Hardy v.Rogers (INMATE 1)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

RANDI HARDY, )

#280293, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:24-CV-705-WKW-CSC

)

TIFFANY ROGERS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Randi Hardy, an inmate proceeding pro se, filed this 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 action. Doc. 1. Plaintiff subsequently filed more than 30 notices to the Court

containing additional allegations related to the Complaint. See Docs. 4, 6–9, 12, 14, 16–

25, 27–30, 32–34, 37–45. Upon review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)1,

as well as Plaintiff’s additional filings, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this case be

DISMISSED prior to service of process as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.

II. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff brings this action against Tiffany Rogers, Tramon Rogers, and Pamela

Whitten. Doc. 1 at 1, 2. She claims that these individuals violated her rights in Mobile,

1 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must review her pleading(s) under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, the Court is required to dismiss a complaint if it determines that the

action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant immune from such relief.

Alabama prior to her incarceration at Tutwiler Prison for Women. Id at 2. Specifically, she

claims that, beginning in February 2023 and continuing through the date of her pleading,

these individuals “hurt[] [her] body with a voodoo doll.” Id. She alleges the following:

I hear a programming noise. I see the static in my eyes. I hear them talking

using voodoo around my head.

They violate my body everyday all day by sticking pins in a voodoo they

have made of me. They have made a routine to hurt my body all day starting

from my back, stomach, feet, legs, arms, head, face, chest, my toe, my armpit

and my hands.

My mind. They program me everyday.

They have been doing this for exactly 2 whole years with no remorse. They

made it a routine to hurt me. I feel like I[’]m dying because of them hurting

my body all day.

Id. at 3. As relief, she asks that these individuals “be jailed . . . and of course charged with

assault, har[]assment, torture and all kinds of other charges.” Id. at 4.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The named Defendants are not state actors.

As an initial matter, none of Plaintiff’s named Defendants appear to be state actors.

“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a violation of a

constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted). There is nothing in the Complaint or Plaintiff’s subsequent filings to indicate that

Defendants were acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged events.2 Indeed,

2 It appears from Plaintiff’s numerous filings that the three named Defendants are the father of Plaintiff’s

child, his sister, and his mother.

for a private actor to be deemed to have acted “under color of state law,” he must “have

exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)

(internal quotations and citation omitted). However, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts

that would support an inference that Defendants exercised power that was made possible

only because they were clothed with the authority of state law. Thus, because Plaintiff has

wholly failed to demonstrate that Defendants acted under color of state law, the

undersigned finds that they are not state actors subject to § 1983 liability.

B. Plaintiff is not entitled to her sole request for relief.

Second, Plaintiff’s sole request for relief—that various criminal charges be brought

against Defendants and that they be incarcerated for their actions—is not cognizable in a

§ 1983 action. See Cooley v. Streeter, No. 1:18-00540, 2020 WL 4211287, at *13 (S.D.

Ala. May 19, 2020) (“It is well established that private citizens can neither bring a direct

criminal action against another person nor can they petition federal courts to compel the

criminal prosecution of another person.”) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)

and Otero v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th Cir. 1987)). Thus, even if Plaintiff

could succeed on her claims, this Court cannot grant the relief she seeks.

C. Plaintiff’s claims are clearly baseless.

Finally, even if Defendants were state actors and Plaintiff had sought relief this

Court could grant, Plaintiff’s claims fail under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Section 1915

“accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual

allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989). “Clearly baseless” factual contentions

include those that are “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992).

Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants are using a voodoo doll to harm her and

programming her mind with various noises and images are fanciful, fantastic, and

delusional so as to be “clearly baseless.” See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 327; Denton, 504

U.S. at 32–33; see also, e.g., Stanberry v. Ivey, No. 2:21-CV-59, 2021 WL 2451145, at *2

(M.D. Ala. May 12, 2021) (rejecting allegations that a defendant used voodoo, witchcraft,

and sorcery to inflict injury on the plaintiff as “fantastical, bizarre, and delusional”);

Wheeler v. Brown, No. 1:22-CV-4979, 2022 WL 22894122, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 20, 2022)

(rejecting allegations of voodoo as “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” and thus “clearly

baseless”) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims are due to be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because none of the named Defendants are state actors for purposes of § 1983;

Plaintiff seeks relief that is not cognizable in a § 1983 action; and Plaintiff’s allegations

are clearly baseless under Neitzke and Denton, the undersigned finds that any amendment

would be futile. See Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (11th Cir.

2004) (“[A] district court may properly deny leave to amend the complaint . . . when such

amendment would be futile.”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that this

case be DISMISSED prior to service of process as frivolous and for failure to state a claim

on which relief may be granted.

It is further ORDERED that, on or before January 24, 2025, the parties may file

objections to this Recommendation. The parties must specifically identify the factual

findings and legal conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made.

Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order and, therefore, is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) will bar a party from a de novo

determination by the District Court of legal and factual issues covered in the

Recommendation and waive the right of the party to challenge on appeal the District

Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions accepted or adopted by

the District Court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. See Stein v. Reynolds Sec.,

Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206

(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

DONE this 10th day of January, 2025.

/s/ Charles S. Coody

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE