Hamilton v. Tennessee Department of Correction

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DAVID HAMILTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. 3:24-cv-00725

v. ) Judge Trauger

)

TENNESEE DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David Hamilton, (“the plaintiff”), a state inmate incarcerated at the Riverbend Maximum

Security Institution (RMSI), has filed a pro se Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No.1) and

an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (Doc. No. 3.) He has also filed a

Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. No. 2.) The case is before the Court on the plaintiff’s IFP

application and Motion to Amend and for initial review of the Complaint under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

I. PAUPER STATUS

A prisoner bringing a civil action may be permitted to proceed as a pauper, without

prepaying the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Because it appears from the plaintiff’s submissions

that he lacks the funds to pay the entire filing fee, his IFP application (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED

and a $350 filing fee is ASSESSED.1 The fee will be collected in installments as described below.

1 Prisoners bringing civil lawsuits or appeals are “required to pay the full amount of a filing fee,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1), either in a lump sum at the time of filing or in installments over time via an assessment against

the prisoner’s inmate trust account. Where the prisoner is granted pauper status and allowed to pay in

installments, the fee is $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)–(b) & Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule, provision 14

(eff. Dec. 1, 2023).

The warden of the facility in which the plaintiff is currently housed, as custodian of his

trust account, is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, the greater of:

(a) 20% of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s credit at the jail; or (b) 20% of the

average monthly balance to the plaintiff’s credit for the six-month period immediately preceding

the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Thereafter, the custodian shall submit 20% of

the plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to the plaintiff for the preceding

month), but only when the balance in his account exceeds $10. Id. § 1915(b)(2). Payments shall

continue until the $350 filing fee has been paid in full to the Clerk of Court. Id. § 1915(b)(3).

The Clerk of Court MUST send a copy of this Order to the warden of the facility in which

the plaintiff is currently housed to ensure compliance with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

pertaining to the payment of the filing fee. If the plaintiff is transferred from his present place of

confinement, the custodian must ensure that a copy of this Order follows the plaintiff to his new

place of confinement, for continued compliance with the Order. All payments made pursuant to

this Order must be submitted to the Clerk of Court for the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

The plaintiff has filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel, (Doc. No. 2.)

The Supreme Court has held that “an indigent’s right to appointed counsel . . . exists only

where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). Thus, unlike in criminal proceedings, there is no constitutional

right to an appointed counsel in a civil action, such as this action. Willett v. Wells, 469 F. Supp.

748, 751 (E.D. Tenn. 1977), aff’d, 595 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1979); see Williamson v. Autorama,

Inc., No. 91-5759, 947 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Willett favorably). The appointment of

counsel for a civil litigant is a matter within the discretion of the district court and will occur only

under exceptional circumstances. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1993).

In support of his Motion to Appoint Counsel, the plaintiff states that he is a “common man

with no understanding of the law,” that he is unable to afford counsel, the issues in his case are

complex, and that he is unable to afford counsel. (Doc No. 2.)

The plaintiff’s circumstances as described are typical to most prisoners. See Murray v.

Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (pro se litigant); Richmond v. Settles, 450 F. App’x 448, 452-53

(6th Cir. 2011) (indigent litigant); Debow v. Bell, No. 3:10-cv-1003, 2010 WL 5211611, at *1

(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 15, 2010) (inmates are typically indigent and untrained pro se litigants).

Moreover, the plaintiff has demonstrated that he is able to prosecute his case by filing a complaint,

several attachments, and a motion for the appointment of counsel. At this time, the plaintiff has

not demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel. Thus, the

plaintiff’s motion will be denied without prejudice to renew at a later time, if appropriate.

III. INITIAL REVIEW

A. Legal Standard

In cases filed by prisoners, the Court must conduct an initial screening and dismiss the

Complaint (or any portion thereof) if it is facially frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Review under the same criteria is also

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) when the prisoner proceeds IFP.

To determine whether the Complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, the

Court reviews for whether it alleges sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face,” such that it would survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009)). At this stage, “the Court assumes the truth of ‘well-pleaded factual allegations’

and ‘reasonable inference[s]’ therefrom,” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Vullo, 602 U.S. 175, 181

(2024) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79), but is “not required to accept legal conclusions or

unwarranted factual inferences as true.” Inner City Contracting, LLC v. Charter Twp. of Northville,

Michigan, 87 F.4th 743, 749 (6th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). The Court must afford the pro se

Complaint a liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), while viewing it in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Inner City, supra.

The plaintiff filed the Complaint under Section 1983, which authorizes a federal action

against any person who, “under color of state law, deprives [another] person of rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-

Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint

must therefore plausibly allege (1) a deprivation of a constitutional or other federal right, and (2)

that the deprivation was caused by a “state actor.” Carl v. Muskegon Cnty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th

Cir. 2014).

B. Facts

The plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the South Central Correctional Facility, he

was working one day in the kitchen, when Captain Clark, not a defendant named in this lawsuit,

and the Chief of Security asked him to step outside. They accused him of fitting the description

of someone who had just committed an assault. When the plaintiff protested that he had been

working, Captain Clark informed the plaintiff that he was actually targeted because Clark

remembered the plaintiff from being in the “hole,” i.e. segregation, two years earlier. When the

plaintiff placed his hands against the wall, he claims that Defendant Perry, the warden at the South

Central Correctional Facility, punched him in the back of the head, smashing his face into the wall

and causing his face to become cut. When the plaintiff asked Perry why he was doing this,

Defendant Captain Brown pulled out her mace can. Perry allegedly ordered Brown to spray mace

on the plaintiff, which made it difficult for him to breath. The plaintiff fell to the ground where he

claims he was beaten in the ankle bone, his hair was pulled by Perry, while they sprayed mace

directly in his nostril. The plaintiff was taken to a medical exam room where he claims that

Defendant Franks and another unnamed officer or officers, pulled his pants down and sprayed

mace in his “posterior,” which this court takes to mean his buttocks. The plaintiff alleges that this

amounted to a sexual assault. The plaintiff was also beaten by these officers. The plaintiff received

zero medical attention and was spit on and berated by Brown and other officers he cannot identify

as he was escorted to the “hole.” (Doc. No. 1 at 3-4).

Upon the plaintiff’s transfer to RMSI, he reported the physical and sexual assault to the

prison authorities, but he claims that they did nothing to address his concerns. The plaintiff alleges

he was placed in an unsanitary cell with feces crammed in every window as retaliation for reporting

the assaults and the denial of medical care. He also claims that he was placed in SuperMax for four

months after reporting the incident, again in retaliation for reporting the incidents. (Doc. No. 1 at

4).

The plaintiff alleges he has sustained numerous physical injuries. (Doc. 1 at 5.)

C. Analysis

1. The Tennessee Department of Corrections must be dismissed from the suit.

The complaint must be dismissed against the Tennessee Department of Corrections

(TDOC), because it is an agency of the State of Tennessee and is immune under the Eleventh

Amendment from being sued. Wingo v. Tennessee Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 454 (6th Cir.

2012); see also Vick v. Core Civic, 329 F. Supp. 3d 426, 450 (M.D. Tenn. 2018). The plaintiff’s

claim for money damages against the TDOC must be dismissed.

2. The suit must be dismissed against the Corrections Corporation of America.

The plaintiff has sued the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”) because the CCA

runs the South Central Correctional Facility. However, the plaintiff does not allege that the CCA

had a policy of encouraging prison authorities to physically or sexually assault inmates, deny them

medical care, or retaliate against them for exercising their rights.

A plaintiff must allege the personal involvement of a defendant to state a civil rights claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978)

(Section 1983 liability cannot be based upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious or

supervisory liability); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009)(same); see also Taylor

v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff must allege facts

showing that the defendant participated, condoned, encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in

alleged misconduct to establish liability).

A private corporation like CCA “that performs the traditional state function of operating a

prison acts under color of state law for purposes of § 1983.” Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419

F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir.

1996)). “However, CCA cannot be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. The

plaintiff makes no allegation that CCA was involved in the deprivation of his constitutional rights

or had a policy or custom of encouraging these deprivations. The Corrections Corporation of

America is dismissed from the lawsuit.

3. The plaintiff has stated a claim against the remaining defendants.

The plaintiff alleges that Defendants Perry, Brown, Franks, and unknown officers

subjected him to excessive force by beating him or spraying him with mace.

A colorable Eighth Amendment claim for the use of excessive force contains both an

objective and subjective component. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). The objective component requires the plaintiff to demonstrate

that he has been subjected to specific deprivations that are so serious that they deny him “the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981);

see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1992). For a successful excessive force claim, the

objective component requires that the pain inflicted be serious. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8–9. The

subjective component of an excessive force requires that the defendant act with deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s health or safety. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03. In an excessive-force

claim, the subjective component requires the plaintiff to show that the defendants acted

“‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,’” rather than “‘in a good faith

effort to maintain or restore discipline.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475

U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986)). The plaintiff’s allegations, if true, make out a colorable claim for

excessive force.

The plaintiff also claims that the act by Defendant Franks and other unnamed guards in

removing his pants and spraying him with mace in the buttocks amounts to a sexual assault.

“Federal courts have long held that sexual abuse is sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth

Amendment. This is true whether the sexual abuse is perpetrated by other inmates…or by guards.”

Rafferty v. Trumbull Cnty., Ohio, 915 F.3d 1087, 1095 (6th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff’s allegation

that Franks and other guards removed his pants and sprayed mace in or on his buttocks, if true,

states a claim for relief. The plaintiff alleges he was denied medical care for his injuries.

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires prison officials to provide

adequate medical care to prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Brooks v.

Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Amendment prohibition against unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain is violated when there is deliberate indifference to the serious medical

needs of an inmate. Hicks v. Grey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1454-1455 (6th Cir. 1993). To state a claim for

a violation of this right, the plaintiff must allege that: (1) he had a sufficiently serious medical

need; and (2) a defendant “acted deliberately (not accidentally), [and] also recklessly in the face

of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.”

Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., Ky., 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted). The plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied medical care, if true, state a claim

for relief.

The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants retaliated against him for reporting the assault

and denial of medical care by placing him in an unsanitary cell and by sending him to SuperMax

after he arrived at RMSI.

Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his constitutional rights violates the

Constitution. see Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to

set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged

in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least

in part, by the protected conduct. Id. The plaintiff, however, has not identified the defendants

involved with this action. The court will give the plaintiff additional time to identify these

defendants. (See below).

III. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

As discussed above, the plaintiff has stated nonfrivolous claims against Defendants Grady

Perry, James Franks, and f/n/u Brown. Accordingly, the Clerk is INSTRUCTED to send the

plaintiff a service packet (blank summons and USM 285 form) for each of those Defendants.

The plaintiff MUST complete the service packets and return them to the Clerk’s Office

within 30 DAYS of the date of this Order. Upon return of the completed service packets,

PROCESS SHALL ISSUE.

As to the unnamed Defendants, process cannot be served upon unidentified individuals.

Therefore, the plaintiff MUST exercise due diligence and conduct a reasonable investigation to

promptly determine the full names of these Defendants so that process can be timely served under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). The plaintiff MUST then file a motion to amend the

Complaint to name the Defendants.

Defendants the Tennessee Department of Corrections and Corrections Corporation of

America are DISMISSED from this action.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. No. 2) is DENIED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

The Court’s determination that the Complaint states a colorable claim for purposes of this

initial screening does not preclude the Court from dismissing any claim at any time for the reasons

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude any Defendant from filing a motion to

dismiss any claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

This action is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the

management of the case, to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions under 28

U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary, under Rule 72(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.

It is so ORDERED. Uy

Aleta A. Trauger

United States District Judge

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