The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
MONROE DIVISION
THEODORE TOPOLEWSKI CASE NO. 3:23-CV-00258
VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY
POLICE JURY ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D. MCCLUSKY
MEMORANDUM RULING
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 57] filed by
Defendant Madison Parish Police Jury (“MPPJ” or “Defendant”). Plaintiff, Theodore Topolewski
(“Topolewski” or “Plaintiff”), filed an Opposition [Doc. No. 78], and Defendant filed a Reply
[Doc. No. 82].
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Topolewski, a Caucasian male, filed the instant employment suit against Defendant on
February 27, 2023.1 Topolewski filed a first amended and supplemental complaint and a second
amended and supplement complaint.2 Topolewski asserts several causes of action sounding in
race-based discrimination, contractual discrimination, equal protection, substantive due process,
§ 1985 conspiracy, and civil conspiracy.
The Madison Parish Service District Hospital was created by the Madison Parish Police
Jury, per the authority granted by La. R.S. § 46:1051, to operate the Madison Parish Hospital in
Tallulah, Louisiana. The Hospital Service District, a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana
is governed by a board of five commissioners (Hospital Board), each appointed by the Police Jury.
1 [Doc. No. 1].
2 [Doc. No. 10, 19].
On April 7, 2014, Plaintiff and the Hospital entered into an employment agreement.3 The
employment agreement was extended several years. Plaintiff served as Director/Chief Executive
Officer (“CEO”) of the Hospital until his discharge on October 14, 2022.4 The employment
agreement in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s termination was set to expire on February 28, 2023.5
Although the MPPJ has no contractual obligation to Plaintiff, by statute, the Hospital Board
members are elected to serve by a majority vote of the Police Jury.6 Further, one of the MPPJ’s
duties is to fill vacant spots on the Hospital Board.7 Plaintiff acknowledges through his deposition
that “the Board has the sole responsibility of . . . firing the president; not the Police Jury.”8 Plaintiff
further admits that he entered a contract “with the hospital,” at no point did negotiations include
the MPPJ, and at no point did the Police Jury have to approve his contract.9 Moreover, Plaintiff
never had any kind of relationship with the MPPJ in his capacity as CEO except to update them as
to the hospital’s construction.10
On August 3, 2022, the Hospital’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”), Robert Laurents
(“Laurents”), informed Plaintiff that Latayatcha Ross (“Nurse Ross”), a licensed nurse practitioner
employed by the Hospital, was falsifying medical records to obtain a contractual bonus.11
Plaintiff’s initial response to Laurents was to “let it go.”12 One day later, on August 4, 2022,
Laurents and the business office manager informed Plaintiff that Nurse Ross falsified over one
hundred and twenty (120) records.13 Plaintiff requested samples of the records which allegedly
3 [Doc. No. 78-2].
4 [Doc. No. 78-3, p. 3].
5 [Doc. No. 78-2].
6 La. R.S. § 46:1053.
7 [Id.].
8 [Doc. No. 57-5, p. 25].
9 [Id. at 24, 25].
10 [Id. at 27].
11 [Doc. No. 57-5, p. 147].
12 [Doc. No. 78-6, p. 3].
13 [Id.].
showed their incompleteness.14 Plaintiff contacted the Hospital’s outside counsel, Sullivan Stolier
Schulze, LLC (“Sullivan Stolier”), to request an internal investigation.15 After conducting the
internal investigation, Sullivan Stolier informed Plaintiff to terminate Nurse Ross immediately.16
On August 9, 2022, Plaintiff called a meeting with Hospital Chief Medical Officer – Dr. Lawrence
Chenier, Nurse Ross’ collaborating physician – Dr. Donald Perry, and Nurse Ross’ administrative
boss – Stacey Sandidge, to brief them of the situation.17 The report was given to the Hospital on
August 25, 2022, and corroborates Plaintiff’s testimony.18 The report also notes that immediate
termination was warranted under her contract.19
On August 25, 2022, Plaintiff emailed a copy of the report to the Hospital Board.20 At that
time, the Hospital Board was made up of five members: Mary Trichell (“Trichell”) – Chair,
Thomas Leoty (“Leoty”) – Vice Chair, Cole Norris (“Norris”), Calvin Washington
(“Washington”), and Thomas Mitchell (“Mitchell”). 21 Trichell, Leoty, and Norris are Caucasian,
and Washington and Thomas are African American. Plaintiff asked Washington his thoughts on
the report, and Washington said that the report was “false.”22 Nurse Ross reportedly “had a very
nice personality,” “her demeanor was very, very nice,” and “she seemed to be a great person.”23
Plaintiff declared in his deposition that in addition to accusing Sullivan Stolier of making a false
report, Washington used the word “racial” and clearly stated his intentions of gaining an African
American majority board.24 Plaintiff memorialized the conversation in an email to Trichell, despite
14 [Doc. No. 78-6, p. 4].
15 [Doc. No. 57-5].
16 [Doc. No. 78-6, p. 4].
17 [Doc. No. 78-6, p. 5].
18 [Doc. No. 78-7, p. 1].
19 [Id.].
20 [Doc. No. 78-8].
21 [Doc. No. 78-8, p. 1].
22 [Doc. No. 78-12, p. 10].
23 [Id. at p. 32].
24 [Doc. No. 78-9].
Washington testifying that he does not recall saying such.25 Plaintiff asked Trichell if she knew
Jane Sanders (“Sanders”), president of the MPPJ and if she would speak to Sanders about the
Nurse Ross incident.26 According to Trichell, she and Sanders had a long discussion at Sanders’
house about Nurse Ross.27 Sanders testified that it was “not sitting down for two hours at my house,
no.”28
On or around September 19, 2022, the MPPJ allowed Nurse Ross to speak at a meeting
and “tell her side of the story.”29 Plaintiff was also invited to “tell his side of the story,” but he did
not attend.30 After Nurse Ross spoke, the MPPJ informed Nurse Ross that it does not control the
Hospital’s employment decisions, and thus could not redress her concerns.31
On October 10, 2022, the MPPJ convened its regular meeting and voted to dismiss board
members Trichell and Leoty as their terms had allegedly expired.32 The MPPJ received letters from
Mitchell and Washington asking to be reappointed but received no letters from Trichell or Leoty.33
Plaintiff submits that the manner of reappointment was suspicious because, before the dismissal
of Trichell and Leoty, Mitchell requested a schedule of the board members’ term dates from the
MPPJ secretary, Margaret Drew (“Drew”), as opposed to the hospital board secretary, Whitaker.34
Further, the MPPJ agenda for the October 10, 2022 meeting allegedly failed to adhere to the
specific notice requirements regarding dismissal and appointee of members. Both Trichell and
Leoty state in their deposition that they did not have any warning or notice that they had to submit
25 [Doc. Nos. 78-9; 78-12, p. 17-19].
26 [Doc. No. 78-10, p. 6].
27 [Id.].
28 [Doc. No. 57-9, p. 46].
29 [Doc. No. 57-3].
30 [Id.].
31 [Id.].
32 [Doc. No. 57-9].
33 [Id.].
34 [Doc. No. 78-23].
written requests to the police jury to remain on the hospital board.35 The MPPJ unanimously voted
to re-appoint both Mitchell and Washington, changing the hospital board from a Caucasian
majority to an African American majority.36
On October 12, 2022, the amended board issued a notice of a special meeting to take place
on October 14, 2022.37 The special meeting’s agenda included the following matters: “Board
hearing for licensed contractor employee; Removal of Officers for cause; Salary reviews;
Investigations into all personnel-related matters.”38
On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff forwarded the email regarding the board’s agenda notice to
an attorney from Sullivan Stolier and claimed that he would not attend and “hopefully they will
do me a favor and terminate my contract.”39 Plaintiff testified that he did not attend the meeting
because the board was illegally constituted and called by no officers.40 Further, Plaintiff declared
that he feared for his safety due to the community's reactions regarding Nurse Ross’ termination.41
Jeanette Phillips, who was a housekeeper of the Hospital, testified in an affidavit that she observed
Plaintiff on the day of his termination, “making trips back and forth, moving his things out of his
office. He made trips out of the hospital, moving boxes and his things.”42 This allegedly led the
Hospital Board to believe that Plaintiff abandoned his position.43 Plaintiff presents deposition
testimony that he removed his belongings because he was suspicious of the Hospital Board’s
intentions to terminate him.44
35 [Doc. Nos. 78-10, p. 9; 78-26, p. 2].
36 [Doc. No. 57-9].
37 [Doc. No. 78-22].
38 [Doc. No. 78-29].
39 [Doc. No. 55-32].
40 [Doc. No. 78-6, pp. 16-18].
41 [Id.].
42 [Doc. No. 55-15].
43 [Doc. No. 55-2, p. 18].
44 [Doc. No. 55-6, p. 22].
Finally, on October 14, 2022, the Hospital Board voted to remove Plaintiff as the Hospital’s
CEO, effective immediately.45 Plaintiff received the termination notice on October 17, 2022, with
no reasoning provided.46 Additionally, the Hospital Board reinstated Nurse Ross due to the absence
of proof regarding the reason for her termination and hired Williams, Nurse Ross’ attorney, to a
newly created position at the Hospital.47 Further, Doctor Donald Perry (“Dr. Perry”), an African
American, was appointed as interim CEO and remained as such for two (2) years.48 On February
1, 2024, the Hospital hired permanent CEO, William Ermann (“Ermann”), a Caucasian male.
On July 12, 2024, Defendant filed the pending Motion moving the Court to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant as Plaintiff presents no evidence of any wrongdoing.49
Plaintiff opposed.50 Defendant also moves the Court to award it attorney’s fees under § 1988 and
other costs under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). Plaintiff does not offer a response.
The issues have been briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Under FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), the court will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” If the movant meets their initial burden of showing no genuine issue of material
fact, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce evidence or designate specific facts
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v.
Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). A fact is “material” when
45 [Doc. No. 78-30].
46 [Doc. No. 78-31].
47 [Id.].
48 [Id.].
49 [Doc. No. 57].
50 [Doc. No. 78].
proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the lawsuit’s outcome under applicable law in
the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words, “the mere
existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion
for summary judgment.” Id. at 247-48. And a dispute about a material fact is “genuine” only if the
evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
While courts will “resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party,” an actual
controversy exists only “when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.” Little
v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). But summary judgment is appropriate
when the evidence is “merely colorable or is not significantly probative.” Cutting Underwater
Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
Moreover, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.
Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). Courts “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr¬McGee Oil and Gas
Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Finally—and importantly—there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a
party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof of trial.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
B. Analysis
1. Equal Protection and Contractual Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that the MPPJ subjected him to racial discrimination and denied him equal
protection under § 1983 and contractual discrimination under § 1981.51 Defendant argues
Plaintiff’s employment claims against it should be dismissed because the MPPJ did not employ
nor terminate Plaintiff.52
Section 1983 provides:
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To state a viable claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Lauderdale v. Texas
Dep’t. of Crim. Just., Institutional Div., 512 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Leffall v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1994). Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating against employees on several grounds, including race. 42 U.S.C.§ 2000. Section
1983 and Title VII are “parallel causes of action.” Cervantez v. Bexar Cnty. Civ. Serv. Comm'n,
99 F.3d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the “inquiry into intentional discrimination is
essentially the same for individual actions brought under sections 1981 and 1983, and Title VII.”
Lauderdale, 512 F.3d at 166 (citing Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009, 1019–21 (8th Cir.1986)).
51 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 26].
52 [Doc. No. 57-2, p. 17].
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff was hired by the Hospital and not the MPPJ.
Plaintiff, too, seemingly agrees with this contention and acknowledges that his contract was with
the Hospital and not the MPPJ. Plaintiff testified that the MPPJ “had nothing to do with the
contract” and that the Hospital Board “ha[d] the sole responsibility of hiring and firing the
president, not; not the Police Jury.”53 Further, Defendant submits evidence that members of the
Hospital Board testified that the MPPJ was not involved with Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff
acknowledges that the MPPJ did not influence the Hospital’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.
In McCoy v. Detention Center Claiborne Parish, 2008 WL 1819927 (W.D. La. 2008), the Court
found there was no employment relationship between McCoy and the police jury. Therefore, it
was clearly established that the police jury could not be held liable for employment discrimination
claims and granted summary judgment in the police jury’s favor. The Court finds the same here.
Because the MPPJ was not Plaintiff’s employer—nor had any influence over Plaintiff’s
termination, the MPPJ is not liable under the Equal Protection Clause or § 1981. Because Equal
Protection and § 1981 actions are all parallel to Title VII and thus require an employer-employee
relationship, the Court sees no need to analyze further under the McDonnell Douglas Corp.
analysis. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment regarding Plaintiff’s Equal
Protection and § 1981 claims is GRANTED.
2. Substantive Due Process
“To succeed with a claim based on substantive due process in the public employment
context, the plaintiff must show two things: (1) that she had a property interest/right in her
employment, and (2) that the public employer's termination of that interest was arbitrary or
capricious.” Moulton v. City of Beaumont, 991 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1993). “A public employee
53 [Doc. No. 57-5, pp. 24-26].
has a property interest in her job if she has a legitimate claim of entitlement to it, a claim which
would limit the employer’s ability to terminate the employment.” Johnson v. Sw. Miss. Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 878 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir. 1989). The property interest in his job depends on state law, i.e.,
Louisiana law in this case. Wallace v. Shreve Mem'l Libr., 79 F.3d 427, 429–30 (5th Cir. 1996).
To demonstrate a property interest in his job under Louisiana law, the plaintiff must show either
(1) that she had a contract for a definite term, or (2) that her employer agreed to fire her only for
cause. Id.; see also Cobb v. City of Harahan, 516 Fed. App’x 337, 341 (5th Cir.2013).
Louisiana law recognizes a presumption that an individual's employment is “at will” unless
there is a specific statutory requirement, or the relationship has been altered by either express
contract limiting the conditions of termination. La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2747; Jackson v. E. Baton
Rouge Par. Indigent Def.'s Bd., 353 So.2d 344, 345 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1977).
Again, Plaintiff offers no evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether the MPPJ had any contractual obligation to Plaintiff. On the contrary, Plaintiff testified
several times throughout his deposition that the MPPJ was not his employer and that the MPPJ
had nothing to do with his contract. Plaintiff also testified that he believed the Hospital Board, not
the MPPJ, “ha[d] the sole responsibility of hiring and firing the president, not; not the Police
Jury.”54 Thus, Plaintiff cannot satisfy element two of this claim because the MPPJ was not his
employer, nor did the MPPJ terminate him. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion on this issue is
GRANTED.
54 [Doc. No. 57-5, p. 25].
3. 42 U.S.C § 1985(3) Conspiracy
Defendant asserts Plaintiff has not and cannot prove any conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of
his equal protection or due process. Plaintiff asserts that he has produced evidence to support his
conspiracy claims against Defendants. He has not.
42 U.S.C § 1985(3) provides:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the
purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of
preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or
Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or
Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons
conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who
is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a
legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully
qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as
a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen
in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any
case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of
the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his
person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or
deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more
of the conspirators.
To state a cognizable claim under § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege that (1) a racial or class-
based discriminatory animus lay behind the conspiracy and (2) the conspiracy aimed to violate
rights protected against private infringement. Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of Opelousas, 255 F.3d
261, 270 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)); United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983); Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263, 267–68 (1993).
Once more, Plaintiff produces no evidence of a conspiracy between the MPPJ and the
Hospital regarding unlawful discrimination. Plaintiff argues that the MPPJ conspired with the
Hospital and Hospital Board to terminate him based on his race and regain an African American
majority board—and such was successful as the MPPJ appointed individuals to fill vacancies on
the Hospital Board. Plaintiff further argues that conspiracy is shown because the MPPJ allowed
Nurse Ross to speak at a police jury meeting.
The Court finds no genuine issue of material fact as to a conspiracy between the MPPJ, by
itself, or with any other named defendant. The MPPJ was required, by law, to fill vacancies on the
Board.55 While there is evidence that Washington and Mitchell submitted reappointment letters to
the MPPJ, there is no evidence that the MPPJ was “in” on the discreet and suspicious request to
be reappointed. The question of discrimination lies among and between the Hospital and Hospital
Board; there is no evidence that the MPPJ was part of or knew of the conspiracy to gain an African
American board or terminate Plaintiff because he did not fit the other defendants’ agenda. Further,
Defendant submits, and Plaintiff admits through his deposition that he, too, was offered a chance
to speak at the same police jury meeting that Nurse Ross spoke at. However, he decided it was not
in his best interest to go to the meeting. Nonetheless, Plaintiff acknowledges that the MPPJ made
no comments against or regarding Plaintiff at that meeting. Thus, to the extent the MPPJ moves
for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1985 Conspiracy claims, the Motion is GRANTED.
4. Civil Conspiracy Claim
Defendant maintains Plaintiff cannot prove that a conspiracy existed. In Opposition,
Plaintiff states that a reasonable jury could find evidence of an agreement to remove Plaintiff from
CEO.
55 La. R.S §46:1053.
Article 2324 provides that “[h]e who conspires with another person to commit an
intentional or willful act is answerable, in solido, with that person, for the damage caused by such
act.” La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A). In order to prove a conspiracy, a plaintiff must establish that: (1)
there was an agreement to commit an illegal or tortious act; (2) the act was actually committed;
(3) the act resulted in the plaintiff's injury; and (4) there was an agreement as to the intended
outcome or result. Jeff Mercer, LLC v. State through Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 222 So. 3d 1017,
1024 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/7/17). “The actionable element of a conspiracy claim is not the conspiracy
itself but rather the tort that the conspirators agree to perpetrate and actually commit in whole or
in part.” Prime Ins. Co. v. Imperial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 151 So. 3d 670, 676 (La. App. 4 Cir.
10/1/14).
The Court sees no need to flesh out this claim element by element for the reasons stated
under § 1985 Conspiracy. See Section II(B)(3), supra. Simply put, there is no evidence that the
MPPJ agreed with the Hospital or the Hospital Board to commit an illegal or tortious act against
him. The evidence that Sanders denied the time and location of meeting Trichell regarding Nurse
Ross’ incident does not pass the summary judgment threshold in bolstering the claim that the MPPJ
terminated Plaintiff because he was Caucasian. Further, an email regarding the meeting agenda
from Mitchell to Sanders is of no significance here. Sanders was president of the MPPJ; thus, she
was entitled to the meeting agenda. The fact that Mitchell then forwarded the email to Nurse Ross’
attorney, while suspicious in its own right, has nothing to do with the MPPJ.
Therefore, for all reasons set out above and in this section, the Motion for Summary
Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Civil Conspiracy claims is GRANTED.
5. Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C 1988(b)
Defendant states that Plaintiff’s claims lack an evidentiary basis, so Defendant is entitled
to an award of attorney’s fees incurred for defending these claims. Plaintiff offers no argument to
the contrary.
“Under § 1988, a court “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs” for proceedings in vindication of civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
A prevailing defendant is entitled to fees “only when a plaintiff's underlying claim is frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless.” Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 239 (5th Cir. 1999). The
district court will review frivolity by asking whether the case was so lacking in merit that it was
groundless, rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful. Jones v. Texas Tech. Univ.,
656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir.1981). Factors important to frivolity determinations are (1) whether
plaintiff established a prima facie case, (2) whether the defendant offered to settle, and (3) whether
the district court dismissed the case or held a full-blown trial. See EEOC v. Kimhrough Inv. Co.,
703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir.1983). These factors are helpful “guideposts,” but frivolousness must be
judged on a case-by-case basis. Doe v. Silsbee ISD, 440 Fed. App’x 421, 425 (5th Cir. 2011). The
ultimate result of a civil rights action cannot be the basis for an award of attorney's fees to the
successful defendant. Plemer v. Parsons–Gilbane, 713 F.2d 1127, 1141 (5th Cir.1983); Stenseth
v. Greater Fort Worth & Tarrant County Community Action Agency, 673 F.2d 842, 849 (5th
Cir.1982); Jones, 656 F.2d at 1145.
The Court finds that there were some credible suspicions to proceed on Plaintiff’s claims
with colorable merit, even though the evidence regarding the MPPJ is slight. While the Court
cannot say that Plaintiff’s race and termination were linked to the MPPJ, neither can the Court say
that Plaintiff’s suspicions regarding his superiors were without total merit. “Even when the law or
the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable
ground for bringing suit.” Cook v. Somerville and Somerville, Ltd., 1997 WL 13728 (E.D. La.
1997) (quoting White v. South Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 693 F.2d 1127, 1141 (5th Cir. 1983)). “When
a plaintiff presents some credible evidence to prove his claim, he has shown that his case has
colorable merit; consequently, the prevailing defendant is not entitled to attorney fees.” Kador v.
City of New Roads, 2011 WL 2297815 (M.D. La. 2011) (citing Vaughner v. F.J. Pulito, 804 F.2d
873, 878 (5th Cir.1986); Lopez v. Aransas County Sch. Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544–45 (5th
Cir.1978)).
Thus, to the extent Defendant request an award of attorney fees, its request is DENIED.
6. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)
Defendant argues that it incurred $7,051.42 in deposition costs for which they are entitled
to be paid. Plaintiff offers no argument in Opposition. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1)
provides, in relevant part: “Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of
the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. See FRCP 54(d)(1). In determining whether
to award costs related to depositions, the Court “has great discretion to tax the cost of a deposition
if it finds that all or any part of the deposition was necessarily obtained for use in the case.” Nissho–
Iwai Co., Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales, 729 F.2d 1530, 1553 (5th Cir.1984) (cleaned up).
The Court finds that Defendant shall be awarded $3,627.85 for deposition costs. The Court
awards this amount by adding the “Court Reporter – Depositions” for 11/1423 ($867.20),
11/120/2023 ($601.25), 12/11/2023 ($722.05), and 03/13/2023 ($687.35) and “Deposition Fee”
on 06/25/2024 ($750.00).56
56 [Doc. No. 57-15].
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 57] is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim against Defendant
regarding Equal Protection, Substantive Due Process, § 1981, § 1985 conspiracy, and civil
conspiracy.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s request of an award of attorney fees under
§ 1988 is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s request for an award of costs is
GRANTED, thereby awarding costs in the amount of $3,627.85.
MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 12th day of February, 2025.
~ : death
Terry A. Doughty
ited States Distri¢tJudg
16