Brown v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

JASPER DIVISION

KAYSE BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:24-cv-1001-GMB

)

NICK SMITH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are two partial motions to dismiss Plaintiff Kayse Brown’s

claims against Defendants Sheriff Nick Smith, Carl Carpenter, and Justin White.

Docs. 6 & 13. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Doc. 22. The motions are fully

briefed (Docs. 7, 14, 17–20) and ripe for decision. For the following reasons,

Carpenter and White’s motion (Doc. 6) is due to be denied, while Sheriff Smith’s

motion (Doc. 13) is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Both motions raise questions about the court’s subject matter jurisdiction

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Boglin v. Bd. of Trs. of

Ala. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (finding

that “immunity issues are construed as challenges to the subject-matter jurisdiction

of a federal court”). Subject matter jurisdiction is the statutorily conferred power of

the court to hear a class of cases. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) takes

one of two forms: a “facial attack” or a “factual attack.” Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919

F.2d 1525, 1528–29 (11th Cir. 1990). “Facial attacks challenge subject matter

jurisdiction based on the allegations in the complaint, and the district court takes the

allegations as true in deciding whether to grant the motion.” Morrison v. Amway

Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). On the other hand, “[f]actual attacks

challenge subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings. In

resolving a factual attack, the district court may consider extrinsic evidence such as

testimony and affidavits.” Id.

Smith, Carpenter, and White assert that Brown’s complaint, “on its face, lacks

an adequate basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Doc. 7 at 2; Doc. 14 at 2. The

court therefore is confined to the four corners of Brown’s complaint and will not

consider the affidavit (Doc. 7-1) Carpenter and White submitted in support of their

motion.

II. RELEVANT FACTS

In June 2021, the Recovery Resource Center (“RRC”) hired Brown as a

Certified Recovery Specialist. Doc. 1 at 3. The RRC works with the Walker County

Sheriff’s Office (Doc. 1 at 5), and inmates within the Walker County Jail “frequently

called Brown’s cell phone to report the conditions in the jail.” Doc. 1 at 6. Smith is

the “elected Sheriff of Walker County,” Carpenter is an “employee of the Walker

County Sheriff’s Office,” and White is the “Jail Administrator of the Walker County

Jail.” Doc. 1 at 2.

After Walker County Jail inmate Tony Mitchell “died of hypothermia and

sepsis caused by neglect and abuse while in the jail” (Doc. 1 at 3), Brown began to

advocate for “transparency and better conditions in the Walker County Jail.” Doc. 1

at 4. She formed a group called “Justice for Tony Mitchell,” attended vigils and

protests for Mitchell, and reposted messages on Facebook, some of which “were

critical of the way . . . Sheriff Smith’s employees treated Mitchell and other

inmates.” Doc. 1 at 4.

In March 2024, a little more than a year after Mitchell’s death, Carpenter

texted RRC Director John Bales. Doc. 1 at 4. He asked Bales to attend “a meeting

with the Sheriff about Brown’s employment” and attached some of her Facebook

posts to his text message. Doc. 1 at 4. Bales told Brown about the messages the next

day and mentioned “that he was going to have a call with the Sheriff.” Doc. 1 at 4.

During the call, “the Sheriff told Bales that he did not like that Brown was

advocating for Mitchell.” Doc. 1 at 4. Separately, someone at the Sheriff’s Office

mentioned the contract between the Walker County Jail and RRC to Bales and told

her (1) the Sheriff’s Office knows “‘how valuable the RRC is,’ but that it’s ‘gotten

really hard to separate’ it from [her] advocacy regarding Tony Mitchell’s death”;

(2) “the bridges aren’t burned, but they seem to be smoldering”; and (3) the Sheriff’s

Office would “‘appreciate [her] help putting it out’ on his side.” Doc. 1 at 8.

After Bales told Brown that he “had talked to the Sheriff and or Carpenter and

Smith about her employment,” he also told her “that she needed to ‘be careful.’”

Doc. 1 at 5. Brown responded that she thought the Sheriff’s Office was “trying to

make her lose her job” because of her advocacy for Mitchell, and Bales said that “he

‘will validate that thought, because that’s the reality of it.’” Doc. 1 at 9.

Sheriff Smith and Brown’s husband also spoke on the phone. Doc. 1 at 12.

During this call, Sheriff Smith said, “I am getting to the point where, if that’s how

things are going, I mean, we can call people’s bosses or do that kind of thing as

well.” Doc. 1 at 12. Meanwhile, White “wrote correspondence to Brown’s

employer,” stating that “Brown’s advocacy was threatening her employer’s

relationship with the Walker County Sheriff’s office,” and urging her employer to

“take action against her.” Doc. 1 at 5 & 9.

In May 2024, Bales terminated Brown’s employment with the RRC because

of “a complaint from the ‘Partner Community.’” Doc. 1 at 5. Following her

termination, Carpenter and White notified all of the female inmates at the Walker

County Jail that Brown had been terminated from the RRC. Doc. 1 at 6. Carpenter

and White also told the inmates that they “should not trust Brown, because she was

not who she said she was.” Doc. 1 at 6. Carpenter, White, and Smith then blocked

the inmates from making any more calls to Brown. Doc. 1 at 6.

Brown filed her complaint against Smith in his official and individual

capacities, Carpenter in his individual capacity, and White in his individual capacity.

Brown’s complaint includes the following counts against all defendants: (1) a First

Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) a state-law

tortious interference claim; (3) a claim for violations of Article I, Section 4 of the

Alabama Constitution; and (4) a state-law wantonness claim. Doc 1. at 6–16. Sheriff

Smith moves to dismiss all claims against him in his official capacity, arguing he is

entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Doc. 13. Smith, Carpenter,

and White move to dismiss the state-law claims against them in their individual

capacities, arguing they are entitled to State immunity under the Alabama

Constitution. Docs. 6 & 13. Only the claims against Sheriff Smith in his official

capacity will be dismissed.

III. DISCUSSION

The court begins by analyzing the official capacity claims against Sheriff

Smith and then addresses the individual capacity claims against all three defendants.

A. Official Capacity Claims Against Sheriff Smith

Smith argues that the claims brought against him in his official capacity

should be dismissed. Doc. 14 at 5. Specifically, he contends that these claims are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Doc. 14 at 5.

The Eleventh Amendment provides that the “Judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Generally, the

Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the state or an agency of the state, including

§ 1983 claims. See Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984); Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003).

Eleventh Amendment immunity has “been extended to state officials, acting

in their official capacity, where an agency or individual may ‘be treated as an arm

of the State partaking of the Eleventh Amendment Immunity.’” Melton v. Abston,

841 F.3d 1207, 1233 (11th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 550

U.S. at 544 (quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,

280 (1977)). “A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state

has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity or Congress has abrogated the state’s

immunity.” Id. Congress has not waived, and Alabama has not abrogated, the state’s

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. at 1234. “Consequently, Alabama state

officials are immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.”

Id. For these reasons, Sheriff Smith is immune from suit in his official capacity for

Brown’s § 1983 and state-law1 claims seeking monetary damages.

Brown seems to argue, however, that Smith was acting as a municipal officer,

not as a state official, when he advocated for Brown’s termination. See Doc. 19 at

11; Doc. 1 at 2. In other words, Brown suggests that her § 1983 claim against Sheriff

Smith is effectively a claim against Walker County and not the State of Alabama.

See Doc. 19 at 11.

Unlike the State of Alabama, a local government “is liable under § 1983 for

its policies that cause constitutional torts”—policies that “may be set by the

government’s lawmakers, ‘or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy.’” McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 784 (1997)

(quoting Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978)). But “local governments can never be liable under § 1983 for the acts of

those whom the local government has no authority to control.” Turquitt v. Jefferson

County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998). “A local government must have

power in an area in order to be held liable for an official’s acts in that area.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The areas over which a local

1 It is unclear from the complaint whether Brown intended to bring the state-law claims against

Sheriff Smith in his official capacity, and Brown did not respond to Smith’s arguments for

dismissal of the state-law official-capacity claims. See Doc. 19. Therefore, even if the Eleventh

Amendment did not immunize Smith from the state-law claims against him in his official capacity,

these claims have been abandoned. See Boyd v. Daniels, 2014 WL 1245885, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Mar.

24, 2014) (dismissing claims on motion to dismiss for failure to respond); Joseph ex rel. Joseph v.

Allen, 2013 WL 3712334, at *5 (N.D. Ala. July 12, 2013) (same).

government or a county exercises authority is “dependent on an analysis of state

law.” McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786. In making this determination, the court “must

respect state and local law’s allocation of policymaking authority, and not assume

that final policymaking authority lies in some entity other than that in which state

law places it.” Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1288 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

“In Alabama, counties possess only those powers expressly delegated to them

by the legislature.” Ex parte Sumter County, 953 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (Ala. 2006).

The powers delegated to the counties related to county jails are (1) that “[t]he county

commission shall erect . . . jails,” and (2) that “[e]ach . . . county shall be required to

maintain a jail within their county.” Ala. Code § 11-14-10; Sumter County, 953 So.

2d at 1238; Stark v. Madison County, 678 So. 2d 787, 787 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).

The counties in Alabama therefore lack authority over “the daily administration or

operation of a county jail or for overseeing inmates,” the sheriff’s law-enforcement

policies, and the “training, supervision, hiring, or firing of the sheriff’s employees.”

Sumter County, 953 So. 2d at 1238; see McMillian, 520 U.S. at 793; Turquitt, 137

F.3d at 1292 (“Alabama sheriffs are not county policymakers in their daily

management of county jails.”).

Brown’s argument that Sheriff Smith was acting as a municipal policymaker

for Walker County therefore fails. Walker County’s authority is limited to funding

the jail and providing the facilities to house the jail. See Ala. Code § 11-14-10.

Brown does not allege that Sheriff Smith was acting as a policymaker in either of

those areas when he interfered with Brown’s employment, so the court has no reason

to conclude that Sheriff Smith was acting on behalf of Walker County and not the

State of Alabama in this context. The Eleventh Amendment therefore immunizes

Sheriff Smith from all claims against him in his official capacity.

B. Individual Capacity Claims

All three defendants argue that they enjoy State immunity under Article I,

Section 14 of the Alabama Constitution, and therefore are immune from Brown’s

state-law claims brought against them in their individual capacities. See Doc. 7 at 3–

5; Doc. 14 at 3–5. Specifically, Smith claims he, as the sheriff, has “absolute

immunity from lawsuits when ‘acting within the line and scope of [his]

employment.’” Doc. 14 at 3 (citing Sumter County, 953 So. 2d at 1239). Similarly,

Carpenter and White claim that they are deputy sheriffs who enjoy the same absolute

State immunity afforded to sheriffs under Section 14. Doc. 7 at 3–5. Brown, in part,

argues in her response that Carpenter and White are jail employees who should only

be afforded the immunity applicable to jailers under Alabama Code § 14-6-1.2

2 Carpenter and White attach an affidavit to their motion that purports to establish their roles as

deputy sheriffs and not as jail employees. See Doc. 7-1. Because this is a facial attack, however,

the court will not consider this affidavit. See Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529. Regardless, the question

whether Carpenter and White are deputies or jail employees is not dispositive of their motion to

dismiss because, for the reasons set out below, they are not entitled to the immunity afforded to

either position.

Doc. 17 at 7–11.

At the outset, the court notes that the “burden to establish an immunity defense

rests with the Defendants.” Almond v. Randolph County, Ala., 2020 WL 3052223,

at *5 (M.D. Ala. June 8, 2020); Lockhart v. Franklin, 777 F. App’x 387, 391 (11th

Cir. 2019) (citing Hickman v. Dothan City Bd. of Educ., 421 So. 2d 1257, 1259 (Ala.

1982)). The court finds that Smith, Carpenter, and White have not met that burden

here.

1. State Immunity

Smith, Carpenter, and White argue that Article I, Section 14 of the Alabama

Constitution immunizes them from state-law claims for money damages in their

individual capacities. Doc. 14 at 3–5. Section 14 states “[t]hat the State of Alabama

shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.” Ala. Const. art. I,

§ 14. It thereby “provides ‘immunity to state officials sued in both their official and

individual capacities,’” because a suit against a state official is generally viewed as

an action against the state. Flood v. Ala. Dept. of Ind. Rel., 948 F. Supp. 1535, 1549

(M.D. Ala. 1996) (quoting Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 383 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996));

LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009). And State immunity

extends to sheriffs and their deputies when they are acting “within the line and scope

of their employment.” Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996); see Hight

v. Smith, 2022 WL 17178660, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 23, 2022); LeFrere, 582 F.3d

at 1265–66; see also Alexander v. Hatfield, 652 So. 2d 1142, 1144 (Ala. 1994)

(“[D]eputy sheriffs are immune from suit to the same extent as sheriffs.”).

At the motion to dismiss stage, “the [c]ourt cannot simply accept that . . .

sheriffs and deputy sheriffs were acting within the scope of their employment.”

Almond, 2020 WL 3052223, at *5; Ex parte Haralson, 853 So. 2d 928, 933 (Ala.

2003) (“We cannot conclude, at this early stage of the proceedings, without evidence

showing that at the time of the accident he was acting within the line and scope of

his employment, that [the sheriff’s deputy] is entitled to immunity.”). “The mere

fact that a tort occurs while a sheriff is on duty . . . does not automatically raise

immunity’s shield.” Almond, 2020 WL 3052223, at *5; Haralson, 853 So. 2d at 933

(“No State officer, such as a deputy sheriff, can avoid tort liability simply by

claiming that his ‘mere status as a [S]tate official cloaks him with the [S]tate’s

constitutional immunity.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips v. Thomas, 555

So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989)).

For this reason, a sheriff or deputy asserting an immunity defense must

provide more than “bare conclusory assertions” that he was acting within the scope

of his employment. Lockhart, 777 F. App’x at 391 (affirming the denial of State

immunity where sheriff provided no facts, evidence, or legal authority supporting

her claim that she acted within the scope of her employment); Assoc. of County

Comms. of Ala. Liab. Self-Insured Fund v. Robinson, 777 F. App’x 397, 399–400

(11th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal where deputies “did not provide any evidence

or legal authority establishing that the alleged conduct was within the scope of their

duties and authority”); Cooper v. Smith, 2013 WL 252382, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan 23,

2013) (denying state immunity to deputy sheriffs who cited portions of the Alabama

Code and stated that their alleged tortious conduct occurred while performing those

statutory duties but did not submit any evidence in support of this contention);

Haralson, 853 So. 2d at 933 (denying State immunity because it was conceivable

plaintiff could prove facts showing that the deputy “was on a personal errand or

otherwise had departed from the line and scope of his employment” at the time of

the tortious conduct, and defendant offered no evidence to foreclose this possibility);

Almond, 2020 WL 3052223, at *6 (“[T]he Court cannot accept the [sheriff and

deputy’s] general statements that conclude, but do not evince, that they acted within

the scope of their duties.”).

Here, Smith, Carpenter, and White argue that they are entitled to State

immunity because this case ultimately “involves the Sheriff’s function to run the day

to day operations of the jail and who can enter the jail.”3 Doc. 7 at 4; Doc. 14 at 4.

Smith and his deputies therefore maintain that they were acting in the scope of their

employment when they advocated for Brown’s termination. Doc. 7 at 4; Doc. 14 at

3 While Smith filed a motion to dismiss separate from Carpenter and White’s, the arguments in

support of state immunity in the motions and reply briefs are virtually identical. See Docs. 7, 14,

18 & 20. The court therefore analyzes these arguments simultaneously.

4; see Doc. 1 at 4–6. But the defendants provide no factual support or evidence for

this conclusory assertion. See Docs. 7, 14, 18 & 20. They merely cite to Alabama

Code § 14-6-1, which states that “[t]he sheriff has the legal custody and charge of

the jail in his or her county and all prisoners committed thereto.” Doc. 7 at 4;

Doc. 14 at 4. It therefore remains conceivable at this stage in the proceedings that

Brown could prove that the defendants’ actions were personally motivated or outside

the line and scope of their employment. See Haralson, 853 So. 2d at 933. Thus,

even assuming that Carpenter and White are deputy sheriffs, the defendants have not

met their burden to show they are entitled to state immunity.

In addition, even if the defendants had adequately asserted an immunity

defense, they incorrectly claim that State immunity for sheriffs and their deputies is

without exception.4 Doc. 7 at 3–4; Doc. 14 at 3–4. It is true that “[t]he wall of

immunity erected by § 14 is nearly impregnable.” Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835

So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002). But in Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119, 1141 (Ala.

2013), the Supreme Court of Alabama recognized six types of exceptions5 to actions

4 In the defendants’ motions to dismiss, they assert that “[a]ll courts reviewing this issue have

unanimously ruled that absolute immunity bars state-based tort claims against Alabama county

sheriffs.” Doc. 7 at 4; Doc. 14 at 4. In their reply briefs, however, they take a contradictory position

and recognize that since at least 1987, the courts have applied, at a minimum, five exceptions to

state immunity. Doc. 18 at 5; Doc. 20 at 5.

5 While courts often refer to these six judicially created categories of actions as “exceptions,” that

term is a misnomer. Hight v. Smith, 2024 WL 3243465, at *9 n.8 (N.D. Ala. June 28, 2024). “[I]n

actuality[,] these actions are simply not considered to be actions ‘against the state for § 14

purposes.’” Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 119.

where State immunity may otherwise apply. The first five exceptions are not

relevant here, but the sixth permits “actions for damages brought against State

officials in their individual capacity where it is alleged that they had acted

fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of

law, subject to the limitation that the action not be, in effect, one against the State.”

Moulton, 116 So. 3d at 1141 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)

(restating the five well-known exceptions and recognizing the sixth); Hight v. Smith,

2022 WL 17178660, at *4. Since deciding Moulton, the Alabama Supreme Court

has assumed the sixth exception applies to sheriffs. See Birmingham Br. (WVTM-

TV) LLC v. Hill, 303 So. 3d 1148, 1159–60 (Ala. 2020) (applying the sixth exception

to a sheriff but dismissing the claims because the plaintiff did not show that the

sheriff had acted under a mistaken interpretation of the law); see also Hight, 2022

WL 17178660, at *4 (finding that a sheriff and his deputy did not demonstrate they

were entitled to State immunity because they did not address the sixth exception’s

applicability to plaintiff’s claims against them).

The defendants argue that the sixth exception to State immunity does not

apply to sheriffs or deputy sheriffs because a “suit against a sheriff is essentially a

suit against the state.” King v. Colbert County, 620 So. 2d 623, 626 (Ala. 1993);

see Doc. 18 at 5–7; Doc. 20 at 5–7. In support of their argument, they rely on four

Alabama Supreme Court decisions that did not address the sixth exception to State

immunity in suits against sheriffs. See Doc. 18 at 6–7; Doc. 20 at 6–7. Each of these

cases predates Moulton, 6 and current Alabama case law does not support the

defendants’ position. See Birmingham Br. (WVTM-TV) LLC, 303 So. 3d at 1159–60.

Therefore, even if the defendants had met their initial burden of proving their

entitlement to State immunity, they have not given the court reason to conclude that

the exception recognized in Moulton does not apply here.

In sum, Smith, Carpenter and White do not establish they are entitled to State

immunity. Even if they did, they have not demonstrated that an exception to

immunity would not cover Brown’s claims.

2. Jailer Immunity

Similarly, as Brown points out, Carpenter and White have not established that

they enjoy jailer immunity even if they are employees of the Walker County Jail and

not deputy sheriffs. See Doc. 17 at 7–10. The Alabama Jailer Act provides immunity

for those who are employed by a sheriff to “operate the jail and supervise the inmates

housed therein.” Ala. Code § 14-6-1; see Bozeman v. County of Elmore, 2021 WL

2954004, at *6 (M.D. Ala. July 14, 2021); York v. Williams, 2023 WL 7927762, at

*17 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2023). It “entitle[s] jailers to the same immunity enjoyed

6 These cases, in reverse chronological order, are Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005);

Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 305 (Ala. 2004); King v. Colbert County, 620 So. 2d 623,

626 (Ala. 1993); and Parker v. Amerson, 519 So. 2d 442, 446 (Ala. 1987). See Doc. 18 at 6–7;

Doc. 20 at 6–7. Moulton, which recognized the sixth exception to immunity, see Archie, 2021 WL

1182370, at *3, was decided in 2013. The defendants do not point to any cases decided after

Moulton that support their position in their briefs. See Docs. 7, 14, 18 & 20.

by sheriffs and deputies, provided the jailers are acting within the line and scope of

their duties and in compliance with the law.” York, 2023 WL 7927762, at *17. While

“[t]he Alabama Supreme Court has not interpreted the phrase ‘in compliance with

the law,’” id. at *18, the “Eleventh Circuit has held that § 14-6-1 does not ‘immunize

[defendants] from liability under state law if they violated [a plaintiff’s]

constitutional rights.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Hughes, 920

F.3d 729, 734 (11th Cir. 2019)).

As explained above, Carpenter and White do not provide any support for their

claim that they were acting within the line and scope of their employment when they

contacted Bales, threatened Brown’s employment, or blocked inmates from calling

Brown. See Doc. 1 at 4–6; see also Docs. 7 & 18. And even if they did, the existence

of an actionable First Amendment claim against them undermines any argument that

they were acting in compliance with the law. See Docs. 6 & 7; see also Bozeman,

2021 WL 2954004, at *6 (denying a jailer immunity from state-law claims because

he did not move to dismiss the federal constitutional claim asserted for the same or

similar conduct and explaining that “a plausible allegation of a violation of federal

constitutional law means that there is also a plausible allegation that [the jailer] was

not acting in compliance with the law for purposes of immunity”). Therefore,

regardless of whether Carpenter and White are properly classified as deputies or

jailers, they are not immune from Brown’s claims.

Because Smith, Carpenter, and White have not shown their immunity from

suit, their motions to dismiss Brown’s individual-capacity state-law claims are

denied. Of course, the defendants may assert an immunity defense at the summary

judgment stage. See Robinson, 777 F. App’x at 400 (“If [the deputy defendants]

believe, after a period of discovery, that the evidence establishes their entitlement to

state-law immunity, they may seek summary judgment on this defense.’’).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

1. Sheriff Smith’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part, and all claims against Sheriff Smith in his official capacity

are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Carpenter and White’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED on February 7, 2025.

GRAY a Te

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17