providing that absolute judicial immunity is “grounded on principles of public policy”
How later courts described this case
- providing that absolute judicial immunity is “grounded on principles of public policy”
- absolute immunity of prosecutor defeats suit at outset so long as prosecutor’s actions were within scope of immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ACCEPTED
15-24-00095-CV
FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
2/3/2025 3:39 PM
No. 15-24-00095-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
CLERK
_______________
FILED IN
15th COURT OF APPEALS
In The Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS
2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM
Fifteenth District of Texas CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Austin, Texas Clerk
_______________
EDWARD RANDOLPH TURNBULL, IV,
APPELLANT
V.
THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, ET. AL.
APPELLEES
_______________
Appealed from the 201st Judicial District Court
of Travis County, Texas
The Honorable Karin Crump and Maya Guerra Gamble, Judges Presiding
_______________
BRIEF OF APPELLEES. THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, THE CHIEF
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, AMANDA M. KATES, JOHN S. BRANNON, DANIELA
GROSZ, AND DANIEL MARTINEZ
_______________
SEANA WILLING ROYCE LEMOINE
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL DEPUTY COUNSEL FOR ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY
MICHAEL G. GRAHAM COUNSEL
APPELLATE COUNSEL COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY STATE BAR OF TEXAS
COUNSEL royce.lemoine@texasbar.com
P.O. BOX 12487
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2487
512.427.1350; FAX: 512.427.4253
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
EDWARD RANDOLPH TURNBULL, IV
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Gaines F. West II
John “Jay” Rudinger, Jr.
West, Webb, Allbritton & Gentry PC
1515 Emerald Plaza
College Station, TX 77845-1515
Telephone: 979-694-7000
Fax: 979-694-8000
Email: gaines.west@westwebblaw.com
Judd E. Stone II
Stone Hilton PLLC
600 Congress Ave., Suite 2350
Austin, Texas 78701
Email: judd@stonehilton.com
APPELLEES FILING THIS BRIEF
Commission for Lawyer Discipline
Seana Willing (Chief Disciplinary Counsel)
Amanda M. Kates
John S. Brannon
Daniela Grosz
Daniel Martinez
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES FILING THIS BRIEF
SEANA WILLING -Chief Disciplinary Counsel
MICHAEL G. GRAHAM - Appellate Counsel
ROYCE LEMOINE - Deputy Counsel for Administration
STATE BAR CARD NO. 24026421
Email: royce.lemoine@texasbar.com
P.O. Box 12487
Austin, Texas 78711-2487
512.427.1350; 1.877.953.5535
Fax: 512.427.4253
1
APPELLEES: COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES
Jenny Hodgkins Daniel John Olds of Clark Hill, PLC,
Dallas, TX
&
David N. Kitner of Strasburger &
Price, LLP, Dallas, TX
Board of Directors of the State Bar of Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Texas Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Laura Gibson Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Cindy V. Tisdale Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Sylvia Borunda Firth Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Chad Baruch Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Benny Agosto, Jr. Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
David N. Calvillo Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Elizabeth Sandoval Cantu Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
2
Luis Cavazos Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Craig Cherry Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Jason Charbonnet Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Kelly Ann F. Clark Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Jeff Cochran Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
David C. Courreges Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Thomas A. Crosley Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Steve Fischer Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Lucy Forbes Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Gregory M. Fuller Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
3
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
August Harris, III Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Matthew J. Hill Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Forrest L. Huddleston Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Lori M. Kern Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Modinat Kotun Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Bill Kroger Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Dwight McDonald Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Carra Miller Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Lawrence Morales, II Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
4
Lydia Elizondo Mount Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Kimberly M. Naylor Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Laura Pratt Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Jeanine Novosad Rispoli Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Michael J. Ritter Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Audie Schumbato Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Mary L. Scott Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
John Sloan Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
D. Todd Smith Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
G. David Smith Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
5
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Paul K. Stafford Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Alex J. Stelly, Jr. Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Nitin Sud Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Radha Thiagarajan Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Robert L. Tobey Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Aaron Z. Tobin Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Andrew Tochin Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
G. Michael Vasquez Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
Kimberly Pack Wilson Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
6
Kennon L. Wooten Patrick W. Mizell, Brooke Ashley
Noble & Emily Keller Stark
Bamesberger of Vinson & Elkins,
Houston, TX
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL .......................................................................... 1
TABLE ON CONTENTS .................................................................................................. 8
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES............................................................................................. 11
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................... 18
STATEMENT AS TO ORAL ARGUMENT ....................................................................... 19
ISSUES PRESENTED .................................................................................................... 20
STATEMENT OF FACTS............................................................................................... 21
I. Turnbull’s lawsuit against the Microsoft Corporation in Harris County ...... 21
II. Turnbull’s threats and participation in filing disciplinary grievances
against his opposing counsel, the Microsoft Attorneys ................................. 25
III. Turnbull’s lawsuit against the State Bar of Texas, the CFLD, the CDC,
BODA and 50+ volunteers and employees of the State Bar of Texas for
a voluntary grievance committee panel’s decision to dismiss the
grievances he filed against his opposing counsel .......................................... 28
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ................................................................................ 31
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................... 32
I. The Texas Attorney Disciplinary Process ..................................................... 33
II. Turnbull has not suffered a “non-hypothetical injury,” and he does not
have standing to bring this lawsuit because he possesses no private
cause of action for the dismissal of his grievances and/or complaints he
submitted against his opposing counsel. Further, Turnbull can seek
redress against his opposing counsel in the 190th Judicial District
Court.. ............................................................................................................ 39
8
A. Turnbull’s Erroneous Open Courts Claim ............................................... 43
1. Tex. Gov’t Code §81.071(b)(2) does not direct any of the Appellees to
find out from the volunteer members of a Summary Disposition
Panel the reason(s) “why” they dismissed a grievance and then
provide a complainant (like Turnbull) with such information.
TRDP 2.13 specifically sets forth what type of notice is given to
a complainant when a Summary Disposition Panel dismisses a
complaint ............................................................................................. 44
2. Tex. Gov’t Code §81.0752 and TRDP 2.16 mandate that all
Appellees not disclose “any type of information” to a
complainant (like Turnbull), if that information was presented
to a volunteer panel of a district grievance committee and
dismissed pursuant to TRDP 2.13 ....................................................... 47
B. Turnbull’s Erroneous Due Course of Law Claim .................................... 51
C. Turnbull’s Frivolous Equal Protection Claim .......................................... 53
III. Turnbull sets forth no plausible claim against Appellees. And all of his
allegation’s center around his dissatisfaction with the volunteer
grievance committee panel’s “decision” to dismiss his “fully
investigated” Complaints ............................................................................... 57
A. Turnbull’s allegations against Kates, Grosz, and Martinez ..................... 57
B. Turnbull’s allegations against the CFLD ................................................. 59
C. Turnbull’s allegations against the CDC (Willing) and Brannon .............. 60
D. Turnbull’s additional false allegations to the trial court .......................... 60
IV. Because Appellees are obligated to follow the TRDPs, and Turnbull’s
own supporting documents show that none of the Appellees committed
a “ministerial, ultra vires” act, Appellees are entitled to protection under
Sovereign Immunity and/or the immunity protections provided them
under TRDP 17.09 ......................................................................................... 67
9
A. The CFLD and its members are entitled to Sovereign Immunity
and/or immunity protections under TRDP 17.09 ................................ 67
B. Willing, Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez, are entitled to
Sovereign Immunity and/or the immunity protections provided
them under TRDP 17.09, because they complied with all rules. ........ 71
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER: TURNBULL’S LAWSUIT IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A
LITIGANT ATTEMPTING TO USE THE MEDIA AND OUR TEXAS COURT SYSTEM TO BYPASS
THE PROCESS THAT OUR TEXAS LEGISLATURE HAS ALREADY SET UP FOR LICENSED
ATTORNEYS TO PROPOSE CHANGES TO THE TDRPC AND TRDPS (SEE SUPP CR 1620-
1621). AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT TURNBULL’S LAWSUIT WAS
FRIVOLOUS................................................................................................................ 73
CERTIFICATES OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE .......................................................... 75
10
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Commission of Webster Cty.,
488 U.S. 336 (1989)....................................................................................... 54
Banales v. Jackson,
601 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1980) .................................... 50
Bell v. Low Income Women,
95 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2002) ........................................................................... 53
City of Dallas v. Sanchez,
494 S.W.3d 722 (Tex. 2016)(per curiam) ..................................................... 32
City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ...................................................................67, 71
Crampton v. Farris,
596 S.W.3d 267 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2019)..........................69, 72
Dailey v. Thorpe,
445 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).................. 32
Daves v. State Bar of Texas,
691 S.W.2d 784 (1985).................................................................................. 50
Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones,
8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) ............................................................................. 67
Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik,
355 S.W.3d 618 (Tex. 2011)(per curiam) ..................................................... 69
Doe v. Board of Dirs. Of State Bar of Tex.,
No. 03-15-00007-CV, 2015 WL 6656216
(Tex.App. – Austin Oct. 27, 2015, pet. denied)(mem. op)......................46, 56
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger,
582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979) ...................................................................33, 70
11
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex.App. – Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) .........................32
Hall v. McRaven,
508 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. 2017) .........................................................................67
Harris Cnty. v. Sykes,
136 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. 2004) .........................................................................69
Howell v. Texas Workers’ Comp. Comm’n,
143 S.W.3d 416 (Tex.App. – Austin 2004, pet. denied) ...............................44
Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409 (1976).................................................................................69, 70
In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc.,
991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999) ......................................................................... 33
Johnson v. Rodriguez,
110 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 1997) ......................................................................... 43
Lefebure v. D’Aquilla,
15 F.4d 650 (5th Cir. 2021) ............................................................................ 43
Leonard v. Abbott,
171 S.W.3d 451 (Tex.App. – Austin 2005, pet. denied) ...............................53
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614 (1973).................................................................................41, 43
Martinez v. State Bar of Texas,
797 F.App’x. 167 (5th Cir. 2020) .................................................41, 43, 51, 68
Matzen v. McLane,
659 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. 2021) .........................................................................67
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brownsville Navigation District,
453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970). ........................................................................67
12
Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,
909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995) ........................................................................ 44
Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi,
518 S.W.3d 594 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.) ......................... 32
Rosales v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline,
No. 03-18-00725-CV, 2020 WL 1934815
(Tex.App. – Austin Apr.22, 2020, no pet.)(mem. op.) ............................41, 43
Sarfo v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline,
No. 03-19-00146-CV, 2021 WL 746052
(Tex.App. - Austin Feb. 26, 2021, no pet.)(mem.op) .................................... 63
State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez,
891 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1994) ......................................................................... 56
Tex. Dep’t of Health Serv. v. Holmes,
294 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App. – Austin 2009, pet denied) ............................... 68
Univ. of Tex. Med. School at Houston v. Than,
901 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1995) ......................................................................... 51
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,
528 U.S. 562 (2000)....................................................................................... 53
Webster v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline,
No. 23-0694, 2024 WL 5249494 (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024) ..................38, 42, 45
Willie v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline,
No. 14-10-00900-CV, 2011 WL 3064158
(Tex.App. – Houston [14th Dist.] July 26, 2011, pet. denied)(mem. op.) .... 68
Wooley v. Schaffer,
447 S.W.3d 71 (Tex.App. – Houston [14th] 2014, pet. denied) ................... 32
Yaselli v. Goff,
12 F.2d 396 (1926) ....................................................................................... 70
13
STATUTES AND RULES PAGE
Tex. Const. Art. I, § 13. .......................................................................................... 44
Tex. Const. Art. I, § 19. .......................................................................................... 51
Tex. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1 ..................................................................................33, 70
Tex. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1 ........................................................................................ 33
Tex. Const. Art. V, Sec. 3 ........................................................................................ 33
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ........................................................................................... 32
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.011(a) .............................................................................18, 31
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.011(b) .............................................................................34, 45
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.011(c) ................................................................................... 45
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.072..................................................................................34, 66
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.072(b)(2) ......................................................44, 45, 46, 47, 58
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.0752....................................................................47, 48, 50, 51
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.076(b) .............................................................................18, 31
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.076(g) .......................................................................46, 54, 58
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.0875...................................................................................... 74
Tex. Gov’t Code § 81.0875(c) ...........................................................................48, 60
Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a .......................................................................................30, 31, 32
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.02 ........................................................................... 36
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.10 ...................................................35, 48, 50, 55, 71
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.10(A) ...............................................................35, 40
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.10(B)...................................................................... 35
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.12 ...................................................35, 36, 39, 48, 55
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.12(F) ...................................................................... 63
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.12(G) ..................................................................... 55
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.13 ............................ 27, 36-40, 44, 46-49, 53, 56-63
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.14 .......................... 27, 37, 39, 54, 55, 59, 66, 68, 72
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.14(A) ...............................................................59, 68
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.15 ................................ 27, 37, 55, 56, 60, 64, 66, 71
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 2.16 .......................... 29, 36, 47, 48, 50, 51, 55, 56, 72
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 5.01 ........................................................................... 58
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 5.02(C)...................................................................... 63
14
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 5.02(D) .........................................................37, 55, 60
Tex. Rules Disciplinary P. R. 17.09 ........................................... 20, 31, 46, 67, 69-72
Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct R. 1.06(b)(2) ...........................................63, 64
Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct R. 4.04(b) ..................................................... 26
Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof’l Conduct Preamble, ¶15 ................................................ 41
15
No. 15-24-00095-CV
_______________
In The Court of Appeals
Fifteenth District of Texas
Austin, Texas
_______________
EDWARD RANDOLPH TURNBULL, IV,
APPELLANT
V.
THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, ET AL.
APPELLEES
_______________
Appealed from the 201st Judicial District Court
of Travis County, Texas
The Honorable Karin Crump and Maya Guerra Gamble, Judges Presiding
_______________
BRIEF OF APPELLEES. THE COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE, THE CHIEF
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, AMANDA M. KATES, JOHN S. BRANNON, DANIELA
GROSZ, AND DANIEL MARTINEZ
____________________
TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Appellees, the Commission for Lawyer Discipline (“CFLD”), the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel (“CDC” and/or Seana Willing), Amanda M. Kates, John S.
Brannon, Daniela Grosz, and Daniel Martinez, submit this brief in response to
Appellant’s Brief. For clarity, this brief refers to Appellant as “Turnbull” and/or
“Appellant”. This brief designates record references as CR or Supp CR __ (clerk’s
16
record or supplemental clerk’s record, by volume and page), RR MTD, p._____
(reporter’s record for the Motion to Dismiss hearing held on July 29, 2024); RR PTJ
(July 2024), p. ____(reporter’s record for the Plea to the Jurisdiction hearing held on
July 2, 2024); or RR PTJ (Oct. 2024), p. ___(reporter’s record for Plea to the
Jurisdiction hearing held on October 26, 2024). References to the Appellant’s brief
are labeled Apt. Br., ___ followed by the relevant page number(s). References to
rules are references to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct1
(“TDRPC”) or the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure2 (“TRDP” or the “Rules”)
unless otherwise noted.
1
Reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G. app. A (West 2023).
2
Reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G. app. A-1 (West 2023).
17
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Type of Proceeding: District Court
Plaintiff/Appellant: Edward Randolph Turnbull, IV.
Defendants/Appellees: The Commission for Lawyer Discipline, a standing
committee of the State Bar of Texas, which is an
agency of the Texas Judicial department. See TEX.
GOV’T CODE §§81.011(a) and 81.076(b) (West
2023). The Chief Disciplinary Counsel (Seana
Willing), and her current/former employees
Amanda M. Kates, John S. Brannon, Daniela Grosz,
and Daniel Martinez.
Trial Judge: The Honorable Karin Crump (former presiding
judge of the 250th Judicial District Court3) and the
Honorable Maya Guerra Gamble (presiding judge
of the 459th Judicial District Court)
Judgment or Order
Appealed: On August 6, 2024, the district court dismissed
Turnbull’s claims against the above-listed
Appellees as frivolous and with prejudice. [CR
1526, 1528, 1530].
3
Now-Justice Crump was elected to the Third Court of Appeals in 2024.
18
STATEMENT AS TO ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant has requested oral argument. Appellees do not believe oral
argument will assist the Court in making its decision in this case due to the existence
of well-established precedent. However, should this Court grant Appellant’s request
for oral argument, Appellees request the opportunity to appear and argue.
19
ISSUES PRESENTED
I. Appellant is not a “party” that is entitled to relief in a Disciplinary Proceeding
initiated by grievances he filed against his opposing counsels in ongoing
litigation, and he has not suffered a “non-hypothetical injury.” The district
court correctly ruled that Appellant does not have standing to sue Appellees
and that his lawsuit was frivolous and should be dismissed with prejudice.
II. The Commission for Lawyer Discipline is a standing committee of the State
Bar of Texas and is entitled to Sovereign Immunity protection and/or the
protections afforded its members under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure. The Chief Disciplinary Counsel (Seana Willing),
Amanda Kates, John Brannon, Daniela Grosz, and Daniel Martinez, are all
current/former employees of the State Bar of Texas, and are all entitled to
protection under Sovereign Immunity and/or the immunity protections
afforded to them under Rule 17.09 of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure.
20
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Turnbull’s lawsuit against the Microsoft Corporation in Harris County.
On October 25, 2019, Appellant, Edward Randolph Turnbull, IV, a Texas
licensed attorney, and his criminal defense firm, Turnbull Legal Group (“TLG”),
filed a lawsuit against the Microsoft Corporation in the 190th Judicial District Court
of Harris County, Texas. [CR 328, 451, 581]. Turnbull’s lawsuit alleged Microsoft
had violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”) and converted TLG’s
client files by denying him access to TLG’s files that he stored on his Microsoft
OneDrive account. Turnbull also requested a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)
and temporary injunction to enjoin Microsoft from blocking his access to TLG’s
files and to safeguard all data belonging to TLG. [CR 451, 494, 573-645, 742].
On October 29, 2019, the court granted Turnbull’s request for an ex parte
TRO, enjoining Microsoft from blocking his access to TLG’s files, and setting a
hearing for his request for a temporary injunction pending arbitration. [CR 880-882].
Then on November 11, 2019, the parties agreed to extend the TRO until a hearing
on Turnbull’s temporary injunction request. [CR 884-885]. While Microsoft agreed
it would “return all data” associated with Turnbull’s OneDrive account to him,
Turnbull agreed to remove the TRO provision requiring Microsoft to restore TLG’s
access to said account. [CR 884].
21
Prior to February 2020, Turnbull admitted that, at times, the discussions
between he and Microsoft’s attorneys Olga Lovett and Rene Trevino (the “Microsoft
Attorneys”) had become “a bit heated.” [CR 890]. And on February 6, 2020,
Turnbull, his attorneys Jeremy Doyle and Solace Southwick, and the Microsoft
Attorneys all participated in a meeting (the “February 6th Meeting”) to see if they
could come to some kind of resolution before the February 17, 2020, temporary
injunction hearing. [CR 941]. The February 6th Meeting was apparently
unsuccessful.
The next day Microsoft filed its Defendant’s Answer and Affirmative
Defenses Subject to Its Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay this Litigation. [CR
260-265]. Microsoft’s answer asserted that “Turnbull’s direct actions of sharing or
making public images of child sexual exploitation imagery (“CSEI”),” violated the
terms of the Microsoft Service Agreement (MSA), “which resulted in the suspension
and termination of Turnbull’s OneDrive account.” [CR 262]. Subsequently, on
February 14, 2020, Turnbull filed Plaintiff’s Verified First Amended Petition for
Temporary Restraining Order and Temporary Injunction Pending Arbitration. [CR
311- 321].
On February 17, 2020, the court held a hearing on Turnbull’s request for a
temporary injunction seeking access to TLG’s files on his Microsoft OneDrive
account. [CR 54-185]. During the hearing, the court was presented with testimony
22
and documentation that showed Microsoft’s PhotoDNA review of Turnbull’s
OneDrive account had flagged two images as possible CSEAI (Child Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse Imagery) material. [CR 120-126]. Turnbull also testified and
acknowledged that he had previously informed Microsoft that some content on his
OneDrive account “likely violated” the MSA; and that he believed the images at
issue related to a “promotion of prostitution case” that involved “some juveniles.”
[CR 72-73, 83-86, 90, 104-106, 107-109 (testimony references to Exhibit 9 CR
1318-1319), 126-129, 570-571, 839, 1057, 1318-1319].
On February 25, 2020, the court granted Turnbull’s injunction request in part
- ordering Microsoft to segregate and remove the two CSEAI images and return
Turnbull’s files to him in three days. [CR 1028-1030]. Shortly thereafter, Turnbull
initiated a suit before the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) seeking over
$75,000 in damages against Microsoft premised on his claims that: (1) Microsoft
delayed response in providing him access to TLG client files; and (2) that Microsoft
(not specifically the Microsoft Attorneys by name) threatened TLG at the February
6th Meeting. [CR 291-309]. In that suit, Turnbull further alleged that Microsoft told
TLG “that if it continued its effort to try and get its case files back by pursuing
injunctive relief, there would be a criminal investigation, involvement from the State
Bar and public pleadings that alleged TLG’s and Turnbull’s sharing and making
public child exploitation images …” [CR 291-309]. Turnbull also requested the
23
AAA award him “mental anguish damages” against Microsoft related to said claims.
[CR 308-309].
Subsequently, Microsoft responded on July 22, 2020, by filing Defendant’s
First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaims for Declaratory
Judgment, and Request for Injunctive Relief in the state district court case. [CR 340-
356]. Microsoft’s response again asserted Turnbull had violated the MSA by sharing
or making public CSEAI imagery from his OneDrive account and thus possessed no
cause of action against Microsoft. [Id.]. Microsoft also argued it was entitled to relief
against Turnbull on its counter-claims and sought affirmative relief against Turnbull
for his violation of the “Code of Conduct” in the MSA. [CR 345]. Further, Microsoft
requested an Anti-Arbitration injunction premised on its claim that Turnbull waived
his right to have the matter decided by arbitration by the filing of his lawsuit and
request for injunctive relief. [CR 353].
The trial court held a hearing on Microsoft’s request for an Anti-Arbitration
Injunction on August 6, 2020. On August 7, 2020, the court stayed the arbitration
proceeding that Turnbull had initiated, and allowed both parties 60 days to conduct
discovery. [CR 366-367]. On December 16, 2020, the court ultimately granted
Microsoft an Anti-Arbitration injunction, after both parties were allowed to present
their arguments, and enjoined the parties “from submitting [the] case to Arbitration.”
[CR 369].
24
On December 23, 2020, Turnbull appealed that adverse ruling. Then, despite
not filing any previous grievances related to his interaction with the Microsoft
Attorneys during the February 6th Meeting (a year earlier), Turnbull hired attorney
Gaines West (“West”), former chair of the Board of Disciplinary Appeals
(“BODA”), on or about January 11, 2021, who then sent a threatening letter to the
Microsoft Attorneys. [CR 1036-1037]. That letter implied that the Microsoft
Attorneys had committed professional misconduct during the February 6th Meeting
and stated that Turnbull would file grievances against them with the CDC’s Office
if they did not respond to his letter. [CR 1036-1037]. Turnbull’s state court lawsuit
against Microsoft is still pending following the First Court of Appeal’s reversal of
the Anti-Arbitration Injunction.4
II. Turnbull’s threats and participation in filing disciplinary grievances
against his opposing counsel, the Microsoft Attorneys.
On or about February 10, 2021, Turnbull followed through on his threat and
had West file two grievances against the Microsoft Attorneys on his behalf while his
appeal was pending in the First Court of Appeals. [Supp CR 6-20]. In fact, between
February 2020 and September 2022, Turnbull filed at least six (6) grievances against
the Microsoft Attorneys and submitted over 500 pages of documents - which
included West’s emails and letters advocating for the CDC and the Summary
4
See Turnbull Legal Group, PLLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01-20-00851-CV, 2022 WL 14980287
(Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2022).
25
Disposition Panel to find “just cause” on Turnbull’s claims that the Microsoft
Attorneys committed professional misconduct during the February 6th Meeting. [CR
804-1040, 1261-1415]; [Supp CR 4-163].
As to Turnbull’s first two grievances – which were received by the CDC on
or about February 10, 2021, and upgraded to the status of Complaints on May 13,
2021, by BODA - Turnbull claimed the Microsoft Attorneys verbally threatened him
“solely to gain an advantage” in the lawsuit that Turnbull filed against Microsoft (in
violation of TDRPC 4.04(b)) during the February 6th Meeting, a year earlier. [Supp
CR 4-21, 195, 197, 202-718]. He also claimed they set forth a purportedly false
statement in their answer to his lawsuit by asserting “Turnbull’s OneDrive account
shared or made public images of child sexual exploitation imagery…”5 [Supp CR
98].
However, Turnbull only produced documentation showing his threat against
the Microsoft Attorneys on January 11, 2021, and no evidence that the Microsoft
Attorneys ever made a report to law enforcement or filed a grievance against
Turnbull with the CDC’s office. [Supp CR 87-88]. In fact, on February 8, 2021,
5
A fact that is still in dispute before the 190th Judicial District Court, and that Turnbull seemed to
concede in his testimony during the Temporary Injunction hearing on February 17, 2020. [CR 84-
90]. In fact, the witness testimony presented during the trial court’s hearing on February 17, 2020,
seems to support the basis for Microsoft’s pleadings of which Turnbull complains. [CR 72-73, 83-
86, 90, 104-106, 107-109 (testimony references to Exhibit 9 at CR 1318-1319), 126-129, 570-571,
839, 1057, 1318-1319].
26
Turnbull represented to the First Court of Appeals, in his appeal of the 190th Judicial
District’s decision granting Microsoft’s request for an Anti-Arbitration Injunction,
that Microsoft did not file (or participate in filing) criminal charges and/or a
grievance against him with the State Bar of Texas, and only filed responsive
pleadings to Turnbull’s lawsuit – which Turnbull still contends contained a false
statement related to the “child exploitation images.” [CR 589]. Additionally, in his
Brief to the First Court of Appeals, Turnbull’s allegations were made against
Microsoft, and not the Microsoft Attorneys individually. [CR 589].
After the CDC’s investigation of Turnbull’s Complaints turned up over 600
pages of documents and five (5) contravening notarized Declarations by five (5)
individual attorneys that were present during the February 6th Meeting, the CDC
determined her investigation was complete and assigned Turnbull’s Complaints to a
Summary Disposition Panel for their final review and determination as to whether
the Complaints should proceed pursuant to TRDP 2.14 and TRDP 2.15, or be
dismissed, pursuant to TRDP 2.13. [CR 207-552, 556-650]; [Supp CR 4-163, 821-
825, 1240-1248]. Turnbull was notified that his Complaints had been assigned to a
volunteer Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4 Grievance Committee on or
about August 13, 2021. [CR 788, 790].
Ultimately, the volunteer members of the Summary Disposition Panel
“reviewed all the evidence submitted and obtained during the investigation,”
27
including the documentation submitted by Turnbull and decided that Turnbull’s
Complaints should not proceed pursuant to the TRDPs. [CR 775-777, 779-780].
Such documentation included Turnbull’s testimony before the 190th Judicial District
Court (on February 17, 2020) and the (5) declarations referenced above that averred
no threats were made towards Turnbull during the February 6 th Meeting. [CR 188-
205, 207-241]. Turnbull was notified of the panel’s decision on or about September
21, 2021. [CR 775-777, 779-780]. Additionally, Turnbull’s subsequent grievances
were classified as inquiries and affirmed as such by BODA following Turnbull’s
classification appeal. [CR 1247-1256].
III. Turnbull’s ensuing lawsuit against the State Bar of Texas, the CFLD, the
CDC, BODA and 50+ volunteers and employees of the State Bar of Texas
for a voluntary grievance committee panel’s decision to dismiss the
grievances he filed against his opposing counsel.
As mentioned in Appellees’ dismissal motions, Turnbull filed this lawsuit (the
“Travis County Lawsuit”) after his identical federal lawsuit against: (1) the State Bar
of Texas; (2) the CFLD; (3) the CDC; and (4) more than fifty (50) individuals who
are current or former elected Directors, Officers, volunteer committee members, or
employees of the State Bar of Texas, was dismissed on February 27, 2024. [Supp
CR 1611-1617, 1861-1867, 2111-2117]. In Turnbull’s federal lawsuit, he similarly
claimed that: 1) he suffered an “injury” because his Complaints against the Microsoft
Attorneys were dismissed; 2) Appellees violated his constitutional rights to equal
28
protection and free speech; and 3) Appellees violated his state due process rights.
[Supp CR 1623-1696]. Turnbull also falsely claimed that each Appellee was
involved in the “decision” to dismiss his Complaints despite acknowledging that his
Complaints were dismissed by a Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4
Grievance Committee on or about September 21, 2020 [Supp CR 1653, 1674]. To
date, Turnbull has not sued any volunteer member of the Summary Disposition Panel
that actually made the “decision” to dismiss his Complaints.
In the Travis County Lawsuit, Turnbull sued all of the same Appellees that he
sued in his federal lawsuit, except former CDC Administrative Attorney, Timothy
Baldwin, after Turnbull was involved in an incident that took place at Baldwin’s
residence. [Supp CR 1619-1621]. Apart from his claim that he believes TRDP 2.16,
as promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court, is unconstitutional, Turnbull also
similarly alleged that each Appellee made the ultimate “decision” to dismiss the two
Complaints and four grievances that Turnbull filed against his opposing counsels
between 2020-2022. [CR 30]. And in fact, despite attaching documentation showing
specifically that his Complaints against the Microsoft Attorneys were dismissed by
a Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4 Grievance Committee, and that the
CDC (herself) classified his subsequent grievances as inquiries that eventually were
affirmed by BODA, Turnbull frivolously claimed four CDC attorneys (Kates,
Brannon, Grosz and Martinez) actually “made the determination to send Mr.
29
Turnbull’s Grievances to the SDP…” contradicting his own exhibits attached to his
pleadings.6 [CR 27, 775-777, 779-780]; [Supp CR 1681].
On June 24 & 26, 2024, Appellees each filed a Rule 91a dismissal motion
requesting that the trial court dismiss Turnbull’s Travis County Lawsuit as frivolous.
[Supp CR 1585-1821, 1835-1858, 2085-2109]. After hearing argument from all
Appellees, the Honorable Karin Crump (then-presiding judge of the 250th Judicial
District Court7) entered an order dismissing Turnbull’s lawsuit against the Appellees
“as frivolous and with prejudice.” [CR 1526, 1528, 1530].
6
Interestingly, even in his Appellant brief before this court, Turnbull admits “that the CDC placed
the grievances on a summary disposition docket rather than referring the grievances to an
investigatory hearing panel…” – not Kates, Brannon, Grosz, Martinez, or any other named
Appellee in his lawsuit, and that Brannon merely notified Turnbull of such on August 16, 2021.
[Apt. Br., 2].
7
See FN 3, supra.
30
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The district court correctly held that Turnbull’s lawsuit against Appellees was
frivolous and should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court’s decision rested on well-established precedent, which
included authority holding that Appellees are obligated to follow the TRDPs (as
promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court); and that a grievant does not possess a
constitutional right to compel the State Bar of Texas to: (1) investigate a grievance
against a Texas licensed attorney, or to do so in any particular manner; or (2) to
render a decision to his/her liking.
Alternatively, the State Bar of Texas is an agency of the judicial branch of the
State of Texas and the CFLD is a standing committee of the State Bar. TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. §81.011(a) and §81.076(b). Both are entitled to sovereign immunity.
Willing, Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez are current and/or former employees
of the State Bar and also entitled to sovereign immunity as well as the immunity
protections afforded them pursuant to TRDP 17.09.
31
ARGUMENT
For the reasons set forth below, the trial court did not err in granting
Appellees’ dismissal motions. The purpose of a Rule 91a motion is to dismiss a
cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law or fact. Dailey v. Thorpe,
445 S.W.3d 785, 788 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). A cause of
action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences
reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. Id. A
cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person could believe the facts
pleaded. Id.
A Rule 91a dismissal motion is “analogous” to a dismissal motion brought in
federal court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Texas Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, in that the pleadings should contain “enough facts to state a claim of relief
that is plausible on its face.” Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 75-76 (Tex.App. –
Houston [14th] 2014, pet. denied); GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752,
754 (Tex.App. – Beaumont 2014, pet. denied). The pleadings must also allege
sufficient facts to invoke a waiver of governmental immunity. Reaves v. City of
Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.)
(citing City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 725 (Tex. 2016)(per curiam)).
Here, Turnbull has presented no grounds to support a plausible cause of action
against Appellees and/or sufficient facts to show sovereign immunity has been
32
waived to allow him to sue them. Turnbull’s accusations against Appellees are also
implausible, frivolous, and brought in bad faith. As such, Appellees contend that a
de novo review of the trial court’s dismissal of Turnbull’s lawsuit, will show that
Turnbull lacked standing to bring his claims and that no action/inaction on the part
of Appellees warrants his persistent attempts at retribution through misuse/abuse of
the legal system.
I. The Texas Attorney Disciplinary Process.
The Texas Supreme Court’s authority to regulate the practice of law is an
inherent power derived from the Texas Constitution’s delegation of the judicial
power of the Government of the State of Texas to the judiciary and the Court. TEX.
CONST. ART. II, SEC. 1 & ART. V, SEC. 1 & 3; Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582
S.W.2d 395, 397-399 (Tex. 1979); In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768,
769-770 (Tex. 1999). As that Court has explained, “The inherent powers of a court
are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the
administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity,”
and such power, “[h]as existed since the days of the Inns of Court in common law
English jurisprudence.” Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398-399 (citations omitted). In
1939, the Texas Legislature first passed the State Bar Act, to assist the Texas
Supreme Court in this endeavor – the current version of the State Bar act makes this
33
clear.8 To accomplish this, the Texas Supreme Court has promulgated the TDRPCs
and the TRDPs, setting forth both the standards of conduct to which all Texas
attorneys are to be held (the TDRPCs) and the procedural rules by which attorney
disciplinary actions are to be governed (the TRDPs). And despite Appellant’s
contentions, the Texas Supreme Court is (and always has been) the sovereign
authority inherently tasked with the regulation of the practice of law in Texas,
including through the oversight and discipline of Texas-licensed attorneys - not
Appellees (certainly, not of their own accord). [Apt. Br., 11]. Through the State Bar
Act the legislature has assisted the Court in that endeavor by providing further
resources to the Court and passing administrative control of the State Bar to the
Court for, amongst other things, establishing the disciplinary and disability
procedures. TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.072. [Apt. Br., 11].
Once a grievance is filed in Texas, the CDC must determine whether to
classify the grievance as a “Complaint” (a writing that alleges conduct that, if true,
constitutes professional misconduct and is brought by a person identified under
TRDP 1.06(G)(2)), or an “Inquiry” (a writing that alleges conduct that, even if true,
8
Contrary to Turnbull’s argument that the Texas Legislature “authorized disciplinary actions
against attorneys,” the Texas Supreme Court has always had such authority, and the State Bar was
created to assist the Supreme Court of Texas in its exclusive authority to regulate the practice of
law, “This chapter is in aid of the judicial department’s powers under the constitution to regulate
the practice of law, and not to the exclusion of those powers.” [Apt. Br., 18]; TEX. GOV’T CODE
§81.011(b)-(c).
34
does not constitute professional misconduct or is not brought by a person identified
under TRDP 1.06(G)(2)). TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10. If the CDC
determines that the allegations do not constitute professional misconduct, the writing
is classified as an Inquiry. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10. A complainant has
the right to appeal the classification of a grievance as an Inquiry to BODA. TEX.
RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10(A). A respondent, likewise, has a right to appeal the
classification of a grievance as a “Complaint.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
2.10(B).
Grievances classified by the CDC as an Inquiry but overturned on appeal
before BODA, are upgraded for investigation. In those instances, or in the instance
where a respondent attorney unsuccessfully appeals a Complaint classification to
BODA pursuant to TRDP 2.10(B), the respondent attorney must respond to the
allegations of misconduct within thirty days of receiving notice of the allegations.
TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10 (emphasis added). Pursuant to TRDP 2.12, the
CDC is then mandated to investigate all Complaints.
After receiving the response from a respondent attorney, the CDC is required
to: (1) determine whether Just Cause exists in the evidence obtained, and send the
respondent attorney a notice of the allegations and an election notice; or (2) make
an initial determination that there is no Just Cause and send the matter to a Summary
Disposition Panel (a panel made up of members of a district grievance committee
35
appointed in accordance with TRDP 2.02), for the Panel’s determination as to
whether the Complaint should be dismissed or proceed to litigation.9 Further, in the
course of its investigation the CDC may also (1) issue investigatory subpoena(s);
and/or (2) set the matter before an Investigatory Hearing Panel to assist her
investigation and to help her make the Just Cause/No Just Cause determination,
though neither of those additional investigatory steps is required under the TRDPs.10
In those cases that go before a Summary Disposition Panel of the appropriate
district grievance committee, that panel is presented with all “information,
documents, evidence, and argument deemed necessary and appropriate…” to make
a final determination. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13. That final determination
is not made by the CFLD, the CDC, or a CDC employee, it is made by the Summary
Disposition Panel. And the CDC and her employees are mandated by the Texas
Supreme Court not to disclose any of the “information, proceedings, hearing
transcripts, and statements presented to the panel of the district grievance
committee” to anyone other than the CDC. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.16; see
also TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.0752.
Here, Turnbull’s first two grievances against his opposing counsel were
upgraded to the status of Complaints, on or about May 13, 2021, and investigated by
9
TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.02 and 2.13
10
TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.12
36
the CDC. [Supp CR 195, 197]. As Turnbull admits in his lawsuit, those Complaints
were presented to a Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4 Grievance
Committee and dismissed by that panel on September 21, 2021. [CR 775-776, 779-
780]. That is, pursuant to TRDP 2.13, the volunteer members of the Summary
Disposition Panel reviewed all the information that Turnbull and his attorney
presented to the CDC, and decided Turnbull’s Complaints should not “proceed in
accordance with Rule 2.14 and Rule 2.15” of the TRDPs. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY
P. R. 2.13. And Turnbull received notice of their decision, in compliance with TRDP
Rule 2.13. [CR 775-776, 779-780].
Additionally, in the underlying lawsuit Turnbull has not plausibly alleged that
any named Appellee failed to comply with any of the TRDPs, as promulgated by the
Texas Supreme Court. And any argument that a named Appellee in this lawsuit could
have made the ultimate “decision” to dismiss Turnbull’s Complaints – amounting
to some form of “selective prosecution” (as alleged in Turnbull’s original petition
(CR 17 and 25)) – is refuted by Turnbull’s own pleadings and the TRDPs, which
give the CDC and/or her employees no authority, whatsoever, to dismiss a
Complaint. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13 and 5.02(D).
While Turnbull appears to argue that the assignment of his Complaints to a
Summary Disposition Panel, instead of an Investigatory Hearing Panel, somehow
amounted to an “apparent double standard”, because “Sidney Powell” had a
37
“scheduled Investigatory Hearing,” Turnbull’s own supporting documents attached
to this lawsuit show how such argument is mere conjecture. [CR 19]. In fact,
Turnbull failed to present any pleading or documentation identifying the “similarly-
situated” complainants he refers to, or showing any similarities between himself and
complainants who filed the grievances against “Attorney General Ken Paxton, Brent
Webster, and Sidney Powell.” He also failed to notify the trial court that the CDC
actually made the same initial classification decision with his
grievances/Complaints, as they did in the cases involving the “Attorney General Ken
Paxton,” and “Brent Webster.” Webster v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, No.
23-0694, 2024 WL 5249494, at *2 (Tex. Dec. 31, 2024).
Further, Turnbull has not - and cannot - set forth any pleading showing that:
(1) the CDC did not finish her investigation of Turnbull’s Complaints at the time
they were assigned to the Summary Disposition Panel; (2) Turnbull’s lawsuit against
the Microsoft Corporation has concluded; and/or (3) the presiding judge (in
Turnbull’s lawsuit against Microsoft) referred any of Turnbull’s allegations to the
CDC, or has entered an order finding that the Microsoft Attorneys filed responsive
pleadings in his lawsuit that contained factual misrepresentations, as actually
occurred in the “Sidney Powell” matter he references. [Supp CR 1698-1807]. In fact,
such would be implausible because Turnbull’s underlying lawsuit is still pending,
and his own counsel admitted that Turnbull’s complaints against the Microsoft
38
Attorneys were “fully investigated.” [RR PTJ (July 2024), p. 25]. Thus, foregoing
the need for the CDC to assign Turnbull’s Complaints to an Investigatory Hearing
Panel to elicit additional evidence to assist her in carrying out her obligations. TEX.
RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.12, 2.13, and 2.14.
Further, Turnbull’s own documentation showing he was able to continue
filing grievances twice more against the Microsoft Attorneys in 2022, even after his
first Complaints against the Microsoft Attorneys were dismissed by the Summary
Disposition Panel on September 21, 2021, refutes any allegation that his “free
speech” was ever “chilled,” as alleged in his original petition. [CR 21-25, 32, 804-
1040, 1261-1415].
II. Turnbull has not suffered a “non-hypothetical injury,” and he does not
have standing to bring this lawsuit because he possesses no private cause
of action for the dismissal of his grievances and/or complaints he
submitted against his opposing counsel. Further, Turnbull can seek
redress against his opposing counsel in the 190th Judicial District Court.
In essence, Turnbull is claiming that he has suffered “an injury” because: (1)
he has not received the satisfaction of seeing his opposing counsel sanctioned (as a
result of the multiple grievances he filed against them); (2) he was not notified “why”
his Complaints were dismissed by the Summary Disposition Panel; and (3) he was
not allowed to amend and file a third set of grievances against his opposing counsel
39
on or about August 11, 2022.11 [CR 3-34]. More specifically, in his original petition,
Turnbull claims the Microsoft Attorneys committed “multiple acts of misconduct”
and expresses his belief that the “CDC has maintained the erroneous position that
Mr. Turnbull’s Grievances do not allege professional misconduct.” [CR 24-25].
However, as set forth above, the CDC’s and/or Turnbull’s “position” on his
“Grievances” did not determine whether his grievances/Complaints would be
prosecuted. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13.
In his Appellant’s Brief, Turnbull focused his argument on his claims that he
suffered a “non-hypothetical injury” because he was not notified as to “why” his
Complaints against his opposing counsel were dismissed. [Apt. Br., 4, 8-13]. And
while this argument appears to be Turnbull’s way of dancing around the existence
of well-established precedents - holding that a complainant who files a bar grievance
cannot suffer a constitutionally recognized injury related to the outcome of an
investigation of his/her grievances - Turnbull still seemingly claims he has been
“denied relief” due to the dismissal of his Complaints, and expresses his belief that
he should be able to seek “redress” against the Microsoft Attorneys via the “Texas
State Bar.” [CR 25].
11
TRDP 2.10(A), limits how many times a complainant can amend his grievance against a
respondent attorney. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10(A). However, that does not prevent a
complainant from filing a new grievance against the same respondent attorney.
40
Despite Turnbull’s beliefs, the Texas Supreme Court has clearly set forth that
the TDRPC and TRDPs “do not undertake to define standards of civil liability of
lawyers for professional conduct” and that “Violation of a rule does not give rise to
a private cause of action…” TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT, PREAMBLE ¶15.
That is, the Texas attorney disciplinary system is not a place for Turnbull to seek
personal “redress” for the perceived misconduct he believes was perpetrated against
him by his opposing counsel in the lawsuit he brought against Microsoft. As a result,
Turnbull cannot show he sustained a constitutionally-recognized injury or has
standing to sue Appellees. Martinez 797 F. App’x. 167, 168 (5th Cir. 2020); Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); Rosales v. Comm’n for Lawyer
Discipline, No. 03-18-00725-CV, 2020 WL 1934815 at *3 n.3 (Tex. App. – Austin
Apr. 22, 2020, no pet.)(mem. op). And as the Honorable U.S. Magistrate Judge Mark
Lane pointed out in his Report and Recommendation in Turnbull’s federal lawsuit
(dated January 25, 2024), “First, Turnbull cites no authority that he has been injured
in any constitutionally-recognized way by the handling of his grievances. Second, if
he is still involved in litigation with the complained-of attorneys and their actions in
that litigation are problematic, his obvious means of redress is to raise his concerns
with the trial court.” [Supp CR 1865].
Before the trial court, Turnbull didn’t just complain about not receiving an
explanation as to “why” the Summary Disposition Panel dismissed his Complaints.
41
He requested the trial court issue an injunction to command the CFLD “to re-open”
his grievances against the Microsoft Attorneys, and another injunction against the
CFLD, and the CDC in an attempt to prevent them from carrying out their
obligations under the TRDPs – arguing that their following the TRDPs would cause
him “irreparable injury or extreme hardship”. [CR 31]. In fact, his own counsel told
the trial court in the underlying state lawsuit that one of Turnbull’s contentions was
that even though his Complaints against his opposing counsels were “fully
investigated,” Turnbull believes they were “improperly” dismissed by the
volunteer Summary Disposition Panel. [RR PTJ (July 2024), p. 25.]
Turnbull also tried to argue that if his injunction requests were not granted, he
believes he “will be kept from any mechanism to reprimand attorneys who
misrepresent the truth and file dishonest pleadings with a court…” [CR 32].
However, neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the Texas Legislature has given the
CFLD or the CDC any authority to “re-open” grievances. And as set forth in the
Texas Supreme Court’s recent decision in Webster, it is clear that “the court
overseeing the conduct” of which Turnbull complains of (the 190th Judicial District
Court), is the “appropriate disciplinary authority” where he should seek redress.
Webster, 2024 WL 524949 at *19.
At bottom, Turnbull has no standing to bring this lawsuit. He does not possess
a cognizable cause of action because a complainant attempting to use the attorney
42
grievance process against opposing counsel in “ongoing” litigation is simply not a
party to a disciplinary proceeding. Martinez, 797 F. App’x. at 168 (citing Linda R.S.
v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)); Rosales v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline,
2020 WL 1934815 at *3 n.3 (Tex. App. – Austin Apr. 22, 2020, no pet.).
Turnbull is also “unable to show that the consideration of his bar grievance
‘produce[d] erroneous or unreliable results [that] imperil[ed] a protected liberty or
property interest.’” Martinez v. State Bar of Texas, 797 F. App’x. at 168 (citing
Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 308 (5th Cir. 1997)). As such, Turnbull could
not have sustained a “non-hypothetical injury,” merely because the Summary
Disposition Panel told him that his Complaints had been dismissed, without telling
him “why” they had been dismissed.12 And his claims based on an alleged failure to
prosecute another person are outside the court’s subject matter jurisdiction for lack
of standing. Lefebure v. D’Aguilla, 15 F.4th 650, 654 (5th Cir. 2021).
A. Turnbull’s Erroneous Open Courts Claim.
12
Unlike in the case Turnbull cites in support of his arguments, Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369
S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) - where the plaintiffs were actual parties in the underlying criminal cases
against them that had the potential of resulting in their imprisonment (loss of liberty interest), and
their lawsuit against Williamson County related to visiting judge’s refusal to appoint them counsel
to represent them in those criminal matters, in violation of their constitutional right to counsel and
the Texas Fair Defense Act – here, Turnbull was not a party to – and did not possess any interest
in - the prosecution of his grievances against his opposing counsel. Linda R.S. at 619. That is
because, “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S.at 619.
43
The “open courts” provision provides that: “all courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done to him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law.” TEX. CONST. ART. I, § 13. “The open courts provision
includes at least three separate guarantees: (1) courts must actually be operating and
available; (2) the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through
unreasonable financial barriers; and (3) meaningful remedies must be afforded, ‘so
that the legislature may not abrogate the right to assert a well-established common
law cause of action unless the reason for its action outweighs the litigants'
constitutional right of redress.’” Howell v. Texas Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 143
S.W.3d 416, 444 (Tex.App.-Austin 2004, pet. denied) (quoting Texas Workers'
Comp. Comm'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex.1995)) (internal citations
omitted). However, the open courts provision “applies only to statutory restrictions
of a cognizable common law cause of action.” Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d
494, 499 (Tex. 1995) (citing Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 355-
56 (Tex. 1990)). In this matter, Turnbull possesses no common law cause of action.
1. Tex. Gov’t Code §81.072(b)(2) does not direct Appellees to find out from
the volunteer members of a Summary Disposition Panel the reason(s)
“why” they dismissed a grievance and then provide a complainant (like
Turnbull) with such information. TRDP 2.13 specifically sets forth what
type of notice is given to a complainant when a Summary Disposition
Panel dismisses a complaint.
Here, Turnbull seemingly attempts to argue he has standing to bring this
44
lawsuit because Appellees somehow violated Art. I, Section 13 of the Texas
Constitution, which requires that the courts be open. He implies that under Section
81.072(b)(2) of the Texas Government Code, he was entitled to a “full and fair”
explanation of the reason(s) why his complaints against the Microsoft Attorneys
were dismissed, and the lack thereof caused him a “non-hypothetical injury.” [Apt.
Br., 18]. He also appears to suggest that Tex. Gov’t Code §81.072(b)(2) somehow
restricts the Texas Supreme Court’s “powers under the constitution to regulate the
practice of law” and “administrative control over the state bar,” and/or effectively
commands Appellees to act outside of the authority given to them under the Texas
Supreme Court’s promulgated TRDPs, and indeed, against the admonitions of Tex.
Gov’t Code 81.0752(a) regarding confidentiality. [CR 18-19].13 TEX. GOV’T CODE
§§§81.011(b)-(c), 82.072(b)(2) & 82.0752(a). Clearly, Appellees are not exempted
from the State Bar Act’s own confidentiality requirements.
Regardless, Turnbull’s claim is erroneous and unfounded, because the Texas
Supreme Court has not promulgated a disciplinary procedure rule that gives any of
the Appellees the ability, and/or authority, to provide such an explanation to
13
As set forth in Webster – the State Bar Act “encouraged systematizing and simplifying the
disciplinary process by ‘empowering the Supreme Court to prepare, propose, adopt[,] and
promulgate rules and regulations for disciplining, suspending[,] and disbarring attorneys at law.”
However, the State Bar Act, “is not the source – much less the sum- of judicial authority to regulate
the practice of law.” Webster, 2024 WL 524949 at *8 (referencing Act of Apr.6, 1939, 46th Leg.,
R.S., ch.1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 64, 64.)
45
Turnbull. And, as alluded to above, the Texas Supreme Court has already
promulgated a very specific rule informing complainants as to the type of notice they
will receive if their Complaint is dismissed by a Summary Disposition Panel. TEX.
RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.13.
While Turnbull wants to argue that Appellees are “required to follow the
Texas Legislature’s instructions in the State Bar Act,” he fails to set forth even one
applicable Legislative instruction that is directed towards any Appellee, and not the
Texas Supreme Court. [Apt. Br., 11]. In addition, Turnbull and his counsel are
keenly aware that Appellees have already been put on notice by the Texas Supreme
Court, and the Third Court of Appeals, that they are required to follow the TRDPs.
See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 17.09, and Doe v. Board of Dirs. of State Bar of
Tex., No. 03-15-00007-CV, 2015 WL 6656216, *4-5 (Tex.App. – Austin Oct. 27,
2015, pet. denied)(mem. op). Further, the Texas Legislature has specifically told the
CDC that she is to perform her “disciplinary functions for the state bar under the
Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure.” TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.076(g).
Contrary to Turnbull’s claim that Section 81.072(b)(2) of the Texas
Government Code supports his argument and grants him a “statutory right to an
explanation as to why his grievances were dismissed,” Section 81.072(b)(2) is
clearly directed at the Texas Supreme Court, and not to any of the named Appellees
46
that Turnbull has sued. And, in fact, Section 81.072(b)(2) does not even possess
language that could be seen as authorizing any of the Appellees (listed in his lawsuit)
to ask a Summary Disposition Panel “why” they dismissed his complaints and then
convey to him what the panel members told them was the reasoning for the dismissal.
[Apt. Br., 8].
Again, TRDP 2.13 clearly states that “If the Summary Disposition Panel
dismisses the Complaint, both the Complainant and Respondent will be so notified.”
TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.13. Such seems practical since none of the
Appellees would have any insight into the panel’s reasoning.
2. Tex. Gov’t Code §81.0752 and TRDP 2.16 mandate that all Appellees not
disclose “any type of information” to a complainant (like Turnbull), if
that information was presented to a volunteer panel of a district
grievance committee and dismissed pursuant to TRDP 2.13.
In accordance with Section 81.0752 of the Texas Government Code - which
clearly limits the explanation that can be provided to a complainant, by setting forth
that: “All types of information, proceedings, hearings, transcripts, and statements
presented to a panel of a district grievance committee are confidential and may not
be disclosed to any person other than the chief disciplinary counsel unless: (1)
disclosure is ordered by a court; or (2) the panel finds that professional misconduct
occurred,” - the Texas Supreme Court promulgated Rules 2.10, 2.13, and 2.16 of
47
the TRDPs to prevent such violations. TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.0752; TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.10, 2.13, & 2.16.
TRDP 2.16, provides that “All members and staff of the Office of the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, Board of Disciplinary Appeals, Committees, and Commission
shall maintain as confidential all Disciplinary Proceedings and associated
records (emphasis added),” unless an exception applies under the rule. TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.16. And Section 81.0752 of the Texas Government Code,
clearly refers to “All types of information,” that are presented to a Summary
Disposition Panel. TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.0752. If Turnbull believes TRDP 2.16 is
“unconstitutional”, as he alleges in his original petition, he can petition the Texas
Bar’s Committee on Disciplinary Rules and Referenda (CDRR) to propose a rule
change, in accordance with the process that the Texas Legislature has provided him
under Section 81.0875(c) of the Texas Government Code. [CR 30, 34]; TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.12 and 2.13; TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.0875(c).
That said, currently the restrictions set forth in Section 81.0752 also limit the
information or “explanation” that can be provided to a non-party complainant like
Turnbull. And, as set forth above, TRDP 2.13 provides only that if “the Summary
Disposition Panel dismisses the Complaint, both the Complainant and Respondent
will be so notified.” Nothing more. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.13.
48
As Turnbull’s own documentation shows, he was informed on or about
September 21, 2021, that the Summary Disposition Panel “voted to dismiss the
complaint after reviewing all evidence submitted and obtained during the
investigation.” [CR 775-776, 779-780]. The Summary Disposition Panel reviewed
more than 600 pages of documents that were submitted by Turnbull, his attorney
West, and the Microsoft Attorneys. [CR 207-552, 556-650]; [Supp CR 4-163, 821-
825, 1240-1248]. They also reviewed multiple submissions by Turnbull, as well as
West’s arguments and requests that the Summary Disposition Panel find that the
Microsoft Attorneys counsel committed professional misconduct as to more than six
(6) TDRPC rules. [CR 18-20, 556-564, 656-664]. Most complainants could discern
from a Summary Disposition Panel’s dismissal of their complaints, that the volunteer
panel did not agree with his/her arguments and/or that the documentation he
presented supported his accusations.
Nevertheless, it also seems plausible that the Texas Supreme Court
promulgated TRDP 2.13, because they did not want volunteer members of a
grievance committee panel to have to sit down and write a letter to a complainant,
telling the complainant that they dismissed his complaint(s) (as to each and every
alleged rule violation) because: (1) the complainant is not believable; (2) the
complainant is actually the one that threatened his opposing counsel and participated
in the filing of disciplinary grievances against opposing counsel; and/or (3) they
49
chose to believe the declarations provided by his opposing counsels instead of his
arguments. Either way, here, Turnbull is not able to plead or show how he was
injured just because he did not receive an explanation as to “why” his Complaints
were dismissed on top of being informed that the Summary Disposition Panel chose
to dismiss his Complaints. Further, Turnbull cannot plead that any Appellee actually
possesses such information, or that the Texas Supreme Court has promulgated a rule
requiring the volunteer members of a Summary Disposition Panel to pen such a
letter.
At the point that Turnbull’s Complaints were dismissed by a Summary
Disposition Panel, or his subsequent grievances were classified as inquiries
(pursuant to TRDP 2.10), all Appellees listed under TRDP 2.16, were bound by the
Texas Supreme Court’s promulgated rules and Section 81.0752 of the Texas
Government Code, as to what information, if any, could be provided to Turnbull.
Even if the TRDPs were to conflict with the State Bar Act in this respect (and
Appellees do not believe there is such a conflict), “When a provision of the State
Bar Act conflicts with an order of the Supreme Court regulating and controlling the
practice of law, the statutory provision must yield to the Court’s rule.” Daves v. State
Bar of Texas, 691 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Tex.App. – Amarillo 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(citing Banales v. Jackson, 601 S.W.2d 508, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. – Beaumont 1980).
50
As such, Turnbull’s claims under Art. I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution
fail, because Turnbull has no legal basis to compel Appellees to violate the TRDPs,
or Section 81.0752 of the Texas Government Code.
B. Turnbull’s Erroneous Due Course of Law Claim
Article 1, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution states that “[n]o citizen of this
State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” TEX. CONST.
ART. I, § 19. Texas courts have considered federal interpretations of procedural due
process when applying Texas’s guarantee of due process of law. Univ. of Tex. Med.
School at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995). When determining
whether a governmental action violates the due course of law guarantee, the courts
engage in a two-step inquiry. Id. The court first determines if the plaintiff has an
enumerated interest that is entitled to protection, and if so, then did the governmental
agency follow due course of law in depriving the plaintiff of that interest. Id.
Here, as set forth above, Turnbull cannot even show he has a “protected liberty
or property interest” in a Summary Disposition Panel’s ultimate decision concerning
his complaints against his opposing counsels. Martinez, 797 F.App’x at 168.
Additionally, Turnbull’s attempts to claim he has a “right” to a “full and fair
explanation” for “why” his Grievances were dismissed…” by the Summary
Disposition Panel, and his argument that application of TRDP 2.16 is
51
“unconstitutional” and deprives him of that right are meritless, as described above,
and still do not provide him a cognizable cause of action against Appellees, who do
not possess the information he is seeking. [CR 27, 30, 34].
While Turnbull criticizes the Appellees by saying that their following the
TRDPs (as they are obligated to do), amounts to “cloaking the attorney discipline
system…” the record here clearly shows how transparent the process really is, and
solidifies Appellees’ argument that they have all complied with their obligations as
required by the Texas Supreme Court. [Apt. Br., 20]. For instance, Turnbull’s
exhibits attached to his original petition show that Turnbull (via West) possessed or
was provided with every single document presented to the Summary Disposition
Panel. [Supp CR 3-1584]. And at every turn, Turnbull (via West) was allowed to
submit multiple letters and emails to the CDC and her staff, containing argument
and supporting documents – which thwart Turnbull’s conspiracy theories put forth
in his original petition. [CR 18-20, 556-651, 652-654, 656-664, 769-770]; [Apt. Br.,
15]. Further, said exhibits show West was able to present all of his arguments to the
Summary Disposition Panel, which demonstrates the amount of accessibility
Turnbull actually was given to the panel. [CR 37-50, 556-564, 656-664]. This
included Turnbull’s supplemental claims against the Microsoft Attorneys, on or
about July 7, 2021, and July 28, 2021, which Turnbull later claimed were new
52
allegations that supported his second set of grievances against his opposing counsel
on May 2, 2022. [CR 804-1039]; [Supp CR 821-825, 1240-1248].14
Again, because the documentation that Turnbull attached to his own pleadings
show that Appellees followed all applicable procedures under the TRDPs, and
Turnbull has acknowledged that he was provided notice that the Summary
Disposition Panel dismissed his Complaints, in accordance with TRDP 2.13, after
they reviewed “all evidence obtained and submitted during the investigation,”
Turnbull’s due course of law argument fails.
C. Turnbull’s Frivolous Equal Protection Claim.
The Texas Supreme Court has held that the equal protection analysis under
the federal Equal Protection Clause applies to equal protection challenges under the
Texas Constitution. Bell v. Low Income Women¸ 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002).
As in federal court, Texas requires a plaintiff to allege “he has been intentionally
treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis
for the difference in treatment.” Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2005, pet. denied) (citing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
14
In his second set of grievances against the Microsoft Attorneys, submitted on May 2, 2022,
Turnbull asserted that his opposing counsel gave “contradictory and untrue explanations”, and
committed professional misconduct because of their “refusal to return property”, “threats to pursue
a false and baseless criminal investigation” against him, and “neglect and refusal to contact the
appropriate agencies.” [CR 804-1039]. Such were the same allegations West made on Turnbull’s
behalf on July 7, 2021, and July 28, 2021, prior to the Summary Disposition Panel’s dismissal of
his Complaints on September 21, 2021. [Supp CR 821-825, 1240-1248].
53
562, 564 (2000) and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of
Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 345–346 (1989)).
While in his federal lawsuit, Turnbull claimed he had been “discriminated
against” because of his “political affiliation as a criminal defense attorney,” in
this lawsuit Turnbull merely claims he is entitled to “equal protection” and Appellees
deprived him of his right to equal protection by treating him “differently than other
similarly situated complainants in being denied a full and fair explanation for why
his Grievances were dismissed.” [Apt. Br., 11, 13]; [Supp CR 1612, 1646-1647,
1900]; [CR 29]. But, as described exhaustively above, Turnbull was not entitled to
an explanation from the volunteer members of the Summary Disposition Panel as to
“why” his Complaints/grievances were dismissed. He also failed to identify even
one other complainant that has ever received such an explanation. As such,
Turnbull’s statements - implying that the CDC or one of her employees took some
action to “discriminate” against him or has the ability to weaponize the disciplinary
process - is a gross mischaracterization of the CDC’s authority under the TRDPs.
[Apt. Br., 14, 20].
As described above in Section I, the CDC is the “administrator of the state
bar’s grievance procedure as provided by the Texas Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure.” TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.076(g). And the CDC possesses no independent
authority to dismiss a Complaint or prosecute a disciplinary matter. TEX. RULES
54
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13 and 5.02(D). Additionally, the CDC can be: (1) mandated
by the BODA to investigate a complaint (that she previously classified as an
inquiry); (2) required to dismiss a complaint heard by an Investigatory Hearing
Panel; (3) required by a Summary Disposition Panel to proceed in accordance with
Rules 2.14 and 2.15; and (4) required to dismiss a pending disciplinary proceeding
or action, at any time, by the CFLD. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.10, 2.12G,
and Part III. In no way, does the CDC have any ability to independently decide who
will be “prosecuted” under the TRDPs. And Turnbull’s claim that after his
complaints against the Microsoft Attorneys were dismissed, the “CDC thereafter
filed disciplinary petitions against …” other prominent attorneys in our state “for the
same allegations,” is truly a disingenuous declaration from a licensed Texas attorney
familiar with the TRDPs. [Apt. Br., at 3]
The CDC is mandated to file disciplinary proceedings/actions (on behalf of
the CFLD) pursuant to the TRDPs if an Investigatory Hearing Panel does not dismiss
a complaint and is unable to resolve the matter with the respondent attorney. TEX.
RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.12(G). Likewise, the CDC can be mandated to file a
disciplinary proceeding/action (on behalf of the CFLD) if required to do so by a
Summary Disposition Panel. Such happens, and could have happened with
Turnbull’s Complaints had the panel “decided that Turnbull’s complaint should
proceed pursuant to Rules 2.14 and 2.15.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.12, 2.14,
55
2.15.
The bottom line is that Turnbull failed to name even one other complainant in
his original petition who has ever received notice of the
“recommendation/reasoning” behind a Summary Disposition Panel’s dismissal
decision. [CR 4-34]. Most likely because none of the Appellees possess the authority
to obtain such information from the volunteer members of a Summary Disposition
Panel and then transmit such to a complainant. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.16
and TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.0752. Further, as described above, the Texas Supreme
Court specifically promulgated TRDP 2.13, which provides what type of notice a
complainant receives when a volunteer Summary Disposition Panel dismisses a
complaint. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13. And the Third Court of Appeals in
Doe v. Board of Directors of State Bar of Texas, clearly articulated that TRDP 2.16
“does not include an exception for disclosure to complainants” of any documentation
related to the “recommendation/reasoning” for the panel determination or allow
Appellees to “provide for a full explanation to each complainant on dismissal of a
complaint.” Doe, 2015 WL 6656216 at *4. In addition, Texas Courts have already
informed litigants like Turnbull that a Texas District Court is powerless to modify
Rule 2.16 or implement a new rule. Id., at fn 4, (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez,
891 S.W.2d 243, 244-246 (Tex. 1994)).
56
Either way, as to Turnbull’s Open Courts, Due Process of Law, and Equal
Protection claims, Turnbull possesses no private cause of action against any
Appellees named in this lawsuit and his own documentation shows that he has
received the same notice that all complainants receive when a Complaint is
dismissed by a Summary Disposition Panel, pursuant to TRDP 2.13.
III. Turnbull sets forth no plausible claim against Appellees. And all of his
allegations center around his dissatisfaction with the volunteer grievance
committee panel’s “decision” to dismiss his “fully investigated”
Complaints.
A. Turnbull’s allegations against Kates, Grosz, and Martinez.
As pertaining to Kates, Grosz and Martinez, Turnbull’s original petition failed
to allege even a single, plausible cause of action against any of them. [CR 4-34]. In
fact, Turnbull dismissed Kates in his similar federal lawsuit, but included her in his
subsequent Travis County Lawsuit, despite knowing she works in the CDC’s Austin
Office, and was never assigned to assist the CDC with the handling of any of his
grievances/complaints against his opposing counsels out of the Houston Office.
Conspicuously, Kates’s name does not appear anywhere in the documentation that
Turnbull attached to his original petition related to his grievances/complaints. [CR
34-1419]; [Supp CR 3-199].
As noted above, Turnbull admitted in his pleadings that he was notified on or
about September 21, 2021, that a Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4
57
Grievance Committee (“Summary Disposition Panel”) dismissed his Complaints
against the Microsoft Attorneys, pursuant to TRDP 2.13. [CR 20]. As evident by the
documentation he provided, he was notified of said dismissals in accordance with
TRDP 2.13, and by former CDC Administrative Attorney Timothy Baldwin. [CR
775-776, 779-780]. Nowhere on said notices do Kates, Grosz and/or Martinez’s
names appear on any of the documentation informing Turnbull of the CDC’s
assignment of his cases to the Summary Disposition Panel or of the subsequent panel
determination to dismiss the complaints. And Baldwin was not included in this
lawsuit subsequent to Turnbull showing up at his residence unannounced. [Supp CR
1619-1621].
Also - despite Turnbull’s assertions - Kates, Grosz, and Martinez do not have
“legislative duties” in providing Turnbull with the Summary Disposition Panel’s
explanation as to “why” his complaints were dismissed. That is, because they do not
possess such information, and the CDC and her employees are required by the Texas
Legislature and Texas Supreme Court to follow the TDRPC and TRDPs. TEX. GOV’T
CODE §81.076(g) and TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 5.01.
Again, as set forth above, Section 81.072(b)(2) is directed to the Texas
Supreme Court and its authority to promulgate of the TDRPC and TRDPs, not the
CFLD, the CDC, or any of the CDC’s employees. To date, the Texas Supreme Court
has not promulgated a rule that allows any of the Appellees, or even the members of
58
the Summary Disposition Panel – who possess such information - to provide
Turnbull with such an explanation.
B. Turnbull’s allegations against the CFLD.
As to the CFLD, Turnbull’s allegations are clearly frivolous. Turnbull’s
original petition fails to allege even a single, plausible cause of action/inaction
against the CFLD or any of its twelve voluntary members (six of which are appointed
by the Texas Supreme Court). [CR 4-35]. In fact, TRDP 2.14(A), sets forth that the
CFLD only becomes a party to a disciplinary proceeding if a Complaint “is not
dismissed after an investigatory hearing or by a summary disposition panel, or
resolved through a negotiated judgment entered by an investigatory panel.” TEX.
RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.14(A).
Again, Turnbull admitted he was notified on September 21, 2021, that a
Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4 Grievance Committee dismissed his
Complaints against the Microsoft Attorneys, pursuant to TRDP 2.13. Turnbull also
admitted that no “Just Cause” was ever found as to any of his complaints or
grievances against the Microsoft Attorneys. [CR 19-21]. As such, Turnbull knows
the CFLD was never involved with Turnbull’s complaints/grievances against his
opposing counsels.
59
C. Turnbull’s allegations against the CDC (Willing) and Brannon.
Turnbull’s original petition also fails to allege even a single, plausible cause
of action against the CDC (Willing) or Brannon. This is, again, because Turnbull
admitted he was notified on or about September 21, 2021, that a Summary
Disposition Panel of the District 4 Grievance Committee dismissed his Complaints
against the Microsoft Attorneys, pursuant to TRDP 2.13. And Rule 2.13 of the
TRDPs sets forth that the Summary Disposition Panel had the sole authority to
determine whether Turnbull’s 2021 complaints could proceed to litigation in
accordance with TRDP 2.14 and TRDP 2.15. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.13.
Further, TRDP 5.02(D) clearly provides that the CDC and her staff attorneys
have no independent authority to dismiss a Complaint. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY
P.R. 5.02(D). Thus, Turnbull is aware that the CDC and Brannon never made, or
could have made, the ultimate decision to dismiss his Complaints. As such, the trial
court correctly found that Turnbull does not have standing to sue Appellees, and thus
any claim that he suffered a purported “non-hypothetical injury” would not be
“traceable” to any action/inaction on the part of Appellees.
D. Turnbull’s additional false allegations to the trial court.
Transparency: In this lawsuit and his federal lawsuit, Turnbull conjured up
implausible conspiracy allegations seemingly for the sole purpose of trying to assist
West’s attempt to bypass Section §81.0875(c) of the Texas Government Code, and
60
to use the district court to change the “legislative structure of the Texas Bar.” [Supp
CR 1620-1621]. Specifically, Turnbull claimed that “neither the Complainant nor
the Respondent Attorney may participate in the Summary Disposition process.” [CR
20]. Yet, as evident by the documents attached to his original petition, that statement
is completely inaccurate.
As set forth above, the CDC is required by the Texas Supreme Court (via the
TRDPs) to “present the Complaint together with any information, documents,
evidence, and argument deemed necessary and appropriate,” to the Summary
Disposition Panel before it makes a determination. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
2.13. And it is clear from a review of the trial court’s record, and the more than 2,000
pages of exhibits that Turnbull attached to his original petition, that that is exactly
what happened in a clearly transparent manner. In fact, the exhibits attached to
Turnbull’s original petition show:
1. Turnbull possesses, and/or was provided with, a copy of the grievance forms,
responses, declarations, sur-replies, and investigative documents that
encompassed some of the 600+ pages of investigative documents that were
presented to the Summary Disposition Panel before the panel made their final
decision to dismiss Turnbull’s complaints, pursuant to TRDP 2.13, on
September 10, 2021. [CR 4-1418]; [Supp CR 4-199].
2. Turnbull and West were allowed to send and present multiple emails and
letters to the Summary Disposition Panel containing their arguments with
supporting documentation related to Turnbull’s complaints against his
opposing counsels. [CR 18-20, 556-651, 656-664]; [Supp CR 4-199].
3. Turnbull filed additional grievances against the Microsoft Attorneys on May
2, 2022, after Turnbull’s original complaints were dismissed by the Summary
61
Disposition Panel on September 21, 2021. [CR 804-1039]. Turnbull also was
allowed to appeal the CDC’s classification decision of those May 2, 2022,
grievances to the BODA – which BODA affirmed. [CR 1197-1250].
4. There existed ample evidence for the Summary Disposition Panel to make a
decision as to Turnbull’s claims related to the pleadings, events, and
conversations that Turnbull set forth in his complaints against the Microsoft
Attorneys; including whether Turnbull’s opposing counsel violated an ethical
rule. That information included Turnbull’s own testimony during a
Temporary Injunction Hearing, the testimony of other witnesses during the
same hearing supporting Microsoft’s pleadings, and the existence of
Declarations submitted by attorneys Mary-Olga Lovett, Rene Trevino, Brien
Jacobsen, Ward Morrison, and Laura P. Hansen – which refuted Turnbull’s
rendition of the February 6th Meeting. [CR 54-205, 207-241].
Regardless, TRDP 2.13 makes sure that a complainant’s Complaint “together
with any information, documents, evidence, and argument deemed necessary and
appropriate by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel,” is presented to the Summary
Disposition Panel. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.R. 2.13. And in this case, Turnbull
was allowed to present all of his legal arguments and exhibits to the panel in his
crusade to have the Microsoft Attorneys sanctioned. [CR 556-651, 656-664, 769-
770].
Investigatory Hearings: In an effort to mislead the trial court, Turnbull
alleged in his original petition that “In 2003, the state law was amended to allow an
Investigatory Hearing panel to determine Just Cause,” and implies that this change
to the law required Appellees to present his Complaints to an Investigatory Hearing
Panel as part of the CDC’s ongoing investigation to determine if just cause exists.
[CR 26-27]. This argument is completely untrue, because the amendment
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allowing investigatory hearings did not occur until June 1, 2018, and the Texas
Supreme Court never amended the TRDPs to “allow an Investigatory Hearing panel
to determine Just Cause and decide whether an attorney must select either an
Evidentiary Panel review or District Court review.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R.
2.12(F); Sarfo v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 03-19-00146-CV, 2021 WL
746052, at *3, fn. 4 (Tex.App. – Austin Feb. 26, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). In fact,
the Texas Supreme Court’s rules grant the CDC discretion to use “an investigatory
hearing” as part of her “investigation,” and to gather more information with only
three possible outcomes following such hearing, none of which include the Panel’s
determination of Just Cause. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.12, 5.02(C).15
Brannon: Unfortunately, as Turnbull did in his federal lawsuit, Turnbull has
expounded on another one of his false narratives. [Apt. Br., 14, 22, 30] [Supp CR
1824, 1827]. That is, despite no finding of professional misconduct against Brannon
by any Texas District Court or volunteer grievance committee panel - with the
exclusive authority to make such a finding - Turnbull claims Brannon acted in
violation of Rule 1.06(b)(2) and failed to disclose he had a “conflict of interest” that
prevented him from assisting the CDC with her investigation and handling of
15
Ironically, West provided a copy of his correspondence to Brannon, dated August 16, 2021,
where West indicated his understanding that an investigatory hearing is a “tool” that can be used
to assist the CDC in her initial determination of Just Cause. [CR 769-770]. Another example of
the disingenuous and insincere nature of Turnbull’s pleadings currently before this court.
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Turnbull’s complaints. [Apt. Br., 14, 22, 30]; [Supp CR 1824, 1827]. As Turnbull
did in his federal lawsuit, he in essence is claiming Brannon’s purported improper
“conflict of interest,” led Brannon to discriminate against Turnbull by
recommending that Turnbull’s First Grievances be placed on the Summary
Disposition docket. [Apt. Br., 14, 22, 30]; [Supp CR 1824, 1827].
However, as set forth above, the CDC, not Brannon, assigned Turnbull’s
complaints to a Summary Disposition Panel of the District 4 Grievance Committee
on August 13, 2021, to determine if Turnbull’s Complaints will proceed in
accordance with Rule 2.14 and Rule 2.15. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13.
Turnbull even admits such in his original petition when he set forth that on August
16, 2021, Turnbull was notified that “the CDC had placed the First Grievances
against Ms. Lovett and Mr. Trevino on a Summary Disposition Panel (“SDP”)
docket.” [CR 19].
In addition, while Turnbull asserts that Brannon “neither disclosed this
conflict of interest nor rescued (sic) himself, in violation of numerous Texas
Disciplinary Rules,” his original petition and supporting exhibits do not even
identify that Brannon possessed: (1) any interest that would “adversely” limit his
obligations to the CDC; or (2) a disqualifying conflict within the meaning of the
TDRPCs, which would be required to support such violation. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R.
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.06(b)(2).
64
The fact is, that the documents attached to Turnbull’s pleadings do not
properly allege and/or support that Brannon had a “conflict of interest,” - at all.
Moreover, it is telling that Turnbull continues to avoid using the dates of Brannon’s
prior employment when pushing this narrative. [Apt. Br., 14, 22, 30]; [Supp CR
1824, 1827].
In reviewing all of his federal court and state court pleadings - Turnbull’s
“conflict of interest” claim is seemingly based solely on his assertion that Brannon
was previously employed as an attorney for a lawfirm (Thompson & Knight LLP)
in 2013, which eventually merged into a new lawfirm (Holland & Knight) in 2021
(eight years after Brannon left Thompson & Knight and well after he became
employed by the State Bar of Texas in 2018), and that the new lawfirm (Holland &
Knight) subsequently represented a Microsoft attorney (who was not one of the
Microsoft Attorneys Turnbull grieved in Texas) eight years after Brannon left
Thompson & Knight. Turnbull’s unsupported, conclusory assertion is that this set of
facts somehow created a disqualifying conflict that prohibited Brannon from
assisting the CDC in her handling of Turnbull’s subsequent complaints against the
Microsoft Attorneys. [Apt. Br., p. 14, 22, 30]; [Supp CR 1824, 1827].
While Turnbull publicly made these allegations in his original petition and
through the media (premised on a purported “anonymous email”, apparently without
doing any minimal investigation) - accusing Brannon of “violating multiple rules of
65
professional misconduct” – fortunately only a Texas District Court or Grievance
Committee panel has the exclusive authority to make such a finding. TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.17 and 3.09; TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.072. Especially, since
Turnbull has not, and cannot even set forth pleading(s) asserting Brannon has, or
ever had, a relationship with the new firm of Holland & Knight, the Microsoft
Corporation, and/or owed any fiduciary responsibilities to the Microsoft Corporation
that could have been seen as adversely limiting his responsibilities to the CDC.16
TRDP Decisions: In his original petition, Turnbull tried to argue a purported
“unequal treatment” claim, by falsely stating that Appellees “arbitrarily” decide who
“will face either an Evidentiary Panel’s review, or a District Court’s review.” [CR
26-30]. He even claimed that such amounted to “illegal actions,” on the part of
Appellees. [CR 27]. But the TRDPs, clearly set forth that it is actually the
respondent attorney that makes this election under TRDP 2.15, and not Appellees.
TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.15. That means that if the Summary Disposition
Panel would have decided that Turnbull’s Complaints should proceed in accordance
with Rule 2.14 and 2.15, then the Microsoft Attorneys, and not any of the named
Appellees, would have had to decide whether they wanted the disciplinary matter
against them heard before an Evidentiary Panel or District Court. Again, such is just
16
In Plaintiff’s Original Petition, Turnbull even went so far as to falsely claim Brannon was
“formerly a partner at the law firm of Thompson & Knight, LLP.,” and indicates such was
supported by an “anonymous email,” that he received. [CR 23].
66
another example of the arguments that Turnbull attempted to conjure up before the
trial court in an attempt to support his frivolous lawsuit.
IV. Because Appellees are obligated to follow the TRDPs, and Turnbull’s
own supporting documents show that none of the Appellees committed a
“ministerial, ultra vires” act, Appellees are entitled to protection under
Sovereign Immunity and/or the immunity protections provided them
under TRDP 17.09.
A. The CFLD and its members are entitled to Sovereign Immunity and/or
immunity protections under TRDP 17.09.
A party suing a governmental entity must establish the state’s consent, which
may be alleged either by reference to a statute or to express legislative permission.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999)(per curiam)(citing
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brownsville Navigation District, 453 S.W.2d 812,
814 (Tex. 1970)). And, absent a waiver by the Texas Legislature or “ultra vires”
acts by a government official, “sovereign immunity continues to protect state
officials from both suit and liability in their official capacities.” Matzen v. McLane,
659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex. 2021) (citing Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 238
(Tex. 2017); and City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009)).
To fall within the ultra vires exception to state actors’ sovereign immunity, a
suit “must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion, but rather
must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal authority or
failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” (emphasis added). Heinrich at 372.
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Here, Turnbull has not even identified any of the CFLD members individually
or any action/inaction taken by a CFLD member that is the basis for his lawsuit. [CR
4-35]. And Turnbull has presented no viable claims against any member of the
CFLD that would support his citing of Tex. Dep’t of Health Serv. v. Holmes, 294
S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App. – Austin 2009, pet denied). Especially, in light of the fact
that Turnbull was the complainant who filed the grievances against his opposing
counsels, and not the respondent attorney to a disciplinary proceeding. Martinez,
797 F.App’x at 168. In addition, Turnbull can make no plausible claim against the
CFLD, or any of its members; because the CFLD never became a party to any
disciplinary proceedings involving Turnbull’s opposing counsels. TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.14(A).
The CFLD is a standing committee of the State Bar of Texas, which is a
governmental agency that is entitled to protection afforded by sovereign immunity.
Willie v. Comm'n for Lawyer Discipline, No. 14-10-00900-CV, 2011 WL 3064158,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 26, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(citing TEX. GOV’T CODE §§s81.011 and 81.076 in holding that the Commission is
subdivision of state and entitled to assert doctrine of sovereign immunity). In
addition, sovereign immunity protects the State of Texas and its agencies from
lawsuits, including suits for declaratory or injunctive relief, unless immunity has
68
been expressly waived. Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621-622
(Tex. 2011) (per curiam); Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004).
In addition, the Texas Supreme Court promulgated TRDP 17.09, which
provides that “All members of the Commission … are immune from suit for any
conduct in the course of their official duties.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.09.
Texas courts have also analyzed TRDP 17.09 and previously upheld the State Bar
of Texas and the CFLD members’ immunity protection under the TRDPs. Crampton
v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 273-74 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2019)(stating
“Rule 17.09’s immunity provision is similar in nature to the doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity recognized at common law because it provides immunity
‘for any conduct in the course of their official duties’”)(also citing Imbler v.
Pachman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-423 (1976) (absolute immunity of prosecutor defeats
suit at outset so long as prosecutor’s actions were within scope of immunity)).
While Turnbull seemingly tries to assert that the Texas Supreme Court had no
authority to promulgate TRDP 17.09, on his premise that the Texas Legislature did
not give the Texas Supreme Court such authority, again, the State Bar Act “is not
the source – much less the sum - of judicial authority to regulate the practice of
law.”17 And regardless, the Texas Legislature did recognize that it was up to the
17
See FN 13, supra.
69
Court to establish the standards and procedures that guide the Bar in assisting it to
oversee the conduct of Texas-licensed attorneys. TEX. GOV’T CODE §81.072(a).
The Texas Supreme Court’s authority to regulate the practice of law derives
from Article II, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. ART. II, SEC. 1.
And such is an “inherent regulatory power,” implicating the Texas Supreme Court’s
supervisory role in such regulation. Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395,
398-99 (Tex. 1979). Additionally, TRDP 17.09, arguably also derives from absolute
judicial immunity (that has been recognized at common law for more than a hundred
years), because it provides for immunity “for any conduct,” taken, “in the court of
their official duties” Imbler at 422-23. In fact, such immunity protections derive
from cases like Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind. 117, 44 N.E. 1001, and Yaselli v. Goff,
12 F.2d 396, 406 (1926) (providing that absolute judicial immunity is “grounded on
principles of public policy”)
Here, the Texas Supreme Court promulgated TRDP 17.09, for arguably
situations just like this one. Where Turnbull has sued more than fifty (50) individuals
just because he does not like the correspondence he received, on September 11,
2021, that Appellees were mandated to provide Turnbull in carrying out their
obligations to the Texas Supreme Court (under the TRDPs). TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13.
70
B. Willing, Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez, are entitled to Sovereign
Immunity, and/or the immunity protections provided them under TRDP
17.09, because they complied with all rules.
For the same reasons set forth above, the CDC (Willing), Kates, Brannon,
Grosz, and Martinez are entitled to sovereign immunity protection, and the immunity
protections afforded them under Rule 17.09 of the TRDPs.
Again, to fall within the ultra vires exception to state actors’ sovereign
immunity, a suit “must not complain of a government officer’s exercise of discretion,
but rather must allege, and ultimately prove, that the officer acted without legal
authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” (emphasis added). Heinrich
at 372.
Here, as to Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez, Turnbull makes no plausible
allegation because the individual that provided him notice that the Summary
Disposition Panel dismissed his Complaints against his opposing counsel was
Timothy Baldwin, who is not a party to this lawsuit. As to the CDC (Willing),
Turnbull only seemingly complains that the CDC made the discretionary decision
that she had completed her investigation of Turnbull’s Complaints and assigned
them to a Summary Disposition panel to determine if his complaints should “proceed
in accordance with Rule 2.14 and Rule 2.15” of the TRDPs. [CR 775-776, 779-780].
TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 2.13. And Turnbull’s exhibits show that all
Appellees complied with their obligations under the TRDPs, including Rules 2.10,
71
2.13, and 2.16 of the TRDPs, as to all notices he received, and that the volunteer
members the Summary Disposition Panel “reviewed all the evidence submitted and
obtained during the investigation,” as presented to them before deciding to dismiss
Turnbull’s complaints. [CR 18-20, 556-651, 652-654, 656-664, 769-770].
In addition, even if Turnbull had made a plausible claim, TRDP 17.09
reiterates that the immunity provided to the CDC, and her staff members are for any
conduct taken in the course of their official duties:
All members of the Commission, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
(including Special Assistant Disciplinary Counsel appointed by the
Commission [for Lawyer Discipline] and attorneys employed on a
contract basis by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel), all members of
Committees, all officers and Directors of the State Bar, and the staff
members of the aforementioned entities are immune from suit for any
conduct in the course of their official duties. The immunity is absolute
and unqualified and extends to all actions at law or in equity.
—TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.09 (emphasis added).
The CDC (Willing), Kates, Brannon, Grosz, and Martinez are, or were,
attorneys employed by the office of the CDC during the time Turnbull filed his
complaints/grievances against his opposing counsels. Therefore, if Turnbull had
made an actual claim against them, his claim would not have survived the broad
protection provided by TRDP 17.09. Crampton v. Farris, 596 S.W.3d 267, 273-74
(Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2019). As such, all are entitled to the protections
afforded them under TRDP 17.09.
72
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
TURNBULL’S LAWSUIT IS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF A LITIGANT ATTEMPTING TO USE
THE MEDIA AND OUR TEXAS COURT SYSTEM TO BYPASS THE PROCESS THAT THE
TEXAS LEGISLATURE HAS ALREADY SET UP FOR OUR STATE’S LICENSED
ATTORNEYS TO PROPOSE CHANGES TO THE TDRPCS AND TRDPS (SEE SUPP CR
1620-1621). AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT TURNBULL’S
LAWSUIT WAS FRIVOLOUS.
While Turnbull may have good reason to be frustrated with the Microsoft
Corporation (as outlined in his underlying Harris County lawsuit) his actions of
misdirected retribution against Appellees and 50+ volunteers and employees of the
State Bar of Texas – merely because he believes a volunteer panel of the District 4
Grievance Committee “improperly” dismissed his “fully investigated” Complaints
against the Microsoft Attorneys – are inappropriate and frivolous. And the fact that
Turnbull is aware that his pleadings are contradicted by his own exhibits, yet he
chose to push forth with his public attempts to insult, degrade, and sue Appellees –
knowing that Appellees are obligated to follow the TRDPs and most had no
involvement (whatsoever) with the grievances he filed against his opposing counsel
in his lawsuit against the Microsoft Corporation, is also concerning.
The bottom line is that not one of the Appellees named in his lawsuit made
the “decision” to dismiss Turnbull’s Complaints and/or possesses the volunteer
members’ reasoning as to “why” they decided to dismiss his Complaints. And
Turnbull knows that if he doesn’t like the TRDPs, the Texas Legislature has given
73
him the means to propose changes to the rules. For all these reasons, Appellees pray
this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Turnbull’s Travis County Lawsuit as
frivolous and with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
SEANA WILLING
CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
MICHAEL G. GRAHAM
APPELLATE COUNSEL
______________________
ROYCE LEMOINE
STATE BAR CARD NO. 24026421
DEPUTY COUNSEL FOR ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL
COMMISSION FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE
STATE BAR OF TEXAS
P.O. BOX 12487
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2487
512.427.1350; FAX: 512.427.4167
royce.lemoine@texasbar.com
74
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the foregoing brief on
the merits contains approximately 12,694 words (total for all sections of brief that
are required to be counted), which is less than the total words permitted by the
TRAPs. Counsel relies on the word count of the computer program used to prepare
this petition.
_______________________
ROYCE LEMOINE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that the above and foregoing brief of Appellees, the
Commission for Lawyer Discipline, Seana Willing, Amanda M. Kates, John S.
Brannon, Daniela Grosz, and Daniel Martinez, was served by electronic service
through this Court’s electronic filing service provider on the 3rd day of February
2025, to the following counsels.
___________________________________
ROYCE LEMOINE
Gaines West
John “Jay” Rudinger, Jr.
WEST, WEBB, ALLBRITTON & GENTRY, P.C.
1515 Emerald Plaza
College Station, Texas 77845
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
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Judd E. Stone II
Stone Hilton PLLC
600 Congress Ave., Suite 2350
Austin, Texas 78701
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
Patrick W. Mizell
VINSON & ELKINS, L.L.P.
845 Texas Ave., Suite 4700
Houston, Texas 77002
&
Emily S. Bamesberger
Brooke A. Noble
VINSON & ELKINS, L.L.P.
200 W. 6th Street, Suite 2500
Austin, Texas 78701
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES,
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE STATE BAR OF TEXAS, ET. AL.,
Daniel J. Olds
Jadd F. Masso
David N. Kitner
CLARK HILL PLC
901 Main Street, Suite 6000
Dallas, Texas
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, JENNY HODGKINS
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Automated Certificate of eService
This automated certificate of service was created by the efiling system.
The filer served this document via email generated by the efiling system
on the date and to the persons listed below. The rules governing
certificates of service have not changed. Filers must still provide a
certificate of service that complies with all applicable rules.
Lauren Baisdon on behalf of Royce LeMoine
Bar No. 24026421
lbaisdon@texasbar.com
Envelope ID: 96922889
Filing Code Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument
Filing Description: Brief Not Requesting Oral Argument
Status as of 2/3/2025 4:00 PM CST
Case Contacts
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Pat Mizell pmizell@velaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Jadd Masso 24041411 jmasso@clarkhill.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Royce Lemoine 24026421 royce.lemoine@texasbar.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Richard Huntpalmer 24097857 Richard.Huntpalmer@texasbar.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Gaines West 21197500 gaines.west@westwebb.law 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
John Rudinger 24067852 jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Daniel Olds 24088152 dolds@clarkhill.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Brooke Noble bnoble@velaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Michael Graham 24113581 Michael.Graham@TEXASBAR.COM 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Emily Bamesberger ebamesberger@velaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Justin B.Cox jbcox@clarkhill.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
David Kitner 11541500 dkitner@clarkhill.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Associated Case Party: EdwardRandolphTurnbull
Name BarNumber Email TimestampSubmitted Status
Billy SHart billy.hart@westwebblaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Jay Rudinger jay.rudinger@westwebblaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Judd Stone 24076720 Judd@stonehilton.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT
Gaines West gaines.west@westwebblaw.com 2/3/2025 3:39:57 PM SENT