Garrett v. Harris County Sheriff's Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT February 11, 2025

Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

DANIEL LEE GARRETT, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-2591

§

HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S §

OFFICE, HARRIS COUNTY §

JAIL, AND HARRIS COUNTY, §

TEXAS, §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court1 is pro se Plaintiff Daniel Lee Garrett’s

(“Plaintiff”) Sealed Motion (ECF No. 18), Defendants Harris County Sheriff’s

Office, Harris County Jail, and Harris County’s (collectively, “Defendants”)

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19), Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal Reply to Motion

(ECF No. 21), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement Original Pleading (ECF

No. 23). Based on a review of the motions, arguments, and relevant law, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19) and DENIES

AS MOOT all other pending motions (ECF Nos. 18, 21, 23). Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1 The parties consented to proceed before a Magistrate Judge for all proceedings under

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (ECF No. 24).

I. Background2

Plaintiff alleges he was arrested on September 15, 2020, while having a

mental health crisis. (ECF No. 10 at 4). Plaintiff states he was taken to Harris

County Jail where he informed medical staff that he was a veteran and needed

to go to the hospital. (Id.). After being released from Harris County Jail,

Plaintiff alleges he was found running naked along Interstate 10. (Id.).

Plaintiff states he was taken to Lyndon B. Johnson Hospital and released

without treatment. (Id.).

On June 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed his first complaint and supplemental

complaint. (ECF Nos. 2–3). On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendment violations as well as medical negligence and

malpractice claims. (ECF No. 10 at 1). On September 5, 2024, Defendants

filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19).

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal

of an action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court should

2 “When considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts as true the well-pled factual

allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).

2

construe the allegations in the complaint favorably to the pleader and accept

as true all well-pleaded facts. Sullivan v. Leor Energy, LLC, 600 F.3d 542, 546

(5th Cir. 2010). In the Fifth Circuit, motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

are viewed with disfavor and rarely granted. Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc.,

565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009). To survive dismissal, a complaint must plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Although all

reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of a plaintiff, a plaintiff must

plead “specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.” Tuchman v. DSC

Commc’ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Firefighters’ Ret.

Sys. v. Grant Thornton, L.L.P., 894 F.3d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Although a

complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, the allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”) (internal

quotations omitted)). “‘Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’” Firefighters’ Ret.

3

Sys., 894 F.3d at 669 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “The court is not

required to conjure up unpled allegations or construe elaborately arcane

scripts to save a complaint.” Santerre v. Agip Petroleum Co., Inc., 45 F. Supp.

2d 558, 568 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).

To determine whether to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may only

look to allegations in a complaint to determine their sufficiency. Id.; Atwater

Partners of Tex. LLC v. AT & T, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-175-TJW, 2011 WL 1004880,

at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2011). “A court may, however, also consider matters

outside the four corners of a complaint if they are incorporated by reference,

items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items

appearing in the record of a case, and exhibits attached to a complaint whose

authenticity is unquestioned.” Joubert on Behalf of Joubert v. City of Houston,

No. 4:22-cv-3750, 2024 WL 1560015, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 10, 2024).

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se

complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice”).

4

III. Discussion

Defendants argue all of Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law. (ECF

No. 19 at 3).

a. Harris County Jail and Harris County Sheriff’s Office

As an initial matter, Defendants argue the Harris County Jail and the

Harris County Sheriff’s Office cannot be sued. (Id. at 4).

Under Rule 17(b), an entity must have the capacity to be sued. Thus, for

a plaintiff to sue a city or county department, that department must enjoy a

separate legal existence. See Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311,

313 (5th Cir. 1991). Whether an entity enjoys a separate legal existence and,

therefore, has the capacity “to sue or be sued is determined . . . by the law of

the state where the court is located.” FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b).

It is well-settled that “the Harris County Sheriff’s Office is merely an

agency or division of Harris County” and does not enjoy a separate legal

existence. Gragert v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:09-cv-2063, 2010 WL 11538411, at *4

(S.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2010); see also Kennard v. City of Houston, No. 22-cv-3365,

2023 WL 159782, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-

20046, 2023 WL 5125068 (5th Cir. Apr. 3, 2023). The same goes for the Harris

County Jail. Hatton v. Harris Cnty. Jail, No. 18-cv-1948, 2019 WL 1858826,

at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2019) (citing Patterson v. Harris Cnty. Jail, No. 09-cv-

5

1516, 2009 WL 10705736, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2009), aff’d, 358 F. App’x.

491 (5th Cir. 2009) (“As a division within the Harris County Sheriff’s

Department, the Harris County Jail does not qualify as an entity with capacity

under the rules because it cannot sue or be sued.”)). As such, Plaintiff’s claims

against the Harris County Sheriff’s Office and the Harris County Jail are

dismissed.

b. Harris County

As to Harris County, Defendants argue (1) Plaintiff has no Fifth, Sixth,

or Eighth Amendment violations as a matter of law; (2) Plaintiff cannot sue

Harris County for medical negligence or malpractice under the Texas Tort

Claims Act because the county has not waived its immunity; (3) there is no

respondeat superior in civil rights cases; and (4) Plaintiff’s claims fail under

the two-year statute of limitations. (ECF No. 19 at 3–4).

i. Fifth Amendment

Plaintiff asserts a Fifth Amendment claim against Harris County. (ECF

No. 10 at 1). However, “the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies

only to actions of the federal government.” Velazquez v. City of Westwego, 531

F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1154 (E.D. La. 2021) (citing Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d

262, 270 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding plaintiff failed to state a claim under the Fifth

Amendment due process clause because the defendant “was an officer of the

6

state of Louisiana rather than of the federal government”)). Plaintiff has not

alleged that Harris County was acting under federal authority. See Francis v.

Cnty., No. 14-cv-2943, 2016 WL 6662275, at *3 n.15 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2016),

aff’d sub nom. Francis v. Garcia, 702 F. App’x. 218 (5th Cir. 2017). As such,

Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed. See Mark v. Hickman, No. 17-

cv-2784, 2019 WL 5653631, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2019).

ii. Sixth Amendment

Plaintiff asserts a Sixth Amendment claim against Harris County. (ECF

No. 10 at 1–3).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . .

trial.” U. S. Const. amend. VI. Courts deciding speedy trial claims consider

four factors: “(1) whether delay before trial was uncommonly long; (2) whether

the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for the delay; (3)

whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and

(4) whether he suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.” United States v.

Herrera, 534 F. Supp. 3d 727, 736 (S.D. Tex. 2021). Courts do not regard any

of the four factors as “either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding

of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. . . . [C]ourts must still engage in a

7

difficult and sensitive balancing process.” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533

(1972).

Other than generally asserting a delay, Plaintiff does not allege facts

related to the remaining factors to show that his right to a speedy trial has

been abridged. (See ECF No. 10 at 2–3); see also Ligons v. Texas, No. 18-cv-

3550, 2018 WL 4922417, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 10, 2018) (citing United States v.

Crosby, 713 F.2d 1066, 1078–79 (5th Cir. 1983) (observing that a speedy trial

violation under the Sixth Amendment requires proof of actual, substantial

prejudice to the defense or evidence of intentional, tactical delay by the

prosecution)). As such, Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment claim is dismissed. See

id. (dismissing a complaint seeking relief under § 1983 where pro se plaintiff

alleged he had been denied a speedy trial but failed to provide sufficient facts

to support his claim).

iii. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against Harris County.

(ECF No. 10 at 1, 3–4). Defendants argue the Eighth Amendment does not

apply to pretrial detainees. (ECF No. 19 at 5).

Here, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. See Feliz v. El Paso Cnty., 441 F.

Supp. 3d 488, 498 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (explaining “pre-trial detainees have not

been convicted of a crime”). While “[t]he standard is the same as that for a

8

prisoner under the Eighth Amendment,” § 1983 claims brought on behalf of

pretrial detainees invoke the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Cadena v. El Paso County, 946 F.3d 717, 727 (5th Cir. 2020). Thus, to the

extent Plaintiff brings a separate Eighth Amendment claim, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss is granted as to that claim. See Feliz, 441 F. Supp. 3d at

497.

iv. Medical Negligence and Malpractice Claims

Plaintiff alleges Harris County “should be held liable for medical

negligence/malpractice from the omissions or inactions of its medical staff by

failing to properly identify, assess, and provide adequate mental health care

attention.” (ECF No. 10 at 1). He claims medical staff “failed to properly

assess, identify and treat [Plaintiff] with any medical/mental health care” after

he experienced a “psychotic-breakthrough” from an earlier arrest and was

released without treatment. (Id. at 4).

Sovereign immunity shields a state from suit unless it expressly

consents to being sued. See Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex.

2004). Governmental immunity affords similar protection to subdivisions of

the state, such as counties. See id. Under Texas law, a governmental unit is

immune from tort liability unless the legislature has waived immunity, or the

governmental unit has consented to suit. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v.

9

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 224 (Tex. 2004) (noting a state can consent to suit);

Dall. Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339,

341 (Tex. 1998) (discussing legislative waiver). “Harris County is a

government unit.” Goodman v. Harris County, 571 F.3d 388, 394 (5th Cir.

2009) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001(3)). The Texas Tort

Claims Act (the “TTCA”) “‘creates a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.’”

Id. (quoting Johnson v. Waters, 317 F. Supp. 2d 726, 738 (E.D. Tex. 2004)).

Specifically, the TTCA provides a limited waiver of immunity for certain suits

against governmental entities. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253

S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008) (citation omitted). “In order for immunity to be

waived under the Act, the claim must arise under one of the three specific areas

of liability for which immunity is waived, and the claim must not fall under

one of the exceptions from waiver.” Morgan v. City of Alvin, 175 S.W.3d 408,

417 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). The three areas of liability

in which immunity is waived under the Act are: “(1) injury caused by an

employee’s use of a motor-driven vehicle within the scope of his employment;

(2) injury caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property;

and (3) premise defects.” Id. at 418 (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §

101.021–022). Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading facts “that affirmatively

demonstrate jurisdiction by alleging a valid waiver of immunity.” Aguocha-

10

Ohakweh v. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 731 F. App’x. 312, 316 (5th Cir. 2018)

(citing Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. 2003)).

In this case, Plaintiff pleads no facts alleging a valid waiver of immunity.

Id. Plaintiff’s claims of medical negligence/malpractice do not involve one of

the three areas of liability in which immunity is waived. See Riggs v. City of

Pearland, 177 F.R.D. 395, 406 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (finding factual allegations

related to failure to render proper medical care are not waived by the TTCA)

(citing Texas Dep’t of Corrections v. Herring, 513 S.W. 2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1974)

(finding denial of adequate medical care and treatment does not allege a “use

of tangible property” under the TTCA)).

Further, the TTCA explicitly states it does not extend its limited waiver

of immunity to claims “arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or

any other intentional tort.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.057. Here,

Texas has not waived its official immunity to actions alleging an intentional

tort against a governmental unit, TEX. CIV. P. & REM. CODE § 101.057, and it

has not consented to any such action. As Plaintiff’s “medical

negligence/malpractice” claims relate to intentional conduct, they are barred

under the TTCA. See Saenz v. City of El Paso, 637 F. App’x. 828, 831 (5th Cir.

2016) (“A plaintiff may not maintain a negligence claim under the TTCA where

the claim is based on ‘the same conduct’ as the intentional tort claim.”) (citing

11

Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 580 (Tex. 2001)); Rodgers v.

City of Lancaster Police, No. 3:13-cv-2031, 2017 WL 457084, at *15 (N.D. Tex.

Jan. 6, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:13-cv-2031, 2017 WL

447216 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Rodgers v. Lancaster Police &

Fire Dep’t, 713 F. App’x. 323 (5th Cir. 2018) (“As for her negligence, gross

negligence, and medical malpractice claims, a plaintiff cannot circumvent the

intentional tort exception by couching her claims in terms of negligence.”)

(internal quotations omitted); see also Goodman, 571 F.3d 388 at 394 (5th Cir.

2009) (explaining the TTCA excludes “allegations against a governmental unit

arising out of the same conduct that formed the basis of the intentional tort

claims against its employee”); Swiat v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., No. 4:10-cv-

354, 2011 WL 2559637, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2011) (“If a plaintiff pleads

facts which amount to an intentional tort, no matter if the claim is framed as

negligence, the claim generally is for an intentional tort and is barred by the

TTCA.”).

Although Plaintiff generally alleges “medical negligence/malpractice,” he

fails to plead any facts alleging a valid waiver of immunity. Moreover, as his

allegations against Harris County amount to an intentional tort, they are

barred. (See ECF No. 10 at 1–2, 4–5); see also Rodgers, 2017 WL 457084, at

*16 (finding general claims of negligence that relate to intentional conduct was

12

enough to find the claims should be dismissed); Birabil v. Martinez, No. 3:15-

cv-2255, 2016 WL 4402259, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 3:15-CV-2255, 2016 WL 4411412 (N.D. Tex. Aug.

18, 2016) (same). As such, dismissal is warranted on Plaintiff’s “medical

negligence/malpractice” claims. See Alcala v. Tex. Webb Cnty., 620 F. Supp. 2d

795, 802 (S.D. Tex. 2009).

v. Respondeat Superior

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff mentions “Respondeat Superior”

when identifying Harris County. (ECF No. 10 at 1). Defendants argue

municipalities may not be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior or

vicarious liability in § 1983 cases. (ECF No. 19 at 17). The Court agrees.

James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (“A municipality is not

liable under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior, . . . but instead only

for acts that are directly attributable to it ‘through some official action or

imprimatur.’” (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)

and Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001)).

vi. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

Finally, Plaintiff asserts Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims

against Harris County. (ECF No. 10 at 1). He claims Harris County, Texas,

“should be held liable for medical negligence/malpractice from the omissions or

13

inactions of its medical staff by failing to properly identify, assess, and provide

adequate mental health care attention.” (Id.). However, Defendants argue

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. (ECF No. 19 at 9).

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress [...]

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights. Instead, it creates a private

right of action to redress violations of federal law, such as the Fourth

Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment, perpetrated by those acting under

color of state law. See Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498, 504 n. 2 (5th Cir.

1999).

A claim for relief under § 1983 for denial of medical treatment must

allege deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Varnado

v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991). “Unsuccessful medical

treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 cause of action.” Id. (citing Johnson v.

Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)). “Nor does ‘[m]ere negligence,

neglect or medical malpractice.’” Id. (quoting Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d

105, 107 (5th Cir. 1979)). Even assuming Plaintiff’s allegations are true, they

14

do not amount to deliberate indifference to his needs, such as would give rise

to a § 1983 claim for denial of medical treatment. Id.; see Baughman v.

Hickman, 935 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that to establish a due

process claim regarding episodic acts or omissions, a plaintiff must “establish

that the official[s] acted with subjective deliberate indifference.”). Thus,

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for “medical negligence/malpractice” warrant

dismissal.

Moreover, “[s]ection 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations.”

Heilman v. City of Beaumont, 638 F. App’x. 363, 366 (5th Cir. 2016). Instead,

“[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by

the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum

state.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576. Texas has a two-year statute of limitations

for personal injury claims. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a); see

Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576. Under federal law, the limitations period begins

to run when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury which is

the basis of the action.” Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)

(citations omitted). The plaintiff must know of the injury and the causal

connection between the defendant and the injury. Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576.

Here, the actions that form the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint took place

in approximately 2020. (See ECF No. 10). Because the statute of limitations

15

for § 1983 claims begin to accrue when the party “knows or has reason to know

of the injury which is the basis of the action,” Plaintiff had until approximately

2022 to file his complaint. Blackmon v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just. Allan B.

Polunsky Unit, No. 9:22-cv-182, 2023 WL 5833411, at *9 (E.D. Tex. July 7,

2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Blackmon v. Tex. Dep’t of

Crim. Just. Allan B. Polonsky Unit, No. 9:22-cv-182, 2023 WL 5430326 (E.D.

Tex. Aug. 22, 2023) (internal quotations omitted). However, Plaintiff did not

file his first complaint until June 2024. (See ECF Nos. 1–2). As such, Plaintiff’s

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are barred by the statute of

limitations.

c. Leave to Amend

Rule 15(a) requires a trial court to grant a party leave to amend a

complaint freely, and the language of the rule “evinces a bias in favor of

granting leave to amend.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). By no means is

leave to amend automatic, but the court must have a “substantial reason” to

deny a party’s request to do so. Id. In deciding whether to grant or deny a

motion to amend, the court may consider a variety of factors including “undue

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failures

to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

16

opposing party... , and futility of the amendment.” Jd. (quoting Jones v.

Robinson Prop. Grp., LP, 427 F.3d 987, 994 (Sth Cir. 2005)). Further, denial

of a motion for leave to file an amended complaint is within the Court’s

discretion when the amendment would be futile. See Briggs v. Mississippi, 331

F.3d 499, 508 (5th Cir. 2003). The “futility standard” is “the same standard of

legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Stripling v. Jordan

Production Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000).

Here, while Plaintiff does not request leave to amend, the Court notes,

based on the foregoing, including the statute of limitations, any potential

claims arising out of these facts against Harris County, are barred. Thus,

allowing leave to amend would be futile.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (ECF No. 19) and DENIES AS MOOT all other pending motions (ECF

Nos. 18, 21, 28). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10) is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

SIGNED in Houston, Texas on February 11, 2025.

‘Richard W. Bennett

United States Magistrate Judge

17