The opinion
M.N. v Presbyterian Church (USA)
2025 NY Slip Op 30431(U)
January 31, 2025
Supreme Court, New York County
Docket Number: Index No. 950467/2021
Judge: Hasa A. Kingo
Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip
Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York
State and local government sources, including the New
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This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official
publication.
INDEX NO. 950467/2021
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 133 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/31/2025
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
PRESENT: HON. HASA A. KINGO PART 5M
Justice
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 950467/2021
M. N.,
MOTION DATE 04/29/2024
Plaintiff,
MOTION SEQ. NO. 006
-v-
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA), SYNOD OF
NORTHEAST OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH,
PRESBYTERY OF NEW YORK CITY, CHURCH OF THE DECISION + ORDER ON
MASTER, YOUNG LIFE, YOUNG LIFE NEW YORK CITY, MOTION
DOES 1-10
Defendant.
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The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 006) 104, 105, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129,
130
were read on this motion to/for DISMISS .
Defendant, Presbytery of New York City (“Defendant”), moves to dismiss Plaintiff M.N.’s
(“Plaintiff”) complaint pursuant to CPLR §§ 3211(a)(5) and (7), arguing that Plaintiff’s claims are
time-barred, fail to state a cause of action, and that an extension of time for service under CPLR §
306-b is unwarranted. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that the Child Victims Act (“CVA”)
provides a legislative mechanism for addressing decades-old claims of child sexual abuse and that
Defendant’s motion improperly seeks to evade liability based on procedural technicalities rather
than substantive adjudication on the merits.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action on July 4, 2021, pursuant to CPLR § 214-g, alleging that
between 1967 and 1970, he was sexually abused by Leroy Oatis, a basketball coach affiliated with
Defendants. The abuse allegedly occurred within the context of Plaintiff’s participation in a
basketball league sponsored by Defendants. Plaintiff asserts claims of negligent hiring,
supervision, and retention, alleging that Defendants knew or should have known of Oatis’
predatory conduct but failed to act.
Following the expiration of the statutory revival window under the CVA on August 14,
2021, Plaintiff encountered difficulties effecting service. Service was purportedly completed on
January 17, 2024, prompting Defendant to move for dismissal, asserting that the delay in service
warranted dismissal under CPLR § 306-b and that the action was untimely under CPLR §
3211(a)(5). Defendant further contends that Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a cause of action
for negligence under CPLR § 3211(a)(7).
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ARGUMENTS
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve within the statutory 120-day period
after filing the complaint, coupled with an extended delay of more than two years, precludes relief
under CPLR § 306-b. Defendant relies on Estate of Jervis v Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assn., 279
AD2d 367 (1st Dept 2001), and Cruz-Guzman v. 2380-2386 Grand Ave, LLC, 137 AD3d 639 (1st
Dept 2016), for the proposition that where a plaintiff has not diligently prosecuted their claim, a
court should not extend time for service in the interest of justice. Defendant further asserts that
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that Defendant had notice of Oatis’ propensity
for abuse or that Defendant exercised any supervisory authority over him.
In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that an extension under CPLR § 306-b is warranted in the
interest of justice, emphasizing that the CVA was enacted precisely to allow claims such as his to
be adjudicated on their merits rather than dismissed on procedural grounds. Plaintiff relies on
Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 (2001), arguing that the interest of justice
standard under CPLR § 306-b is broader and more flexible than the good cause standard, and that
factors such as the meritorious nature of the claim, lack of prejudice to the Defendant, and
legislative intent weigh in favor of permitting the case to proceed. Plaintiff further contends that
the complaint sufficiently pleads causes of action for negligence, citing Doe v. Ascend Charter
Schools, 121 NYS3d 285 (2d Dept 2020), where a motion to dismiss was denied despite general
allegations of prior notice of sexual misconduct.
DISCUSSION
A. Extension of Time for Service Under CPLR 306-b
The Court of Appeals in Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 NY2d 95 (2001), made
clear that courts must engage in a fact-specific analysis when determining whether to extend the
time for service under CPLR § 306-b. Factors relevant to this analysis include the expiration of
the statute of limitations, the meritorious nature of the claim, and potential prejudice to the
defendant. Here, Plaintiff’s claim is undeniably meritorious, as evidenced by detailed allegations
of systemic negligence in hiring and supervising individuals with access to minors.
New York courts have repeatedly emphasized that procedural hurdles, like those alleged
here, should not obstruct Legislative intent. The CVA was enacted to permit survivors of childhood
sexual abuse to seek redress despite the passage of time. Courts have consistently granted
extensions under CPLR § 306-b where, as here, the action was timely commenced but service was
delayed due to reasonable difficulties (see Beauge v New York City Tr. Auth., 282 AD2d 416 [2d
Dept 2001]; State of New York Mtge. Agency v Braun, 182 AD3d 63 [2d Dept 2020]). Given that
Plaintiff has demonstrated a good-faith effort to serve Defendant and that no prejudice has been
articulated by Defendant, the court finds that an extension of time for service is warranted in the
interest of justice.
In addition, the delays in service and initial procedural hurdles in this case must be viewed
in the broader context of the unprecedented volume of claims filed under the CVA during its
revival window, coupled with the unforeseen challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.
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These external circumstances created systemic backlogs, impacted court operations, and
contributed to delays that were beyond Plaintiff’s control. Given these realities, Defendant cannot
credibly assert prejudice when this matter remains in its infancy from a discovery standpoint. The
interests of justice demand that Plaintiff not be penalized for circumstances outside Plaintiff’s
control, particularly when legislative intent under the CVA prioritizes adjudicating such claims on
their merits rather than dismissing them based on procedural technicalities.
B. Statute of Limitations Defense
Defendant’s assertion that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred under CPLR § 3211(a)(5) is
unpersuasive. The CVA explicitly revived claims that would otherwise have been barred, and
Plaintiff commenced this action within the applicable revival window. The Legislature’s intent in
enacting CPLR § 214-g was to prioritize substantive adjudication of child sex abuse claims over
technical defenses. Courts have consistently held that statutory revival provisions should be
construed broadly to effectuate legislative intent (see Sassi v Mobile Life Support Servs., Inc., 37
NY3d 236 [2021]; Samuel W. v United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism, 219 AD3d 421 [1st
Dept 2023]). The court declines to circumvent this legislative prerogative by dismissing the case
on hyper-technical procedural grounds.
C. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Negligence Allegation
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR § 3211 (a)(7),
courts afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as
true, and give the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84
NY2d 83, 87 [1994]; JF Capital Advisors, LLC v Lightstone Group, LLC, 25 NY3d 759, 764
[2015]). Ordinarily, the court’s inquiry is limited to assessing the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s
pleadings; accordingly, the court’s only function is to determine whether the facts as alleged fit
within a cognizable legal theory (JF Capital Advisors, 25 NY3d at 764, supra). However, where
the complaint consists of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity (Godfrey v Spano, 13
NY3d 358, 373 [2009]) or where the statements in a pleading are not sufficiently particular to give
the court and parties notice of the transactions and/or occurrences intended to be proven (CPLR §
3013; Mid-Hudson Val. Fed. Credit Union v Quartararo & Lois, PLLC, 31 NY3d 1090, 1091
[2018]), the motion to dismiss should be granted. Indeed, “allegations consisting of bare legal
conclusions as well as factual claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not entitled
to any such consideration” (Garber v Board of Trustees of State Univ. of NY, 38 AD3d 833, 834
[2d Dept 2007], quoting Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91 [1999]). CPLR § 3013, states that
“[s]tatements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of
the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and
the material elements of each cause of action or defense.” Thus, conclusory allegations will not
suffice (see DiMauro v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 105 AD2d 236, 239 [2d Dept 1984];
Fowler v American Lawyer Media, 306 AD2d 113, 113 [1st Dept 2003]; Sheriff v Murray, 33
AD3d 688 [2d Dept 2006]). When the allegations in a complaint are vague or conclusory, dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action is warranted (see Schuckman Realty v Marine Midland Bank,
N.A., 244 AD2d 400, 401 [2d Dept 1997]; O'Riordan v Suffolk Ch., Local No. 852, Civ. Serv.
Empls. Assn., 95 AD2d 800, 800 [2d Dept 1983]). That said, a motion to dismiss under CPLR §
3211(a)(7) must be denied if the complaint states a cognizable cause of action. The court must
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accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true, afford the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable
inferences, and determine only whether the alleged facts fit within any cognizable legal theory
(Leon, 84 NY2d at 87-88, supra).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege notice of Oatis’ propensity for sexual
abuse. However, courts have repeatedly held that claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention may survive a motion to dismiss where a plaintiff alleges facts that, if true, establish a
failure to act upon readily observable warning signs (see Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese,
229 AD2d 159 [2d Dept 1997]; Doe v. Ascend Charter Schools, 121 NYS3d 285 [2d Dept 2020]).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Oatis’ conduct was open and notorious, that Plaintiff was
frequently isolated, and that Oatis was permitted unsupervised access to minors, which raises an
inference of constructive notice. Courts have recognized that institutions may be held liable where
they failed to implement reasonable safeguards to prevent foreseeable abuse (see Haddock v. City
of New York, 75 NY2d 478 [1990]; McArdle v. Beacon City Sch. Dist., 127 AD3d 826 [2d Dept
2015]). Given these allegations, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim for negligence, warranting
denial of Defendant’s motion.
The court has considered Defendant’s remaining arguments, and finds them unavailing.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED in its entirety; and it is
further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s service upon Defendant is deemed timely and proper, nunc
pro tunc, in the interest of justice; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall be permitted to proceed with discovery.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.
1/31/2025
DATE HASA A. KINGO, J.S.C.
CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
□
GRANTED X DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER
APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER
□
CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE
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