Donna Tealer v. R. Byars

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10129

____________________

DONNA TEALER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

R. BYARS,

A. CATLIN,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-02639-LMM

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal requires us to consider whether the district court

properly granted qualified immunity to two DeKalb County police

officers who were involved in securing a warrant for the arrest of

Plaintiff-Appellant Donna Tealer. Under the warrant, officers ar-

rested Tealer on charges of felony false imprisonment and misde-

meanor battery. Later, the prosecutor dismissed the false-impris-

onment charge.

Tealer sued Defendants-Appellees Officer Robert Byars and

Assistant Police Chief Antonio Catlin (“Officers”)—the Officers in-

volved in securing her arrest warrant—alleging claims for mali-

cious prosecution and false arrest under the Fourth Amendment,

and a Georgia constitutional violation. The district court dismissed

the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdic-

tion over the state claim. After careful review, and with the benefit

of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor

of the Officers.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts1

1 Because this appeal is before us on an order on a motion to dismiss, we accept

as true for purposes of our review the allegations set forth in Donna Tealer’s

Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto, and we make all reasonable

inferences in Tealer’s favor. See Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir.

2003). For this reason, the actual facts may or may not be as presented.

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On the afternoon of March 8, 2020, Tealer was at her son

David Tealer’s (“David”) 2 home. Using a Ring camera application

on her cell phone, Tealer observed two white vans parked in her

driveway. Because Tealer wasn’t expecting any visitors, she sus-

pected a potential burglary and feared for the safety of her 92-year-

old mother, who was alone at the house.

David advised his mother to call 911, and he drove her to

her house. While David drove, Tealer remained on the call with

911 and continued watching the Ring footage on her phone. She

observed one of the white vans leave her driveway while the other

remained. Tealer told the 911 dispatcher that she saw a man in a

blue shirt retrieve a ladder and climb onto the roof of her home.

Based on that sight, Tealer supposed that the man might be stealing

her satellite dish or attempting to enter the rear of her home by

climbing on the roof. Tealer told the dispatcher that her son was a

law-enforcement officer and was armed. David was a law-enforce-

ment officer with the South Fulton Police Department, though at

the time of these events, he was off duty.

When the Tealers arrived at Tealer’s house, they saw the

man in the blue shirt, later identified as Carlos Santos-Mendez, on

the roof of the house. David drew his firearm and pointed it at

Santos-Mendez. David identified himself as law enforcement and

ordered Santos-Mendez to come down from the roof and get on

2 To avoid confusion between Appellant Donna Tealer and her son David

Tealer, we refer to Donna Tealer as “Tealer” and to David Tealer as “David.”

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

the ground. Santos-Mendez initially ignored the commands, but

eventually came down from the roof and dropped to his knees.

Meanwhile, Tealer observed a metal hammer at the base of

the ladder, close to Santos-Mendez. She feared that Santos-Mendez

might use the hammer to fight back, so she approached Santos-

Mendez and tried to force him to lie down by “guiding him at his

back.”

Santos-Mendez responded by struggling with Tealer as she

attempted to force him to the ground. After holstering his gun,

David joined the struggle and ordered Santos-Mendez to put his

hands behind his back.

Santos-Mendez ignored the Tealers’ commands and at-

tempted to break free. During the scuffle, Santos-Mendez was

speaking on his cell phone in Spanish, and Tealer mistakenly be-

lieved that Santos-Mendez was telling the individuals in the first

white van to return and assist him in the fight. So Tealer attempted

to force Santos-Mendez to comply by striking Santos-Mendez three

times on the side of his head with her fist.

Santos-Mendez stopped resisting, and David realized that

Santos-Mendez’s boss, DelRoy Scott, was on the other end of the

cell phone. Santos-Mendez, too, identified the person on the

phone as his “boss.” Scott spoke to David and told David that he

was on his way to the house. When Scott arrived, he advised the

Tealers that he had hired Santos-Mendez to work on Tealer’s roof

as a subcontractor.

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As it turned out, Tealer had previously contracted with Scott

to perform roofing repairs on her house. But she had had no con-

tact with Scott since about two weeks earlier. According to Tealer,

Scott failed to perform the repairs on the date they agreed upon,

Scott never rescheduled the appointment, and Tealer had not

heard from Scott in two weeks when Santos-Mendez arrived to

work on the roof. Based on these events, Tealer alleges that Scott

breached the roofing contract, so it was null and void. And in

Tealer’s view, Scott had no authority to allow Santos-Mendez to

enter her property on March 8th.

About 10-15 minutes after Scott got to the Tealers’ home,

DeKalb County police officers arrived. Once law enforcement ar-

rived, the Tealers released Santos-Mendez and turned him over to

the officers. The officers investigated, interviewing all parties pre-

sent. They determined that the incident arose from a “misunder-

standing” based on the Tealers’ mistaken belief that Santos-Men-

dez was a burglar. The officers released Santos-Mendez. One of

the officers completed an incident report in which he identified Da-

vid as a “suspect” and Santos-Mendez as “the victim.”

Between March 9 and 11, 2020, Defendant Officer Robert

Byars further investigated the incident. Officer Byars reviewed

written statements, body-camera footage, and the Ring camera

footage. He also interviewed several witnesses, including Santos-

Mendez and David.

Defendant Assistant Police Chief Antonio Catlin—who had

supervisory authority over the investigation—stayed apprised of

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the facts of the case. Assistant Chief Catlin also spoke with Tealer

over the phone. Tealer told him, among other things, that she had

no agreement with Scott for roofing work on March 8th; that she

did not know Santos-Mendez; and that she believed Santos-Men-

dez initiated an altercation with her. Assistant Chief Catlin in-

formed Tealer that his office decided to seek arrest warrants for her

and David.

On March 12, 2020, Officer Byars submitted applications for

arrest warrants to a Georgia Superior Court judge, but the Superior

Court judge denied the warrant applications. Officer Byars later

presented warrant applications to a DeKalb County magistrate

judge, and the magistrate judge issued the arrest warrants. Accord-

ing to Tealer, Officer Byars did not inform the magistrate judge

that the Superior Court refused to issue the warrants. The DeKalb

Police Department arrested Tealer on charges of felony false im-

prisonment and battery.

Tealer alleges that Officer Byars’s application to the magis-

trate judge contained material omissions and misrepresentations.

According to Tealer, Officer Byars omitted the following infor-

mation:

• A Georgia Superior Court previously refused to issue an ar-

rest warrant for Tealer;

• Tealer believed someone was attempting to unlawfully en-

ter her residence;

• Tealer contacted 911 to report the incident;

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• David did not hear Santos-Mendez’s attempts to tell him

that DelRoy Scott was his employer;

• Tealer began a physical altercation with Santos-Mendez af-

ter Santos-Mendez “stood up” and became combative;

• Tealer feared that Santos-Mendez would fight back with a

nearby hammer;

• Scott breached his previous agreement with Tealer and had

no authority to be on Tealer’s property on March 8th;

• Scott had not communicated with Tealer for two weeks be-

fore the incident;

Tealer also asserts that Officer Byars’s warrant application con-

tained the following alleged misrepresentations:

• There was a signed contract to complete work on the roof;

• Santos-Mendez “returned” to Tealer’s home to “complete

work;”

• It was unclear whether Santos-Mendez had previously

worked on the roof;

• Santos-Mendez immediately identified himself as an em-

ployee of DelRoy Scott and complied with Tealer’s com-

mands;

• Tealer received notification that Santos-Mendez was at the

residence;

• Tealer and David called DelRoy Scott;

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

• David held Santos-Mendez at gun point “the entire time.”

After the warrants issued, Tealer was arrested for felony false

imprisonment and misdemeanor battery. The prosecutor later dis-

missed the false-imprisonment charge. But the battery charge re-

mains technically pending, though it has been “dead docketed,”

meaning the prosecution is postponed indefinitely.

B. Procedural History

On July 1, 2022, Tealer sued Officer Byars and Assistant

Chief Catlin. Her Amended Complaint, which is the operative

pleading here, sets forth Fourth Amendment claims for malicious

prosecution and false arrest and a claim for a Georgia constitutional

violation. Tealer brought the federal claims under Section 1983,

but she did not identify whether she was suing the Officers in their

individual or official capacities.

Upon the Officers’ motion, the district court dismissed

Tealer’s false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims under Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). As to the false-arrest claim,

the district court reasoned that Tealer failed to state a claim because

false arrest concerns only “seizures without legal process, such as

warrantless arrests.” But Tealer acknowledged that she was ar-

rested under a valid warrant that a magistrate judge signed. The

court reasoned that Tealer’s proper claim, if any, was for malicious

prosecution. That said, the district court concluded qualified im-

munity barred Tealer’s malicious-prosecution claim. Finally, the

district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

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Tealer’s state claim under the Georgia Constitution. As a result,

the district court dismissed all claims. Tealer now appeals.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant or

deny the defense of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, ac-

cepting the factual allegations in the complaint as true and drawing

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Dalrymple v. Reno,

334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d

1117, 1121 (11th Cir.2001)). We also review de novo a district

court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Baker v. City of Madison,

67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023). In conducting our review, we

accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Paez v. Mulvey, 915

F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2019).

As for a district court’s decision to decline to exercise supple-

mental jurisdiction over state-law claims, we review that for an

abuse of discretion. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d

733, 738 (11th Cir. 2006).

III. ANALYSIS

Tealer challenges the district court’s order on two grounds.

First, she argues that the district court incorrectly dismissed her

malicious-prosecution claim on qualified-immunity grounds. Sec-

ond, she asserts that the district court incorrectly declined supple-

mental jurisdiction over her Georgia claim. We address each issue

in turn.

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A. The district court did not err in dismissing Tealer’s malicious-prose-

cution claim

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-

zures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Tealer contends that the Officers

violated her right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from

an unreasonable seizure by engaging in a malicious prosecution of

her.

Malicious-prosecution claims are claims of unlawful seizure

when legal process occurs. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1157–

58 (11th Cir. 2020). A Fourth Amendment violation happens if the

“legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s

probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police of-

ficer’s false statements.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367

(2017). To establish this type of claim, Tealer must show “(1) that

the defendant violated [her] Fourth Amendment right to be free

from seizures pursuant to legal process and (2) that the criminal

proceedings against [her] terminated in [her] favor.” Luke v. Gulley,

975 F.3d 1140, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020).

There’s no question Tealer has satisfied the second element.

Tealer alleges malicious prosecution arising from the false-impris-

onment charge lodged against her. Because the prosecutor dis-

missed the false-imprisonment charge, those proceedings termi-

nated in her favor.

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So we consider whether Tealer has alleged enough facts to

establish the first element: “that the legal process justifying [her]

seizure was constitutionally infirm” and “that [her] seizure would

not otherwise be justified without legal process.” Williams, 965

F.3d at 1165. The legal process justifying a seizure is constitution-

ally infirm if “the officer who applied for the warrant should have

known that his application failed to establish probable cause” or

“an official, including an individual who did not apply for the war-

rant, intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions

necessary to support the warrant.” Id. A misstatement or omission

does not violate the Fourth Amendment if it is immaterial. That

is, even if a misstatement or omission occurs, if probable cause

would still exist “if the offending statement was removed or the

omitted information included,” the misstatement or omission is

not material. Paez, 915 F.3d at 1287. And if no omission or mis-

statement is material, a plaintiff cannot show that a malicious pros-

ecution has occurred.

1. Claims Against Officer Byars

We first consider Tealer’s claims against Officer Byars.

Tealer argues that Officer Byars is liable because he applied for her

arrest warrant and, in Tealer’s opinion, should have known that his

application failed to establish probable cause. She also claims that

Officer Byars misrepresented and omitted material information in

and from the arrest warrant. We disagree. Instead, we conclude

that qualified immunity bars Tealer’s claims.

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Qualified immunity protects police officers from suit in their

individual capacities for discretionary actions they have performed

in the course of their duties. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231

(2009). This protection shields officials from suit if their conduct

does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional

right of which a reasonable officer would have known. Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity is intended to balance the need for offi-

cial accountability with the need to permit officials to engage in

their discretionary duties without fear of personal liability or har-

assing litigation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Durruthy v. Pastor, 351

F.3d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003). Qualified immunity protects from

litigation “all but the plainly incompetent or one who is knowingly

violating the federal law.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th

Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It’s in-

tended to “liberate[] government agents from the need to con-

stantly err on the side of caution by protecting them both from lia-

bility and the other burdens of litigation, including discovery.”

Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

To obtain qualified immunity, an officer must first show he

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when he

engaged in the challenged conduct. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d

1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002). If the defendant makes this showing,

the plaintiff “bears the burden of proving both that the defendant

violated [her] constitutional right and that ‘the right was clearly

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established at the time of the violation.’” Washington v. Howard, 25

F.4th 891, 897–98 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Barnes v. Zaccari, 669

F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2012)).

The court will not always have to analyze both steps; if no

constitutional violation occurs, “the inquiry ends there.” Robinson

v. Arrugueta, 415 F.3d 1252, 1255 (11th Cir. 2005). The court also

need not take the steps in any particular order. Rather, the court

may “exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed

first.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. And because qualified immunity

can be a defense from suit—not just liability—“it is ‘important for

a court to ascertain the validity of a qualified immunity defense as

early in the lawsuit as possible.’” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1194 (quoting GJR

Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)

(citation omitted)).

Clearly established law is law that “makes it obvious that the

defendant’s acts violated the plaintiff’s rights in the specific set of

circumstances at issue.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1297 (11th

Cir. 2018) (alteration adopted) (quoting Youmans v. Gagnon, 626

F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). For the law to be

clearly established, “existing law must have placed the constitu-

tionality of the officer’s conduct ‘beyond debate.’” District of Co-

lumbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “It is not enough that the rule is sug-

gested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear

enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish

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14 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. The contours

of a clearly established rule are “so well defined” that a reasonable

officer would clearly understand “that his conduct was unlawful in

the situation he confronted.” Id. (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001)). This requires a “high ‘degree of specificity’” that

is “especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” Id. at

63–64 (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).

In the Eleventh Circuit, only United States Supreme Court

precedent, published Eleventh Circuit precedent, and relevant

Georgia Supreme Court precedent can clearly establish law. Brad-

ley v. Benton, 10 F.4th 1232, 1242–43 (11th Cir. 2021). Because an

unpublished opinion is “not binding precedent,” United States v.

Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2013), it cannot clearly es-

tablish the law. Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1241 n.6 (11th Cir.

2021).

The district court concluded that Officer Byars and Assistant

Chief Catlin were performing a discretionary function. Tealer does

not contest this holding on appeal. And we agree that this element

of qualified immunity is satisfied here because the “pursuit and ap-

prehension of suspected criminals is a core discretionary function

of the police.” Hunter v. City of Leeds, 941 F.3d 1265, 1278 n.16 (11th

Cir. 2019) (citing Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1289–90 (11th Cir.

2009) (per curiam)).

At the next step, though, Tealer contends that the district

court erred in granting qualified immunity because, in her view,

the Officers’ conduct violates clearly established law. Tealer argues

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Officer Byars and Assistant Chief Catlin should have known that

the warrant application failed to establish probable cause and that

the warrant application intentionally misrepresented and omitted

information that, if included, would have vitiated probable cause.

To determine whether a misstatement or omission in an of-

ficer’s warrant affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment, we use a

two-part test. “First, we ask whether there was an intentional or

reckless misstatement or omission.” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1287 (citing

United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986)). If so, we

determine whether the misstatement or omission was material by

considering if the omission or correction of the misstatement or

the addition of the omitted statement would undermine probable

cause. Id. An officer is entitled to qualified immunity if his warrant

affidavit would still support arguable probable cause even after the

misstatements were corrected or the omissions were added. See id.

at 1287–88; Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1257 n.25 (11th

Cir. 2010).

Tealer asserts that the alleged omissions and misrepresenta-

tions were intentional. We assume the truth of her factual allega-

tions. See Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 994. Even so, Tealer’s malicious-

prosecution claim fails because arguable probable cause existed to

arrest her for false imprisonment, even accounting for the alleged

omissions and misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit.

“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57

(quoting Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). Probable

cause “does not require anything close to conclusive proof or proof

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beyond a reasonable doubt . . . , or even a finding made by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence.” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286. Instead,

“probable cause exists when the facts, considering the totality of

the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of a reasonable

officer, establish ‘a probability or substantial chance of criminal ac-

tivity.’” Washington, 25 F.4th at 898–99 (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at

57). In a malicious-prosecution case, we ask “whether the judicial

officer who made the probable-cause determination had sufficient,

truthful information to establish probable cause.” Williams, 965

F.3d at 1163.

As relevant here, the warrant affidavit that Officer Byars sub-

mitted to the magistrate judge averred that probable cause existed

to arrest Tealer for False Imprisonment, Georgia Code § 16-5-41.

Under Georgia law, a “person commits the offense of false impris-

onment when, in violation of the personal liberty of another, [s]he

arrests, confines, or detains such person without legal authority.”

Ga. Code § 16-5-41(a).

Tealer admits that she forcibly and intentionally detained

Santos-Mendez on the ground for an extended period. But she con-

tends that the Officers should have known that the detention was

justified because Tealer thought Santos-Mendez was a burglar, and

she allegedly had authority to effectuate a citizen’s arrest of Santos-

Mendez.

Tealer also asserts that Officer Byars’s warrant affidavit

omitted and misrepresented information supporting Tealer’s al-

leged ability to make a lawful citizen’s arrest and showing that the

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incident was a misunderstanding. And she alleges that Officer

Byars made a material omission by failing to inform the magistrate

judge that the Superior Court previously denied Officer Byars’s ap-

plication for an arrest warrant, and a material misstatement that

Scott was authorized to perform work on Tealer’s property on

March 8th.

We begin with Officer Byars’s knowledge that Tealer

thought Santos-Mendez was a burglar. Tealer argues that Officer

Byars’s warrant application misstated several details relating to

Tealer’s misunderstanding.

But all these alleged misstatements were immaterial. For

starters, even if Tealer believed Santos-Mendez was a burglar, she

still did not release him when she learned he worked for Scott. In

fact, according to Tealer’s own version of the facts, while Santos-

Mendez was held on the ground, he identified the person he was

speaking to on the phone—DelRoy Scott—as his boss. And Scott

informed the Tealers that Santos-Mendez was his subcontractor

when he arrived at Tealers’ house. Yet Tealer continued to hold

Santos-Mendez down until law enforcement arrived—some 10–15

minutes after Scott arrived at her home and told her information

that refuted her belief that Santos-Mendez was a burglar.

At best, Tealer’s incorrect belief that Santos-Mendez was a

burglar relates to the mistake-of-fact affirmative defense under

Georgia law. See Ga. Code § 16-3-5. But affirmative defenses usu-

ally do not undermine probable cause. Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286,

1289–90; see, e.g., Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1325

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18 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

(11th Cir. 2014); Jordan v. Mosley, 487 F.3d 1350, 1356–57 (11th Cir.

2007). “Indeed, arresting officers, in deciding whether probable

cause exists, are not required to sift through conflicting evidence or

resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality of the circum-

stances present a sufficient basis for believing that an offense has

been committed.” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286 (citation and internal quo-

tation marks omitted).

Probable cause does not require “convincing proof” or

“proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Manners v. Cannella, 891

F.3d 959, 968 (11th Cir. 2018). Nor is an officer “required to resolve

every inconsistency found in the evidence.” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286.

Similarly, officers aren’t lawyers, so we “do not expect them to re-

solve legal questions or to weigh the viability of most affirmative

defenses.” Id. (citing Williams v. City of Albany, 936 F.2d 1256, 1260

(11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)). So the Officers did not have a duty

to resolve this legal question before seeking Tealer’s arrest, and

Tealer’s mistake-of-fact defense does not undermine probable

cause here. See Jordan, 487 F.3d at 1357 (stating that, “[u]nder the

law of probable cause, no police officer had a duty to resolve” a

potential affirmative defense “before seeking out Plaintiff’s arrest”).

Next, Tealer argues that she made a citizen’s arrest, so Geor-

gia Code § 17-4-60 authorized her to detain Santos-Mendez. This

argument fares no better than the last one.

While § 17-4-60 is now repealed, on March 8, 2020, it pro-

vided, “A private person may arrest an offender if the offense is

committed in his presence or within his immediate knowledge. If

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the offense is a felony and the offender is escaping or attempting to

escape, a private person may arrest him upon reasonable and prob-

able grounds of suspicion.” Ga. Code § 17-4-60 (repealed May 10,

2021). This argument suffers from the same problem as Tealer’s

burglar argument. The assertion that Tealer made a citizen’s arrest

is another defense to the false-imprisonment charge. So Officer

Byars was not responsible for determining whether a valid citizen’s

arrest took place before applying for the arrest warrant.

A reasonable officer also could have concluded that Santos-

Mendez did not commit an offense in Tealer’s presence and that

Tealer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect he was committing a

felony. Santos-Mendez arrived at Tealer’s house in broad daylight

with a ladder and a tool belt. Yet without any investigation, Tealer

immediately treated Santos-Mendez as burglar and trespasser. She

physically restrained him and struck him on the head three times

without any type of inquiry. Tealer took this action even though

she knew she had spoken with Scott about roof repairs less than

two weeks earlier.

Even if the alleged misstatements in the warrant affidavit

were corrected, the magistrate judge could have determined that

probable cause existed to conclude that Tealer acted without au-

thority to effectuate a citizen’s arrest, and therefore falsely impris-

oned Santos-Mendez. Tealer admits that she intentionally detained

Santos-Mendez, and the detention lasted well beyond the period

that she could have even arguably reasonably believed Santos-

Mendez committed a crime. So correcting the alleged

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20 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

misstatements wouldn’t have resulted in a lack of even arguable

probable cause.

Tealer also contends that the magistrate judge would have

denied the arrest warrant if the magistrate knew that Scott failed to

fix Tealer’s roof on time and failed to reschedule the appointment.

Tealer asserts that Scott’s failure breached the contract and that this

breach terminated the agreement. So, she reasons, neither Scott

nor Santos-Mendez were authorized to be on her property, and she

reasonably believed that Santos-Mendez committed criminal tres-

pass under Georgia Code § 16-7-21(b)(1).

Tealer has not shown that the Officers violated the Fourth

Amendment under clearly established law. Even if the warrant af-

fidavit documented Scott’s failures, at least arguable probable cause

supported the conclusion that Tealer falsely imprisoned Santos-

Mendez. Again, Tealer agrees that she forcibly and intentionally

detained Santos-Mendez and did so even after learning that he was

there to fix her roof. That’s enough to establish at least arguable

probable cause for false imprisonment.

Finally, Tealer contends that the warrant affidavit omitted

material information because it did not note that a Georgia Supe-

rior Court had allegedly previously refused to issue a warrant for

her arrest. Tealer similarly asserts that the Superior Court’s refusal

to issue an arrest warrant “would have led any reasonable officer to

conclude that arguable probable cause was lacking.” Again, we dis-

agree.

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23-10129 Opinion of the Court 21

First, the warrant allegedly presented to the Superior Court

wasn’t attached to the Amended Complaint so we can’t consider its

contents. In other words, we can’t consider how, if at all, its sup-

porting affidavit differed from the affidavit submitted to the mag-

istrate judge; and we can’t judge whether the warrant even per-

tained to Tealer at all. Second, even if we considered the warrant,

the Superior Court’s refusal to issue it does not change Tealer’s ac-

tions on March 8, 2020, or negate arguable probable cause for her

arrest. Regardless of the Superior Court’s decision, Tealer con-

cedes that on March 8th, she forcibly and intentionally detained

Santos-Mendez against his will, despite knowing for at least part of

the time she detained him that he was there to fix her roof. This

fact was enough to create arguable probable cause for a false-im-

prisonment charge, even if the magistrate judge knew of the Supe-

rior Court’s alleged decision.

On a final note, we reject Tealer’s suggestion that the district

court erred because it failed to follow our decision in Carter v. Butts

County, 821 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2016). Carter simply does not create

a clearly established rule applicable to this case. In Carter, the de-

fendant police officer’s home was foreclosed upon. Id. at 1314. The

defendant officer received notices of impending foreclosure and

subsequent sale, and he knew the new owner would be sending

agents to the home to clean it and prepare it for sale. Id. at 1321–

23. Despite this knowledge, the defendant officer arrived at the

house and ordered the arrests of the plaintiff individuals who were

preparing the house for sale, claiming that they had committed a

burglary, criminal trespass, and theft. Id. at 1314-18. The plaintiffs

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22 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

brought claims against the defendant officer for false arrest under

§ 1983. Id. at 1322. We rejected the officer’s defense of qualified

immunity, finding that the officer “knew that [the property man-

ager] was authorized to enter and clean out the Property” and he

had “enough information to know that [they] were not engaged in

burglary, criminal trespass, or theft.” Id. at 1321.

Carter does not suggest—much less clearly establish—that

Officer Byars violated the Fourth Amendment. The officer in

Carter knew that he arrested the plaintiffs on false pretenses be-

cause he had direct knowledge that they were permitted by law in

his former home. Id. at 1320. Here, in contrast, Officer Byars had

no direct knowledge of what occurred at Tealer’s house. And in

any case, Officer Byars applied for an arrest warrant for false im-

prisonment because Tealer (by her own admission) intentionally

and forcibly detained Santos-Mendez. Unlike in Carter, no facts ex-

ist here that so much as suggest Officer Byars arrested Tealer even

though he knew she did not commit a crime.

In short, the district court correctly held that Tealer’s § 1983

action against Officer Byars is barred by qualified immunity.

2. Claim Against Assistant Chief Catlin

Although Officer Byars applied for the arrest warrant, Tealer

argues that Assistant Chief Catlin is liable as Officer Byars’s super-

visor and for his failure to intervene. But as we’ve already dis-

cussed, Tealer did not show that Officer Byars’s underlying con-

duct violated clearly established law. No matter how much

knowledge Assistant Chief Catlin had about the arrest warrant, he

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23-10129 Opinion of the Court 23

was not directly involved, and the facts do not show that the officer

who authored the arrest warrant was engaged in a clear violation

of established law. No supervisory liability exists if the underlying

conduct does not itself violate the law. See Paez, 915 F.3d at 1291

(because officers committed no constitutional violations, their su-

pervisors could not be found liable for violating Section 1983); My-

ers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] supervisor

may not be held liable under section 1983 unless the supervised of-

ficial committed an underlying violation of a constitutional right.”).

And while Tealer suggests that liability exists for failure to

intervene, that too fails when no constitutional violation occurred

in the first place. See Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1199 (11th

Cir. 2023) (“Of course, a failure-to-intervene claim requires an un-

derlying constitutional violation.”).

The district court correctly held that Assistant Chief Catlin

is also entitled to qualified immunity.

B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Tealer’s state-law claim.

We also affirm the district court’s decision to decline supple-

mental jurisdiction over Tealer’s state-law claim. Tealer concedes

that if the district court properly dismissed her federal claims, then

the court could decline jurisdiction over the Georgia claim. Be-

cause the district court correctly dismissed Tealer’s federal claims,

the court had discretion to dismiss her Georgia claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3); Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639

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24 Opinion of the Court 23-10129

(2009). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it de-

clined jurisdiction over the state claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s or-

der dismissing Tealer’s Amended Complaint.

AFFIRMED.