K. J. v. Jackson

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-3052

K. J., a minor, by and through his

guardian ad litem, Kasey L. Johnson, D.C. No.

3:22-cv-00244-

Plaintiff - Appellant, DMS-DDL

v.

OPINION

Doctor LAMONT A. JACKSON, in

his individual capacity and official

capacity as Interim Superintendent of

the San Diego Unified School

District; CHUCK PODHORSKY;

JOE CAVAIOLA, in his individual

capacity and official capacity as vice

principal of La Jolla High School,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 4, 2024

Phoenix, Arizona

Filed February 11, 2025

2 K.J. V. JACKSON

Before: Richard A. Paez, Marsha S. Berzon, and John B.

Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Paez

SUMMARY *

Procedural Due Process/Qualified Immunity

The panel reversed the district court’s summary

judgment for public school administrators and remanded in

an action brought by high school student K.J., through his

guardian ad litem, alleging that defendants violated his right

to procedural due process when they extended his school

suspension (for fighting at school) without informing him of

the new charges or evidence that formed the basis of the

extended suspension (willfully causing serious injury not in

self-defense).

The district court held that although defendants violated

K.J.’s procedural right to due process, they were entitled to

qualified immunity from damages because the law was not

clearly established on whether students are entitled to due

process protections when a suspension is extended. The

district court further held that K.J. lacked Article III standing

to seek expungement of his disciplinary record because it

was only speculation that the disciplinary record would harm

his reputation or future prospects.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

K.J. V. JACKSON 3

The panel agreed with the district court that defendants

violated K.J.’s due process rights. K.J. had a property

interest in his education under California law that was

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause. The suspensions deprived K.J. of that

interest. Because defendants never informed K.J. of the new

charges and new evidence that formed the basis of the

extended suspension, he did not have a meaningful

opportunity to present his side of the story regarding those

charges.

Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity

because the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly

established in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). Here,

K.J.’s suspension was not extended based on the same

alleged conduct as his initial suspension. Rather the

extended suspension was essentially a second suspension

based on new alleged conduct and a new charge. The

procedures delineated in Goss clearly apply to suspension

extensions based on new charges or new evidence. K.J.’s

rights were sufficiently definite under Goss such that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have

understood that he was violating them.

The panel held that K.J. may seek expungement of any

records of the suspension extension and expulsion

recommendation. Expungement was not barred by Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity because it was a form of

prospective relief that K.J. could receive under the Ex Parte

Young doctrine. K.J. had standing to seek injunctive relief

at the time he filed his complaint, and his claim for injunctive

relief was not moot because expungement remains a form of

meaningful prospective relief. The panel remanded to the

district court to consider K.J.’s claim for expungement in

addition to his claim for damages.

4 K.J. V. JACKSON

COUNSEL

Goriune Dudukgian (argued), California Justice Project,

Pasadena, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael C. Sullivan (argued), Matthew W. Burris, and

Briana M. Antuna, Quarles & Brady LLP, San Diego,

California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

“[I]t would be a strange disciplinary system in an

educational institution if no communication was sought by

the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him

of his dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in

order to make sure that an injustice is not done.” Goss v.

Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975). Fifty years ago, Goss

articulated the due process rights of a student facing

suspension—oral or written notice of the charges against

him, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have, and

an opportunity to present his side of the story. Id. at 581.

We write today to stress what has long been clearly

established: public school officials must comply with Goss

when imposing a suspension, including an extension of an

existing suspension based on new allegations or new

evidence of misconduct.

We agree with the district court that Defendants violated

K.J.’s due process rights in extending his suspension without

giving him an opportunity to be heard on the charges and

evidence against him. We also hold, reversing the district

court, that (1) K.J.’s damages claims are not barred by

K.J. V. JACKSON 5

qualified immunity because his rights were clearly

established in Goss, and (2) K.J. may seek expungement of

any records of the suspension extension and expulsion

recommendation from his disciplinary file. We therefore

remand this case to the district court for consideration of

K.J.’s claims for damages and expungement. 1

I.

A.

On February 4, 2022, a lunchtime fight broke out on La

Jolla High School’s (“LJHS”) campus. All students

involved—after each meeting with various administrators

and submitting a written statement about the incident—were

suspended for “fighting at school” and sent home that day.

K.J. was one of these students and was suspended for three

days. In his handwritten statement, he described how

another student had been bullying him because of his race;

this student had used the “n word with a hard r,” “said he

hates minority’s [sic],” and called K.J. a “monkey.” K.J.

wrote, about the fight, that after he asked this student why he

was being racist, this student and/or his friend “shoved [K.J.]

into the wall” and “started [k]neeing [him] in the face.”

K.J.’s friend(s) then intervened to “help” K.J.

At some point after K.J. was sent home from school, Joe

Cavaiola, one of the vice principals, watched surveillance

1

Defendants raise again on appeal their argument that Superintendent

Jackson is not a proper defendant in either his official or personal

capacity. Because “we believe the decisionmaking process will benefit

from having the district court ‘make these determinations in the first

instance,’” we also remand for consideration in the first instance whether

Superintendent Jackson is a proper defendant. Sorosky v. Burroughs

Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)).

6 K.J. V. JACKSON

videos of the end of the fight that occurred outside the gym

and learned that one of the students involved in the fight

suffered injuries. Although he later admitted that it was

“impossible for [him] to know” from the available footage

which student caused the alleged injuries, based on these

new details, Cavaiola decided that one student—K.J.—did

not just participate in the fight but “willfully caused serious

injury” to another person not in “self-defense.” So, on

February 7, the night before K.J. was set to return to school,

Cavaiola called K.J.’s mother to let her know that school

officials decided to extend K.J.’s suspension and were

recommending that he be expelled from LJHS. 2 K.J. was

not on this call.

The next day, Cavaiola sent K.J.’s parents an email,

summarizing:

Upon further review of the closed circuit

camera campus footage on Friday, 2/4/22, the

[San Diego Unified School District

(“SDUSD”)] team is extending [K.J.’s]

school suspension from three days to five

days.[ 3] Due to the nature of the sustained

2

California Education Code § 48911(g) governs school officials’

authority to extend students’ suspensions in these circumstances. School

officials cannot directly expel a student. They can only recommend

expulsion to the school district’s governing board, which has the sole

authority to order the student expelled. See id. § 48915. School officials

may, however, extend a student’s suspension until the governing board

of the school district has rendered a decision on the proposed expulsion,

subject to certain requirements. Id. § 48911(g).

3

Although the suspension was listed as five days, a SDUSD counselor

confirmed that K.J. could not return to LJHS until the SDUSD governing

board decided on his expulsion.

K.J. V. JACKSON 7

injuries (during the Friday, 2/4/22

altercation) [K.J.] has been recommended for

expulsion from LJHS. During this time,

[K.J.] is not allowed to be on the LJHS

campus nor participate in/attend any LJHS

events. I have attached the updated

suspension/expulsion paperwork. Your next

step is to communicate directly to the

Placement and Appeal Department.

In response, K.J.’s parents met, as instructed, with a

counselor from the SDUSD Placement and Appeal

Department to discuss the expulsion process and their rights.

K.J. did not attend, as he was not required to be at nor was

he invited to this meeting. His parents were also not allowed

to present any defense to the factual allegations underlying

the suspension and recommended expulsion at this meeting.

At no point did school officials communicate with K.J. about

the extended suspension.

The day after that meeting, this lawsuit was filed. Five

days later, SDUSD rescinded the recommendation for K.J.’s

expulsion, ending the extended suspension and allowing K.J.

to return to school. From the time K.J. was suspended on

February 4 to his return to school on March 1, no one from

SDUSD or LJHS ever communicated with K.J. 4 Although

K.J.’s mother knew that K.J.’s suspension had been extended

on the basis of a new allegation, there is no evidence in the

record that the medical reports or the videos Cavaiola relied

on were provided or explained to her, let alone to K.J.

4

At his deposition, Cavaiola confirmed that he did not try to call K.J. at

his home and that he did not e-mail K.J. any documents to his school

email address.

8 K.J. V. JACKSON

Although K.J. has since returned to school, and his

expulsion recommendation has been withdrawn, his

February 8 “Report on Suspension” remains in his internal

disciplinary file within his student record. This report lists

both the extended suspension and the expulsion

recommendation for “willfully” causing “serious” injury not

in “self-defense.” Prior to the February 4 fight, K.J. had no

history of school discipline. SDUSD administrators, LJHS

administrators, school counselors, and K.J.’s specific

teachers have access to his disciplinary file. And while the

information in his file is not provided to colleges,

universities, or potential employers without K.J.’s consent,

K.J. would likely need to self-report any disciplinary

violations on applications for higher education or

employment.

B.

On February 23, 2022, K.J., by and through his guardian

ad litem Kasey Johnson, filed a complaint in the district

court, asserting a single cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. He alleged that defendants Lamont Jackson

(Superintendent of SDUSD), Chuck Podhorsky (Principal of

LJHS), and Joe Cavaiola (Vice Principal of LJHS), acting

under color of state law, violated his right to procedural due

process guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

The district court granted Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The district court agreed with K.J. that

Defendants violated his procedural due process rights under

Goss. The district court nonetheless entered judgment for

Defendants. First, it held that Defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity from damages because the law was not

clearly established on “whether students are entitled to due

K.J. V. JACKSON 9

process protections when a suspension is extended.”

Second, it held that K.J. lacked Article III standing to seek

expungement of his disciplinary record, the only other relief

sought, because it was only “speculation” that the

disciplinary record would harm his reputation or future

prospects. Because the district court granted Defendants

summary judgment, it declined to address their argument

that Superintendent Jackson is an improper defendant. This

appeal followed.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment.

See Brown v. Arizona, 82 F.4th 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2023).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any

genuine issues of material fact and whether the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c).

III.

A.

We first determine whether Defendants violated K.J.’s

due process rights. We agree with the district court that they

did. A state may not deprive persons of “life, liberty, or

property” without “due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV, § 1. There are three elements of a procedural

due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) “a liberty or

property interest protected by the Constitution,” (2) “a

deprivation of the interest by the government,” and (3) a

“lack of process.” Portman v. County of Santa Clara, 995

F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993).

10 K.J. V. JACKSON

There is no dispute that K.J. had a protected interest in

his education at LJHS. Property rights are “defined by

reference to state law,” id., and in California, the right to a

public education is a fundamental constitutional right, see

Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5; Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240,

1248 (Cal. 1992). When a state chooses to extend a right to

education, it is “constrained to recognize a student’s

legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property

interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and

which may not be taken away for misconduct without

adherence to the minimum procedures required by that

Clause.” Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.

There is also no dispute that suspensions constitute

deprivations of K.J.’s protected interests. Here, Defendants

first suspended K.J. for three days and then effectively for

an indeterminate period because Defendants recommended

K.J.’s expulsion and prohibited him from returning to school

while the recommendation was pending before the SDUSD

governing board. K.J. was ultimately excluded from LJHS’s

campus for sixteen days. As explained in Goss, “education

is perhaps the most important function of state and local

governments, and the total exclusion from the educational

process for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the

suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the

suspended child.” Id. at 576 (internal quotations and citation

omitted). And, because school suspensions can “seriously

damage the students’ standing with their fellow pupils and

their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for

higher education and employment,” such suspensions also

constitute deprivations of a protected liberty interest. Id. at

575.

Defendants dispute, however, the process K.J. was due

before they imposed the additional suspension extension.

K.J. V. JACKSON 11

Defendants argue that because they met with K.J. on

February 4, the day he was initially suspended, K.J. had

already received an opportunity to share his account of what

happened in the fight. K.J., by contrast, argues that Goss

requires that school officials provide him with (1) “oral or

written notice of the charges against him,” (2) “an

explanation of the evidence the authorities have,” and

(3) “an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. at

581. K.J. argues that Defendants failed to comply with these

requirements by extending his suspension from LJHS

without obtaining his response to whether he had “willfully”

caused “serious” injury to anyone, a new allegation based on

new evidence. Id.

We agree with K.J. Because Defendants never informed

K.J. of the new charges and new evidence that formed the

basis of the extended suspension, he did not have a

meaningful opportunity to present his side of the story

regarding those charges and that evidence in his initial

February 4 meeting with school administrators. See id. The

new charge was not a mere formal or technical change.

Instead, as a justification for extending his suspension, K.J.

was accused for the first time of “willfully” causing “serious

injury” not in “self-defense.” As K.J. argued before the

district court, the “alleged conduct changed significantly

between the first and second suspensions,” so he “did not

have the opportunity on February 4, or at any time thereafter,

to defend himself against these much more serious

allegations” underlying the additional suspension.

Additionally, K.J. was never given an “explanation of the

evidence the authorities” had that formed the basis of his

additional suspension. Id. In fact, on February 4, the only

time Cavaiola interviewed K.J. about the fight, Cavaiola did

12 K.J. V. JACKSON

not know about the medical report or what the video footage

showed.

Without knowing both “what he [was] accused of doing”

and “what the basis of the accusation [was],” K.J. did not

have “an opportunity to explain his version of the facts,” id.

at 582, as to the “willfully causing serious injury” charge

during that initial meeting. And, because Defendants did not

communicate with K.J. at any point thereafter, K.J. never

had an opportunity to present his side of the story in response

to that charge and the consequent decision to extend his

suspension. These “rudimentary procedures” are the bare

minimum and even less than the “more formal procedures”

that Goss suggests may be required for suspensions, like

K.J.’s, that exceed ten days. Id. at 584.

Finally, it is of no consequence that K.J. faced a

suspension extension, rather than an original suspension.

The fact remains that on February 8, K.J. was effectively

given an additional suspension based on charges and

evidence that he never had an opportunity to address. 5 See

id. at 582 (“[I]n being given an opportunity to explain his

version of the facts at this discussion, the student [must] first

be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the

accusation is.”). We therefore agree with the district court

that Defendants violated K.J.’s constitutional rights. 6

5

Goss requires that “the student be given” notice of the charges, an

explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the

story. 419 U.S. at 581 (emphasis added). Even if notifying K.J.’s parents

could have given K.J. notice of the new charges, it is clear from the

record that K.J. never had an opportunity to address the new charges and

evidence.

6

We do not reach the issue of whether solely an extension of the period

of a prior suspension, with no reliance on new allegations or new

K.J. V. JACKSON 13

B.

Even if Defendants violated K.J.’s constitutional rights,

they would be entitled to qualified immunity and shielded

from personal liability unless their actions violated “clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “[F]or a right to be

‘clearly established,’ the ‘right’s contours’ must have been

‘sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the

defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

violating it.’” Spencer v. Pew, 117 F.4th 1130, 1138 (9th

Cir. 2024) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard,

572 U.S. 765, 778-79 (2014)). We hold that Defendants are

not entitled to qualified immunity because the unlawfulness

of their conduct was clearly established in Goss.

The district court held that Defendants were entitled to

qualified immunity because there were no precedential cases

governing these facts. It held that “Goss does not explicitly

address the more precise issue in this case, which is whether

students are entitled to a second round of due process

protections if an initial suspension is extended.” Similarly,

Defendants suggest that there is no clearly established “legal

obligation to allow Appellant to retell his story a second

time.”

Setting aside that “officials can still be on notice that

their conduct violates established law even in novel factual

circumstances,” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002);

see Rieman v. Vazquez, 96 F.4th 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2024),

Goss clearly governs these facts. In concluding otherwise,

evidence, requires the school to provide new notice or another

opportunity to be heard.

14 K.J. V. JACKSON

both the district court and Defendants inaccurately describe

what occurred. Here, K.J.’s suspension was not extended

based on the same alleged conduct. When K.J. was first

suspended, he was accused of “[c]aus[ing], attempt[ing], or

threaten[ing] to cause physical injury.” Under this charge,

he could have simply been suspended for being in a school

fight, even if he did not physically harm someone. He was

also not charged with willfully doing anything, whether

willfully causing a minor injury or willfully causing a

serious injury. His extended suspension was essentially a

second suspension based on new alleged conduct and a new

charge: “willfully caus[ing] serious injury except in self-

defense.” At this point, Defendants were accusing K.J. of

being the one who intentionally injured another person.

Although K.J. had the opportunity to explain his side of the

story with regards to the first charge, he did not have the

“opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what

he deems the proper context” with respect to the second,

more serious charge. Goss, 419 U.S. at 584. In response to

the new charge, he did not have an opportunity to deny the

allegation that it was he who caused the injury, disclose who

in fact caused the injury, or explain that he caused the injury

solely in self-defense.

Under Goss, K.J. was entitled to hear the new accusation,

learn the basis for that accusation, and be given an

opportunity to explain his version of the facts as to that

accusation. See id. at 582; see also id. at 580 n.9 (noting a

student “was never told the basis for the principal’s belief

that he was involved” in the misconduct, and that school

officials may not make “the decision that misconduct had

occurred without at some meaningful time giving [the

student] an opportunity to persuade [them] otherwise”). On

February 4, the only time school officials spoke to K.J. about

K.J. V. JACKSON 15

the fight, K.J. was not notified of the accusation underlying

his February 8 additional suspension—“willfully” causing

“serious” injury—or what the basis of that accusation was—

the video evidence and medical reports. There can therefore

be no serious suggestion that K.J.’s February 4 hearing

satisfied the due process requirements for the February 8

suspension extension. He was thus not asking for a “second

round of due process protections,” but merely what Goss

minimally requires.

Defendants nonetheless argue that because the basis of

the suspension extension was “not a new event,” Goss does

not apply. But the procedures delineated in Goss clearly

apply to suspension extensions based on new charges or new

evidence. Goss states that due process rights attach to each

suspension, and for any suspension, a student is owed certain

process. Id. at 581. A suspension extension is still a

suspension from school, and a suspension extension based

on new allegations or new evidence is effectively a second

suspension. It is irrelevant that the suspension and

suspension extension arose from the same event. Goss

requires notice of the “charges” against a student as well as

an “explanation of the evidence the authorities have,” not

simply a description of the event in question. Id. (emphasis

added). Goss’s unambiguous focus is on the charges and

evidence—the case—against the student and an opportunity

to respond to that case. Id. at 580. As Goss forcefully

recognizes, “[f]airness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-

sided determination of facts decisive of rights. . . . No better

instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give

a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against

him and opportunity to meet it.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

16 K.J. V. JACKSON

We are also not persuaded that Goss’s requirements have

been modified or limited by any subsequent decisions.

Defendants point principally to C.R. v. Eugene School

District 4J, 835 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2016) and Wynar v.

Douglas County School District, 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir.

2013). These cases confirm, not limit, Goss’s fundamental

requirements. In Wynar, we held that school officials are not

constitutionally required to specify the “specific rules,

policies, or procedures that are alleged to have been

violated.” Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1072-73 (emphasis in

original). Similarly, in C.R., we held that Goss does not

require a notice of charges to include a “bill of particulars.”

C.R., 835 F.3d at 1154. We nonetheless required officials to

comply with Goss’s minimum requirements to give students

facing suspension “notice of the charges against him and, if

he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the

authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the

story.” Id. at 1153 (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 581); Wynar,

728 F.3d at 1072 (same). In both C.R. and Wynar, unlike

here, the student conceded that he received informal notice

of the charges against him and, through multiple interviews,

an opportunity to tell his side of the story. See Wynar, 728

F.3d at 1072; C.R., 835 F.3d at 1146-48, 1153. The cases

are therefore inapposite.

In sum, K.J.’s rights were “sufficiently definite” under

Goss such that “any reasonable official in the defendant’s

shoes would have understood that he was violating [them].”

Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778-89. 7 It is “beyond debate,”

7

Additionally, under SDUSD’s administrative regulation AR 5144.1(a),

which governed Defendants’ conduct in February 2022, any “extension

of the original period of suspension” must be preceded by an offer to

hold a conference “giving the student an opportunity to be heard” as part

of “due process.” Although internal regulations do not necessarily

K.J. V. JACKSON 17

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011), that for any

suspension K.J. faced, he was entitled to (1) “oral or written

notice of the charges” underlying the suspension, (2) “an

explanation of the evidence the authorities have” in support

of that charge, and (3) “an opportunity to present his side of

the story” in response to the case against him, Goss, 419 U.S.

at 581. There can be no serious question that K.J.’s

suspension extension on February 8 constituted a

suspension. After all, it is the very reason K.J. could not

return to school on February 8 after completing his original

three-day suspension. There is additionally no dispute that

Defendants never heard from K.J., on February 4 or anytime

thereafter, about the new charge and the evidence underlying

the February 8 suspension extension. Because Goss clearly

requires “the student first be told what he is accused of doing

and what the basis of the accusation is,” and it is clear that

K.J. never had an opportunity to be heard regarding the new

charge underlying the suspension extension, Defendants

violated his clearly established rights under Goss. Id. at 582.

We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of qualified

immunity.

reflect constitutional requirements, their interpretation of constitutional

requirements can be relevant to whether officials had a “fair warning” of

the unconstitutionality of their conduct. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 743-45

(relying on an administrative regulation to buttress its conclusion that a

reasonable person would have known the disputed practice was

unconstitutional); cf., e.g., Vazquez v. County of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153,

1164-65 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Training materials and regulations are also

relevant, although not dispositive, to determining whether reasonable

officers would have been on notice that their conduct was

unreasonable.”).

18 K.J. V. JACKSON

C.

We also conclude that K.J. may seek expungement of

any records of the suspension extension and expulsion

recommendation. In so concluding, we first hold that such

expungement is not barred by Eleventh Amendment

sovereign immunity. We also hold that K.J. had standing to

seek injunctive relief at the time he filed his complaint, and

that his claim for injunctive relief is not moot because

expungement remains a form of meaningful prospective

relief.

As an initial matter, the “Eleventh Amendment bars suits

against the State or its agencies for all types of relief, absent

unequivocal consent by the state.” Romano v. Bible, 169

F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999). 8 The Ex Parte Young

doctrine avoids any Eleventh Amendment bar to suit when

private individuals “sue state officials in federal court for

prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law, as

opposed to money damages.” Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d

887, 895 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis omitted); Ex Parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The district court correctly

held that expungement of information from school records

was a form of prospective relief that K.J. could receive under

8

We have held that California public school districts are “to be treated

as an arm of the State partaking of the State’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity.” Sato v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 928 (9th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Holz v. Nenana City Pub. Sch. Dist., 347 F.3d 1176,

1180 (9th Cir. 2003)). We take no position on whether this holding

should be revisited given our new test for evaluating whether an entity is

an arm of the state under the Eleventh Amendment. See Kohn v. State

Bar of California, 87 F.4th 1021 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc), cert.

denied, 144 S. Ct. 1465 (2024). In any case, K.J.’s request for

expungement falls within the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity.

K.J. V. JACKSON 19

the Ex Parte Young doctrine. See Flint v. Dennison, 488

F.3d 816, 825 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that injunctive relief

expunging disciplinary information from university records

“cannot be characterized solely as retroactive injunctive

relief and [is] not barred by the Eleventh Amendment”);

R.W. v. Columbia Basin Coll., 77 F.4th 1214, 1226 (9th Cir.

2023) (holding that expungement of negative information

from school records is a form of prospective relief that

plaintiffs can seek under Ex Parte Young). There is therefore

no Eleventh Amendment bar to K.J.’s request for

expungement.

We next consider the district court’s determination that

K.J. lacked standing to seek expungement. The district court

confused Article III’s standing and mootness requirements.

Both “standing and mootness are jurisdictional issues

deriving from the requirement of a case or controversy under

Article III.” Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch., 228 F.3d

1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000). “[T]he standing inquiry remains

focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the

requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.”

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008); Fellowship of

Christian Athletes v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of

Educ., 82 F.4th 664, 680 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc). By

contrast, “[t]he central question for mootness is whether

changes in the circumstances that prevailed at the beginning

of litigation,” such as the withdrawal of K.J.’s expulsion

recommendation and his subsequent return to school, “have

forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.” Meland v.

Weber, 2 F.4th 838, 849 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations

and citation omitted). K.J. had standing to challenge his

ongoing suspension at the time he filed his complaint, and

expungement would afford K.J. meaningful relief now. We

therefore hold that K.J. may seek an expungement order.

20 K.J. V. JACKSON

First, K.J. had standing to challenge the constitutionality

of his ongoing suspension on February 23, 2022, when he

filed the complaint. Article III standing consists of three

elements: (1) the “‘plaintiff must have suffered an injury in

fact’” that “‘is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual

or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’”; (2) “the

injury must ‘be fairly traceable to the challenged action of

the defendant’”; and (3) “it must be ‘likely’ that the injury is

redressable by a favorable decision.” Fellowship of

Christian Athletes, 82 F.4th at 680 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (cleaned up)).

When a plaintiff alleges a procedural injury, he need only

show that the procedures are “designed to protect some

threatened concrete interest.” Citizens for Better Forestry v.

U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citation omitted); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n.8. K.J. has done

so here. The procedures required by the Due Process Clause

protect K.J.’s concrete interests in his education and

reputation. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 575-76 (recognizing that

a suspension is a “serious event in the life of the suspended

child” and could “seriously damage the students’ standing

with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere

with later opportunities for higher education and

employment”); see also TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594

U.S. 413, 425 (2021) (recognizing “reputational harms” as

concrete injuries).

Once a plaintiff establishes such a concrete interest, his

“burden to establish the other two standing elements—

causation and redressability—is lessened.” Multistar Indus.,

Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 707 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir.

2013). A plaintiff alleging a procedural violation must

“show only that [he has] a procedural right that, if exercised,

could protect [his] concrete interests.” Salmon Spawning &

K.J. V. JACKSON 21

Recovery All. v. Gutierrez, 545 F.3d 1220, 1226 (9th Cir.

2008) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Here, the

“possibility” that an explanation of the evidence or an

opportunity to be heard on the more serious charges 9 would

have prevented K.J.’s continued suspension “meets the

causation and redressability factors applicable to such

procedural claims.” Multistar Indus., 707 F.3d at 1054. K.J.

therefore had standing to challenge his unconstitutional

suspension when he filed his complaint.

K.J. also had standing to pursue injunctive relief at the

time he filed his complaint. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at

431 (“[P]laintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim

that they press and for each form of relief that they seek (for

example, injunctive relief and damages).”). Because K.J.

was still suspended and unable to return to LJHS when he

filed his complaint, he was facing the “continuing, present

adverse effects” of his “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct”—

namely, Defendants’ unconstitutional suspension extension.

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). He could

thus seek injunctive relief to stop those effects, such as an

order allowing him to return to school pending expulsion

proceedings or an order providing him with an opportunity

to be heard regarding the suspension extension and

recommended expulsion. We therefore have no trouble

concluding that K.J. had standing to pursue a claim for

injunctive relief when he filed his complaint. 10

9

For example, Cavaiola admitted in his deposition that it was

“impossible” to know from the surveillance videos whether K.J. or

another student caused the alleged injuries.

10

In holding that K.J. had standing to seek injunctive relief, we do not

suggest that there would not be standing in a suit filed solely for

22 K.J. V. JACKSON

Since K.J. filed this lawsuit, however, Defendants have

withdrawn K.J.’s expulsion recommendation, and K.J. has

returned to school. Much of K.J.’s claim for prospective

relief is thus moot. The February 8 “Report on Suspension,”

however, remains in K.J.’s disciplinary file, and he now

seeks 11 expungement of any information about the February

8 suspension extension and expulsion recommendation from

his school record. His disciplinary file is accessible to

administrators, counselors, and K.J.’s teachers at LJHS. See

Goss, 419 U.S. at 575 (explaining that reputational harm

associated with a disciplinary record includes the harm to

one’s reputation with teachers). K.J. would also likely need

to disclose the information in his disciplinary file on college

applications. K.J.’s claim is therefore not moot.

“The party asserting mootness has the heavy burden of

establishing that there is no effective relief remaining for a

court to provide.” Tinoqui-Chalola Council of Kitanemuk &

Yowlumne Tejon Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 232 F.3d

1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 2000). Under Flint, expungement of

unconstitutional disciplinary action from school records “is

certainly a form of meaningful relief.” 488 F.3d at 824

(internal quotations and citations omitted). We recognized

in Flint that “[w]hen a student’s record contains negative

information derived from allegedly unconstitutional school

[acts,] . . . that information may jeopardize the student’s

expungement of school disciplinary records, as that issue is not before

us.

11

K.J. did not specifically pray for expungement in his original

complaint. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), however, provides

that final judgment “should grant the relief to which each party is

entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c).

K.J. V. JACKSON 23

future employment or college career.” Id. 12 “So long as a []

student’s record contains evidence of disciplinary sanctions,

and the [] student seeks an order requiring school officials to

expunge from school records all mention of the disciplinary

action, the action is not moot.” Id. (internal quotations and

citation omitted). K.J. may thus seek such relief.

Defendants argue that K.J. would need to “disclose

information relating to the on-campus fight and initial,

subsequent suspension” in any case. There is, however, a

significant difference between being part of a school fight

and receiving a three-day suspension and willfully causing

serious injury and facing potential expulsion. As noted, K.J.

also faces reputational harm, as his teachers, including future

teachers, will have access to the disciplinary file, which

charges him with willfully causing serious injury to another

person. Though K.J. may need to disclose that he was

involved in a school fight, the unconstitutional extension of

the suspension includes new and more serious allegations,

and an expungement order would remove that new charge

from his school record.

Because K.J. had standing when he filed his complaint,

and because expungement remains a form of meaningful

relief, we remand to the district court to consider K.J.’s claim

for expungement in addition to his claim for damages.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

12

Flint did not require the student to submit specific evidence to this

effect. Indeed, a threat of future harm “may be too speculative to support

standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000).