The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
HUNTINGTON DIVISION
NICHOLAS TREY DANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 3:23-cv-00712
TFC J.J. DEAN, III,
West Virginia State Police Trooper,
Defendant.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Plaintiff, Nicholas Trey Daniel (“Plaintiff Daniel”), filed his original pro se
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was wrongfully arrested and
imprisoned by Defendant TFC J.J. Dean, III (“Defendant Dean”) and other defendants,
namely—Wayne County Prosecutor Deborah Preece, Wayne County Sheriff Rick
Thompson, Wayne County Magistrate Billy Dell Runyon, and West Virginia State Police
Trooper TFC J.J. Dean III. (ECF No. 1). This matter was previously assigned to the
undersigned’s predecessor, Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert, to consider motions to
dismiss which were filed on behalf of Deborah Preece, Richard Thompson and Billy Dell
Runyon. Judge Eifert considered those motions to dismiss and submitted proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for disposition to the presiding District Judge
Robert C. Chambers, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 29). Her
recommendations were adopted by Judge Chambers and the claims against Deborah
Preece, Richard Thompson and Billy Dell Runyon were dismissed and those parties were
removed pursuant to Judge Chambers’ Memorandum Opinion and Order entered March
28, 2024. (ECF No. 31).
Plaintiff Daniel subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47).
However, Judge Eifert ordered that Plaintiff Daniel’s motion was premature and that if
be held in abeyance until the parties conducted discovery. (ECF No. 57). She further
order that the parties were to participate in settlement negotiations, but that if their
efforts at settlement negotiations were unsuccessful, the parties were to file dispositive
motions on or before October 31, 2024. (Id.)
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff Daniel’s renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 71) and Defendant TFC J.J. Dean, III’s Integrated Motion for
Summary Judgment and Response In Opposition To Plaintiff’s Second Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72) and memorandum in support thereof (ECF No. 73).
For the following reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the
presiding District Judge GRANT Defendant Dean’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
DENY Plaintiff Daniel’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISS this action with
prejudice. It is further recommended that Plaintiff Daniel’s Motion to Amend (ECF No.
70) his complaint to adjust his demand for relief be DENIED as MOOT.
I. Relevant History
Plaintiff Daniel’s complaint alleges he was the victim of a wrongful arrest.
According to the complaint, a West Virginia State Trooper, J. J. Dean III (“Defendant
Dean”), filed a criminal complaint in November 2021 with the Wayne County Magistrate’s
Office, charging Plaintiff Daniel with battery and sexual abuse in the third degree. (ECF
No. 1 at 1). The criminal complaint identified Plaintiff Daniel by name, date of birth, social
security number, and driver’s license number. (Id.). The criminal complaint was based on
a report filed by Defendant Dean, which stated that the alleged crimes involved a 14-year-
old juvenile. (Id. at 2). The Wayne County Sheriff’s Department arrested Plaintiff Daniel
on these charges in July 2022. (Id.).
Upon arrest, Plaintiff Daniel was taken to the Sheriff’s Department and then to the
Western Regional Jail and Correctional Facility (“WRJ”). (Id.). The next morning,
Plaintiff Daniel was arraigned before a county magistrate. (Id.). At the arraignment,
Plaintiff Daniel was not “asked about the validity of the charges.” (Id. at 3). After his
arraignment, Plaintiff Daniel was taken back to WRJ, where he was housed with the
general population, even though his charges included sex offenses against a minor. (Id.).
Plaintiff Daniel felt anxious about the heightened risk to his safety. (Id.). He remained at
WRJ for nearly a week until his preliminary hearing. (Id.). At the preliminary hearing,
Plaintiff Daniel was told his charges would be increased from misdemeanors to felonies.
(Id.). Plaintiff Daniel returned to WRJ after the preliminary hearing, where he received a
phone call from the Wayne County Prosecutor, Deborah Preece, informing him that he
had been wrongfully charged and would be released immediately. (Id.).
Plaintiff Daniel was released from jail, but the news of his arrest had already spread
across his home county, impacting his personal and professional life. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff
Daniel alleges that, as a result of the wrongful arrest, he has suffered extreme distress and
anxiety, and that the charges have negatively impacted custody hearings, job interviews,
other criminal investigations, and his personal relationships. (Id.). He states he has
become a target of gossip and slander, and that he has suffered both mentally and
physically from the trauma inflicted by Defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff Daniel requests
compensatory damages and punitive damages in his complaint. (Id. at 5).
As stated above, the only remaining defendant in this matter is Defendant Dean.
Plaintiff Daniel’s complaint asserts a claim against Dean under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
contending that Plaintiff “was wrongfully arrested and detained based on the negligence
and deliberate indifference shown by [Defendant Dean].” (ECF No. 1 at 4)
II. Standard of Review
Both Plaintiff Daniel and Defendant Dean seek summary judgment in their favor.
Summary judgment is proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 when no genuine issue of material
fact is in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A fact is material if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a disputed issue of material
fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The party moving for summary judgment
bears the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence that demonstrates the
existence of a genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325
(1986).
If the moving party meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party, who “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Id. at 322, n.3. The nonmoving party must do more than rely upon the allegations or the
denial of allegations contained in his pleading to defeat a motion for summary judgment;
instead, he must offer some “concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could
return a verdict in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Concrete evidence includes
“particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The court must not resolve disputed facts, nor
weigh the evidence. Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1239 (4th Cir. 1995).
Instead, the court must accept as true the facts asserted by the nonmoving party and
review the evidence “draw[ing] all justifiable inferences” in its favor. Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991).
Even still, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” favoring the non-moving
party will not prevent entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557,
586 (2009), (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587 (1986)). Thus, while any permissible inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts “must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, 475 U.S. at 587, “[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is
not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Felty v. Graves-
Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted).
II. Discussion
1. Plaintiff’s Claims for “Wrongful Arrest” or “Wrongful Detainment”
Are Barred by the Applicable Statute of Limitations
As previously recognized by this Court, “[a] plaintiff must file a Section 1983 action
within the prescribed time period. Because there is no federally prescribed statute of
limitation, Courts look to and apply their respective State’s statutes of limitation.”
Montgomery v. Reed, No. 2:24-00149, 2024 WL 3876522, at *5 (S.D.W.Va. July 24,
2024) (citing Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50, 109 S.Ct. 573 (1989)), adopted by
Montgomery v. Reed, 2024 WL 3868242 (S.D.W.Va. Aug. 19, 2024). “The Fourth Circuit
has recognized that ‘in the absence of any state statute of limitations specifically
applicable to suits to redress a violation of civil rights, the West Virginia limitation on
personal injury actions applies.” Id. (quoting McCausland v. Mason Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 649
F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1098, 102 S.Ct. 671 (1981)). Pursuant to
West Virginia law, “[t]he applicable period of limitations for a claim of false imprisonment
is one-year.” Id. (citing Wilt v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 165, 506 S.E.2d 608,
613 (1998) and Snodgrass v. Sisson's Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 161 W.Va. 588, 244 S.E.2d
321 (1978)).
While the limitation period is governed by state law, “the question of when a cause of
action accrues is answered according to federal law.” Id. (citing Brooks v. City of Winston-
Salem, N.C., 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996). “[F]or a Section 1983 action, ‘a cause of
action accrues either when the plaintiff has knowledge of his claim or when he is put on
notice—e.g., by the knowledge of the fact of injury and who caused it—to make reasonable
inquiry and that inquiry would reveal the existence of a colorable claim.’” Id. (citing
Nasim v. Warden, MD House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert
denied, 516 U.S. 1177, 116 S.Ct. 1273 (1996). “Accrual of a claim does not await awareness
by the plaintiff that his injury was negligently inflicted.” Nasim, 64 F.3d at 955 (internal
quotation omitted). “A Section 1983 claim for false arrest and false imprisonment accrues
when the claimant is detained pursuant to the legal process.” Id. (citing Wallace v. Kato,
594 U.S. 384, 127 S.Ct. 1091, 1100 (2007)). “Generally, an individual’s arraignment date
is the date they are detained pursuant to legal process.” Id.
Pursuant to West Virginia law, Plaintiff Daniel had one year to file a claim for “false
arrest” or “false imprisonment.” In this case, Plaintiff Daniel was arrested in and put “on
notice” of a potential claim in July of 2022. He was “heard before the Wayne County
Magistrate’s Office via telephonic and video connection and arraigned for the [sexual
abuse and battery] charges” the morning after his arrest. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 8). Althgouh the
statute of limitations in this matter expired in July 2023, Plaintiff did not file this action
until November 1, 2023. Thus, Plaintiff Daniel’s claim for “wrongful arrest” or “wrongful
detainment” was untimely filed and should be dismissed as a matter of law. See, e.g.,
Montgomery, 2024 WL 3876522, at 6 (holding that, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action,
“Plaintiff’s false arrest claims against [the defendant] should be dismissed because the
one-year statute of limitations ha[d] run.”); Roberts v. Maston, No. 2:23-00019, 2024
WL 714943, at *5 (S.D.W.Va. Jan. 26, 2024), adopted by Roberts v. Maston, 2024 WL
712860 (S.D.W.Va. Feb. 21, 2024) (dismissing claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment by “applying the West Virginia one-year statute of limitation together with
the federal standard of accrual” and “find[ing] that [the plaintiff’s] cause of action for false
arrest expired on January 18, 2009, one-year from the date [the plaintiff] was detained
pursuant to legal process”).
In his response to Defendant Dean’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff Daniel
contends that his complaint also asserts claims for “slander,” “mental anguish,” and
“malicious prosecution,” and that as such his complaint should be considered timely as to
those claims. (ECF No. 74). Based upon applicable law, Plaintiff Daniel’s assertions are
unfounded.
Plaintiff Daniel contends that his name was slandered by being labeled a “Sex
Offender” on the WRJ website and on social media. (ECF No. 74). However, Plaintiff
Daniel’s Complaint clearly indicates that his action is being brought “pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.” (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff Daniel does allege in his complaint “scandalous
charges” and “damage to his personal reputation,” but slander, libel and/or defamation
are not specifically pled. (ECF No. 1 at 4). In any event, as the Fourth Circuit has noted,
“the United States Constitution does not afford a remedy for reputational injury alone.”
Aylor v. Town of Culpeper, 103 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 1996) (Unpublished). In
reliance upon Aylor, federal courts have noted that “[n]o federal right of actions exist
under § 1983” for defamation, libel, or slander. Newsome v. Floyd, No. 4:23-cv-03968,
2024 WL 1152614, (D.S.C. Mar. 18, 2024). Furthermore, slander claims, like “wrongful
detainment” and “wrongful arrest” claims, are subject to a one-year statute of limitations,
which Plaintiff missed. See Greene v. Putnam Cnty. Comm’n, No. 3:21-0520, 2022 WL
16859755 (S.D.W.Va. Nov. 10, 2022). Therefore, even, if the Court liberally construes
Plaintiff Dean’s Complaint to allege “slander,” that claim is barred by the statute of
limitations.
Likewise, Plaintiff Daniel’s claim of “mental anguish” in his response to the motion
for summary judgment fails as a matter of law. “Mental anguish” is not a separate cause
of action. It is a form of damages which is recoverable for some tort claims. Even if the
Court were to construe Plaintiff Daniel’s assertion of “mental anguish” as a claim for
“intentional infliction of emotional distress,” Plaintiff Daniel’s complaint fails to
sufficiently plead such a claim, which is a state-law claim that does not arise under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff Daniel’s Complaint clearly states that this action is
brought “pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” and the “Statement of Complaint” is devoid of
reference to “mental anguish” or “emotional distress.” (Id.). Based upon a clear reading
of Plaintiff Daniel’s Complaint, he did not assert a claim for mental anguish or intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
The final contention in Plaintiff Daniel’s response to the motion for summary
judgment is that his complaint asserts a claim for “malicious prosecution.” However, as
this Court has previously acknowledged, malicious prosecution claims also carry a one
year statute of limitation. See Young v. Lacy, No. 1:17-03633, 2020 WL 4251798,
(S.D.W.Va. July 24, 2020) In Young, the Court adopted “the PF&R’s findings [by
Magistrate Judge Cheryl A. Eifert] as to West Virginia statute of limitations provisions
corresponding to each claim, as follows: . . . ii) false arrest and false imprisonment claims
are subject to one-year statutes of limitations; iii) malicious prosecution claim is subject
to a one-year statute of limitations . . . .”. Id. at 4. Thus, Plaintiff Daniel’s claims of false
imprisonment, false arrest and malicious prosecution are all time barred because they
were not timely filed.
2. Defendant Dean is Entitled to Qualified Immunity, Even if Plaintiff
Daniel’s Claims for Malicious Prosecution are Considered Timely Filed
“[A] malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 is properly understood as a Fourth
Amendment claim for unreasonable seizure which incorporates certain elements of the
common law tort.” Lambert v. Williams, 222 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 2000). “To state such
a claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff
pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012),
cited by English v. Clarke, 90 F.4th 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2023). “Not every mix-up in the
issuance of an arrest warrant, even though it leads to the arrest of the wrong person with
attendant inconvenience and humiliation, automatically constitutes a constitutional
violation for which a remedy may be sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Thompson v. Prince
William Cnty., 753 F.2d 363, 364 (4th Cir. 1985).
In this case, there is no question that Plaintiff Daniel was not the perpetrator of the
alleged sexual assault that gives rise to this case. However, in order to state a cognizable
“malicious prosecution” claim against Defendant Dean, Plaintiff Daniel must show that
Dean caused “a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to a legal process unsupported by
probable cause.” Evans, 703 F.3d at 647.
As recognized by the Fourth Circuit, “[r]easonable law enforcement officers are not
required to ‘exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve every doubt about a
suspect’s guilt before probable cause is established.’” Wadkins v. Arnold, 214 F.3d 535,
541 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 264 (4th Cir.1991)).
And, “[i]t’s surely reasonable for a police officer to base his belief in probable cause on a
victim’s reliable identification of his attacker.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 262 (citing
McKinney v. George, 726 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1984)). According to the Fourth
Circuit, “it is difficult to imagine how a police officer could obtain better evidence of
probable cause than an identification by name of assailants provided by a victim, unless,
perchance, the officer were to witness the crime himself.” Id. In this case, “the victim
identified the suspect as Trey Daniels and provided information regarding his
approximate age and approximate geographic location.” (ECF No. 73-1). With this
information, Dean performed a driver’s license search and found only one individual
possessing a similar name, age, and location—Plaintiff. (ECF No. 73-3).
During Plaintiff Daniel’s deposition, he acknowledged the fact that he went by the
name “Trey Daniels” in Wayne County, which is the name of the assailant provided by the
victim to law enforcement. (ECF 73-2). Plaintiff also acknowledged that he understood
how a mix-up such as his could happen:
Q: And let me see if I understand what I think you’re trying to tell me. You
understand how the police officers could’ve thought that you were the Trey Daniel
that had been accused of this crime, but you think if they had done some more
investigative work, they could’ve figured out that you weren’t; is that what you’re
saying.
A: Yes. . . .
Id. Further, as cited in support of Defendant Dean’s motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff Daniel testified at the conclusion of his deposition that he merely wanted Dean
to take his investigation “further.” Id.
Not taking the investigation “further,” however, does not state a cognizable claim
for malicious prosecution. As stated herein, the Fourth Circuit has held that “[i]t is [] plain
that an officer is not required to ‘exhaust every potentially exculpatory lead or resolve
every doubt about a suspect’s guilt before probable cause is established.’” Miller, 475 at
630 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). “An investigation need not be perfect,
but an officer who intentionally or recklessly puts lies before a magistrate, or hides facts
from him, violates the Constitution unless the untainted facts themselves provide
probable cause.” Id.
In this case, Plaintiff Daniel does not assert that Defendant Dean lied to or misled
the magistrate while presenting the Criminal Complaint which led to the issuance of a
warrant against Plaintiff Daniel. Plaintiff Daniel’s allegations against Defendant Dean
stem from his allegedly imperfect investigation, but the facts given to Defendant Dean
and presented before the magistrate provided sufficient probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant and Plaintiff Daniel’s arrest. Thus, any malicious prosecution claim against
Defendant Dean fails as a matter of law.
Furthermore, based upon the uncontested facts of this matter, Defendant Dean
had qualified immunity and is entitled to summary judgment. As stated by the Fourth
Circuit, “a particularly appropriate procedure for determining an official’s entitlement to
qualified immunity is summary judgment.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264 (1991). “Because
qualified immunity is designed to shield officials not only from ultimate liability but also
from the hardships of litigation itself, ‘the immunity shield is necessarily more protective
than is the defense on the merits.’” Id. (quoting Collinson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 998 (4th
Cir. 1990)). “This broader protection is reflected in a test of ‘objective reasonableness’ for
entitlement to qualified immunity.” Id. at 261 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344
(1986)). “[T]he qualified immunity reasonableness determination is based on evidence
reasonably available to the police officer and in light of any exigencies present. See
Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 312–13. Importantly, this inquiry must not result in a ‘second-
guessing’ of the officer’s actions ‘with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight.’” Brown v. Wiita, 7
Fed. App’x 275, 278 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir.
1994)).” In determining whether [an officer] is entitled to qualified immunity, the guiding
principle is that ‘only where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable will the shield of immunity
be lost.’” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 344).
In this case, Defendant Dean’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the
evidence at his disposal, and therefore, Defendant Dean is entitled to qualified immunity
on Plaintiff Daniel’s claims in this action. Here, Defendant Dean presented the evidence
at his disposal to a magistrate, who determined that probable cause existed to issue a
warrant for Plaintiff Daniel’s arrest. While “obtaining an arrest warrant does not provide
per se evidence of objective reasonableness,” it can “provide additional support for [an
officer’s] claim that he acted with objective reasonableness.” Id. at 262 (citing Malley, 475
U.S. at 345–46 and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988-91, 82 L. Ed. 2d 737,
104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984)). The presumption of reasonableness attached to obtaining a
warrant can be rebutted where ‘a reasonably well-trained officer in [Dean’s] position
would have known that his [application] failed to establish probable cause and that he
should not have applied for the warrant.” Id. (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 345). As explained
above, any reasonable officer in Defendant Dean’s position, could have similarly
concluded that probable cause existed for filing a Criminal Complaint against Plaintiff
Daniel given the victim’s identification of an assailant with Plaintiff Daniel’s similar name
and age and Defendant Dean’s subsequent search of the driver’s license database. Thus,
Defendant Dean’s decision to present a magistrate with a Criminal Complaint was
objectively reasonable in light of the information available to him at the time.
Nonetheless, “[e]ven if the existence of probable cause were a close question, the
‘qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments.’” Durham v.
Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 534
(4th Cir. 2011)). In Durham, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the applicability of qualified
immunity in a “case of mistaken identity.” Durham, 690 F.3d at 185. There, a police
officer worked with a confidential informant who disclosed to the officer that he intended
to buy drugs from a man named “Michael Dwayne Durham.” Id. Working with the Task
Force office, the officer received a social security number and Big Stone Gap post office
address associated with the name “Micheal Dwayne Durham.” Id. Neither the Task Force
nor the officer “secure[d] a photo of the drug dealer.” Id. Utilizing the social security
number provided to him, the officer provided Mr. Durham’s prior criminal history. Id. at
186. The officer conducted two more drug buys, wherein the confidential informant
repeated the name “Michael Dwayne Durham,” then advised the task force to indict Mr.
Durham. Id. “From that point on, [the officer] had no involvement in Durham’s arrest
and prosecution.” Id. A grand jury later returned three indictments against Mr. Durham,
and he remained in jail for more than three months. Id. The prosecutor eventually learned
that Mr. Durham was incorrectly identified after Mr. Durham’s counsel presented phone
records to show that the wrong person had been arrested, and the prosecutor dismissed
the three indictments. Id. at 187. The Durham-plaintiff then filed a civil action against the
officer (and others), alleging, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law malicious
prosecution claims. The officer moved for summary judgment, which was granted.
As the Fourth Circuit noted in Durham, “‘[f]or probable cause to exist, there need
only be enough evidence to warrant the belief of a reasonable officer that an offense has
been or is being committed; evidence sufficient to convict is not required.’” Id. at 190
(quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002)). The Fourth Circuit
further found that the Durham-officer had “ample evidence” (including the informant
saying the name “Michael Dwayne Durham” three times, the plaintiff having a local
address and a Tennessee driver’s license, and the plaintiff having prior drug offenses. Id.
In this matter, the evidence relied upon by Defendant Dean in the instant case is
analogous. The minor victim identified her assailant as “Trey Daniels,” a name Plaintiff
Daniel admits to going by. (ECF No. 73-2). Upon searching the driver’s license database
using this information, the only person with a similar name and age to that provided by
the minor victim was Plaintiff Daniel. Finally, like the Durham-Plaintiff, Plaintiff Daniel
admitted to having a long criminal history. (ECF No. 73-2). Thus, based upon the evidence
in his possession at the time, a reasonable officer could have similarly concluded that
Plaintiff Daniel committed the alleged offense and that probable cause existed for the
Criminal Complaint.
Although “[i]t will, of course, always be possible to contend in court that an
arresting officer might have gathered more evidence, . . . judges cannot pursue all the
steps a police officer might have taken that might have shaken his belief in the existence
of probable cause. Certainly[,] in hindsight, one wishes this arrest had not occurred, but
with hindsight, it becomes far easier to portray any person charged with making a close
discretionary decision in a pejorative light.” Torchinsky, 942 F.2d at 264 (1991). “A
society that expects police officers to provide protection must afford them in turn some
protection from lawsuits. If immunity is lost in every case of mistaken arrest, then many
a perpetrator of violent crime will go unapprehended.” Id.
As in these other cases, it is certainly regrettable that Plaintiff Daniel was “arrested
for a crime he clearly did not commit. However, not every unfortunate incident gives rise
to § 1983 liability against a municipality or its officials. The police must be held to
standards of reasonableness, not to standards of perfection.” Id. Defendant Dean acted
reasonably, and thus, he is entitled to qualified immunity. As such, summary judgment
should be granted in his favor.
IV. Proposal and Recommendations
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully PROPOSES that the
presiding District Judge accept and adopt the findings herein and RECOMMENDS that
the motion for summary judgment, filed by Defendant Dean be GRANTED, that Plaintiff
Daniel’s motion for summary judgment be DENIED, and that this matter be
DISMISSED and REMOVED from the docket. Plaintiff Daniel’s remaining motion to
amend his complaint as to damages should also be DENIED as MOOT.
The parties are notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendations” is
hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable Robert C. Chambers,
United States District Judge. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code,
Section 636(b)(1)(B), and Rules 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
parties shall have fourteen days (filing of objections) and three days (if received by mail)
from the date of filing this “Proposed Findings and Recommendations” within which to
file with the Clerk of this Court, specific written objections, identifying the portions of the
“Proposed Findings and Recommendations” to which objection is made and the basis of
such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted by the presiding District
Judge for good cause shown.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de
novo review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727
F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be provided to the opposing
parties, Judge Chambers, and Magistrate Judge Reeder.
The Clerk is instructed to provide a copy of this “Proposed Findings and
Recommendations” to Plaintiff and counsel of record.
FILED: January 8, 2025
ey A J Ogey K. Reeder _
y United States Magistrate Judge
16