The opinion
1
2025 CO 7
Patrick Frazee, Petitioner:
v.
The People of the State of Colorado.
No. 23SC85
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc
February 10, 2025
The
supreme court granted certiorari to determine whether a
Department of Human Services caseworker is a law enforcement
officer under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and, if so, whether Miranda's test for
custody applies when someone in pretrial detention is
questioned about the facts underlying their custody.
Following
the principles set forth in Densmore v. People, 2025
CO 6 , ¶¶ 2, 28, 46,P.3d, also announced today, the
court concludes that the Department of Human Services
caseworker here was neither a law enforcement officer nor an
agent of law enforcement for Miranda purposes.
Accordingly, Miranda does not apply in this case,
and, thus, the court need not reach the question of whether
Miranda's test for custody should apply when a
Department of Human Services caseworker questions someone in
pretrial detention about the facts underlying their custody.
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 20CA35
Attorneys for Petitioner: Megan A. Ring, Public Defender Sean
James Lacefield, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Brittany Limes Zehner, Assistant Solicitor General Denver,
Colorado.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae ACLU of Colorado and Office of
Respondent Parents' Counsel: Timothy R. Macdonald Sara
Neel Emma Mclean-Riggs Laura Moraff Denver, Colorado Zaven T.
Saroyan Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Department of Human
Services: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Nicole Chaney,
Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Denver Department of Human
Services and Arapahoe County Department of Human Services:
Amy J. Packer, Assistant City Attorney Denver, Colorado
Jordan Lewis, Assistant County Attorney Aurora, Colorado.
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Office of Alternate Defense
Counsel and Colorado Criminal Defense Bar: Spencer Fane LLP
Dean Neuwirth Denver, Colorado.
2
JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
CHIEF JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER
joined.
OPINION
GABRIEL JUSTICE.
3
¶1
We granted certiorari to determine whether a Department of
Human Services caseworker is a law enforcement officer under
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and, if so,
whether Miranda 's test for custody applies when
someone in pretrial detention is questioned about the facts
underlying their custody. Patrick Frazee urges us to adopt a
bright-line rule that Department of Human Services
caseworkers must give Miranda warnings any time they
interrogate someone in custody about current or unsolved
allegations that a reasonable caseworker should know are
criminal. In the alternative, Frazee argues that, under the
totality of the circumstances, the caseworker here was acting
as a law enforcement officer or as an agent of law
enforcement and, thus, was required to give Miranda
warnings.
¶2
In Densmore v. People , 2025 CO 6 , ¶¶ 2,
38, 46, P.3d, which we are also announcing today, we
addressed a nearly identical issue and concluded that, under
a totality of the circumstances test, the caseworker there
was not acting as an agent of law enforcement for purposes of
Miranda and, thus, Miranda did not apply.
Guided by the principles announced in Densmore , we
conclude that Department of Human Services caseworker Mary
Longmire likewise was neither a law enforcement officer nor
an agent of law enforcement for Miranda purposes.
Accordingly, Miranda does not apply in this case,
and we need not reach the
4
question of whether Miranda 's test for custody
should apply when a Department of Human Services caseworker
questions someone in pretrial detention about the facts
underlying their custody.
¶3
We therefore affirm the judgment of the division below,
albeit on different grounds.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶4
Frazee was arrested in connection with the November 22, 2018
murder of his romantic partner, Kelsey Berreth.
¶5
Frazee and Berreth had a daughter who was just over one year
old at the time of Berreth's death. On the day of
Frazee's arrest, December 21, 2018, the Teller County
Department of Human Services (the "Department")
received a referral from the Woodland Park Police Department
concerning the child. This referral was assigned to Longmire,
the child and family services administrator with the
Department, and, in this instance, Longmire agreed to serve
as a caseworker. The child was brought to the
Department's office, and a court granted the Department
emergency custody of her.
¶6
That same day, Longmire went to the Teller County jail to
meet with Frazee. The purpose of this meeting was to serve
Frazee notice of the upcoming shelter care hearing concerning
the child, to provide him with information about the
5
dependency and neglect process, and to inform him that the
child was in the Department's custody.
¶7
Several days later, on December 26, Longmire again met with
Frazee at the Teller County jail. It is this meeting that is
at issue in this case. No law enforcement authorities asked
Longmire to conduct this meeting, and she did not notify the
local police that she was doing so. The meeting took place
the day before a preliminary protective proceeding concerning
the child was scheduled to occur. As of this time, Frazee had
not yet been formally charged with Berreth's murder. Law
enforcement officers had, however, told Longmire what they
believed had happened, although they did not provide details
and Longmire did not have access to any search or arrest
warrants that had been issued in the case.
¶8
Longmire met with Frazee in the jail's video advisement
room, which is used for, among other things, video
advisements, video court sessions, attorney visits, and other
official visits, such as the one at issue here. A deputy
brought Frazee into the room, but the deputy did not stay,
and Longmire was alone with Frazee during the meeting. Frazee
was neither handcuffed nor restrained, nor did Longmire limit
his freedom of movement during the meeting. And Frazee was
free to leave at any time. Longmire, who was not a law
enforcement officer and who had never been trained in law
enforcement interrogation techniques, did not provide
Miranda warnings to Frazee.
6
¶9
At the outset of the meeting, Longmire explained to Frazee
that due to his incarceration, the child did not have an
appropriate caregiver and that Longmire had questions for
Frazee regarding that issue. Longmire expressly told Frazee
that she would understand if there were questions that he did
not want to answer due to the allegations against him and the
ongoing criminal investigation.
¶10
Longmire further told Frazee that she was there to complete
her assessment of the family and to gather information about
the child that she needed in order to complete the paperwork
for the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children. In
particular, she explained that she "needed to learn
about [Frazee's] background growing up, about [the
child's] development, if she had any medical issues, you
know, what was her daily schedule, how was her development,
different things like that." Longmire also asked about
Berreth, Frazee's relationship with her, and the custody
arrangement that they had regarding the child, so that
Longmire could understand what the child's daily life was
like, whom she was with and when, and her relationship with
both of her parents. And Longmire went through a list of
fourteen standardized questions that she and her colleagues
use to compile a child's family history and to complete
an assessment.
¶11
In response to Longmire's questions, Frazee described how
he and Berreth met, and he provided context and background on
their relationship. He also
7
provided background information on himself, his upbringing,
his family, and his childhood, as well as some information on
Berreth's relationship with his family. ¶12 In
addition, although Berreth was, in fact, deceased by the time
of this meeting, Frazee told Longmire where Berreth was
living, and he noted that he was not living with her at that
time. He then described the custody arrangement that he and
Berreth had concerning the child, noting that it was a
"split custody" arrangement, which was a
then-recent change from their initial arrangement, in which
Frazee had had the child during the day while Berreth worked.
¶13
The conversation next turned to the Thanksgiving 2018 time
frame, when Berreth went missing. Longmire explained that she
wanted to discuss that period in order to determine where the
child was, particularly during the time of Berreth's
disappearance. This was relevant to the allegation that the
child had been exposed to an injurious environment or to
violence. Accordingly, Longmire wanted to know the timeline
of events involving the child during those several days.
¶14
Frazee explained that he had the child with him the day
before Thanksgiving and that he was to return the child to
Berreth that day. For several reasons, however, the exchange
was delayed, and Frazee ultimately returned the child to
Berreth late that evening. The child was to spend
Thanksgiving morning with Berreth and Thanksgiving afternoon
with Frazee, and in accordance with this plan, Frazee picked
up the child on Thanksgiving and took her with him to do
8
some work, which was not atypical. Thereafter, they went to
Frazee's mother's house for Thanksgiving dinner, and
they stayed there through the evening.
¶15
Frazee then told Longmire that on the Friday after
Thanksgiving, he had several communications with Berreth
regarding the exchange of the child. According to Frazee,
Berreth told him that she needed to sort some things out, and
she asked him to keep the child that day, which he did.
¶16
Frazee claimed that he had telephone calls or exchanged text
messages with Berreth the next day (Saturday) and that
Berreth again asked him to keep the child. Frazee told
Longmire that during a conversation that day, Berreth
"lost it," and, thus, Frazee wanted to keep the
child "until the storm blew over."
¶17
Frazee further told Longmire that he spoke with Berreth the
following day (Sunday), and he and Berreth discussed where
their relationship was going. Frazee indicated that they
agreed that Frazee would continue to keep the child with him,
and he again took her to work. Frazee then noted that he and
Berreth exchanged several texts that day, after which he was
unable to get a hold of her. Frazee's description of the
timeline ended with Frazee indicating that he spoke with
Berreth's mother on December 2 and that she said that she
had not been able to reach Berreth. Frazee responded that
Berreth needed her space.
¶18
The meeting between Longmire and Frazee lasted between sixty
and ninety minutes. Longmire described the meeting as
professional, and she noted that
9
Frazee was cooperative and provided a lot of information
about the child. At no time during the meeting did Longmire
confront Frazee about anything. In her view, she had no
information with which to do so.
¶19
After the meeting ended, Longmire documented what she had
learned in a Referral/Assessment Summary. Pursuant to a
release that Frazee had signed during one of Longmire's
two meetings with him, Longmire shared her assessment
documentation with both the district attorney's and
public defender's offices.
¶20
The criminal case against Frazee proceeded, and prior to
trial, the People endorsed Longmire as a witness. Thereafter,
Frazee moved to suppress all of the statements that he had
made to Longmire at his December 26 meeting with her, arguing
that the meeting was a custodial interrogation conducted
without the requisite Miranda warnings. Frazee thus
asserted that the admission of his statements to Longmire
would violate his constitutional rights.
¶21
The trial court subsequently conducted an evidentiary hearing
on Frazee's motion. At this hearing, Longmire testified
to the conversations described above. ¶22 A few days
later, the court issued a written order denying Frazee's
motion. In support of its ruling, the court began by
explaining that Miranda is inapplicable unless the
suspect is in custody and the statement at issue was the
product of a police interrogation. The court next observed
that the facts that Frazee was
10
incarcerated and that the meeting with Longmire took place at
the county jail did not necessarily mean that Frazee was in
custody. Rather, the court noted that in People v.
Denison , 918 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Colo. 1996), People v.
J.D. , 989 P.2d 762, 768 (Colo. 1999), and People v.
Parsons , 15 P.3d 799, 801-02 (Colo.App. 2000), this
court and a division of the court of appeals described the
factors that courts should consider in determining whether an
inmate, who is already in custody, has been further
restricted so as to establish custody for Miranda
purposes. The court then opined that, by its terms,
Miranda applies only to actions of law enforcement
officials, and the court noted the statutory duties imposed
on state human services departments to investigate and act in
circumstances like those present here to ensure that the
needs of the child are satisfied and to keep the court and
the parents apprised as to the status of the matter.
¶23
Applying these principles to the case before it, the court
found that Longmire was not a police officer, a peace
officer, or a law enforcement officer. To the contrary, her
actions in this case were consistent with her duties under
the Children's Code, and because a court had placed legal
custody of the child with the Department, she was required by
law to investigate the matter and to make a recommendation to
the court regarding child placement. As a result, in the
court's view, Longmire was not acting as an agent of law
enforcement but, in fact, was acting independently of law
enforcement. In addition, the court found that
11
although Frazee was in jail, no custodial interrogation had
taken place. Based on these findings, the court concluded
that Longmire had no legal duty to provide Frazee with a
Miranda advisement or warning.
¶24
The case proceeded to a jury trial at which Longmire
testified regarding her meetings with Frazee. The jury
ultimately found Frazee guilty of first degree murder after
deliberation, felony murder, three counts of solicitation to
commit first degree murder, and tampering with a deceased
human body.
¶25
Frazee then appealed, contending, among other things, that
the trial court had erred in admitting Longmire's
testimony. People v. Frazee , No. 20CA35,
¶¶ 1, 38 (Dec. 29, 2022). Specifically, he argued
that suppression of his statements to Longmire was required
because he had made those statements during a custodial
interrogation that Longmire conducted without first providing
him with Miranda warnings. Id. at ¶
38.
¶26
In a unanimous, unpublished decision, the division disagreed
and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Id. at
¶¶ 1, 38-52, 115. In so ruling, the division agreed
with the trial court that Frazee was not in custody for
Miranda purposes during Longmire's meeting with
him. Id. at ¶ 45. Accordingly, the division did
not need to consider whether Longmire was acting as an agent
of law enforcement during the meeting. Id.
12
¶27
Frazee then petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari,
and we granted his petition.
II.
Analysis
¶28
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review
and Miranda 's requirements, particularly with
regard to when a person other than a law enforcement officer
conducts a custodial interrogation. We then apply those
principles to the facts now before us.
A.
Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles
¶29
Our review of a trial court's order regarding a
suppression motion involves a mixed question of fact and law.
Densmore , ¶ 27. We defer to the court's
factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence
in the record, but we review its legal conclusions de novo.
Id. Our review of a trial court's ruling on a
suppression motion is limited to the record created at the
hearing on that motion. Id.
¶30
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals from compelled self-incrimination. U.S.
Const. amend. V. To safeguard this right, Miranda ,
384 U.S. at 478-79 , requires that when an individual is
subjected to a custodial interrogation, the interrogator must
advise the individual that (1) they have the right to remain
silent; (2) anything they say can be used against them in a
court of law; (3) they have the right to an attorney's
presence; and (4) if they
13
cannot afford an attorney, then one will be appointed for
them prior to any questioning if they so desire. Absent an
exception to this rule, unwarned statements made during a
custodial interrogation are presumed to be compelled and are
inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief.
Verigan v. People , 2018 CO 53, ¶ 19 , 420 P.3d
247, 251 .
¶31
In Densmore , ¶ 29, which involved a nearly
identical issue to that now before us, we explained that
although Miranda typically applies to law
enforcement officers conducting custodial interrogations, it
also applies to non-law enforcement officers acting as agents
of law enforcement. We further explained that to determine
whether a non-law enforcement officer is acting as an agent
of law enforcement in conducting a custodial interrogation,
courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including
both objective and subjective factors. Id. at
¶¶ 29, 33. And we provided a nonexclusive list of
factors that courts may consider in determining whether a
person, such as a Department of Human Services caseworker,
was acting as an agent of law enforcement. Id. at
¶¶ 30-32. Such factors include the caseworker's
duty to investigate and interview people who may be
incarcerated; her authority to apprehend, handcuff, and
detain others; her access to police reports and whether she
reviewed any police reports before the interrogation at
issue; her duty to report information that she learned; her
job duties and the purposes of those duties; whether she was
under contract with and
14
paid by the state to perform these duties; whether she
investigates crimes; whether her purpose was to obtain
incriminating information; whether the police directed,
controlled, or participated in her investigation or provided
input regarding the questions she should ask the person to be
interviewed; and the extent of the investigator's contact
with law enforcement officers before she began her
investigation. Id.
¶32
Those same principles apply here, and with these principles
in mind, we turn to the facts of this case.
B.
Application
¶33
Applying the above-described factors, we conclude that
Longmire was not acting either as a law enforcement officer
or as an agent of law enforcement when she spoke with Frazee.
Accordingly, she was not required to provide him with
Miranda warnings before asking him questions.
¶34
Specifically, evidence in the record of the suppression
hearing established that Longmire was not a law enforcement
officer, and she had no law enforcement training. Moreover,
the police did not ask Longmire to meet with Frazee, and she
did not advise them that she was doing so. And Longmire did
not have access to any police reports or files, although
before she met with Frazee, the police had shared with her
their belief as to what had happened, albeit without
providing details.
15
¶35
When Longmire then met with Frazee, she did not have the
authority to apprehend, detain, or handcuff him, and he was
not restrained during his meeting with her. In addition,
Frazee could have left at any time, and Longmire advised him
at the outset of the meeting that he was free to decline to
answer any of her questions, given the circumstances. And no
law enforcement officers directed the meeting or scripted the
questions that Longmire asked. Indeed, no law enforcement
officers participated in or were even present for the
meeting.
¶36
Finally, as in Densmore , ¶ 36, Longmire's
purpose for the interview was not to uncover violations of
law, to develop evidence in a criminal case, or to enforce
criminal law. Rather, her purpose was to learn about the
child's needs, development, and relationships so that she
could place the child in an appropriate home and ensure her
safety. The fact that Longmire ultimately shared her
assessment with the district attorney's and public
defender's offices did not change this fundamental
purpose of her meeting with Frazee. See id. Nor is
it dispositive that Longmire was paid by the state. She had a
statutory duty to investigate matters related to the child
and to report certain information. In doing so, she was not
performing a law enforcement function.
¶37
Considering all of these factors in their totality, we
conclude, as did the trial court with ample record support,
that Longmire was not acting either as a law enforcement
officer or as an agent of law enforcement when she met with
Frazee.
16
Accordingly, she had no obligation to provide Frazee with
Miranda warnings prior to speaking with him.
¶38
In so concluding, and for the reasons set forth in
Densmore , ¶ 32, we decline to adopt
Frazee's proposed bright-line rule that Miranda
should apply whenever a caseworker conducts a custodial
interrogation that involves current or unsolved allegations
that a reasonable caseworker should know are criminal. As we
said in Densmore , such a rule would, as a practical
matter, cover most child welfare interviews that caseworkers
conduct of parents in custody, regardless of the
circumstances of a particular case, and Frazee has offered no
persuasive reason for extending Miranda to custodial
interrogations conducted by people who are neither law
enforcement officers nor agents of law enforcement. See
id.
¶39
We likewise are unpersuaded by Frazee's focus on the
facts that the police made the initial referral; before
Longmire met with Frazee, law enforcement officers had told
her what they believed had occurred; and Longmire knew that
Frazee was the subject of an active criminal investigation at
the time she met with him.
¶40
As to the referral, this is simply one way that a dependency
and neglect proceeding begins. See §
19-3-501(1), C.R.S. (2024) (authorizing law enforcement
officers to refer dependency and neglect matters to the
court, which may then designate a county department of human
services to conduct an investigation).
17
¶41
As to the facts that Longmire obtained some information
before speaking with Frazee and was aware that an active
criminal investigation was ongoing, we decline to conclude
that a caseworker's attempt to educate herself about a
case before she conducts her investigation, in and of itself,
renders her an agent of law enforcement. Rather, as noted
above, courts must consider the totality of the
circumstances, and the fact that Longmire obtained
information before meeting with Frazee, including that he was
the subject of a criminal investigation, does not override
the myriad factors described above establishing that Longmire
was not acting either as a law enforcement officer or as an
agent of law enforcement when she spoke with Frazee.
¶42
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Frazee's contention that
law enforcement officers provided Longmire with a list of
questions to ask Frazee. Although the division below appears
to have accepted Frazee's assertion that Longmire took
notes on a form provided by the district attorney's
office, see Frazee , ¶ 44, in our view, and with
respect, the record demonstrates otherwise. Specifically, as
noted above, Longmire used a standardized list of fourteen
questions that the Department employs during such interviews,
and the People introduced into evidence at the suppression
hearing a blank form containing these standardized questions.
The portion of the transcript on which Frazee relies
establishes nothing more than that when Longmire could not
remember a detail during her testimony,
18
the People refreshed her recollection with the assessment
summary that she had provided to law enforcement . At
no point did Longmire or the prosecutor state that the
district attorney's office had created the assessment
form that Longmire was to use. Nor do we perceive anything in
the record to support an allegation that law enforcement
officials provided such a form to Longmire prior to her
meeting with Frazee.
III.
Conclusion
¶43
For these reasons, we conclude that Longmire did not act
either as a law enforcement officer or as an agent of law
enforcement when she met with Frazee. Accordingly, she had no
obligation to provide Frazee with Miranda warnings
before speaking with him. In light of the foregoing, we need
not reach the question of whether Frazee was in custody for
Miranda purposes.
¶44
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the division below,
albeit on different grounds.