Lara v. Penhall Company

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ADAM LARA, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:24-cv-1016-E-BN

§

PENHALL COMPANY, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Adam Lara filed a pro se lawsuit in state court presenting

employment-based claims, which Defendant Penhall Company removed based on

federal question jurisdiction. See Dkt. Nos. 1 & 2.

United States District Judge Ada Brown referred the removed lawsuit to the

undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

Penhall moved to dismiss Lara’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). See Dkt. Nos. 6 & 7. Lara failed to respond to the motion by the deadline to

do so. See Dkt. No. 8. But he did move for court-appointed counsel and to compel

discovery, requests that the Court denied. See Dkt. Nos. 9-11.

And, after the deadline to amend once as a matter of course, see FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(1), Lara made a filing on July 30, 2024 that could be liberally construed as a

motion for leave to amend, see Dkt. No. 15.

The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendation that, to the extent and for the reasons set out below, the Court

should grant the motion to dismiss, deny the construed motion for leave to amend as

futile, and dismiss this lawsuit.

Legal Standards

Considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded

facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina

Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).

Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must

plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” id. at 555.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Cf. Bryant v. Ditech

Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as

plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible

inferences using speculation.”).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,

Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random

puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is

not satisfied.”).

And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed

factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and

conclusions. So, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it

is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id.;

Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume

true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of

Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).

And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs

must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive

plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend

entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per

curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,

985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal

construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.”

(cleaned up)).

Applying these general standards to this context – where, liberally construed,

Lara brings claims of discrimination and retaliation based on race, national origin,

and disability, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and Texas law – “the complaint need not

contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination [or retaliation]

under the framework set forth ... in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973).” Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2023)

(cleaned up).

“But a plaintiff is still required to plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate

elements of [each] claim.” Id. (cleaned up; emphasis in original).

And, at this stage, “a plaintiff must plead two ‘ultimate elements’ in order ‘to

support a disparate treatment claim … : (1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2) taken

against a plaintiff ‘because of [a] protected status.’” Thomas v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist.,

No. 23-10882, 2024 WL 2874367, at *4 (5th Cir. June 7, 2024) (quoting Cicalese v.

Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019); emphasis in Cicalese).

That is,

[a] complaint need not allege each prong of the prima facie test for

disparate treatment … ; to support a disparate treatment … , though, it

must plausibly set out facts that the defendant took the adverse

employment action against a plaintiff because of [a] protected status.

[Accordingly, a] plaintiff must allege facts, direct or circumstantial, that

would suggest [the employer’s] actions were based on [the plaintiff’s

protected status] or that [the employer] treated similarly situated

employees [not of the plaintiff’s protected status] more favorably.

Sanchez v. Chevron N. Am. Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 20-30783, 2021 WL 5513509,

at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021) (per curiam) (cleaned up; emphasis in original).

And, while the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim under Section

1981 mirror Title VII, “to prevail on a claim that the defendant violated § 1981, ‘a

plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have

suffered the loss of a legally protected right.’” Blash v. City of Hawkinsville, 856 F.

App’x 259, 264 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n

of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020)); see also Williams v. Waste

Mgmt., Inc., 818 F. App’x 315, 325 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Although similar in

some respects to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires plaintiff’s showing but-for

causation.” (citation omitted)); Ramirez v. Merritt, No. SA-19-CV-00592-JKP-HJB,

2020 WL 13610413, at *4 (W.D. Tex. May 18, 2020) (“A plaintiff who sues under §

1981 must plead and prove the conduct was a ‘but for’ cause of his injury; ‘while the

materials the plaintiff can rely on to show causation may change as a lawsuit

progresses from filing to judgment, the burden itself remains constant.’” (citation

omitted)).

“Similarly, for a retaliation claim, a plaintiff only needs to plausibly ‘allege

facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim to survive a motion to dismiss.’”

Smith v. Kendall, No. 23-50713, 2024 WL 4442040, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 8, 2024) (per

curiam) (quoting Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021)).

Those “ultimate elements” are “that 1) [the plaintiff] engaged in protected

activity, 2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and 3) a causal link exists

between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Wright, 990 F.3d

at 433 (cleaned up); see also Johnson v. Halstead, 916 F.3d 410, 420 (5th Cir. 2019)

(observing, albeit prior to Comcast, “that ‘[r]etaliation claims under § 1981 and Title

VII ... are parallel causes of action,’ which means they ‘require[ ] proof of the same

elements in order to establish liability’” (quoting Foley v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 355 F.3d

333, 340 n.8 (5th Cir. 2003); citation omitted)).

This framework, to address Lara’s federal claims, applies equally to his claims

under Texas law. See, e.g., McGee v. Hiland Dairy Foods Co. LLC, No. 3:23-cv-2630-

D-BN, 2023 WL 9005639, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2023) (“[W]hile McGee also makes

claims under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code, ‘[a] purpose of Chapter 21 is to

execute the policies embodied in [Title VII], the [ADEA], and the [ADA].’ So federal

courts commonly apply the federal statutory ‘framework to interpret Chapter 21.’”

(quoting Green v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 3:15-cv-1868-N, 2017 WL 10110295, at

*3 n.2 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2017))), rec. adopted, 2023 WL 9005583 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 28,

2023).

And, “[i]n [all these] context[s], ‘[a] court ... inappropriately heightens the

pleading standard by subjecting a plaintiff’s allegations to a rigorous factual or

evidentiary analysis under the McDonnell Douglas framework in response to a

motion to dismiss.’” Smith, 2024 WL 4442040, at *4 (quoting Cicalese, 924 F.3d at

767).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 requires that leave to amend be granted

freely “when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).

Because this rule provides a “strong presumption in favor of granting leave to

amend,” Fin. Acquisition Partners, LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 291 (5th Cir. 2006),

the Court must do so “unless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend,”

Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981).

One such reason is futility: “If the complaint, as amended, would be subject to

dismissal, then amendment is futile and the district court [is] within its discretion to

deny leave to amend.” Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., Tex., 71 F.4th 385, 391 (5th Cir.

2023) (quoting Ariyan, Inc. v. Sewage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 29 F.4th 226, 229

(5th Cir. 2022)).

Analysis

Penhall persuasively explains that the allegations in the state court petition

itself fail to allege a plausible claim. See Dkt. No. 7 at 2-4 (citing Dkt. No. 2 at 4-7).

Still, as Penhall’s notice of removal reflects, Lara also attached to that petition

a charge of discrimination filed with the Texas Workforce Commission (“TWC”). See

generally Dkt. No. 2.

And pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the

complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); see

also Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The

Civil Rules provide that an attachment to a complaint generally becomes ‘part of the

pleading for all purposes,’ including for ruling on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 10(c); citations omitted)).

The charge filed with the TWC indicates claims for discrimination based on

race, national origin, and disability and for retaliation and includes allegations in

support of these claims that are clearer than those in the body of the petition. See

Dkt. No. 2 at 8-9.

But, even considering these allegations, Lara fails to present facts from which

the Court could infer discrimination “because of” race or national origin, in violation

of Title VII and Chapter 21, where he offers the mere conclusions (1) that, “[f]rom the

beginning of my employment, Penhall treated me disparately as compared to my non-

Hispanic/non-Mexican counterparts” and (2) that he “applied for multiple open

positions; however, Penhall refused to consider me for the positions out of

discriminatory animus” and supports these conclusions just by alleging that, “when I

asked Greg (General Manager, Caucasian) if I could rent his house until it was sold,

Greg derogatorily responded with ‘You can’t afford my home,’ perpetuating the

discriminatory racial stereotype that Hispanic people are poor.” Dkt. No. 2 at 8.

Such allegations also fail to meet Section 1981’s “but for” standard. See

Chapman v. ADT LLC, No. 3:22-cv-2188-D-BN, 2023 WL 995345, at *9 (N.D. Tex.

Dec. 28, 2023) (“As multiple courts have observed since Comcast, a plaintiff’s failure

to plead a plausible Title VII claim requires dismissal of the related Section 1981

claim.” (citation omitted)), rec. adopted, 2024 WL 920074 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2024).

Nor does Lara allege that he participated in an activity protected by any of

these laws, such that he has alleged a plausible claim of retaliation based on race or

national origin.

But Lara’s claims for discrimination and retaliation based on a disability are

more developed:

On or around 04/20/2023, I was feeling extreme pain in my lower

abdomen. When I went to work to explain to them that I may need the

day off and had to return to my car to sit and recover from the pain. The

next day, I was still in debilitating pain. I reported to work and

requested the reasonable accommodation of the day off to go to the

hospital due to my disability. Instead of engaging in the interactive

process to reasonably accommodate me, Brad (Operations

Manager/Divisional Manager, Caucasian) called me into the office and

terminated me without providing a reason for the termination.

This termination was clearly discriminatory and retaliatory.

First, Penhall’s failure to provide a reason for the termination at the

time of termination will be burden shifting. Additionally, the temporal

proximity between my disability and request for reasonable

accommodations and the sudden termination, combined with the lack of

any legitimate reason for termination, the disparate treatment, and the

discriminatory comments, demonstrates that Penhall terminated me

out of discriminatory and retaliatory animus for my disability, need for

reasonable accommodations, and race/national origin.

I proceeded to go directly to the hospital after the discriminatory

and retaliatory termination and was immediately taken into surgery to

treat my gallbladder condition. The doctor stated that I would be under

temporary restrictions to not work and not lift more than 10 pounds for

a maximum of six weeks but potentially shorter pending my follow-up

appointment. I called Brad after surgery to update him about my

disability and provide Penhall with the opportunity to cure its

discriminatory and retaliatory conduct and engage in the interactive

process. Brad instructed me to call again after I was released from the

hospital.

On or around 04/23/2023, when I was released, I called Penhall’s

office to follow up as instructed and inquire about the insurance

coverage for my surgery. Brad answered and gave me the number to call

Penhall’s Human Resources department. However, when I called

Human Resources, they flippantly stated, “We already told you that you

don’t work here anymore,” reiterating the discriminatory and

retaliatory termination and refusing to take remedial action or

otherwise engage in the interactive process – further demonstrating and

ratifying Penhall’s discriminatory and retaliatory animus and refusal to

provide reasonable accommodations.

Dkt. No. 2 at 8-9.

Under the ADA, “an employer is generally prohibited from ‘discriminat[ing]

against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application

procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee

compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of

employment.’” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2020)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).

To plead a plausible claim of ADA discrimination, a plaintiff must provide facts

to support “(1) that he has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the job; and (3)

that he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.”

Thompson v. Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 470 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting EEOC v. LHC

Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014)).

The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record

of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42

U.S.C. § 12102(1).

[But t]he Act is not a general protection of medically afflicted persons.

It protects people who are discriminated against by their employer …

either because they are in fact disabled or because their employer

mistakenly believes them to be disabled. If the employer discriminates

against them on account of their being (or being believed by him to be)

ill, even permanently ill, but not disabled, there is no violation.

Christian v. St. Anthony Med. Ctr., Inc., 117 F.3d 1051, 1053 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation

omitted); see also Carpenter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 745, 764 (W.D.

La. 2008) (“A medical condition is not necessarily an impairment, and an impairment

is not necessarily a substantial limitation on a major life activity so as to be a

disability within the meaning of the ADA.”).

And, so, “[t]he actual name of a disability is irrelevant; what matters is the

effect of [a] disability on an individual’s life.” Anderson v. L. Keeley Corp., No. 4:22

CV 710 JMB, 2022 WL 3585596, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 22, 2022) (citing Albertson’s

Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999)).

And “major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing,

lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

Significantly, “[t]he ADA Amendments Act of 2008 … provides, among other

things, that the term ‘substantially limits’ is to be interpreted as broadly as possible.’”

Milteer v. Navarro Cnty., Tex., 652 F. Supp. 3d 754, 763 (N.D. Tex. 2023) (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)-(B)); see also Mueck v. La Grange Acquisitions, L.P., 75 F.4th

469, 478-81 (5th Cir. 2023) (“tak[ing] the opportunity to acknowledge, as our sister

circuits have, that, following the ADAAA’s passage, an impairment need not be

‘permanent or long-term’ to qualify as a disability”).

But all Lara has alleged is that, as part of his recovery from a routine surgery,

he was advised to “not work and not lift more than 10 pounds for a maximum of six

weeks but potentially shorter pending [a] follow-up appointment.” Dkt. No. 2 at 9.

And, as courts have held after the passage of the ADAAA, “many short term

impairments, such as [a plaintiff’s] recovery period for his hernia surgery, still do not

qualify as a disability under the revised standard of the ADAAA.” Brodzik v.

Contractors Steel, Inc., 48 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1189 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (citations omitted;

further observing that, “though episodic impairments are disabling if they

substantially limit a major life activity when active, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D), there is

nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint to suggest that Plaintiff’s hernia and the resulting

surgery was ‘anything more than a one-time occurrence’”); see also Climer v. Harrah’s

Entm’t, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00047-DMB-JMV, 2014 WL 4692067, at *10 (N.D. Miss.

July 23, 2014) (“Even under the more lenient standards of the ADAAA, ‘[a] temporary

condition post-surgery does not qualify as a disability.’ Lee v. Spectranetics Corp., No.

12-cv00633, 2013 WL 5416972, at *4 (D. Colo. Sep. 27, 2013); see also Butler v. BTC

Foods Inc., No. 12-492, 2012 WL 5315034, at *3 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 19, 2013) (under the

ADAAA, ‘an employee’s inability to work for a period after recovering from surgery

does not necessarily support a finding that [he] has a disability’).”); Willis v. Noble

Envtl. Power, LLC, 143 F. Supp. 3d 475, 483 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (distinguishing Suggs

v. Cent. Oil of Baton Rouge, LLC, No. 13-25-RLB, 2014 WL 3037213, at *4 (M.D. La.

July 3, 2014), where the plaintiff “provided evidence and testimony showing that the

condition substantially limited his circulatory function by causing plaque build-up in

the artery wall which could eventually lead to blood clots and possible stroke” and,

“[a]lthough [that plaintiff’s] condition resulted in only a temporary outward

manifestation of limitations, the brief recovery period following surgery, the disease

itself constituted a continuing disorder of the circulatory system” from its plaintiff,

whose “impairment [also] resulted in a temporary outward manifestation of

limitations” but who did “not have an underlying disease or condition that

substantially limits a major life activity,” and, so, “Plaintiff’s physical impairment

and limitations were both temporary, transitory experiences, that did not result from

an ongoing condition”).

And, to the extent that Lara makes a failure-to-accommodate claim under the

ADA, the statute

requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known

physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with

a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To prevail on a failure-to-

accommodate claim, a plaintiff “must show that (1) [he] is a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) the disability and its consequential

limitations were known by the covered employer; and (3) the employer

failed to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ for such known limitations.”

Mueck, 75 F.4th at 485 (citation omitted).

But Lara’s failure to adequately allege a disability under the ADA also

prevents the Court from finding that this claim is plausibly pleaded.

The ADA further “prohibits an employer from ‘discriminating against any

individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by

the ADA or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the ADA.” Lyons,

964 F.3d at 303-04 (cleaned up). And the ultimate elements of an unlawful retaliation

claim under the ADA are “that: (1) [the plaintiff] engaged in an activity protected by

the ADA, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there is a causal

connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 304 (footnote

omitted).

And, again, a failure to adequately allege a disability under the ADA prevents

the Court from finding the reasonable belief required to allege that Lara opposed an

employment practice that is unlawful under the ADA.

In sum, Lara’s complaint fails to allege a plausible claim.

Turning to leave to amend, the undersigned’s review of Lara’s July 30 filing

reveals that it does not cure the deficiencies set out above, so granting leave to amend

would be futile.

But the opportunity file objections to these findings, conclusions, and

recommendation (as further explained below) allows Lara another opportunity to

show that this case should not be dismissed and that the Court should instead grant

leave to amend. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021)

(per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, but

a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments

would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects. If the

plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects

could be cured, a district court may deny leave.” (citations omitted)).

And the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice if Lara fails to file

timely objections that show a basis to amend to allege a plausible claim – that is, one

supported by “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Recommendation

The Court should grant the motion to dismiss [Dkt. No 6], and, unless Plaintiff

Adam Lara shows through timely objections a basis to amend to allege a plausible

claim, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: January 6, 2025

Lee

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-15-