Kuhl v. Fields

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

NORTHERN DIVISION

AT COVINGTON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-57-DLB-EBA

KATHLEEN KUHL, et al. PLAINTIFFS

v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KEVIN IGO DEFENDANT

*** *** *** *** *** ***

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court upon two Motions filed by Defendant Officer Kevin

Igo: (1) the Motion to Strike Opinions of Plaintiff’s Expert, Angela Goehring (“Motion to

Strike”) (Doc. # 75); and (2) the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 77). The Motions

have been fully briefed and are therefore ripe for review. For the following reasons, the

Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and the Motion to Strike is denied as moot.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are largely undisputed and are well documented by various

video footage and incident reports. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on April 29, 2020,

Covington police officers were dispatched to Charles Kuhl’s residence. (Doc. # 77-1 at

3). Upon arrival, officers called an ambulance for Mr. Kuhl, who was transported by EMTs

to the emergency room at the St. Elizabeth Medical Center (“SEMC”) in Covington,

Kentucky for a suspected overdose. (Id. at 2). Following treatment at SEMC, Mr. Kuhl

discharged himself against medical advice. (Doc. # 70-2).1 Mr. Kuhl is then seen on

SEMC video footage walking outside with his belongings, walking back in, falling

backwards, hitting his head, and then displaying seizure like symptoms. (Doc. # 88-1,

1:22). Mr. Kuhl was subsequently treated for the seizure, and the SEMC report noted the

impression of a closed head injury and ingestion of substance. (Doc. # 77-3 at 1). Mr.

Kuhl was then placed on a 72–hour hold because he was “unsteady with attempts to

ambulate” and was “not safe to be discharged.” (Doc. # 77-2). However, Mr. Kuhl soon

became aggressive and uncooperative. (Id.). Staff at SEMC ultimately contacted

Covington Police Department due to Mr. Kuhl’s aggressive and uncooperative behavior.

(Doc. # 77-4 at 1). The Kenton County Call for Service Report details that SEMC staff

called 911 at 5:04 p.m., with the call narrative stating that Mr. Kuhl was “fighting with the

staff” and was “not sick enough to stay there.” (Id.). The emergency department report,

made at 5:05 p.m., noted this phone call and that Mr. Kuhl was medically cleared for jail.

(Doc. # 77-2).

Defendant arrived at SEMC at 5:06 p.m. (Doc. # 77-4 at 2). As seen on

Defendant’s body camera video footage, upon arrival, SEMC staff tell Defendant that Mr.

Kuhl was “too unsteady to send him out on his own, and too uncooperative to stay here.”

(Doc. # 77-5 at 1:38-1:43). SEMC staff then briefly explained to Defendant that Mr. Kuhl

was there originally for an overdose, and that after he was released, he had fallen and hit

his head and seized. (Id. at 1:50-1:59). The SEMC staff member then verbally told

Defendant that Mr. Kuhl was medically cleared and handed Defendant a cleared for jail

1 These facts are uncontested and were summarized from SEMCs certified medical

records. (Doc. # 70-2). The medical records were produced by the Kenton County Detention

Center Defendants in their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 70) and cited by Plaintiff in her

Response brief in the current matter (Doc. # 94).

note. (Id. at 1:56-3:18). The note states that Mr. Kuhl was “seen and treated” by SEMC

and was “medically cleared to go to jail.” (Doc. # 77-6). As Mr. Kuhl and Defendant are

attempting to leave the emergency department, Mr. Kuhl began to look through the

trashcan for his belongings, which prompted another SEMC staff member to direct Mr.

Kuhl to where his belongings were actually placed. (Doc. # 77-5 at 2:30-2:36). Mr. Kuhl

then told Defendant he was highly disoriented, and when asked why he was disoriented,

responded with unintelligible mumbling, with a mention of Seroquel. (Id. at 2:40-2:49).

Mr. Kuhl and Defendant then walked to the SEMC sallyport, where Mr. Kuhl is

visibly unsteady and needed direction to leave the building. (Id. at 3:46-4:10). As Mr.

Kuhl was standing in the sallyport, he continued to be visibly unsteady, tripping over

himself, dropping his belongings, and needing assistance to stand up. (Id. at 4:13-5:30).

After observing Kuhl’s actions, Officer Igo arrested Mr. Kuhl for public intoxication

(controlled substance) and criminal trespassing 3rd degree. (Doc. # 77-7); (see also Doc.

# 77-5 at 5:15-5:20). After pulling his car closer to the sallyport, Defendant helped Mr.

Kuhl into the police vehicle. (Id. at 6:00-8:00). As Defendant searched through Mr. Kuhl’s

backpack he discovered six used syringes. (Id. at 8:19-13:00). While Mr. Kuhl was sitting

in Defendant’s vehicle, he displayed signs of hallucinations, paired with incoherent

mumbling. (Id. at 13:00-38:50).

Mr. Kuhl and Defendant arrived at the sallyport of the Kenton County Detention

Center (“KCDC”) around 6:00 p.m. (Doc. # 77-4 at 2). Upon arriving at the KCDC, Mr.

Kuhl continued to display difficulty speaking clearly and was visibly unsteady. (Doc. # 77-

5 at 39:40-41:25). Mr. Kuhl additionally needed help getting out of Defendant’s vehicle

and was brought a chair so he could sit outside the KCDC. (Id.). At that time Defendant

left Mr. Kuhl in the care of the KCDC. (Id. at 46:40-47:00). Mr. Kuhl was found

unresponsive the next day on April 30, 2020. (Doc. # 77-9 at 2).

Based on the above, Kathleen Kuhl (“Plaintiff”), individually and as administratrix

of the estate of Charles Kuhl, filed a Complaint on April 29, 2021. (Doc. # 1). Later,

Plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint, which was filed on October 26,

2021. (Doc. # 21). In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff brought numerous claims

against Defendant. After all Defendants’ Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings

was filed and briefed,2 this Court dismissed with prejudice Counts VII and VIII. (Doc. #

41). Defendant then filed the instant summary judgment Motion (Doc. # 77) on all

remaining claims, as well as the Motion to Strike (Doc. # 75). In her Response to

Defendant’s summary judgment Motion, Plaintiff voluntarily waived her excessive force

(Count IV), failure to protect (Count V), and battery claims (Count X), leaving two

remaining claims. (Doc. # 94 at 21).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining claims of

deliberate indifference (Count I) and wrongful death (Count VI). (Doc. # 77). Summary

judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

2 The Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings was filed by all Defendants, including

Officer Igo, at that time. Those Defendants are not parties to this Motion.

“The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues

of material fact.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008). The

movant may do so by “citing to particular parts or materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,

stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Once the movant

has satisfied its burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there

is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. It

must produce evidence showing that a genuine factual issue remains. Plant v. Morton

Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 2000). If, after reviewing the record as a whole, a

rational fact finder could not find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment should be

granted. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1998).

Moreover, the trial court is not required to “search the entire record to establish

that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886

F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, the “nonmoving party has an affirmative duty

to direct the court’s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks

to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th

Cir. 2001).

B. Analysis

1. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant moves for entry of summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s remaining

claims. (Doc. # 77). In Plaintiff’s Response, Plaintiff states she is waiving her claim of

excessive force (Count IV), failure to protect (Count V), and battery (Count X) against

Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiff’s remaining claims are the deliberate indifference claim

(Count I) and wrongful death claim (Count VI). The Court concludes that entry of

summary judgment in Defendant’s favor is appropriate for each claim. The Court will

address each claim in turn.

a. Deliberate Indifference Claim

Pretrial detainees maintain the right to adequate medical treatment pursuant to the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Batton v. Sandusky Cnty., No. 23-

3168, 2024 WL 1480522, at *3 (6th Cir. 2024). A government official violates that right

by acting with “deliberate indifference” to the detainee’s “serious medical needs.” Id.

Recently clarified by the Court in Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., to prevail on a

deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff “must show (1) that [the detainee] had a

sufficiently serious medical need and (2) that each defendant ‘acted deliberately (not

accidentally), and also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is

either known or so obvious that it should be known.’” 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Brawner v. Scott Cnty., Tenn., 14 F.4th 585, 596 (6th Cir. 2021) (punctuation

modified)). “Stated differently, a pretrial detainee must have a serious medical need, and

the defendant must act, whether through intentional action or omission, recklessly in

response to the need and the risk it presented to the detainee.” Bartlett v. Skaggs, No.

4:22-CV-P158, 2024 WL 4607714, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 29, 2024).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Mr. Kuhl’s

objectively serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional right to receive medical

care. (Doc. # 21 ¶¶ 64-72). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Kuhl was experiencing

intoxication, and as a result of Defendant’s deliberate indifference, Mr. Kuhl suffered

“severe emotional, economic, and physical injuries” which “ultimately resulted in his

physical pain, emotional suffering, and death.”3 (Doc. # 21 ¶ 68). Defendant disagrees,

arguing that Mr. Kuhl neither suffered from a sufficiently serious medical need, nor did

Defendant intentionally or recklessly disregard that need. (Doc. # 77 at 7). The Court

addresses each prong in turn.

i. Mr. Kuhl did not suffer from a sufficiently

serious medical need.

The first prong of the deliberate indifference test, the objective component, is

whether Mr. Kuhl suffered from a sufficiently serious medical need. “A sufficiently serious

medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or

one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.” Yarborough v. Henderson Cnty., Tenn., No. 23-5117, 2024 WL

229665, at * 4 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d 554, 567 (6th

Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Mr. Kuhl was in

obvious need of substantial medical assistance for his intoxication and/or severe physical

and cognitive impairment[.]” (Doc. # 21 ¶ 68). However, intoxication, in and of itself, is

not a sufficiently serious medical need. See Border v. Trumbull Cnty. Bd. Of Com’rs.,

414 F.App’x 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] pretrial detainee’s generalized state of

intoxication, without more, is insufficient to establish a serious medical need or an officer’s

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a detainee.”); see also Meier

v. Cnty. of Presque Isle, 376 Fed. Appx. 524, 529 (6th Cir. 2010) (detainee’s “intoxication

3 While the parties do not address whether Mr. Kuhl’s intoxication was the proximate cause

of his death, it should be noted that the coroner’s report lists Mr. Kuhl’s immediate cause of death

as “hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease.” (Doc. # 77-9 at 2). In the

subsequent section that requires a list of any underlying causes which are defined as “disease or

injury that initiated events resulting in death[,]” such section was left blank. (Id.).

by itself—even at the extreme level indicated by the BAC—was insufficient to put

[Defendant] on notice that [the detainee] needed medical attention”); Smith v. Pike Cnty.,

Ky., 338 Fed. Appx. 481, 482 (6th Cir. 2009) (defendants entitled to qualified immunity

because “at the time of the events [], an intoxicated detainee had no clearly established

constitutional right to a hospital evaluation in the absence of medical need that was both

‘apparent and serious’”).

Rather, to establish an intoxicated detainee suffered from a sufficiently serious

medical need, courts have relied on the “extreme nature of [the detainee’s] intoxication.”

Hinneburg v. Miron, 676 F. App’x 483, 486 (6th Cir. 2017); see Preyor v. City of Ferndale,

248 F. App’x. 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2007) (inmate vomited, had diarrhea, and was seen lying

on the cell floor); Bertl v. City of Westland, No. 07-2547, 2009 WL 247907, at *5-6 (6th

Cir. 2009) (inmate lying face down on the floor unresponsive and having seizure like

spasms); Burwell v. City of Lansing, Mich., 7 F.4th 456, 464 (6th Cir. 2021) (detainee

was “bent at the waist, swaying and rocking on the bench inside his cell, grabbing his

head and midsection, dropping his sandwich numerous times, and falling to the floor

repeatedly.”).

Moreover, even when a detainee may be exhibiting signs of extreme intoxication,

if medical personnel previously observed the detainee, and did not find medical attention

necessary, then a plaintiff is unlikely to establish that such a need was obvious to a lay

person. For example, in Spears v. Ruth, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff did

not establish a sufficiently serious medical need. 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009).

There, the decedent admitted to smoking crack cocaine, told the officer he had been

running away from dogs, and was “acting like he had bugs crawling on him and in his

pockets.” Id. Despite the decedent acting visibly intoxicated, both the EMTs at the scene,

and a jail nurse, did not think medical attention was necessary. Id. at 255. The Sixth

Circuit noted that because the EMTs and jail nurse who “presumably had a greater facility

than the average layperson to recognize an individual’s medical need” determined that

the decedent did not need to be transported to a hospital, it was therefore not obvious to

the Officer “who was less able than EMTs to determine [the decedent’s] medical needs.”

Id. As a result, the Sixth circuit concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish the obvious

existence of a sufficiently serious medical need. Id.

Here, Mr. Kuhl was not displaying any “extreme” symptoms of intoxication or a

potential overdose. Mr. Kuhl was disoriented, unsteady on his feet, and had slurred

speech. (Docs. # 77-2, 77-7, and 77-5 at 1:30-8:00). None of those symptoms are

symptoms “atypical . . . from the multitude of drug and alcohol abusers the jail admits

everyday.” Smith v. Pike Cnty., Ky., No. 06-257, 2008 WL 3884331, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Aug.

18, 2008). Moreover, even if Mr. Kuhl had been displaying extreme signs of intoxication,

it is undisputed that upon arrival at SEMC, a staff member notified Defendant that Mr.

Kuhl had originally presented to the SEMC for an overdose and was subsequently treated

after he suffered from a seizure and hit his head. (Doc. # 77-5 at 1:50-1:59). It is also

undisputed that SEMC staff verbally told Defendant that Mr. Kuhl had been medically

discharged and then handed Defendant a “Cleared for Jail” note. 4 (Id. at 1:56-3:18; see

4 Plaintiff argues that “Igo did not know the name or title of the person he spoke with at St.

Elizabeth, not knowing whether or not she was a trained medical professional” and that “Igo had

no idea what, if any, diagnosis or treatment had been rendered and didn’t inquire.” (Doc. # 94 at

14). However, absent any supporting case law, the Court will not disregard both the verbal and

written confirmation that Mr. Kuhl was cleared for jail, simply because Defendant did not know the

official title or name of the employee or what treatments Mr. Kuhl underwent. To do so would

require law enforcement to inquire into each hospital employee’s credentials, as well as any

treatment the arresting officer, untrained in medicine, thought necessary.

also Doc. # 77-6). Thus, the medical staff at SEMC, who “presumably ha[ve] a greater

facility than the average layperson to recognize an individual’s medical need” observed

Mr. Kuhl’s behavior, administered tests based on those observations, and concluded that

Mr. Kuhl was medically cleared for jail. Spears, 589 F.3d at 255. Therefore, Plaintiff has

not established that Mr. Kuhl’s condition and need for medical attention, “which was not

obvious to trained medical personnel, would have been obvious to a layperson or to

[Defendant]”. Id.

Plaintiff argues that the medical clearance by SEMC staff is immaterial because

“the change in Mr. Kuhl’s condition occurred after Kuhl left the hospital.” (Doc. # 94 at

12) (emphasis and bold in original). Specifically, Plaintiff points to the “incoherent

mumblings” and “various hallucinations” that occurred during the transport of Mr. Kuhl to

the KCDC. (Id.). However, these hallucinations began mere minutes after Mr. Kuhl had

been released from the hospital for a suspected drug overdose. Moreover, while still

inside the SEMC, a staff member witnessed Mr. Kuhl digging around in the trashcan in

an attempt to obtain his belongings. (Doc. # 77-5 at 2:30-2:36). Thus, even if the staff

did not witness Mr. Kuhl’s specific hallucinations about smoke, SEMC staff at the very

least witnessed Mr. Kuhl’s very serious disorientation and still discharged him. Therefore,

the Court does not find that Plaintiff has established that Mr. Kuhl’s condition had

deteriorated so intensely that it would have been obvious to Officer Igo that he should

disregard the medical advice from those at SEMC and should transport Mr. Kuhl to a

different hospital. See McGaw v. Sevier Cnty., Tenn., 715 F. App’x 495, 498 (6th Cir.

2017) (“The record does not show any evidence that the officers were or should have

been aware that their lay understandings of this situation were superior to [the Nurse’s]

trained assessment.”). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show that Mr. Kuhl suffered from

a sufficiently serious medical condition rising to the level of a serious medical need for

Fourteenth Amendment purposes.

ii. Defendant Igo did not act deliberately and

recklessly.

Having found that Plaintiff has failed to set forth the objective component of a

Fourteenth Amendment violation, the Court need not address the subjective prong.

However, assuming, arguendo, that Mr. Kuhl had suffered from a sufficiently serious

medical condition, Defendant would still be entitled to summary judgment as Plaintiff has

failed to establish that “[Defendant] ‘acted deliberately (not accidentally) [and] also

recklessly ‘in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so

obvious that it should be known.’’” Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 317 (quoting Brawner, 14

F.4th at 596.).

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that “a non-medically trained officer does not

act with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs when he reasonably

deferred to a medical professional’s opinions.” Green v. Crawford Cnty., Mich., 22 F.5th

593, 608 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting McGaw, 715 F. App’x at 498). In McGaw, the Sixth

Circuit concluded that the corrections officers did not act with deliberate indifference

towards the detainee’s medical needs because the officers “relied on what they

reasonably believed to be appropriate treatment advice by the jail nurse.” 715 F. App’x

at 497. Specifically, the court noted that because “[n]one of the officers had medical

training, [] there is no evidence that they knew or believed that [the nurse’s] diagnosis

was anything but correct.” Id. Similarly, in Spears the Sixth Circuit again found that an

officer was not acting with deliberate indifference, despite being aware that the detainee

had smoked crack cocaine, because the officer “was entitled to rely on the EMTs’ and the

jail nurse’s medical assessments that [the decedent] did not need to be transported to the

hospital.” 589 F.3d at 255.

Plaintiff attempts to distinguish these cases, arguing that because Mr. Kuhl’s

condition deteriorated in the police cruiser, and only Officer Igo was aware of this

deterioration, these cases are not instructive. (Doc. # 94 at 14). Plaintiff points to Kuhl’s

various hallucinations, incoherent mumbling, physical incapacity, and disorientation as

signs of new and alarming symptoms. (Id. at 13). However, as previously discussed,

Defendant was aware that Mr. Kuhl had just recently been treated for a suspected

overdose and seizure. (Doc. # 77-5 at 1:50-1:59). Moreover, the record is clear that

Defendant received both verbal and written confirmation that Mr. Kuhl had been medically

cleared for jail, just moments before Defendant arrived, and minutes before Mr. Kuhl’s

hallucinations are seen on Defendant’s body camera footage. (Id. at 1:56-3:18; see also

Doc. # 77-6). Because Defendant responded to the situation by “following the advice of

a professional [Defendant] believe[d] to be capable of assessing and addressing that risk”

he did not act with deliberate indifference when he followed the advice of the SEMC staff

which had cleared Mr. Kuhl for jail. McGaw, 715 F. App’x at 498.

Finally, Plaintiff repeatedly brings up Covington Police Department Policy and

makes a passing reference to such policy in her argument section, stating that “per

Covington Police Department Policy, Defendant Igo was tasked with monitoring [Mr.

Kuhl’s] condition and ignored those obvious signs of diminished capacity.” (Doc. # 94 at

11). The referenced section, however, specifically refers to those persons with mental

illness. (See Doc. # 94 at 6) (“Under 43.1.4.B there is a list of behavior of mentally ill

persons . . . .”). There is nothing in the record that points to Defendant believing Mr. Kuhl

was someone who was mentally ill. In fact, in his deposition, when asked if he thought

Mr. Kuhl was mentally ill, Defendant repeatedly stated that he thought Mr. Kuhl was under

the influence. (Doc. # 55 at 30-31). Therefore, Defendant did not violate Covington Police

Department Policy, acting deliberately and recklessly towards Mr. Kuhl.

For these reasons, Defendant Igo is therefore entitled to summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim.

b. Wrongful Death Claim

Defendant additionally alleges he is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

wrongful death claim. (Doc. # 77 at 12). Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim, as stated in the

Amended Complaint, states that “[o]n or about April 30, 2020, Defendants, [ ] beat and

used excessive force thereby resulting in serious physical injury and ultimately [Mr.

Kuhl’s] death.” (Doc. # 21 ¶ 99). Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary

judgment because “Kuhl was not in the custody of Officer Igo at the time his injuries

occurred, nor were the violent acts alleged perpetrated by Igo.” (Doc. # 77 at 12). It is

undisputed that Mr. Kuhl was not in Officer Igo’s custody on April 30, 2020. The record

plainly establishes that Mr. Kuhl was in Officer Igo’s custody for a limited amount of time

on April 29, 2020. (See Doc. # 77-5). Therefore, Officer Igo could not have been a party

to the alleged beating and excessive force on April 30, 2020.

Plaintiff attempts to raise new theories in her Response to Defendant’s summary

judgment motion. Specifically, Plaintiff now alleges that the “primary thrust” of the

wrongful death claims were “Mr. Kuhl’s access to adequate medical care” and Officer

Igo’s “failure to treat Mr. Kuhl’s serious medical needs[.]” (Doc. # 94 at 20). Plaintiff’s

attempts at raising new wrongful death theories at this time is improper. “A non-moving

party plaintiff may not raise a new legal claim for the first time in response to the opposing

party's summary judgment motion.” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. and Textile

Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2723 (3d ed. Supp.2005)). And “a plaintiff may not expand its

claims to assert new theories ... in response to summary judgment[.]” RJ Control

Consultants, Inc. v. Multiject, LLC, 981 F.3d 446, 454 (6th Cir. 2020). Therefore, the

Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s wrongful death claim.

2. Motion to Strike

Defendant requests that the Court strike the opinions of Plaintiff’s expert, Angela

Goehring, pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). (Doc. # 75 at 1). Defendant specifically argues

that Ms. Goehring does not have the “experience, education, training, knowledge, or other

qualification in the area of law enforcement – to serve as an expert witness.” (Id. at 2).

Having already determined that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all of

Plaintiff’s claims, and Goehring’s opinions having no bearing on the Court’s adjudication

of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court need not address these

arguments. Therefore, the Motion to Strike (Doc. # 75) is denied as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant Kevin Igo’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 77) is

GRANTED;

(2) | Defendant Kevin lgo’s Motion to Strike Opinions of Plaintiff's Expert, Angela

Goehring (Doc. # 75) is DENIED AS MOOT;

(3) | This matter is STRICKEN from the Court's docket; and

(4) A Judgment in favor of Defendant Kevin Igo will be entered

contemporaneously herewith.

This 11th day of February, 2025.

SSG Sea Signed By:

5 a David L. Bunning DP

S=—"—s Chief United States District Judge

G:\Judge-DLB\DATA\ORDERS\Cov2021\21-57 MOO MSJ.docx

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