Owen v. Prator

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

BRANDON M OWEN CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-506

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

STEVE PRATOR ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM RULING & ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 6) filed by Deputy M. Guerrero

(“Deputy Guerrero”), Deputy M. Rocco (“Deputy Rocco”), Deputy E. Parker (“Deputy

Parker”), Deputy R. Sikes (“Deputy Sikes”), Deputy M. Gray, in their individual and

official capacities, and Sheriff Steve Prator, in his capacity as Caddo Parish Sheriff

(collectively, “Defendants”).1 Defendants seek to dismiss certain claims brought by

Brandon Mark Owen (“Plaintiff”) – namely, all claims brought on behalf of Plaintiff’s

minor son (“B.O.”) and the federal Monell claim against Sheriff Steve Prator (“Sheriff

Prator”).2 Plaintiff opposes the motion.3 Defendants filed a reply memorandum in

response to Plaintiff’s opposition.4 Having considered the foregoing, Defendants’

Motion (R. Doc. 6) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND5

In the early morning hours of April 19, 2022, Plaintiff and B.O. were asleep in

their home when a neighbor called the Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Department claiming

1 R. Doc. 6. Deputy M. Gray is named as a defendant; however, the Complaint does not include any

facts explaining his role in the incident.

2 R. Doc. 6 at 1; see generally, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 658 (1978).

3 R. Doc. 8.

4 R. Doc. 9.

5 For the purposes of this motion, the Court will accept all facts pled by the Plaintiff as true.

she heard someone inside the Plaintiff’s residence yell to call the police.6 Deputies

were dispatched to the area in response to the domestic-disturbance call from

Plaintiff’s neighbor.7 When the deputies arrived there was no ongoing disturbance at

the Plaintiff’s residence.8 After speaking to the neighbor, who informed them that

there were three children living in the home, deputies decided to forcibly enter the

residence without a warrant, citing exigent circumstances.9

All of the deputies agreed to forcibly enter the home. Deputy Spikes planned

the forced entry, Deputy Guerrero “bashed in the front door,” and Deputy Parker

“immediately discharged his rifle into the home and killed the dog, which was not

attacking, but standing and barking.”10 One of the shots fired at the dog was “taken

in direct line of” B.O.’s bedroom where he was standing.11 As Plaintiff held his hands

up and asked why they shot his dog, Deputy Rocco shot Plaintiff with a “less lethal

instrument.”12

LEGAL STANDARD

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing the

pleader is entitled to relief.”13 A claim will survive a motion to dismiss if the complaint

contains sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”14 As

stated in Twombly, “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

6 R. Doc. 1 at 4; see also R. Doc. 6-1 at 6.

7 Id.

8 Id. Plaintiff also contends that deputies had no credible information that there had been a domestic

disturbance.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 5.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).

14 Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

the speculative level.”15 The relevant inquiry is not whether the plaintiff will succeed

at trial, but rather, accepting the allegations of the complaint as true, whether

plaintiff has pled a legally cognizable claim.16 However, courts are not required to

accept legal conclusions as facts.17 Similarly, a complaint does not state a plausible

claim for relief if it only sets forth a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action.”18 Rather, the complaint must contain enough factual allegations to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the

plaintiff's claim.19

ANALYSIS

In this Motion, Defendants argue that (1) the federal claims on behalf of B.O.

are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) that the state claims on behalf of B.O.

should be dismissed because they fail as a matter of law and are duplicative of

Plaintiff’s claims; and (3) Plaintiff’s Monell claims against Sheriff Prator are not

adequately pled. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.

1. Federal Claims on behalf of B.O.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions violated B.O.’s Fourth, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20 To state a claim

under § 1983, a plaintiff must “(1) allege a violation of a right secured by the

15 Id. at 555–56.

16 See Thompson v. City of Waco, Tex., 764 F.3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Doe ex rel. Magee v.

Covington School Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir. 2012); see also, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”)

17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

19 Lormand v. U.S. Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 257 (5th Cir. 2009).

20 R. Doc. 1 at 6-8, paras. 19-24.

Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”21 Thus, an

initial inquiry in a lawsuit filed under § 1983 is whether a plaintiff has alleged that

his constitutional rights have been violated. If no constitutional violation has been

alleged, there is no cognizable claim under § 1983.

Plaintiff asserts that B.O.’s constitutional rights were violated because he

suffered “a violent entry and exchange without any warrant whatsoever.”22 Plaintiff

clarifies, in his opposition, that the violations of B.O.’s constitutional rights occurred

via (a) “excessive force used by the officers in the illegal entry” and (b) the “wrongful

seizure and disposition of the family dog.”23

a) Excessive Force

Plaintiff asserts that B.O. suffers from emotional distress due to deputies’ use

of excessive force when bashing in the front door of the home and by firing a weapon

in the direction of B.O.’s bedroom.24 The Court’s § 1983 “analysis begins by identifying

the specific constitutional right[s] allegedly infringed.”25 Claims for the use of

excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of citizen

are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.26 However, there is no constitutional

right to be free from witnessing police action.27 This Court has previously stated that

21 Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000); see also, West v. Atkins, 108 S.Ct.

2250, 2254–55 (1988).

22 R. Doc. 1 at 6.

23 R. Doc. 8 at 7-8.

24 See generally, R. Doc. 1.

25 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).

26 See id. at 395.

27 Grandstaff v. Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 172 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied 480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1369, 94

L.Ed.2d 686 (1987) (“Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a state common law tort; there is no

“[i]t is well-established that a civil rights claim must be based upon a violation of a

plaintiff's personal rights.”28 Accordingly, “[a] bystander who witnesses a police

action, but who is not himself an object of that action, cannot recover for any resulting

emotional injuries under § 1983, although there may be such a claim under state tort

law.”29

Reasonably construing the allegations in Plaintiff’s favor, the Complaint does

not contain any specific facts indicating that excessive force was directed at B.O.

Instead, the facts alleged indicate that B.O. was not in the room where deputies

bashed in the front door, shot the dog, and arrested his father.30 Plaintiff maintains

that Deputy Parker “discharged his rifle into the home” and “one of the shots … was

taken in direct line of [B.O.]’s bedroom where he was standing.”31 Notably, Plaintiff

does not allege that deputies fired indiscriminately into the home or in the direction

of his bedroom, but instead at the dog.32 B.O. was not the intended target of an active

arrest or investigatory stop; rather, B.O. was sleeping in his bedroom when the home

constitutional right to be free from witnessing [ ] police action.”); see also, Crane v. City of Arlington

Texas, 50 F.4th 453, 468 (5th Cir. 2022).

28 Thomas v. Frederick, 766 F.Supp. 540, 557 (W.D. La. 1991).

29 Id.

30 R. Doc. 1 at 5 (also claiming that “[a] termination point was never found for one of the shots taken[,]”

that “[t]he shooting unnecessarily endangered the lives of every person inside that home, including

the children[,]” and reiterating that “[B.O.]’s room was in the direct line of fire”).

31 R. Doc. 1 at 5.

32 Harmon v. City of Arlington, Texas, 16 F. 4th 1159, 1168 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that when an officer

stuck his arm through a passenger window and fired at the driver, firing the gun a few inches away

from the passenger’s face could not be fairly characterized as directed toward the passenger because

the passenger was not within the purview of the officer’s gunfire and the passenger did not allege that

the officer fired indiscriminately into the car); cf., Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (5th Cir.

1986) (finding that a wife’s Fourth Amendment claims were not viable because there was no evidence

that any act of the deputies was directed towards her but allowing the daughter’s claim to proceed

because she was inside the trailer with the suspect when the police officer fired heavy buckshot into

the trailer home).

became an arrest scene by virtue of circumstances beyond his control. Under these

facts, B.O.'s excessive force claim fails.

b) Wrongful Seizure of Dog

B.O.’s claims for the loss of the dog cannot overcome Defendants’ qualified

immunity defense. Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing

discretionary functions … from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.”33 Although “the defense of qualified immunity

is typically addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case, it may be ... raised

and considered on a motion to dismiss.”34 Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity unless the Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show that “(1)

the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.”35 The “clearly

established law” must be “particularized to the facts of the case” and not “defined at

a high level of generality.”36 A right is clearly established only if preexisting precedent

“ha[s] placed the ... constitutional question beyond debate.”37 Because the plaintiff

33 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).

34 See e.g., Grigsby & Associates, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 294 F.Supp.3d 529, 541-42 (W.D. La. 2018);

see also, Longoria Next Friend of M.L. v. San Benito Independent Consolidated School District, 942

F.3d 258, 263-34 (5th Cir. 2019) (“When a defendant asserts a qualified-immunity defense in a motion

to dismiss, the court has an ‘obligation ... to carefully scrutinize [the complaint] before subjecting public

officials to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.’”) (citations omitted).

35 Harmon, 16 F. 4th at 1163 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816, 172

L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)).

36 White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084, 179

L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523

(1987).

37 Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d

271 (1986); see also, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523

must point to a case almost squarely on point, qualified immunity will protect “all but

the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”38

Here, Plaintiff fails to identify any clearly established law that would place

beyond doubt the constitutional question in this case. The relevant question is not

whether a reasonable officer would have refrained from shooting a barking dog after

forcefully entering a home in response to a domestic disturbance call. Instead, the

relevant question is whether every reasonable officer would have inevitably refused

to do so in light of the Fourth Amendment standards established by case law. Our

answer to that relevant question is in the negative. Plaintiff has not presented the

Court with any materially similar case from the United States Supreme Court, this

Court, or the Supreme Court of Louisiana that would have given Defendants fair

warning that this particular conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the

facts alleged here involve “accidental effects” of conduct directed toward something

other than the B.O., not the kind of “misuse of power” which is the focus of a Fourth

Amendment violation.39 Cases from other circuits are generally in accord with this

principle, especially when bystanders are involved.40 The circumstances of this case,

(1987) (“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right”).

38 Malley, 475 U.S.at 341.

39 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (“the Fourth

Amendment addresses ‘misuse of power’ … not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government

conduct.”) (citation omitted).

40 See e.g., Schultz v. Braga, 455 F.3d 470, 479–83 (4th Cir. 2006) (declining to extend Fourth

Amendment protections to “reasonably foreseeable” victim of officer's gunshot where victim was

already seized by traffic stop and officer did not intend to shoot her but instead intended to shoot her

passenger); Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154, 1155–57 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding no Fourth

Amendment seizure occurred when two escapees abducted plaintiff and her two-year-old daughter and

stole their minivan, and law enforcement officers shot intending to restrain the minivan and escapees

but accidentally injured plaintiff and her daughter who were hostages in the minivan); Medeiros v.

O'Connell, 150 F.3d 164, 167–69 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding no Fourth Amendment seizure and relying

forcible entry and the shooting of a pet, although regrettable, do not constitute the

sort of obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment that would overcome Defendants’

assertion of qualified immunity.

2. State Claims on Behalf of B.O.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions constituted invasion of privacy, an

illegal deprivation of property, and a violation of B.O.’s rights under the Louisiana

Constitution.41 Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated B.O.’s rights

under Louisiana Constitution Article 1 § 5, which provides that “every person shall

be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of property.”42 “Like the Fourth

Amendment, this provision prohibits unreasonable search and seizures.”43 Louisiana

federal district courts have noted that privacy principles embodied in the Fourth

Amendment have been incorporated into Article I, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.44

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that “[p]olice generally need a warrant

to enter a home, but ‘warrantless searches will be allowed when police have a

reasonable belief that exigent circumstances require immediate action and there is

no time to secure a warrant.’”45 It has been held that “reasonably fear[ing] for the

upon Brower, 489 U.S. at 596, 109 S. Ct. at 1381, for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment

addresses misuse of power, not accidental effects of otherwise lawful conduct).

41 R. Doc. 1 at 8, paras. 26-27; see also, R. Doc. 8 at 9 (clarifying that claims for aggravated assault,

battery, (and, presumably, false imprisonment) alleged in the Complaint cannot be maintained on

behalf of B.O. and were not intended to be read as being pleaded on behalf of B.O.).

42 LA. CONST. ART. 1 § 5; see, R. Doc 1 at 4.

43 Todd v. City of Natchitoches, Louisiana, 238 F.Supp.2d 793, 799 (W.D. La. 2002) (citations

omitted).

44 Id. at 798-799.

45 State v. Warren, 949 So.2d 1215, 1224 (La. 2007) (citations omitted).

safety of someone inside the premises” is an exigent circumstance.46 A warrantless

entry based on exigent circumstances must be supported by probable cause, defined

as “reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more

than mere suspicion.”47

To satisfy the pleading standard of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff must

plausibly allege that the deputies’ entry was not under exigent circumstance

supported by probable cause. Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the deputies were

responding to a domestic disturbance call reporting someone inside the home had

cried out for someone to “call the police.”48 Plaintiff’s assertions there was no ongoing

disturbance at the home when deputies arrived, and that the information given to

the deputies was not credible, do not refute that the deputies did not reasonably fear

for the safety of someone on the premises based on the report of Plaintiff’s neighbor.49

Therefore, the claim on behalf of B.O. for invasion of privacy is not plausible.

Moreover, B.O.’s claims relating to the deprivation of property as a result of

the death of the dog are duplicative of Plaintiff’s claims. “A claim may be dismissed

as duplicative under Rule 12(b)(6) when it seeks identical damages as another claim

asserted in the complaint.”50 “[T]wo claims are duplicative of one another ‘if they arise

from the same facts and do not allege distinct damages.’”51

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Doc. 1 at 4, para. 10.

49 Id. at para. 11.

50 Yor-Wic Constr. Co. Inc. v. Eng’g Design Techs., No. 17-0224, 2019 WL 1412943, at *4 (W.D. La.

Mar. 28, 2019) (citation omitted).

51 Id.

At most, Plaintiff appears to claim that B.O., like him, was deprived of the

“family dog” without due process. Plaintiff contends that damages for the loss of the

family dog are not identical because they each have a separate ownership interest in

the dog.52 However, there are no facts included to suggest that B.O. has a distinct

ownership interest in the dog.53 Instead, the Complaint references this pet as “the

dog” three times,54 as the “family dog” once,55 as Plaintiff’s dog once,56 and as B.O.’s

dog only once.57 Viewed as the family dog, Plaintiff and B.O.’s separate claims for loss

of the dog are duplicative. Even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that B.O. had a

separate property interest in the dog, recovery for loss of the family dog is based on

the same exact facts and seeks the same damages as Plaintiff’s claim in his own right.

Accordingly, B.O.’s claims for deprivation of property for the death of the dog are

duplicative.

3. Claims against Sheriff Prator.

Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Prator in his official capacity is premised on §

1983 liability. A suit against a sheriff in his official capacity for the tortious actions

of his employees is a suit against the municipality.58

52 R. Doc. 8 at 9.

53 C.f., Sonnier v. Ackal, No. 6:16-cv-00621, 2017 WL 3080023 at *4 (W.D. La. 6/27/17) (finding that

the evidence established that a father and son both owned the same dog because the father had

voluntarily relinquished temporary possession of the dog to his son when the father would travel for

work).

54 Doc. 1 at 5, para 14(e), 15; Doc. 1 at 7, para. 21.

55 Doc. 1 at 7, para. 19.

56 Doc. 1 at 5, para. 14(f).

57 Doc. 1 at 8, para. 23.

58 Williams v. Zordan, No. 21-1061, 2023 WL 6451111 at *8 (W.D. La. 2/29/23) (citing Burge v. Par. of

St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1999) and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66

(1985) (explaining that an official capacity suit is the equivalent of a suit against the entity of which

the officer is an agent)).

To hold a municipality liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege “(1) an

official policy (2) promulgated by a policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the

violation of the constitutional right.”59 Since Monell,60 the Fifth Circuit has defined

“official policy” as:

(1) A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially

adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by

an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority;

or

(2) A persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which,

although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so

common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be

attributable to the governing body of the municipality or to an official to

whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.61

Thus, to sufficiently plead an official capacity claim, Plaintiff must plausibly

allege, with sufficient factual content, that a custom or policy played a part in the

violation of federal law.62 The Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]o proceed beyond the

pleading stage, a complaint's ‘description of a policy or custom and its relationship to

the underlying constitutional violation ... cannot be conclusory; it must contain

specific facts.’”63 To plausibly plead “a practice so persistent and widespread as to

59 Hicks-Field v. Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Peterson v. City of Fort

Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009)).

60 Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

61 Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir.1984).

62 Turner v. Houma Mun. Fire and Police Civ. Serv. Bd., 229 F.3d 478, 483 n.10 (5th Cir. 2000).

63 Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Spiller v. City of Tex.

City, Police Dep't, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997)); see Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268,

1278 (5th Cir.1992) (“This heightened pleading requirement applies to allegations of municipal

custom or policy.”)

practically have the force of law … a plaintiff must do more than describe the incident

that gave rise to his injury.”64

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two theories of liability: (a) failure to

train/supervise and (b) ratification.

a) Failure to Train

To succeed on a theory of failure to train, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the

[supervisor] failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there is a causal

connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and the alleged violation

of the plaintiff's rights; and 3) the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate

indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”65 To meet the stringent standard

of deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a pattern of abuses that

transcends the error made in a single case.”66 Moreover, “[a] municipality's

culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a

failure to train.”67

Although Plaintiff asserts that Sheriff Prator “failed to do anything to retrain

or curb the abusive practices of the department” and “failed to properly train and/or

retrain the officers … with regard to proper home entry and the necessity of a

warrant, the use of force, when such use is excessive and appropriate” these are

conclusory statements devoid of any factual context.68 Plaintiff has failed to set forth

64 Pena, 879 F.3d at 622 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

65 Pena, 879 F.3d at 623 (citing Thompson v. Upshur Cty., 245 F.3d 447, 459 (5th Cir. 2001).

66 Fuentes v. Nueces County, Texas, 689 Fed.Appx. 775, 779 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

67 York v. Welch, No. 20-40580, 2024 WL 775179 at * 5 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61

(2011)).

68 R. Doc. 1 at 6, para. 17 (Plaintiff also reiterates these claims as failures to investigate and

supervise).

any specifics regarding said failure to train or supervise and in what context those

alleged failures took place. Therefore, the Complaint is insufficient to plausibly allege

a claim that will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.69

b) Ratification

Plaintiff also proposes that by failing to discipline the deputies and blessing

their actions, Sheriff Prator “adopt[ed] their actions as policy.”70 However,

“[s]ubsequent endorsement of a deputies’ actions typically does not indicate the

existence of an official policy…”71 Further, “a policymaker who defends conduct that

is later shown to be unlawful does not necessarily incur liability on behalf of the

municipality.”72 Instead, ratification theories of municipal liability are reserved for

“extreme factual situations.”73

The only elaboration on these claims contained in Plaintiff's pleadings is that

Sheriff Prator did not discipline the deputies after the incident. The facts of this case

do not constitute the kind of “extreme factual scenario” that supports a theory of

ratification. Thus, Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead that Sheriff Prator adopted an

official policy under a ratification theory.

69 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

70 R. Doc. 1 at 6, para. 16.

71 Walker v. Harris County, 477 Fed. Appx. 175, 179 (5th Cir. 2012).

72 See Coon, 780 F.2d at 1161 (explaining that precedent “does not stand for the broad proposition

that if a policymaker defends his subordinates and if those subordinates are later found to have

broken the law, then the illegal behavior can be assumed to have resulted from an official policy”).

73 Cf., Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.1985) (finding ratification where officers

‘poured’ gunfire onto a truck and killed an innocent occupant) with Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d

791, 798 (5th Cir.1998) (refusing to find ratification in a case in which an officer shot the fleeing

suspect in the back)).

A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint confirms that not only has he failed to include

any allegation of an unlawful custom or policy in the Sheriff's Office, he also has

alleged no facts that would support an inference that the deputies acted pursuant to

any unlawful policy or custom. Plaintiff merely claims that Caddo Parish Sheriff’s

Department personnel “have a history of violating the civil rights of citizens through

improper entry, and excessive force, and the practices engaged in by the deputies

have become the practice and custom of the [ ] Department.” Here, there is simply

no allegation, nor a reasonable inference based on sufficiently alleged facts, that

Sheriff Prator promulgated an official policy that caused a constitutional violation.

Nonetheless, Plaintiff suggests that dismissal is inappropriate until such time

a discovery can be conducted on these Monell issues. However, at the motion to

dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plead “sufficient facts … to raise a reasonable

expectation discovery will reveal evidence.”74 Because Plaintiff’s claims lack any

factual support whatsoever, the Court has no reasonable expectation that discovery

will reveal evidence supporting these allegations and dismissal is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 6) is

hereby GRANTED.

IT IS ORDERED that all claims by Plaintiff, Brandon M. Owen, asserted on

behalf of his minor child, B.O. are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

74 Lewis v. Horton, 665 F. Supp. 3d 801, 807 (W.D. La. 2023) (citation omitted).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims by Plaintiff asserted against

Sheriff Steve Prator are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 11th day of February, 2025.

Srnep

JERRY EDWARDS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE