Rodriguez v. The City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALEX RODRIGUEZ,

Plaintiff,

– against – MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-cv-06289 (NCM) (TAM)

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; POLICE

OFFICER MATTHEW BESSEN; POLICE

OFFICER PUJA NEGI; POLICE OFFICER

PATRICK HUGHES; PRESENTLY

UNKNOWN MEMBERS OF THE NEW

YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

NATASHA C. MERLE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Alex Rodriguez brings this action against defendants the City of New York

(“City”) and several individual police officers. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges

violations of his constitutional rights and seeks damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Compl. ¶ 1. Before the Court is the City’s motion to stay this action pending developments

in a Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) investigation into related allegations.

ECF No. 14 (“Motion”). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the Motion and

refers the matter to Magistrate Judge Taryn A. Merkl for pretrial supervision.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action in September 2024. Plaintiff, then a high school student,

alleges that as he walked to a local grocery store one night to buy a sandwich, several

police officers followed and surrounded him, and shortly thereafter, he was “punched or

kicked or both” in the head as he lay on the ground. Compl. ¶¶ 9–21. He was also

handcuffed and aggressively searched by the police officers. Compl. ¶¶ 23–25. Plaintiff

alleges that he was then driven to a police precinct, handcuffed again, questioned, and

charged with multiple offenses, including resisting arrest and jaywalking. Compl. ¶¶ 26–

32. Plaintiff further alleges that he was eventually released from police custody and

received no ticket or mailing requiring a court appearance. Compl. ¶¶ 33–36. Plaintiff

alleges that defendants’ actions caused him “head, neck and wrist pain” as well as

“psychological trauma resulting in anxiety, nightmares, fear of walking on the street, fear

of police officers, shortness of breath and heart palpitations.” Compl. ¶ 44–45.

In lieu of answering the complaint, the City requested a stay of the case in its

entirety until the conclusion of a CCRB investigation “into the incident underlying

plaintiff’s claims in this matter.” ECF No. 12. Upon this request and on the consent of the

parties, the Court stayed the action for 60 days and directed the City to respond to the

complaint or file a status report as to the CCRB investigation thereafter. ECF Order dated

Dec. 5, 2024. The City then requested an additional stay of 90 days and represented that

the CCRB investigation “is expected to conclude in approximately three months, though

there are some variables making it difficult to estimate a conclusion date with certainty.”

Mot. 1. The City also requests “leave to seek another extension of the stay” after the

expiration of any 90-day stay. Mot. 3.

Plaintiff represents that his consent to the initial 60-day stay was based on the

City’s agreement to provide a copy of the New York Police Department’s sprint report and

potentially participate in informal discovery. ECF No. 13 (“Opposition”). Plaintiff further

indicates that the City is no longer willing to engage in informal discovery exchanges.

Opp’n 1. Plaintiff opposes the stay on this ground and contends that the CCRB

investigation is not a valid basis for a stay of the action. Opp’n 1.

DISCUSSION

The Court’s “power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every

court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort

for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676

F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).1 The

party moving for a stay must “establish a clear case of hardship or inequity in being

required to go forward.” United States v. Town of Oyster Bay, 66 F. Supp. 3d 285, 289

(E.D.N.Y. 2014). In evaluating a motion to stay civil proceedings, courts consider the five

“Kappel Factors”:

(1) the private interests of the plaintiffs in proceeding

expeditiously with the civil litigation as balanced against the

prejudice to the plaintiffs if delayed; (2) the private interest of

and burden on the defendants; (3) the interests of the courts;

(4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation;

and (5) the public interest.

Rankine v. Levi Strauss & Co., 674 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (citing Kappel v.

Comfort, 914 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). When assessing these factors, “the

basic goal is to avoid prejudice.” Rankine, 674 F. Supp. 3d at 68.

The City contends that a stay is warranted for three primary reasons: the

investigation file is inaccessible as its contents are protected by the law enforcement and

deliberative process privileges during the CCRB investigation; the City cannot resolve

representational issues with the individual defendants while the CCRB investigation

proceeds; and plaintiff will suffer no prejudice from a stay as there are no statute of

1 Throughout this opinion, the Court omits all internal quotation marks, footnotes,

and citations, and adopts all alterations, unless otherwise indicated.

limitations concerns in this action. Mot. 1–2. None of these reasons weigh in favor of

granting the City a stay.

First, the Court cannot assess the applicability or scope of the law enforcement and

deliberative process privileges as to any documents or portions thereof before the plaintiff

has requested them, the City has identified them, and the parties have presented the

dispute to the Court. The City provides no information as to what documents may raise

these privilege issues, or in what context any discovery may implicate these concerns.

Presumably, the City anticipates that these privileges will prevent disclosure of any

documents from the CCRB investigation to the plaintiff. However, the law enforcement

and deliberative process privileges are qualified limitations on discovery, subject to

document-specific inquiries and balancing tests. See Capellan v. City of New York, No.

20-cv-00867, 2020 WL 13904618, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2020) (“[E]ven predecisional,

deliberative documents pertaining to the CCRB investigation are not definitively shielded

from discovery.”); Goodloe v. City of New York, 136 F. Supp. 3d 283, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)

(“Once the proponent of the law-enforcement privilege has established its applicability to

the documents that are the subject of a discovery dispute, the matter is not necessarily

settled.”); New York v. Mayorkas, No. 20-cv-01127, 2021 WL 2850631, at *12 (S.D.N.Y.

July 8, 2021) (“Like the deliberative-process privilege, [the law enforcement privilege] is

qualified, not absolute, and thus subject to a balancing test.”). The assessment of whether

any privilege prevents disclosure of documents is to be done by the Court when presented

with a discovery dispute, not by defendant.

Further, the City may have already begun its own investigation into plaintiff’s

allegations since the filing of this complaint almost five months ago. Indeed, the City

already produced to plaintiff the New York Police Department’s sprint report regarding

the underlying incident. Mot. 3 n.1. The Court discerns no reason as to why discovery in

this action—regardless of the internal CCRB investigation—could not commence under

these circumstances. For example, the parties may exchange initial disclosures, even if

supplemental discovery may be necessary after the conclusion of the CCRB investigation.

Accordingly, the potential applicability of these privileges in discovery do not weigh in

favor of a stay of this action in its entirety.

Second, the status of legal representation for the individual defendants does not

weigh in favor of a stay. The City is correct that New York General Municipal Law Section

50-k requires Corporation Counsel to “reach a conclusion as to whether an employee

acted within the scope of his employment at the time of the underlying incident before

assuming that employee’s representation.” Mot. 2 (citing N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-k).

However, a stay of the proceedings is not a remedy commensurate with the City’s need to

make this determination. Indeed, individual defendants2 may retain counsel while the

City determines whether its counsel will represent those defendants as well—a

determination that may not necessarily be resolved with the completion of the CCRB

investigation. See Saint-Fort v. City of New York, No. 22-cv-06879, 2023 WL 2771606,

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2023) (noting that “the individual defendants to this action can

simply enter an appearance through their own counsel (either through the Police

Benevolent Association, or privately retained) while Corporation Counsel determines

whether it can represent the officers”). The status of representation for the individual

defendants—who are not currently represented by Corporation Counsel and “may end up

2 The City also contends that while a “disciplinary proceeding or investigation is

pending,” its ability to speak with the officers is “limited.” Mot. 2. While this may be true,

as stated above, these officers do not represent the only avenue to discover facts about the

underlying incident.

being [the City’s] adversary” in this action, Saint-Fort, 2023 WL 2771606, at *2 n.1—does

not weigh in favor of the City’s request for a stay.

Third, plaintiff has a “legitimate interest in the expeditious resolution” of this

action. Trs. of Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Transworld Mech., Inc., 886

F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Discovery during the “early stages of litigation” is

material to any resolution of this case, in part to safeguard “the memories of witnesses”

and the preservation of documents. Capellan, 2020 WL 13904618, at *5. This is true here,

where the underlying incident occurred more than a year ago. See Compl. ¶ 10 (describing

incident in November 2023). Indeed, “a CCRB investigation can be a time-consuming and

protracted process” depending on the number of officers involved and the “complexity of

the underlying events.” Saint-Fort, 2023 WL 2771606, at *3. While the City has requested

a stay limited to 90 days, it is unable to provide an estimate as to when the CCRB

investigation related to this case is likely to conclude and instead asks to submit another

status update at that time. Mot. 1, 3. Accordingly, the prejudice to plaintiff weighs against

a stay.

Furthermore, the Court finds that the interests of the public and the courts weigh

against a stay. Adjudicating the merits of a case regarding allegations of police misconduct

is deeply intertwined with the public’s interest and trust in its law enforcement. Likewise,

the Court’s interest lies in controlling “its docket with economy of time and effort for itself,

for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. The Kappel Factors therefore

collectively weigh against a stay of this action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Motion and refers the matter

to Magistrate Judge Taryn A. Merkl for pretrial supervision. The City shall file an answer

or otherwise respond to the complaint by March 13, 2025.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Natasha C. Merle

NATASHA C. MERLE

United States District Judge

Dated: February 11, 2025

Brooklyn, New York