The opinion
1
2025 CO 6
Adam Douglas Densmore, Petitioner:
v.
The People of the State of Colorado. Respondent:
No. 23SC81
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
February 10, 2025
The
supreme court granted certiorari to consider whether
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies
when a Department of Human Services caseworker conducts a
custodial interrogation.
The
court concludes that, in determining whether a caseworker
acted as an agent of law enforcement in interviewing a person
who was in custody, such that Miranda warnings were
required, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances, including both objective and subjective
factors. Applying that standard to the facts presented, the
court further concludes that the caseworker who interviewed
Petitioner did not act as an agent of law enforcement when
she spoke with him and, therefore, she was not required to
provide Miranda warnings before conducting the
interviews.
Accordingly,
the court affirms the judgment of the court of appeals
division below.
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 18CA1304
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender
Chelsea E. Mowrer, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Grant R. Fevurly, Senior Assistant Attorney General Denver,
Colorado.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae ACLU of Colorado and Office of
Respondent Parents' Counsel: Timothy R. Macdonald Sara
Neel Emma Mclean-Riggs Laura Moraff Denver, Colorado Zaven T.
Saroyan Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Human
Services: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Nicole Chaney,
Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Denver Department of Human
Services and Arapahoe County Department of Human Services:
Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney Denver, Colorado
Jordan Lewis, Assistant County Attorney Aurora, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Office of Alternate Defense
Counsel and Colorado Criminal Defense Bar: Spencer Fane LLP
Dean Neuwirth Denver, Colorado.
2
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER
joined.
OPINION
GABRIEL JUSTICE.
3
¶1
We granted certiorari to consider whether Miranda v.
Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies when a Department
of Human Services caseworker conducts a custodial
interrogation. Adam Douglas Densmore urges us to adopt a
bright-line rule that whenever a caseworker conducts a
custodial interrogation that involves current or unsolved
allegations that a reasonable caseworker should know are
criminal, Miranda applies. Alternatively, he asks us
to adopt an objective totality of the circumstances test that
does not consider subjective intent.
¶2
We decline both invitations and instead conclude that, in
determining whether a caseworker acted as an agent of law
enforcement in interviewing a person who was in custody, such
that Miranda warnings were required, courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances, including both
objective and subjective factors. Applying that standard to
the facts presented here, we further conclude that the
caseworker who interviewed Densmore did not act as an agent
of law enforcement when she spoke with him and, therefore,
she was not required to provide Miranda warnings
before conducting the interviews.
¶3
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals
division below.
4
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶4
In February 2017, Densmore lived in Boulder with his
thirteen-month-old child and the child's mother, Ashley
Mead. After Mead did not arrive for work one day, her
employer called the police.
¶5
At this time, Densmore and the child were in Oklahoma, where
Densmore was arrested by Oklahoma law enforcement officers.
Because Densmore had the child with him when he was arrested
and the child had no other adult caregivers, the police
called the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (the
"Department") and asked the Department to take
custody of the child. At that point, Jessica Punches, then a
child welfare specialist in the Department's Child
Welfare Division, got involved in this matter.
¶6
Punches was not a law enforcement officer, and her job
description did not include any specific law enforcement
activities or criminal investigations. Rather, her job
involved investigating the safety of children and reporting
information that could endanger a child's welfare.
¶7
In performing these duties, Punches frequently interviewed
people who were incarcerated. When she conducted such
interviews, her purpose was to determine what brought a child
to the Department's attention and the steps necessary to
maintain the child's safety. Thus, when interviewing
someone who was incarcerated, she asked questions concerning
substance abuse, domestic
5
violence, family support, discipline, parenting styles, child
placement options, and services that the incarcerated parent
might need. Ultimately, Punches sought to determine the least
restrictive placement for the child, prioritizing placing the
child with a family member, if possible, rather than in
foster care.
¶8
Consistent with the foregoing, Punches took custody of
Densmore's child, brought the child to her office, and
began seeking an appropriate placement. She also spoke with a
detective from the Boulder Police Department. At that point,
the detective informed Punches that Densmore was being held
on a suspected custody violation, Mead's whereabouts were
unknown, and it was unclear whether Mead was alive.
¶9
Punches then interviewed Densmore at the county jail where he
was being held. Before this interview, police had twice
provided Densmore with Miranda warnings, and each
time, Densmore had invoked his right to an attorney. It
appears undisputed that Punches did not provide Densmore with
Miranda warnings before beginning her interview. It
likewise appears undisputed that no law enforcement officer
had asked Punches to interview Densmore and that Punches did
not offer to interview Densmore on behalf of any law
enforcement officers. Rather, consistent with her usual
practice as a child welfare specialist, her intent was to
ascertain information to ensure the safety and appropriate
placement of the child.
6
¶10
Punches questioned Densmore regarding the child's
allergies, her likes and dislikes, how to comfort her, how
she was disciplined, parenting techniques, substance abuse,
domestic violence, and support systems for the family.
Punches also asked Densmore how he ended up in the county
where he was arrested and about his travel plans. She asked
these questions to try to establish a timeline of what had
happened for purposes of her investigation. She further asked
Densmore if he knew where Mead was. She did so because if a
parent is available, then she would want to place the child
with that parent. She also inquired about other family
members who could possibly take custody of the child.
¶11
In the course of this conversation, Punches asked Densmore
when he last saw Mead. He responded that it was on the
previous Sunday, and he noted that he and Mead had gotten
into a fight. Punches asked him to tell her about the fight
and whether it was physical. Densmore responded that he had
slapped Mead. Punches also asked about his relationship with
Mead generally.
¶12
Punches inquired about domestic violence in the household
because she understood that exposure to domestic violence is
a child safety concern. She sought information regarding
Densmore's relationship with Mead because she generally
wanted to know how individuals in a child's home got
along and related to each other, to determine whether there
was any danger to the child.
7
¶13
During Punches's interview of Densmore, a task force
officer sat behind Punches, at her request, for her
"safety." The officer did not ask Densmore any
questions, instruct Punches to ask any questions, or
participate in the interview in any way.
¶14
In addition, an audio/video recording system recorded
Punches's interview of Densmore, as well as
Densmore's interactions with law enforcement officers
following that interview. At the conclusion of the interview,
it appears that both Punches and an FBI agent obtained discs
containing the video recording. It further appears that the
recording was subsequently shared with the Boulder Police
Department.
¶15
After Punches completed her interview of Densmore, she spoke
with an FBI agent who told her that a torso had been found in
a dumpster and that he believed it to be Mead's torso.
She also spoke with a Boulder detective who informed her that
Densmore was being held on suspicion of first degree murder.
¶16
The next day, Punches spoke again with Densmore, this time by
telephone. Two of Punches's colleagues also participated
in this call, the purpose of which was to conduct a
"child safety meeting." It appears undisputed that
neither Punches nor either of her colleagues provided
Densmore with Miranda warnings before this meeting,
assuming that a telephonic meeting like this could even be
characterized as a custodial interrogation. And, as with the
prior interview, the
8
purpose of this meeting was not to aid in any prosecution, to
solve any crimes, or to gather incriminating information;
Punches did not make the call on behalf of any law
enforcement personnel; and no law enforcement personnel
instructed Punches to make this call. Rather, the purpose of
the meeting was to discuss with Densmore the facts that he
was incarcerated and Punches had not yet found another
caregiver, Densmore's admitted substance abuse, and
"possible fighting" between him and Mead. Punches
also discussed with Densmore his strengths as a parent and
the best placement plan for the child.
¶17
In the course of this conversation, Punches again inquired
whether there had been any domestic violence between Mead and
Densmore. When Densmore responded that there had not been,
Punches confronted him with his statement during the initial
interview that he had slapped Mead. Punches followed up
because, as noted above, she understood that domestic
violence in the home was a child safety concern and also
because she wanted her two colleagues, who had not been
present during her initial interview, to hear the information
that she had gathered previously.
¶18
When Punches conducted an investigation like the one in this
case, she created a report that she often (although not
always) filed with the district attorney. She created such a
report here and shared it with the district attorney,
although she did not include in her report information
regarding the child safety
9
meeting. She excluded that information because all parties to
that meeting had agreed to treat the meeting as confidential.
Thus, the child safety meeting was documented only internally
at the Department.
¶19
Several months later, a Boulder detective contacted Punches
because the detective's copy of the recording of
Punches's initial interview with Densmore was not working
properly. The detective inquired whether Punches had a
working copy and asked for information about her interview
with Densmore. Because the Department's records are
sealed, Punches was unsure whether it was appropriate for her
to share this information without a court order. She
therefore asked her supervisor. Her district director
responded that she could share the requested information with
law enforcement, and Punches did so.
¶20
The People charged Densmore with first degree murder of Mead,
tampering with a deceased human body, tampering with physical
evidence, and abuse of a corpse. Densmore thereafter moved to
suppress the statements that he had made to Punches during
her interview of him at the jail and to suppress any
testimony regarding the telephonic child safety meeting.
Regarding the former, Densmore argued that (1) Punches was
acting as an agent of the state when she interrogated
Densmore and, thus, all of his statements should be
suppressed because they were in violation of Miranda
and (2) the statements were not voluntary. Regarding the
latter, he argued, among other things, that the statements
were not voluntary.
10
¶21
The trial court ultimately denied both of Densmore's
motions, principally reasoning that Punches's purpose in
interviewing Densmore was to develop a safety plan and
placement options for the child. In support of this
determination, the court found that it was the
Department's regular practice to interview a child's
biological parents when the Department took custody of the
child and, thus, Punches had a purpose other than to aid law
enforcement in investigating this case. Accordingly, the
court concluded that Punches was not acting as an agent of
law enforcement when she conducted the interview and,
therefore, the interview did not fall within the purview of
the Constitution. In light of this ruling, the court did not
need to decide whether Densmore's statements were
voluntary.
¶22
As to the telephonic child safety meeting, the court
similarly found that the meeting's purpose was to discuss
with Densmore the Department's allegations, to obtain his
thoughts regarding the child's placement, and to find the
least restrictive environment for the child. The purpose of
the meeting was not to aid law enforcement, which did not
participate in the meeting, and, thus, Punches and her
colleagues were not acting as agents of law enforcement
during the meeting. As a result, the court concluded that,
like Punches's initial interview, this meeting did not
implicate constitutional protections, and the court again did
not need to determine whether Densmore's statements were
voluntary.
11
¶23
The case proceeded to a jury trial, and, at trial, the court
admitted some of Densmore's statements to Punches. The
jury convicted Densmore as charged, and he appealed, arguing,
as pertinent here, that the trial court had erred in denying
his motions to suppress his statements to Punches.
¶24
In a unanimous, unpublished opinion, a division of the court
of appeals affirmed. People v. Densmore , No.
18CA1304, ¶ 106 (Nov. 23, 2022). In so ruling, the
division observed that Miranda applies to a
custodial interrogation conducted by a person other than a
law enforcement officer when that person acts as an agent of
law enforcement. Id. at ¶ 28. This is to
prevent law enforcement officers from circumventing
Miranda by directing third parties to act on their
behalf. Id. The division then applied a totality of
the circumstances test to determine whether Punches had acted
as an agent of law enforcement. Id. at ¶ 31. In
applying this test, the division considered, among other
things, that (1) Punches was a government employee; (2) her
job duties all related to child welfare and family
reunification; (3) she confirmed that she was not a law
enforcement officer and did not investigate crimes; (4) the
fundamental purpose of her investigations was not to obtain
incriminating information; (5) there was no evidence that the
police directed, controlled, or participated in her
investigation; (6) she had not consulted or coordinated with
law enforcement personnel regarding the questions to ask
Densmore; (7) she had had only brief contact with law
enforcement officers before
12
beginning her investigation; (8) no evidence showed that she
had reviewed any police reports or other materials related to
the criminal investigation; (9) she had a duty to report
information that may endanger a child's welfare; (10) she
did not provide a report to prosecutors in every case; and
(11) she did not have the authority to apprehend, detain, or
handcuff individuals. Id. at ¶¶ 32-35.
Considering these factors in their totality, the division
concluded that Punches was not acting as an agent of law
enforcement when she spoke with Densmore in this case.
Id. at ¶ 36. The division thus determined that
the trial court had correctly denied Densmore's motions
to suppress his statements to Punches. Id. at ¶
37.
¶25
Densmore then petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari,
and we granted his petition.
II.
Analysis
¶26
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review
and Miranda 's requirements. We then address the
law that applies when a person other than a law enforcement
officer conducts a custodial interrogation. We end by
applying these legal principles to the facts now before us.
A.
Standard of Review and Governing Miranda
Principles
¶27
Our review of a trial court's order regarding a motion to
suppress evidence involves a mixed question of fact and law.
People v. Cline , 2019 CO 33, ¶ 13 , 439 P.3d
1232, 1236 . We defer to a trial court's factual findings
if they are
13
supported by competent evidence in the record, but we review
de novo the court's legal conclusions. Id. Our
review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress
is limited to the record created at the suppression hearing.
People v. Thompson , 2021 CO 15, ¶ 16 , 500 P.3d
1075, 1078 .
¶28
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals from compelled self-incrimination. U.S.
Const. amend. V. To safeguard this right, Miranda ,
384 U.S. at 478-79 , requires that when an individual is
subjected to a custodial interrogation, the interrogator must
advise the individual that (1) they have the right to remain
silent; (2) anything they say can be used against them in a
court of law; (3) they have the right to an attorney's
presence; and (4) if they cannot afford an attorney, then one
will be appointed for them prior to any questioning if they
so desire. Absent an exception to this rule, unwarned
statements made during a custodial interrogation are presumed
to be compelled and are inadmissible in the prosecution's
case in chief. Verigan v. People , 2018 CO 53, ¶
19 , 420 P.3d 247, 251 .
B.
Custodial Interrogations by Non-Law Enforcement
Officers
¶29
Although Miranda typically applies to law
enforcement officers conducting custodial interrogations, we
have opined that it also applies to "civilians acting as
agents of the state in order to prevent law enforcement
officials from circumventing the Miranda
requirements by directing a third party to act on their
14
behalf." People v. Robledo , 832 P.2d 249, 250
(Colo. 1992). To determine whether a civilian is acting as an
agent of law enforcement in conducting a custodial
interrogation, a court must consider the totality of the
circumstances. Id. Although our case law has not
compiled an exhaustive list of factors that a court must
consider, we have provided guidance.
¶30
In Robledo , for example, we considered whether a
counselor at a juvenile detention center acted as an agent of
law enforcement in speaking with a detained juvenile.
Id. In that context, we deemed relevant the
counselor's duty to investigate and interview juveniles
to determine whether they qualified for home monitoring; the
counselor's authority to apprehend, handcuff, and detain
juveniles under certain circumstances; his access to police
reports and the fact that he had reviewed the incarcerated
juvenile's police report before meeting with the
juvenile; the counselor's duty to report information that
he learned and that might cause or had caused bodily injury
to another; and the fact that the counselor was under
contract with and was paid by the state to perform these
duties. Id. at 251 . ¶31 Nothing in
Robledo , however, suggested that these factors are
the exclusive factors that courts are to consider in
determining whether a civilian is acting as an agent of law
enforcement when conducting a custodial interrogation. To the
contrary, we emphasized that courts are to consider the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 250 .
Accordingly, in our view, the division below did not err
15
in also considering factors such as the investigator's
job duties and the purposes of those duties; whether the
investigator was a law enforcement officer who investigates
crimes; whether the investigator's purpose was to obtain
incriminating information; whether the police directed,
controlled, or participated in her investigation or gave
input regarding the questions the investigator should ask the
person to be interviewed; and the extent of the
investigator's contact with law enforcement officers
before she began her investigation. Densmore,
¶¶ 32-35. All of these factors contribute to an
assessment of the totality of the circumstances. ¶32 We
believe-and therefore reaffirm-that the foregoing totality of
the circumstances approach is a workable one that
appropriately considers the facts of each particular case. We
thus decline to adopt Densmore's proposed bright-line
rule that whenever a caseworker conducts a custodial
interrogation that involves current or unsolved allegations
that a reasonable caseworker should know are criminal,
Miranda applies. Such a rule would, as a practical
matter, cover most child welfare interviews that caseworkers
conduct of parents in custody, regardless of the
circumstances of a particular case, and Densmore has offered
no persuasive reason for extending Miranda to
custodial interrogations conducted by people who are neither
law enforcement officers nor agents of law enforcement.
¶33
We likewise decline Densmore's invitation to limit the
factors that a court may consider to objective ones,
excluding subjective factors such as the intent of
16
the interrogator. Neither Robledo nor any other case
of which we are aware expressly limits the agency
determination to an assessment of objective factors, and we
believe that such an approach would, in some cases, preclude
consideration of relevant facts, contrary to a totality of
the circumstances analysis. ¶34 Accordingly, we reaffirm
the totality of the circumstances approach that we adopted
decades ago in Robledo and decline to limit the
factors that a court may deem relevant in a particular case.
C.
Application
¶35
Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before us, we
conclude that Punches was not acting as an agent of law
enforcement when she interviewed Densmore here. To be sure,
Punches, like the counselor in Robledo , was paid by
the state and had duties to investigate and interview
individuals and to report certain information that she had
learned (albeit not necessarily for law enforcement
purposes). Unlike in Robledo , however, no evidence
was presented that Punches had the authority to apprehend,
detain, or handcuff individuals. Nor did she have access to
or review any police reports or other materials related to
the criminal investigation involving Densmore before speaking
with him.
¶36
In addition, although the police were aware that Punches was
interviewing Densmore, they did not direct her to do so. Nor
did they direct or control her investigation or coordinate
with her regarding questions that she was to ask
17
Densmore. And Punches did not intend through her questioning
to assist law enforcement in investigating any crimes or to
obtain incriminating information. Rather, her purpose was to
gather information to ensure the child's welfare and to
find a safe placement for the child. The fact that Punches
sometimes shared her report with the district attorney and
did so here did not change her role or purpose in
interviewing Densmore. Nor did her role or purpose in
performing her duties change when, several months after her
initial interview and child safety meeting with Densmore, she
shared requested information with a Boulder detective.
¶37
We also note that although a task force officer was present
during the initial interview, it appears undisputed that he
was present at Punches's request and solely for her
safety and that he did not participate in any way in the
interview. And although law enforcement officers obtained the
recording of Punches's initial interview of Densmore, the
record does not establish that the interview was recorded to
gather incriminating information.
¶38
Considering all of these facts in their totality, we conclude
that Punches was not acting as an agent of law enforcement
when she interviewed Densmore and, thus, she had no
obligation to provide Miranda warnings prior to
conducting that interview.
¶39
We are not persuaded otherwise by Densmore's reliance on
Estelle v. Smith , 451 U.S. 454 (1981), and
Mathis v. United States , 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
18
¶40
Estelle , 451 U.S. at 467 , concerned whether the
government could introduce, at the penalty phase of a capital
trial, unwarned statements that an in-custody defendant had
made to a psychiatrist during a court-ordered competency
evaluation. There, although the psychiatrist was initially
designated by the court to conduct a neutral competency
evaluation, he subsequently went beyond merely reporting to
the court on the question of the defendant's competence
and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase of the
trial on the issue of the defendant's future
dangerousness. Id. In these circumstances, the Court
concluded that the psychiatrist's role had changed and
that he had essentially become an agent of law enforcement.
Id.
¶41
As Densmore contends, Estelle involved statements
made to a person other than a law enforcement officer without
the benefit of Miranda warnings, and the same is
true here. Unlike here, however, the psychiatrist in
Estelle had spoken to the defendant in the context
of, in direct connection with, and for the purpose of a
pending criminal proceeding. Accordingly, it is not clear to
us that Estelle is on point, as Densmore argues.
Regardless, in the time since Estelle was decided,
the Supreme Court has observed that its "opinion in
Estelle suggested that [its] holding was limited to
the 'distinct circumstances' presented there."
Penry v. Johnson , 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001). Indeed,
the Court has noted that it "[has] never extended
19
Estelle 's Fifth Amendment holding beyond its
particular facts." Id. We therefore decline to
apply Estelle to the very different factual setting
now before us.
¶42
In Mathis, 391 U.S. at 2-4 , 3 n.2, an in-custody
defendant had made unwarned statements to an Internal Revenue
Service agent as part of what the Government deemed a
"routine tax investigation." The defendant
contended that the statements were inadmissible under
Miranda . Id. at 3. The Government responded
that Miranda was inapplicable because (1) the
questions were asked as part of a "routine tax
investigation" that might not have resulted in a
criminal prosecution and (2) the defendant was not
incarcerated by the agent questioning him but was imprisoned
for a different purpose. Id. at 4.
¶43
The Court agreed with the defendant, concluding that the
distinctions between the case before it and Miranda
were "too minor and shadowy" to justify departing
from Miranda . Id. In support of this
conclusion, the Court began by acknowledging that tax
investigations could be initiated for the purpose of civil
proceedings rather than criminal prosecutions and that, to
this extent, tax investigations differ from investigations of
some other crimes. Id. The Court went on to note,
however, that tax investigations frequently lead to criminal
prosecutions, as had occurred in the case before it.
Id. Indeed, the full-fledged criminal investigation
in the matter before the Court began just days after the
agent's last visit to question the defendant.
Id. In these circumstances, the Court
20
declined to conclude that tax investigations are immune from
Miranda 's requirements, as the Government there
had argued. Id.
¶44
Although we acknowledge that there are some parallels between
the interviews at issue in Mathis and the meetings
at issue here, we conclude that the tax investigation in
Mathis differs in material ways from the kind of
child welfare investigation that occurred in this case. The
purpose of the agent's investigation in Mathis
was to enforce federal tax laws, whether through civil or
criminal proceedings. Id. Accordingly, the
investigation served a predominantly law enforcement purpose.
Here, in contrast, Punches conducted her investigation to
determine how to care for and where to place Densmore's
child while Densmore was in custody, Mead's whereabouts
were unknown, and the child had no other caregivers. As a
result, Punches's investigation was not aimed at
uncovering violations of law, developing evidence in a
criminal case, or enforcing criminal law, even if her
investigation ultimately uncovered facts that subsequently
became relevant in the criminal investigation concerning
Densmore.
¶45
Moreover, in a case like this, child welfare specialists like
Punches serve a critical role that is entirely separate and
distinct from any criminal proceedings, namely, ensuring
child safety and finding an appropriate placement for a
child. In our view, such facts make Punches's involvement
in this case materially
21
different from that of the Internal Revenue Service agent in
Mathis . Mathis is therefore distinguishable
from the case now before us.
III.
Conclusion
¶46
For these reasons, we conclude that when determining whether
a Department of Human Services caseworker acted as an agent
of law enforcement in interviewing a person who was in
custody, such that Miranda warnings were required,
courts must consider the totality of the circumstances,
including both objective and subjective factors. Applying
this approach to the facts now before us, we further conclude
that Punches did not act as an agent of law enforcement when
she interviewed Densmore and, therefore, she was not required
to provide Miranda warnings before conducting the
interviews. As a result, the division below correctly upheld
the trial court's order denying Densmore's motions to
suppress.
¶47
Accordingly, we affirm the division's judgment.