Opinion

Charles R Brown v. Department of Justice

Court: Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed: Feb 5, 2025
Status: Unpublished
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 33.9%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CHARLES R. BROWN, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, NY-0752-20-0061-I-2

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DATE: February 5, 2025

Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Raymond R. Granger , Esquire, New York, New York, for the appellant.

Eugene Kim , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

Henry J. Kerner, Member

*The Board members voted on this decision before

the effective date of Acting Chairman Kerner’s designation.

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which

sustained his removal based on charges of conduct unbecoming a Deputy U.S.

Marshal and failure to follow policy. Generally, we grant petitions such as this

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous

findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to

the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of

the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or

involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of

the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite

the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5

of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).

After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner

has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for

review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly

MODIFIED to find that the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, the

appellant’s position as a law enforcement officer, and the notoriety of his

misconduct outweighed the mitigating factors and warranted the removal, and to

find that the appellant’s alcoholism was not the but-for cause of his removal, we

AFFIRM the initial decision.

BACKGROUND

The appellant, a GS-13 Deputy U.S. Marshal, does not dispute the facts that

led to his removal. Brown v. Department of Justice, NY-0752-20-0061-I-1,

Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 8; Brown v. Department of Justice, NY-0752-

0061-I-2, Appeal File (I-2 AF), Tab 10 at 4-7; Hearing Recording (HR)

(testimony of the appellant). On December 16, 2016, the appellant, while off

duty, went to a bar and took with him a personally owned handgun. I-2 AF,

Tab 10 at 5; HR (testimony of the appellant). He consumed numerous alcoholic

drinks, to the point where he blacked out. HR (testimony of the appellant). At

some point in the evening, the appellant walked to a local McDonald’s restaurant

and engaged in a verbal altercation with the cashier, during which he placed his

agency credentials on the counter. IAF, Tab 10; I-2 AF, Tab 10 at 6. His

behavior concerned several other patrons, who escorted the appellant out of the

restaurant. IAF, Tab 14 at 65. At some point after the appellant was escorted out

of the restaurant, he drew the handgun he had brought with him. Id. at 65, 69. A

witness called the police, and the appellant was arrested near the McDonald’s and

charged with reckless endangerment, criminal possession of a firearm, and second

degree menacing with a weapon. Id. at 69. Shortly thereafter, the New York Post

published an article about the appellant’s arrest, identifying him as a Deputy U.S.

Marshal. Id. at 72-73. The appellant eventually entered into a conditional plea of

menacing in the third degree in New York State Court and agreed to complete a

court-ordered alcohol-treatment program and 30 days of community service. Id.

at 12. The appellant completed the conditions of his plea deal, the charges were

dismissed, and all records related to the case were sealed. Id. at 12-13.

On December 18, 2019, the agency removed the appellant for four

specifications of conduct unbecoming a Deputy U.S. Marshal, specifically, for

carrying an agency-authorized weapon while under the influence of alcohol,

displaying his agency credentials for no official purpose, creating a disturbance at

the McDonald’s restaurant requiring intervention by civilians, and brandishing a

handgun that resulted in his arrest, as well as one specification of failure to

follow policy due to his failure to use a gun holster on the night of the incident at

issue in this appeal. IAF, Tab 12 at 8-14. The appellant filed a Board appeal,

challenging the reasonableness of the penalty and arguing that his removal was

the result of disability discrimination on the basis of alcoholism. IAF, Tab 1 at 4,

Tab 17 at 4. After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial

decision affirming the appellant’s removal. I-2 AF, Tab 14, Initial Decision (ID).

First, the administrative judge found that the agency proved the charges by

preponderant evidence, noting that the appellant did not dispute that he

committed the misconduct as alleged. 2 ID at 5. Also, she found nexus between

the appellant’s misconduct and his job because he displayed his agency

credentials while in the McDonald’s. Id.

As for the penalty, the administrative judge explained that, while the

deciding official considered several mitigating factors, she admitted in her

testimony that she did not consider the appellant’s argument that the misconduct

was caused by his alcoholism. ID at 6. Thus, because the agency did not

consider alcoholism as a mitigating factor, the administrative judge conducted her

own Douglas factors analysis, 3 acknowledging that, while she accepted the fact

that the appellant was an alcoholic, it did not warrant a lesser penalty due to the

dangerous nature of the misconduct, his position as a law enforcement officer, the

fact that alcoholism did not explain all of his misconduct, and alcohol

rehabilitation did not entitle him to a federal law enforcement career. ID at 8-12.

Finally, the administrative judge determined that the appellant did not establish

by preponderant evidence his claim of disability discrimination. ID at 13. Thus,

she upheld the agency’s decision to remove the appellant from Federal service.

ID at 14.

The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that (1) the deciding

official and the administrative judge erred by considering his alcoholism as an

aggravating factor; (2) the administrative judge improperly excluded comparator

evidence; and (3) his removal was the result of disability discrimination based on

alcoholism. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 4 at 21-35. The agency has filed

The appellant stipulated that he was authorized by the agency to carry the gun in

question while on duty. I-2 AF, Tab 10 at 5. Therefore, the gun is an

agency-authorized weapon as described in the first specification of the conduct

unbecoming charge, even though it was his personal handgun. IAF, Tab 12 at 9; HR

(testimony of the appellant).

In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board

enumerated a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider in determining the

reasonableness of a penalty for acts of misconduct.

a response in opposition to the appellant’s petition for review, and the appellant

has filed a reply to the agency’s opposition. PFR File, Tabs 6, 9.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

The nature and seriousness of the appellant’s misconduct, his role as a law

enforcement officer, and the notoriety of the misconduct outweigh the mitigating

factors and justify his removal.

On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in her

penalty analysis because she considered his alcoholism to be an aggravating

factor, claiming that she “incorporated misconceptions and biases regarding

alcoholism into her decision” and “relied on unsupported fear of [the appellant]

relapsing and thus treated [the appellant’s] alcoholism as an aggravating factor.”

PFR File, Tab 4 at 34. While the administrative judge was correct to redo the

penalty analysis, to the extent that she considered the appellant’s alcoholism to be

an aggravating factor in the initial decision, we agree that this was an error. See

Walsh v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 627, 638-39 (1997) (explaining that

claims of alcoholism, even if raised as part of an affirmative defense, should still

be considered as a mitigating factor). Nevertheless, any such error was not

prejudicial to the appellant because we find that other factors, most importantly

the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, warrant removal. See Panter v.

Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (stating that an

adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights provides

no basis for reversal of the initial decision).

In evaluating the penalty for sustained misconduct, the Board will consider,

first and foremost, the nature and seriousness of the misconduct and its

relationship to the employee’s duties, position, and responsibilities, including

whether the offense was intentional or was frequently repeated. Arena v. U.S.

Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 125, ¶ 6 (2014), aff’d per curiam, 617 F. App’x 996

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Table). Here, we agree with the administrative judge’s

conclusion that the nature and severity of the appellant’s misconduct “weighs

inexorably against mitigation.” ID at 9. The appellant engaged in egregious and

dangerous behavior, placing himself and innocent bystanders at risk. He brought

a gun with him to a bar, consumed excessive amounts of alcohol, and displayed

his agency credentials without official purpose, seemingly in an attempt to abuse

his authority. HR (testimony of the appellant, testimony of the deciding official).

He engaged in a verbal altercation with an employee at McDonald’s to the point

where he was escorted out of the restaurant by concerned citizens and drew his

gun, further scaring those individuals. HR (testimony of the appellant, testimony

of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 12 at 9-11, Tab 14 at 65, 69; I-2 AF, Tab 10

at 5-6.

As the deciding official testified, the very core of a law enforcement

officer’s role is to create safety, promote order, and enforce laws. HR (testimony

of the deciding official). The appellant broke the law, and his actions created

chaos and endangered the safety of himself and others, which is antithetical to his

role as a law enforcement officer. As the Board has held, the nature and

seriousness of the offense is the most important Douglas factor, and we find that

the outrageous nature of the appellant’s misconduct justifies removal. Raco v.

Social Security Administration, 117 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 14 (2011); see Arena v. U.S.

Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 125, ¶ 6.

However, there are other factors besides the nature and seriousness of the

offense that weigh against mitigation in this case. L aw enforcement officers have

the general duty and responsibility to uphold and enforce the law, not to break it.

Austin v. Department of Justice, 11 M.S.P.R. 255, 259 (1982). It is well

established that an agency has the right to hold its law enforcement personnel to a

high standard of conduct, higher than that applicable to other Federal employees.

O’Lague v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 20 (2016), aff’d

per curiam, 698 F. App’x 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Reid v. Department of the Navy,

118 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶ 26 (2012). Here, the appellant attempted to abuse his

authority by displaying his credentials without an official purpose, and placed

people in danger by behaving in a belligerent manner and brandishing a weapon.

HR (testimony of the deciding official). His misconduct undermines the very

nature of his position, i.e., maintaining order, creating safety, and enforcing the

law, and falls woefully short of the high standard placed on law enforcement

officers. Additionally, the appellant’s misconduct caused substantial public

embarrassment to the agency, as the incident was written about in a major media

outlet that specifically identified him as a Deputy U.S. Marshal. IAF, Tab 14

at 72-73. The notoriety of an act of misconduct is an aggravating factor.

Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981); see Acree v.

Department of the Treasury, 80 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 19 (1998) (noting how the

employee’s misconduct, which was written about in major newspaper articles,

undermined the public’s confidence in the agency), aff’d, 215 F.3d 1347 (Fed.

Cir. 1999) (Table).

We acknowledge that there are several mitigating factors present, most

notably the overwhelming show of support from his colleagues and superiors, his

length of service, excellent performance evaluations, and his substantial efforts at

sobriety. HR (testimony of the appellant, testimony of the appellant’s expert

witness); IAF, Tab 12 at 39-105, Tab 13 at 4-8, 10-16, 21-27, 32-38, 43-49,

54-61. While we commend the appellant on the impressive steps he has taken to

remain sober, we do not find that these steps, or the other mitigating factors,

outweigh the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, particularly because the

appellant’s behavior is antithetical to the very nature of the appellant’s position

as a law enforcement officer. See Lewin v. Department of Justice, 74 M.S.P.R.

294, 301 (1997) (years of service and outstanding performance evaluations do not

outweigh the seriousness of the misconduct); McLaughlin v. U.S. Postal Service,

55 M.S.P.R. 192, 208 (1992) (the appellant’s 28 years of unblemished service,

cooperation with the agency’s investigation into misconduct, and letters of

recommendation submitted on his behalf did not outweigh the seriousness of his

misconduct); see also Jordan v. Department of the Air Force, 36 M.S.P.R. 409,

414-15 (1988) (explaining that written statements of support by coworkers and

satisfactory job performance did not outweigh the agency’s legitimate

apprehension as to his continued employment and the effect of his proven

misconduct on the agency), aff’d, 884 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (Table).

Accordingly, we do not find that the removal is unreasonable in light of the

factors as described, and we thus uphold the penalty.

The appellant has not established that the agency treated him differently than

others in similar circumstances or that it did so knowingly and unjustifiably.

It is well settled that among the factors an agency should consider in

setting the penalty for misconduct is “consistency of the penalty with those

imposed upon other employees for the same or similar offenses.” Douglas,

5 M.S.P.R. at 305. On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge

improperly excluded three comparator cases that, he alleges, proves mitigation is

warranted. PFR File, Tab 4 at 31-33. Specifically, the appellant provides three

comparator cases that he contends involve similar or worse offenses with lesser

penalties: (1) a GS-07 Detention Enforcement Officer in the District of Nevada

who received a proposed 60-day suspension, in part, for an off -duty road-rage

incident with a private citizen; (2) a GS-12 Deputy U.S. Marshal in the Southern

District of Florida who received a proposed 21-day suspension for several

charges, including causing a disturbance at a restaurant after consuming alcohol;

and (3) a proposed demotion to a non-supervisory position and a 60-day

suspension for a GS-13 Supervisory Inspector located in an unspecified location

after he was detained by local law enforcement in part for disorderly conduct.

I-2 AF, Tab 9 at 64-74, 76-84, 86-94. As the comparator cases were included in

the appellant’s prehearing submissions, they are part of the record, and we agree

that the administrative judge should have addressed them in her analysis. Id.

However, because we do not believe that the cases are sufficiently similar to the

appellant’s circumstances, nor do we find any evidence that the agency treated

the appellant in a way not justified by the facts, we find that such error did not

prejudice the appellant’s substantive rights. See Panter, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282.

The universe of potential comparators “should be limited to those

employees whose misconduct and/or other circumstances closely resemble those

of the appellant.” Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 13. Although a

comparator need not always be in the same work unit or under the same

supervisor, it still remains an important factor in determining whether it is

appropriate to compare the penalties they are given. Id., ¶ 13; see Williams v.

Social Security Administration, 586 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Furthermore, there must be some close connection between the misconduct or

some other factor for an employee from another work unit or supervisory chain to

be a proper comparator. Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 13. If the appellant establishes

that he received more severe discipline than a comparator, then the proper inquiry

is whether the agency knowingly treated employees differently “in a way not

justified by the facts, and intentionally for reasons other than the efficiency of the

service.” Id., ¶ 14 (quoting Facer v. Department of the Air Force, 836 F.2d 535,

539 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). Thus, in assessing an agency’s penalty determination, the

relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated

employees differently. Id.

The disciplinary actions presented by the appellant materially differ in

circumstances such that we do not find that the other employees are appropriate

comparators. Specifically, two of the comparators, the GS-07 Detention

Enforcement Officer and the GS-13 Supervisory Inspector, have different

positions, different grade levels, and thus different duties and responsibilities.

I-2 AF, Tab 9 at 64-74, 86-94. Furthermore, at least two of the cases were in

completely different areas of the country, i.e., Nevada and Florida, and it appears

that all three of the cases are in different work units under different chains of

command. Id. at 64-74, 76-84, 86-94. Also, while the comparator cases have

elements that are similar to the appellant’s misconduct, we see no evidence that

these incidents received media attention, which occurred in the appellant’s case.

Id. Finally, we note that the appellant has provided the proposal notices, which

only proves that three different proposing officials decided, for reasons unknown,

to propose lesser discipline. Id. Therefore, even if the agency’s deciding

officials believed removal was warranted, the deciding officials were restricted

by the actions of the proposing officials. Although we acknowledge that the

second case, i.e., the other Deputy U.S. Marshal from Florida, designated the

same individual to act as the deciding official as in the appellant’s case, she could

not have imposed a penalty greater than the proposed 21-day suspension on the

comparator. 4 Id. at 76-84; IAF, Tab 14 at 40-49. Accordingly, we do not find

that the cases presented by the appellant are sufficiently similar in circumstance

to establish that the agency treated the appellant less favorably than other

employees in similar circumstances.

Nevertheless, even assuming that the appellant established that the cases

were proper comparators, we do not find sufficient evidence that the agency

knowingly treated the appellant differently in a way that was not justified by the

facts. As discussed in great detail above, the appellant’s behavior was egregious,

outrageous, and led to public embarrassment not simply by the involvement of

local law enforcement but by the reporting of the incident in major media outlets.

HR (testimony of the deciding official); IAF, Tab 12 at 9-14. Thus, we conclude

that the appellant’s removal was justified by the facts. Furthermore, the

consistency of a penalty with those imposed on other employees for the same or

similar offenses is only one factor to be considered in determining the

reasonableness of an agency-imposed penalty. See Voss v. U.S. Postal Service,

Due process under the Constitution requires that a tenured Federal employee be

provided “written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s

evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Cleveland Board of

Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). An appellant does not have proper

notice or a meaningful opportunity to respond if he is not provided proper notice of the

potential penalty. Thus, the deciding official may not impose a penalty harsher than the

penalty proposed.

119 M.S.P.R. 324, ¶ 6 (2013). Accordingly, even if the appellant did establish

that he was treated differently than other employees in similar circumstances, and

such treatment was done so knowingly in a way that was not justified by the facts,

we still find the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, his role as a law

enforcement officer, and the notoriety of his misconduct justified his removal.

The appellant’s alcoholism was not the but-for cause of his removal, and thus, he

is not entitled to a reversal of the action.

The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove by

preponderant evidence that his removal was the result of disability discrimination

due to his alcoholism. ID at 13. The appellant disputes this finding, asserting

that he established that his removal was motivated by his alcoholism, and that the

agency failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have

removed him absent its discriminatory motive. PFR File, Tab 4 at 24-30.

Although we agree with the administrative judge’s ultimate conclusion, we

modify her analysis to explain that, even if the appellant established that his

alcoholism was the cause of his misconduct and thus a motivating factor in his

removal, he cannot establish that his alcoholism was the “but-for” cause of his

removal, and thus, he is not entitled to a reversal of the action.

The Board adjudicates claims of disability discrimination raised in

connection with an otherwise appealable action under the substantive standards of

section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act. Pridgen v. Office of Management and

Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35. The standards under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the Americans with Disabilities Act

Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), have been incorporated by reference into

the Rehabilitation Act and the Board applies them to determine whether there has

been a Rehabilitation Act violation. Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 791(f). The ADAAA

prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The

Board defers to the EEOC’s use of the motivating factor causation standard when

analyzing whether an appellant has established that an agency’s action was taken

“on the basis of disability.” Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 40. However, to obtain

full relief, an appellant must show that disability discrimination was a but -for

cause of the personnel action. Id.

Even if the appellant’s misconduct was caused by his alcoholism, we still

do not find that the appellant established his removal constituted disability

discrimination. An agency is never required to excuse a disabled employee’s

violation of a uniformly applied, job-related rule of conduct, even if the

employee’s disability caused the misconduct. Fitzgerald v. Department of

Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 463, 469 (2000). Here, the appellant has not established

that the agency retained nondisabled employees after those employees committed

similar offenses. In addition, we find that the appellant’s removal was the result

of the nature of his conduct, i.e., that he placed his safety and the public’s safety

in jeopardy, displayed his agency credentials in a possible attempt to abuse his

authority, and brandished a gun at innocent bystanders, all of which was reported

in major media outlets. HR (testimony of the deciding official). While we

acknowledge that such behavior was a result of his alcoholism, we cannot excuse

such misconduct, as the behavior is antithetical to the agency’s mission and to the

role of a law enforcement officer. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s

removal.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you

should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the

following address:

U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

717 Madison Place, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20439

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that

any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of

discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination

claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective

websites, which can be accessed through the link below:

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding

all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision.

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the

address of the EEOC is:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, D.C. 20013

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:

Office of Federal Operations

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

131 M Street, N.E.

Suite 5SW12G

Washington, D.C. 20507

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection

Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. 6 The court of appeals must receive your petition for

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the