The opinion
PEARSON, J.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ROBERT MAURICE JONES, )
) CASE NO. 4:24-CV-1908
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON
)
MAHONING COUNTY CHILD SUPPORT ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, et al., ) AND ORDER
)
Defendants. )
Plaintiff Robert Maurice Jones filed this action, pro se, against the Mahoning County
Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”), Cuyahoga County CSEA, Mahoning County
Juvenile Court Judge Theresa Dellick, Mahoning County Juvenile Court Magistrate Judge Ted
A. Ferris, Mahoning County Common Pleas Court Judge John Durkin, Trumbull County Probate
Court Judge James Fredericka, Mahoning County CSEA Attorneys Joanna Malmisur and Joshua
Baumann, Mahoning County Assistant Prosecutor Edward DeAngelo, Attorneys Jennifer
Robbins, Ross Smith, and Thomas Mikulka, the State of Ohio, the Ohio Department of Job and
Family Services, and the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Plaintiff appears to seek relief from
his multiple child support orders and the consequences he has experienced from non-payment of
support. He asserts claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “void
orders” and “constitutional violations.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 1). He seeks monetary
damages.
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Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Proceed Jn Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2). That Motion is
granted.
I. Background
Plaintiff's Complaint is ten pages long with sixty-seven pages of exhibits, it contains no
factual allegations and is nearly indecipherable. One of the exhibits to the Complaint indicates
that as of 2010, Plaintiff owed over $ 12,000.00 in child support arrearages to three different
women, and over $ 800.00 to the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services. (ECF No. 1-2
at PageID #: 18). Those child support orders appeared to have been issued in three separate cases
in the Mahoning County Juvenile Court in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In 2010, a criminal action was
initiated against him by the State of Ohio for non-payment of the child support. (ECF No. 1-2 at
PagelD #: 18). Plaintiff pled guilty to three counts of non-support of dependents. On April 5,
2013, Mahoning County Court Judge John Durkin sentenced him to five years of community
controls. (ECF No. 1-2 at PageID #16-17). He completed his sentence in March 2018.
It is unclear whether Plaintiff still owes child support arrearages. He attaches a Notice to
Reinstate /Reissue a License dated December 8, 2015 stating he is no longer in default. (ECF
No. 1-6 at PageID #: 72). That Notice is incomplete. In 2019, his license status was listed as
suspended for non-payment of child support. (ECF No. 1-6 at PageID #: 73-74). He attaches a
letter from the State Department indicating he was denied a passport in 2021 because he has a
child support arrearage that exceeds $ 5,000.00. He attaches a letter from Cuyahoga CSEA
stating he was in arrears in his child support payments for another child who does not appear to
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have been the subject of the Mahoning County Juvenile Court cases, or the Mahoning County
Common Pleas Court criminal case. (ECF No. 1-6 at PageID #: 71). He also attaches a letter
from the State of Ohio dated in 2022 stating that his income tax refund was being applied to his
substantial child support arrearages, the letter indicates that he owed $ 15,529.00 for his three
child support cases in Mahoning County, and $ 20,042.00 for his child support case in Cuyahoga
County. (ECF No. 1-6 at PageID #: 79). Finally, he alleges that on July 18, 2024, Probate Court
Judge Fredericka allowed his portion of the sale of his father’s estate property to be applied
toward his child support arrearages. (ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 4). In state court, Plaintiff
challenged the Probate Court’s jurisdiction to allow his portion of the estate to be garnished, but
was unsuccessful.
Plaintiff now brings forth a Complaint listing six Counts. In Count One, he claims the
Common Pleas Court Judge Durkin, Private Attorney Smith, and Prosecutor DeAngelo had a
duty to intervene to declare his child support orders to be unconstitutional. Instead, Judge Durkin
sentenced him to community control. In Count 2, he states “Lack of Jurisdiction - Not an Article
II Court, violation of Separation of Power Clause Violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments, due
process guaranteed.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6). He states that “Defendants violated Oath of
Office once they agreed and singed [sic] the IV-D Contract to operate in a private capacity and
not officers of the court, conspiring with CSEA, and causing a conflict of interest of my due
process and equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (ECF No. 1
at PageID #: 6). In Count 3, Plaintiff asserts that Juvenile Court Judge Dellick, Magistrate Ferris,
Private Attorney Robbins, and CSEA Attorney Malmisur conspired to cause him harm by
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pursuing child support actions, which he contends is a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (ECF No. | at PageID #: 6). Count Four
contains the same arguments as Count Three but asserts those claims against Trumbull County
Probate Court Judge Fredericka, Private Attorney Mikula and CSEA Attorney Baumann. Count
Five asserts that the State of Ohio and its agencies and CSEA conspired to harm him by requiring
him to pay child support. Count Six asserts that the Defendants violated his right to travel by
suspending his driver’s license and denying him a passport. Finally, although not presented in a
separate Count, Plaintiff claims Defendants acted negligently. He seeks monetary damages.
II. Standard for Dismissal
Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364,
365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a court is required to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 US. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of
Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
when it is premised on an meritless legal theory or when the factual contentions are clearly
baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks
“plausibility in the Complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A
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pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A
plaintiff is not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than “an
unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A
pleading that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not meet this pleading standard. /d. In reviewing a complaint, the court must construe the
pleading in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151
F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).
Ill. Law and Analysis
To the extent Plaintiff is challenging the validity of the state court orders to pay child
support, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction relieve him of those judgments. United
States District Courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn state court decisions even if the request
to reverse the state court judgment is based on an allegation that the state court’s action was
unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005).
Federal appellate review of state court judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme
Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari. Jd. Under this principle, generally referred to as the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, a party losing his case in state court is barred from seeking what in
substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court based
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on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal rights. Berry v.
Schmitt 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on two United States Supreme Court decisions
interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).' See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
USS. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). Congress enacted the statute to prevent “end-runs
around state court judgments” by requiring litigants seeking review of that judgment to file a writ
of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Child.
& Fam. Servs., 606 F.3d 301 , 308 (6th Cir. 2010), The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on
the negative inference that, if appellate court review of state judgments is vested in the United
States Supreme Court, then such review may not occur in the lower federal courts. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 544 US. at 283-84; Kovacic, 606 F.3d 301 at 308-11; Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364,
369 (6th Cir. 2008).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the
Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty
or statute of the United States is drawn in question or where the
validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or
immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or
the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States.
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Rooker-Feldman is a doctrine with narrow application. It does not bar federal jurisdiction
“simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated in state
court.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293; Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99, It also does not address
potential conflicts between federal and state court orders, which fall within the parameters of the
doctrines of comity, abstention, and preclusion. Berry, 688 F.3d 299. Instead, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing his or her case in state court initiates an
action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment itself, and
seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542,
548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look to
the “source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick vy.
Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299; Kovacic, 606 F.3d at
310. If the source of the Plaintiff's injury is the state-court judgment itself, then the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other
source of injury, such as a third party's actions, then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.”
Id.; see Lawrence, 531 F.3d at 368-69. In conducting this inquiry, the Court should also consider
the Plaintiff's requested relief. Evans v. Cordray, No. 09-3998, 2011 WL 2149547, at *1 (6th
Cir, May 27, 2011).
Here, the source of Plaintiff's alleged injury appears, in part, to be the state court child
support judgments themselves. The other source of his alleged injury is the consequences that
were imposed on him for violating the child support orders. To the extent that Plaintiff is asking
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this Court to declare those state court orders to be void or unconstitutional, the Court cannot
grant that relief.
If Plaintiff seeks to relitigate issues that were already decided in the course of the child
support cases, the criminal case, or the probate case, his claims are barred by res judicata. The
term “res judicata” literally means “a matter [already] judged.” Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The doctrine of res judicata bars duplicative litigation based on
the same event or events. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). When one court has already resolved the
merits of a case, another court will not revisit them. /d. The doctrine of res judicata therefore
precludes a party from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim or from raising a new
defense to defeat the prior judgment. Gargallo v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
918 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1990). It bars relitigation of every issue actually brought before the
Court and every issue or defense that should have been raised in the previous action. Jd.
Here, res judicata bars Plaintiff from relitigating in federal court claims and issues that
were previously decided by a state court. Bragg v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 570 F.3d 775, 776 (6th
Cir. 2009). This includes relitigating issues of whether Plaintiff owes child support, whether the
child support statutes are constitutional, whether he could or should have been prosecuted for
nonpayment of support, and whether his inheritance could be garnished to pay for his outstanding
child support obligation. Those issues necessarily were decide in the state court cases.
Moreover, Plaintiff raised or had the opportunity to raise all of his federal claims in the state
court actions. This Court must give full and credit to those state court judgments. Plaintiff
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cannot relitigate those issues for a second time in federal court in the hope of obtaining a
different result.
Furthermore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. He
indicates he is seeking relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Titles 18
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes. They do not provide a private cause of action in a
civil case. Kafele v. Frank & Woolridge Co., 108 Fed.Appx. 307, 308 (6th Cir. 2004).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that a person acting
under color of state law deprived him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt vy. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
Generally to be considered to have acted “under color of state law,” the Defendant must be a
state or local government official or employee. Jennifer Robbins, Ross Smith, and Thomas
Mikulka are private attorneys, not government employees. A privately retained attorney is not
considered a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Washington v. Brewer, No. 91-1935, 1991 WL
243591 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 1991); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981).
Moreover, while Judge Dellick, Magistrate Ferris, Judge Durkin, and Judge Fredericka
are state officials for purposes of § 1983, they are absolutely immune from suits for damages that
stem from decisions they made from the bench or actions they took in the course of presiding
over a case in their court. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d
1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff's only allegations against these judicial officers concerns
decisions they made in the course of his child support cases, the criminal case for non-payment
of support and the probate action. They are immune from suit.
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Similarly, Joanna Malmisur, Edward DeAngelo, and Joshua Baumann are absolutely
immune from suit for their role as prosecutors representing the State in Plaintiff's child support,
and criminal cases. Jmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Pusey v. Youngstown, 11
F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 1993). Absolute immunity is extended to prosecuting attorneys when the
actions in question are those of an advocate. Spurlock v. Thompson, 330 F.3d 791, 798 (6th Cir.
2003). Immunity is granted not only for actions directly related to initiating a prosecution and
presenting the State’s case, but also to activities undertaken “in connection with [the] duties in
functioning as a prosecutor.” Jmbler, 424 US. at 431; Higgason vy. Stephens, 288 F.3d 868, 877
(6th Cir. 2002). Immunity also reaches beyond the criminal process to conduct in civil
proceedings where a government attorney is operating in an enforcement role in “initiating. . .
judicial proceedings,” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 947 (6th Cir. 2000), or “undertak[ing]
the defense of a civil suit,” A- Bari v. Winn, No. 89-5150, 1990 WL 94229, at *1 (6th Cir. July 9,
1990). The few allegations in the Complaint that are aimed at Malmisur, DeAngelo and
Baumann all pertain to their role in representing the government. They are absolutely immune
from suit.
Finally, the State of Ohio and its agencies, which include the Ohio Department of Jobs
and Family Services and the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles are also immune from suit. The
Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to the imposition of liability upon States and their
agencies. Latham v. Office of Atty. Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir. 2005);
Bouquett v. Clemmer, 626 F. Supp. 46, 48 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
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That leaves Plaintiff's claims against the Mahoning County CSEA and the Cuyahoga
County CSEA. Only Count Five in the Complaint is directed specifically at these Defendants. It
states that the CSEA Defendants,
conspired to cause harm to Robert Maurice Jones through IV-D
Contract, operating under color of law and fraudulent concealment.
Defendants conspired to issue void orders knowingly through IV-D
contract, and agreed to act on these void orders causing harm to
Plaintiff, then and now still suffering from void unlawful order,
violating the 5" Amendment right to due process, 14'" Amendment to
due process and equal protection.
ECF No. | at PageID #: 8. As stated above, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to declare
a child support order issued by a state court to be void. Rooker, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983). The orders are valid unless Plaintiff convinces a state court or the Supreme
Court of the United States otherwise. Furthermore, due process requires that Plaintiff be given
notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard “in a meaningful manner.” See
Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 563 (6th Cir, 1983). Plaintiff does not
allege facts suggesting he was denied notice of any child support proceedings or that he was not
given an opportunity to be heard. He fails to state a claim for denial of due process.
Furthermore, equal protection requires Plaintiff to allege facts suggesting he was intentionally
treated differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.
Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Township of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681 -682 (6th Cir. 2011); Radvansky v.
City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 312 (6th Cir. 2005), Plaintiff did not allege facts suggesting
he received disparate treatment.
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Count Two is directed generally at “Defendants.” The portion that could plausibly be
applicable to the CSEA Defendants appears to be redundant to the claims in Count Five. It also
mentions separation of powers. The separation of powers between a state trial judge and county
agency is a matter of state law, not federal constitutional law. See Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d
298, 302 (6th Cir. 2000). It will not support a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of his Right to Travel against “Defendants”
in Count Six. This is founded in part on his driver’s license suspension and the State
Department’s denial of his passport application under 42 U.S.C. § 652(k) based on his child
support arrearage in excess of $ 5,000.00.
The Supreme Court has identified the right to travel from one state to another as a
fundamental right of United States citizenship. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-01 (1999).
This right has three components: (1) the right of a citizen of one state to enter and to leave
another state; (2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second state; and (3) for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that state. /d. at 500.
Plaintiff does not clearly explain how he believes the CSEA Defendants violated his right to
travel. It appears, however, that he is confusing the constitutional right to travel with the
qualified privilege to drive an automobile. George Taylor Duncan y. Linda Cone, No. 00-5705,
2000 WL 1828089, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000). Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting he is
unable to travel between states. He just cannot drive a motor vehicle to do so. He has other
12
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modes of transportation at his disposal, including being a passenger in a vehicle. The suspension
of his driver’s license did not deny him the right to travel.
Although the freedom to travel internationally is an aspect of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it is not a fundamental right equivalent to the right to
interstate travel and thus, is subject to reasonable governmental regulations within the bounds of
due process. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170,
176-77 (1978); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 537 (D.C.Cir.1999) (en banc);
Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1438-39 (9th Cir.1996). Title 42
U.S.C. § 652(k) and regulations that support it do not violate the Due Process Clause as long as
there is a rational basis for refusing to issue a passport and revoking a previously issued one to
individuals who owe arrearage of child support in an amount exceeding $5,000. The
Government has a substantial interest in promoting the payment of child support arrearage.
Restricting passports for persons who owe substantial arrearage is reasonably related to
furthering that end because it encourages people to pay such arrearage, and prevents them from
fleeing the country to avoid payment. See Weinstein v. Albright, No. OOCIV.1193(JGK), 2000
WL 1154310, at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000). Therefore, there is no basis for the Plaintiffs
due process claim. In addition, the CSEA Defendants have no role in the denial of a passport.
That is a decision that is made by the State Department based on information it receives from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.
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V. Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
For the reasons above, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The Court
certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken
in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 6, 2025 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson
Date Benita Y. Pearson
United States District Judge
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