Robinson v. Clark

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

WALLACE ROBINSON PLAINTIFF

ADC #169328

v. No: 4:21-cv-00674 KGB-PSH

ADAM CLARK, et al. DEFENDANTS

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to Chief United States District

Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written objections to all or part of this

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you

may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

DISPOSITION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Wallace T. Robinson Sr., an Arkansas Division of Corrections

(ADC) inmate, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 27,

2021 (Doc. No. 1). He filed an amended complaint on November 4, 2021 (Doc. No.

11), alleging that he was attacked by multiple inmates at the ADC’s Tucker Unit on

February 9, 2021, as a result of understaffing, lack of security, and Officer Myvon1

Taylor’s failure to correctly perform his job. Id. at 4-5. Robinson further alleges

that Chief of Security Major Adam Clark, Deputy Warden Emmer Branch, and

Warden Thomas Hurst knew about the unsafe conditions in the Tucker Unit and

failed to adequately train Taylor. Id. Robinson alleges he suffered significant

injuries as a result of the attack. Id. at 4 & 6. Some of Robinson’s claims have been

dismissed; his pending claims are against defendants Clark, Branch, Hurst, and

Taylor in their individual capacities for failing to protect him from the February 9,

2021 attack.2 See Doc. No. 46.

Defendants Clark, Branch, and Hurst (the “ADC Defendants”) have filed a

motion for summary judgment, a brief-in-support, and a statement of undisputed

material facts (Doc. Nos. 117-119). Robinson filed a response to the ADC

Defendants’ statement of undisputed facts (Doc. No. 126). For the reasons described

herein, the undersigned recommends that the ADC Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment be granted and Robinson’s claims against them be dismissed with

prejudice. Additionally, because the evidence provided by the ADC Defendants

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to correct the spelling of defendant Taylor’s first

name on the docket sheet for this case.

2 Defendant Myvon Taylor filed a pro se Answer on April 18, 2022 (Doc. No. 39).

applies equally to defendant Taylor, the Court recommends that Robinson’s claims

against Taylor also be dismissed with prejudice.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV.

P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must

demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations

must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations

omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must

be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including

those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials . . .”. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact

is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is

genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict

for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.

Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes

that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude

summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th

Cir. 2010).

III. Robinson’s Complaint Allegations

Robinson alleges that he was assaulted by multiple inmates on February 9,

2021, because there was only one officer on duty in his barracks, and that officer,

Myvon Taylor, failed to properly perform his job duties. Doc. No. 11 at 5.

Regarding the unsafe conditions at the Tucker Unit, Robinson further alleges:

[Officer Taylor] never entered the barracks and made any security

rounds as policy requires. The security camera had been covered up

days prior to this incident. I am a class 1 inmate and was left in a class

4 barracks which was overcrowded, known for high rate of violence

and understaffed, when all of the class 2 inmates were moved prior to

filling the barrack with class 4 inmates. There was one officer during

nights watching 4 different barracks which held 50-60 inmates apiece.

These open dormitory barracks 3&4 have been understaffed and had

high violence rates for almost a year or longer. The 200+ inmates in

barracks 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B open dormitories often rely on a single

officer to secure their safety, even though he can’t enter the barracks

alone due to his safety and the fact that he holds the keys to all 4

barracks. . . .

Id. He also alleges that

Thomas Hurst, Emmer Branch, and Adam Clark had knowledge of

these issues regarding open dormitories being overcrow[d]ed,

understaffed, and having a high propensity for violence. Their failure

to respond caused a breach of security and lack of security, which put

inmates and officers health and safety at risk of harm. Records will

show the barracks 3&4 were known for their high rate of violence, and

that the Wardens and Chief of Security created a custom or practice of

housing inmates in 3&4 barracks in a dangerous environment. Hurst,

Branch and Clark consciously disregarded the risk by allowing only one

officer with little experience to supervise 4 overcrowded, high

propensity for violence barracks with over 200 inmates. Their failure

to abide by staffing requirements created an environment which posed

a risk of harm. . . .

Id. at 5-6.

IV. Undisputed Material Facts3

Robinson was housed in the 3A barracks of the ADC’s Tucker Unit from

December 14, 2020, through February 9, 2021. Doc. No. 117-1, Pen Pack of

Wallace Robinson, at 3. There was no one listed on Wallace Robinson’s Enemy

Alert list prior to February 9, 2021. Doc. No. 117-2, Transcript of Wallace

Robinson’s Deposition Testimony (“Wallace Deposition”), at 25:9-10. On February

3 Unless otherwise noted, these material facts are taken from the ADC Defendants’

statement of undisputed facts (Doc. No. 118) and the exhibits attached to their motion for

summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 117-1 – 117-10). In his response to those facts (Doc. No.

126), Robinson claimed no knowledge as to some facts, but did not dispute any material

facts. Opinions, legal conclusions, and immaterial facts are omitted.

9, 2021, Robinson was attacked by inmates Traveles Bullard and Eric Booker.4 Doc.

No. 117-8, Complete Incident Report (“Incident Report”), at 1. The attack lasted

twenty seconds or less. Robinson Deposition at 62:3-9. Robinson had no reason to

suspect an attack from anyone, nor could he identify a motive for the attack. Id. at

25:6-16. Robinson had never spoken to Hurst or Branch prior to this attack. Id. at

68:16-20. And Robinson did not report any kind of threat to defendant Clark prior

to this incident. Id. at 63:23-25. Defendants Hurst, Branch, and Clark were not

present when this incident took place. Id. at 64:8 – 65:7.

At 4:25 a.m., Lieutenant Daryl Morris was notified that Robinson needed

medical treatment. Incident Report at 1. Robinson was seen by a nurse on February

9, 2021, at approximately 4:43 a.m. Doc. No. 117-7, Medical Report (“Medical

Report”), at 1. When asked what happened, Robinson stated “I don’t know.” He

sustained four puncture wounds to his backside, each measuring 2-3mm in diameter.

Id.; see also Doc. No. 117-6, Photos of Wallace Robinson. The nurse who treated

Robinson noted: “Ambulatory into infirmary without distress noted. Alert and

oriented but quiet and difficult to get pt. to answer questions concerning incident. Pt.

did not appear injured upon arrival but blood noted to shirt.” Medical Report at 1.

Robinson was treated for his injuries, placed in protective housing, and transferred

4 Bullard had been in 3A barracks since December 14, 2020, and Booker had been

there since January 26, 2021. Doc. No. 117-3, Declaration of Thomas Hurst (“Hurst

Declaration”), at ¶¶ 9-10.

to Delta Regional Unit on March 25, 2021. Doc. No. 117-3, Declaration of Thomas

Hurst (“Hurst Declaration”), at ¶ 16.

Clark, who worked as Chief of Security, investigated this incident. Incident

Report at 1; see also Doc. No. 117-5, Declaration of Adam Clark (“Clark

Declaration”), at ¶ 7. He spoke to several inmates assigned to 3A barracks and

received confidential oral and written statements. Incident Report, at 1; Clark

Declaration at ¶ 7. As a result of this investigation, Clark determined that inmates

Bullard and Booker were the ones responsible for the assault on Robinson. Id.

Clark’s investigation concluded on February 17, 2021. Id. Inmates Bullard and

Booker were both charged with major disciplinary violations. Id.

Defendant Taylor was the correctional officer assigned to monitor 3 and 4

barracks (Zone 2) at the time of the incident. Hurst Declaration at ¶ 7. Taylor’s 005

report on the incident states:

Approx. 5:255 AM on 02/09/21, I, Cpl. Taylor was at 4 barracks doing

a visual security check. I, Cpl. Taylor heard a loud bang on the window.

It was Inmate Wallace #169328A asking to go to the Infirmary. He had

blood in his mouth and on shirt. I, Cpl. Taylor called for Lt. Morris to

let him know that Inmate Wallace was in route to the Infirmary. I ask

the rest of the barracks what happen nobody didn’t know anything. End

of Statement.

5 All other documentation indicates the attack occurred at 4:25 a.m. The specific

time of the attack is not material.

Incident Report at 8. Taylor mentions nothing about the incident in his Officer

Activity Report.6 Doc. No. 117-9, Officer Activity Reports of Brewer and Taylor, at

3. He made entries at 4:00 a.m. (“Unit Count Time Start”), 4:08 a.m. (“Unit Count

Time Clear”) and 4:31 a.m. (“Visual Security Check Appear All Secure”). Doc. No.

117-9, Officer Activity Reports of Brewer and Taylor, at 3. According to Robinson,

Taylor was guarding 200 inmates in four different areas (3A, 3B, 4A and 4B

barracks) at the time of the incident. Robinson Deposition at 16:17-19. Robinson

also testified that Taylor was a new officer whom he did not know. Id. at 15:16-25

– 16:1-7, 17:3-5. After he was stabbed, he could not find Taylor in the control booths

for 3 or 4 barracks, but Taylor eventually returned and asked Robinson what he

needed, and then allowed Robinson to leave for the infirmary. Id. at 18:5-23.

In February of 2021, Covid-19 had a major impact on ADC facilities,

including the Tucker Unit. Doc. No. 139, Declaration of Emmer Branch (“Branch

Declaration”), ¶ 4. Robinson acknowledges this but states it has no bearing on his

case. Doc. No. 126 at ¶ 21. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Tucker Unit was

understaffed due to illness and open vacancies. Branch Declaration at ¶ 5. To

combat the staffing shortages, overtime hours were approved for security staff.

6 Per post orders, Taylor should have included a note about the attack. Hurst

Declaration at ¶ 14. Taylor was fired a couple of weeks after this incident for

introducing contraband into the facility. Robinson Deposition at 33:23-25; Hurst

Declaration at ¶ 15.

Additionally, other ADC units assisted by sending available staff members. Branch

Declaration at ¶ 6. The management team would assist with holding security until

relief security personnel arrived. Id. According to Branch, personnel occasionally

had to make security rounds for multiple barracks due to the pandemic. Branch

Declaration at ¶ 7.

Each post is assigned post orders, and the correctional staff must read and

document in their security log that they have read and understood their post orders.

During the daily shift briefing, policies are reviewed along with the schedule for the

shift, and any other issues or concerns are addressed. The briefing is covered by the

lieutenant and shift commander. Branch Declaration at ¶ 8. Correctional officers

must visually inspect any barracks they are assigned to and write notes in an activity

report with no more than 40 minutes elapsing between entries. Branch Declaration

at ¶ 9. Nothing in the logs from the previous 3A barracks shift or Taylor’s shift

indicated any faulty camera equipment. Clark Deposition at ¶ 12. Robinson also

testified that he did not inform Taylor or any other officer that the camera had been

covered up. Robinson Deposition at 46:3-9.

V. Analysis

A. The ADC Defendants

The ADC Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity with

respect to Robinson’s claims. Qualified immunity protects government officials

from liability for damages “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their

positions] would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity is a question of law and is appropriately resolved on summary

judgment. McClendon v. Story County Sheriff’s Office, 403 F.3d 510, 515 (8th Cir.

2005); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). To determine whether a

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider two questions:

(1) do the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional or

statutory right; and (2) if so, was that right clearly established at the time of the

defendant’s alleged misconduct. Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th

Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound discretion in deciding which of the

two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of

the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009). In this case, the Court finds that Robinson fails to establish a

constitutional violation, as explained below.

An inmate has a constitutional right to be free from attacks by others. See

Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1994). To succeed on a failure-to-

protect claim, Robinson must show that there was a substantial risk of serious harm

to him and that defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk. See Irving v.

Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 447 (8th Cir. 2008). Specifically,

This claim has an objective component, whether there was a substantial

risk of serious harm to the inmate, and a subjective component, whether

the prison official was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Curry v.

Crist, 226 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2000). To be liable, “the official must

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128

L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). . . .

Vandevender v. Sass, 970 F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 2020). The Eighth Circuit Court

of Appeals has recognized that prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity

when an inmate is attacked by surprise. See Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041,

1047-49 (8th Cir. 2010); Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1001 (8th Cir. 2002); Curry

v. Crist, 226 F.3d at 979; Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d at 1151; Prosser v. Ross, 70

F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500, 502 (8th Cir.

1990).

Robinson acknowledges in his deposition that the February 9, 2021 attack was

a surprise attack. Specifically, he had no reason to expect to be attacked, had no one

on his enemy alert list at the time, had never spoken to Hurst or Branch before, and

had not spoken to Clark about any fear of attacks. Robinson Deposition at 25:6-16,

68:18-20, 69:6-9. He also testified that Hurst, Branch, and Clark were not present

at the time of the attack. Id. at 64:8 – 65:7. There is no dispute that Robinson was

attacked by surprise and that none of the ADC Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to any risk of harm he faced from his attackers.

Robinson claims, however, that the ADC Defendants were aware of, but failed

to correct, inadequate staffing in a violent barracks with faulty cameras. See Doc.

No. 11 at 5-6. He claims that had the facility been staffed correctly with working

cameras, the attack would not have occurred. Allegations of understaffing may

support a constitutional claim if conditions are unsafe and defendants are aware of,

but deliberately indifferent to, those unsafe conditions. See Patterson v. Kelley, 902

F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2018) (plaintiff’s allegations of understaffing and prison

officials’ routine failure to conduct security checks does not establish deliberate

indifference where “the record is devoid of evidence suggesting that any of the

defendants were subjectively aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, a substantial

risk of harm to inmate safety.”); Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 2002)

(finding no evidence in the record demonstrating that defendants “knew of and

deliberately disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”); Crow v.

Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (8th Cir. 2005) (overruled in part on other grounds

by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (“Even if [actions taken to address jail

overcrowding] were unreasonable, and [jail officials] might have done various

things to prevent the blow [plaintiff] endured, ‘reasonableness is a negligence

standard’ and negligence cannot give rise to an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect

claim.”).

The ADC Defendants acknowledge that at the time of the attack on Robinson,

there were some staffing shortages due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that cameras

could not be monitored around the clock. See Branch Declaration at ¶¶ 4-6; Clark

Declaration at ¶ 14. They explain, however, that they took specific steps in an effort

to obtain adequate staffing, including approving overtime hours and re-assigning

staff from other ADC units. See Branch Declaration at ¶¶ 6-7. Robinson does not

dispute this evidence. And while Robinson claims his barracks had a high rate of

violence at the time of the attack which the ADC Defendants knew about but failed

to correct, he has not come forward with any evidence to support his conclusory

claims.7 And even more importantly, he has produced no evidence that the ADC

Defendants were aware of any unsafe conditions caused by understaffing. He

acknowledges he never spoke to Hurst or Branch, and that he expressed no fears to

Clark. As such, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the ADC Defendants’

deliberate indifference to unsafe conditions due to understaffing, and Robinsons’

claims against them should be dismissed with prejudice.

7 A plaintiff’s unsupported statement is insufficient to defeat a properly supported

motion for summary judgment. See Conseco Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 F.3d 902, 909

(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Flentje v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 340 Ark. 563, 11 S.W.3d

531 (2000) (“When the movant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to a summary

judgment, the respondent must discard the shielding cloak of formal allegations and meet

proof with proof by showing a genuine issue as to a material fact.”).

B. Defendant Taylor

Taylor filed a letter on April 18, 2022, which was docketed as his answer to

Robinson’s complaint. Doc. No. 39. Mail sent to the address he provided has since

been returned undeliverable. Despite Taylor’s failure to zealously defend this case,

the Court recommends that Robinson’s claims against him also be dismissed with

prejudice because the evidence produced by the ADC Defendants, including

Robinson’s deposition testimony, shows that Taylor is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Angelo Iafrate Constr. LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc. 370 F.3d 715,

722 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “if an answering party asserts a defense on the

merits that equally applies to the other defendant, the success of the defense operates

as a discharge to all the defendants”).8

Robinson testified that he was attacked by surprise on February 9, 2021, and

that the attack lasted approximately 20 seconds. See Robinson Deposition at 25, 62.

According to Taylor’s incident report, he was doing checks in 4 barracks when he

heard Robinson banging on the control booth door after the attack. Incident Report

8 See also Owens/Mitchell v. Burl, Case No. 4:14CV00126 DPM (E.D. Ark. May 7,

2014) (unpublished opinion) (holding, in a prisoner § 1983 action, that the “non-moving

Defendants” were entitled to dismissal based on a statute of limitations defense that was

raised by other defendants), aff’d without comment, 2014 WL 1820639 (8th Cir. Sept. 29,

2014) (unpublished decision); Universal Cooperatives Inc. v. AAC Flying Serv. Inc., No.

4:11-CV-304-DPM, 2012 WL 1019582, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2012) (“But [plaintiff’s]

claims against all the [defendants] are the same in their essentials and in their failings as a

matter of law. A plaintiff may not, in these circumstances, take a default judgment against

one defendant, thereby producing inconsistent judgments on identical claims.”), aff’d, 710

F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2013).

at 8. This is consistent with Robinson’s testimony. See Robinson Deposition at 18.

Due to the surprise nature of the attack and how rapidly it occurred, Taylor could

not have intervened in time to stop the attack unless he happened to be present at

that very moment. This evidence does not support a finding of deliberate

indifference. Even if Taylor were not making rounds and visually inspecting all the

barracks as Robinson alleges, that would amount to negligence at most. See Tucker

v. Evans, 276 at 1002 (holding that a guard’s alleged failure to properly inspect or

supervise barracks amounted to negligence at most); Crow v. Montgomery, supra

(explaining that intentional conduct, rather than negligence, is required to sustain a

§ 1983 claim). Given these undisputed facts, Robinson’s claims against Taylor

should be dismissed with prejudice.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the ADC

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 117) be granted and

Robinson’s claims against them be dismissed with prejudice. Robinson’s claims

against Taylor should also be dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this 10th day of February, 2025.

SATE RS OREO