this basis.

Those issues aside, the Court now turns to the merits of Plaintiff’s arguments to seal the

settlement agreement and any references to it within its forthcoming motion. Plaintiff contends it has

compelling interests in the agreement’s non-disclosure because it contains confidential settlement

discussions and business information that should not be publicly revealed. (Id. at 4–7). The Court

disagrees.

First, “[t]he Sixth Circuit recognizes a privilege only for the conduct and statements made

during settlement negotiations,” not for “finalized settlement agreements.” Schnatter v. 247 Grp., LLC,

No. 3:20-cv-3, 2024 WL 4846216, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2024) (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber

Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (2003)) (emphasis in original); see also Renfrow-

Pike v. Bruce, No. 3:21-cv-178, 2022 WL 1571768, at *3–4 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2022) (noting the

same). After reviewing the parties’ agreement in camera, the Court finds that it merely describes the

background underlying the parties’ litigation and the terms to which they agreed. In other words, it

does not contain privileged settlement negotiations requiring a blanket seal of all its terms. See

Schnatter, 2024 WL 4846216, at *4 (finding a settlement agreement not worthy of sealing where it only

mentioned the underlying disputes, the existence of an agreement, and its terms).

Nor does the agreement contain the type of confidential business information that usually

warrants sealing. Plaintiff says the parties’ agreement shows what they “were willing to do to promote

harmonious relations,” and if it is disclosed, “[c]ompetitors and even employees and members without

a need-to-know would gain insight and a model for pending and future negotiations.” (Doc. 158 at 4).

In the past, this Court has recognized a company’s compelling interest in sealing “when disclosure [of

certain materials] on the public docket would ‘give a significant advantage to competitors of the parties

in this action.’” Pro. Investigating and Consulting Agency, Inc. v. SOS Sec. LLC, No. 2:19-cv-3304,

2022 WL 4376227, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2022) (quoting Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. Riffe, No.

1:19-cv-23, 2020 WL 5849408, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2020)).

But the Court cannot say disclosure of the settlement agreement would give the parties’

competitors such an advantage here. To start, much of the information Plaintiff seeks to seal is already

publicly available through filings in the parties’ various lawsuits. For instance, Plaintiff requests to

redact the parties’ stipulation of dismissal in this case, which has been on the public docket for several

years. (See Doc. 143); Harter v. Franklin Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 2:23-cv-2995, 2024 WL 4149245,

at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 11, 2024) (denying a request to seal information already publicly available in a

motion for summary judgment). More still, the agreement contains multiple, boilerplate contract

provisions, none of which would give competitors the upper hand in future negotiations. See Anthony-

Thomas Candy Co. v. Nestle USA, Inc., No 2:24-cv-3938, 2024 WL 4456912, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct.

10, 2024) (declining to seal standard contract provisions). Indeed, beyond general statements that the

entire agreement is confidential, Plaintiff fails to provide any further explanation on which portions of

the settlement agreement would be harmful if disclosed. (Doc. 158 at 4–5). And when parties want to

keep information from the public, they must identify with “specificity” “the injury to be prevented.”

Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 307–08. Without more, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has a

compelling business interest that should shield the settlement agreement from the public’s eye.

Plus, even if Plaintiff had a compelling interest in sealing at least part of the agreement, the

public’s interest outweighs it here. As Plaintiff explains, this action concerns “labor relations in the

airline industry,” as well as Defendants’ alleged breach of an agreement with a sizable labor

organization. (Doc. 158 at 4). Therefore, the public’s interest in the “subject matter” of this case is not

as minimal as Plaintiff suggests. Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305 (“[T]he greater the public interest

in the litigation’s subject matter, the greater the showing necessary to overcome the presumption of

access.”); (Doc. 158 at 4–5). By moving to enforce its terms, Plaintiff makes the parties’ settlement

agreement a central issue in this case. See Machliet v. Hutton, No. 1:20-cv-270, 2021 WL 6427932, at

*1 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 22, 2021) (denying a motion to seal a settlement agreement in an action where

plaintiffs alleged defendants breached its terms). As a result, the public has a heightened interest in

viewing its exact terms, so they can understand the Court’s interpretation of the agreement and how

certain individuals allegedly violated it. Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. Volvo Const. Equip. N.A., LLC, No.

3:19-cv-778, 2020 WL 6946577, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 25, 2020) (saying a decision on a breach of

contract claim will include a discussion of the agreement’s terms); Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305

(“[T]he public has an interest in ascertaining what evidence and records [the Court] relied upon in

reaching [its] decisions.”); cf. Am. Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Blasingim, Nos. 1:19-cv-137, 5:17-cv-2253,

2022 WL 22730336, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2022) (sealing parts of asettlement agreement where

privacy interests of unrelated third parties were implicated and where other material in the record

allowed the public to understand “the purpose of the settlement agreement”).

Finally, Plaintiff’s request is not narrowly tailored. Plaintiff wishes to seal the parties’ entire

settlement agreement, as well as references to its contents within its forthcoming motion. Yet, as

discussed, much of the parties’ settlement agreement contains standard contract language. And

Plaintiff’s other proposed redactions include information that is available on public court dockets.

Plaintiff “cannot expect to reap the benefits of an overbroad request by placing the onus on the Court

to determine on a ‘line-by-line basis . . . that specific information in the court record meets the

demanding requirements for a seal.’” Rudd Equip. Co., Inc., 2020 WL 6946577, at *3 (quoting Shane

Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 308); U.S. ex rel. Scott v. Humana, No. 3:18-cv-61, 2021 WL 4449277, at *9

(W.D. Ky. Sept. 28, 2021) (stating the same). As it stands, Plaintiff’s request to seal is much too broad,

and the Court declines to do Plaintiff’s work for it. Cf. Anthony-Thomas Candy Co., 2024 WL 4456912,

at *4 (declining to broadly seal an agreement and sealing only provisions “of particular concern”

identified by the movant).

In sum, Plaintiff has not met its burden to seal the proposed materials, and its Motion to do so

(Doc. 158) is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Under Partial Seal Its Motion

to Enforce Settlement Agreement and for Permanent Injunction, (Doc. 158), is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 12, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE