Washington v. McLane

Case: 23-50235 Document: 115-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/05/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

February 5, 2025

No. 23-50235 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

William Washington,

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Marsha McLane, Executive Director, Texas Civil Commitment Office;

Jessica Marsh, Deputy Director, Texas Civil Commitment Office;

Amanda Beltran, Case Manager, Texas Civil Commitment Office;

Rachel Kingston, Case Manager, Texas Civil Commitment Office;

James Winckler, MTC Chief of Security; Michael Arenivaz,

Security Office,

Defendants—Appellees.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:21-CV-521

______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

William Washington, a person civilly committed for being a sexually

violent predator, raises one issue on appeal: Is a policy prohibiting marriage

_____________________

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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between two civilly committed people unconstitutional? Having considered

the case before us, we answer no.

I. Background

William Washington is housed in a commitment facility for sexually

violent predators (“SVPs”). See In re Commitment of Washington, No. 09-

11-00658-CV, 2013 WL 2732569, at *5–7 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 13,

2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see generally Tex. Health & Safety

Code § 841.001. SVPs are “likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of

sexual violence,” requiring “long-term supervision and treatment.” Tex.

Health & Safety Code § 841.001.

The Texas Civil Commitment Office (“TCCO”) treats and

supervises SVPs. Id. § 841.007. The overarching goal of treatment and

supervision is “to provide the SVP with the necessary tools to eventually be

released to the community and live a productive life free from offending

behavior.” To achieve that goal, TCCO develops and implements policies

with the help of experts.

One of those policies is the subject of this case: TCCO forbids

residents from marrying each other. During his commitment, Washington

fell in love with Katie Layton, another resident. Eventually, Washington

proposed, and Layton accepted. But, in compliance with the policy

forbidding marriages between residents, TCCO did not endorse

Washington’s marriage request.

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Washington sued, asserting that the marriage policy is

1

unconstitutional. The district court granted Defendants’ motions for

summary judgment on all claims. Washington appeals.

II. Jurisdiction

Defendants raise two jurisdictional issues for us to decide for the first

time on appeal—sovereign immunity and standing.2

Sovereign immunity generally forbids suit against state officials in

their official capacities. City of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir.

2019). This principle is subject to several exceptions, including Ex parte

Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Ex parte Young allows suits for prospective relief

against state officials in their official capacities for ongoing violations of

federal law. Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460,

471 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

Ex parte Young and standing analysis “significantly overlap.” City of

Austin, 943 F.3d at 1002 (quotation omitted). To establish standing,

Washington must satisfy three elements—injury in fact, causation, and

redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).

Defendants assert that Washington’s suit should be dismissed

because (1) Washington seeks impermissible relief, (2) an independent state

law causes Washington’s injury, and (3) Washington sues the wrong parties.

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1

Washington asserted additional claims in the district court, but the constitutional

validity of the marriage policy is the only issue on appeal. He does not appeal the dismissal

of his claims against the MTC officers. Accordingly, the TCCO Defendants (hereinafter

“Defendants”) are the only defendants relevant to this appeal.

2

Waiver is not an issue here. Although the district court did not address sovereign

immunity, Defendants raised the issue below. Meanwhile, standing cannot be waived. Doe

v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 496 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Standing is

a jurisdictional requirement and not subject to waiver.”).

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The first implicates sovereign immunity, the second implicates standing, and

the third implicates both.

A. Relief

Ex parte Young allows suits against officers in their official capacities

for prospective injunctive relief. Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563

U.S. 247, 255 (2011). Defendants assert that Washington seeks invalid

relief—a mandatory injunction directing the state to promulgate a new

policy. Defendants do not point to the portion of Washington’s complaint

that raises their concern. Although Washington’s complaint, like many pro

se complaints, is not written with the expertise of a seasoned lawyer,

Washington includes an entirely valid request for relief—nonenforcement of

the challenged policy. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).

Accordingly, Washington’s requested relief does not bar suit.

B. Independent State Law

Defendants assert that a Texas law independently causes the same

injury as the TCCO policy, creating problems for standing’s causation and

redressability requirements. See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 319 (1991).

Texas law requires marriage applicants to present in person before the clerk.

Tex. Fam. Code § 2.002(1). However, Defendants assume without

explanation that Washington would not be allowed to present in person

before the clerk. Indeed, TCCO’s chaperone policy contemplates residents

leaving the facility for “appointments” and “other outings as approved by

the Treatment Team.”3

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3

TCCO Policy 3.4 § III(A), https://tcco.texas.gov/sites/tcco/files/documents/

policies/policy-3-4-approval-contacts-chaperones.pdf [https://perma.cc/T9EE-KH6G].

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In other words, the state law does not render Washington’s marriage

an impossibility. Although the chaperone policy is one additional step

Washington must overcome to be married, that does not leave us without

jurisdiction. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.

252, 261 (1977) (concluding that a contractor had standing even though the

contractor had many additional hoops to jump through—securing financing,

qualifying for subsidies, and construction). The independent state law thus

does not block Washington’s suit.

C. Parties

Under Ex parte Young, the proper defendant has a “particular duty to

enforce the [law] in question and a demonstrated willingness to exercise that

duty.” Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2014). This analysis

implicates standing’s traceability and redressability requirements, so we

analyze standing and Ex parte Young together. City of Austin, 943 F.3d at

1002.

Washington sues TCCO Executive Director Marsha McLane,

Deputy Director Jessica Marsh, and Case Managers Rachel Kingston and

Amanda Beltran.

Starting with McLane and Marsh: McLane and Marsh possess the

requisite enforcement authority and are thus proper defendants. TCCO

policy gives “Facility Administration” and “TCCO management” final say

over proposed unions and partners. As the leaders of TCCO with “direct

governing authority” over TCCO employees, McLane and Marsh have final

say. Jackson v. Wright, 82 F.4th 362, 366–68 (5th Cir. 2023). In addition to

McLane and Marsh’s supervisory authority, they ignored Washington’s

written requests for permission to marry Layton. See id. (concluding that

members of board of regents were proper defendants given their supervisory

authority and their role in enforcement as evidenced by their failure to

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respond to plaintiff’s letter seeking relief). When Washington met with

Marsh, Marsh explained that she “would not allow” Washington’s marriage.

See K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 125 (5th Cir. 2010) (examining state board

members’ active role in enforcement).

Additionally, suit against McLane and Marsh is analogous to suits

against wardens of prisons, which have long been deemed acceptable under

Ex parte Young. See, e.g., Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1252 n.6 (5th

Cir. 1988). Like wardens, McLane and Marsh have the authority to “compel

or constrain” the conditions of Washington’s civil confinement, power to

implement TCCO’s marriage policy, and supervisory authority over the

people who dealt more directly with Washington’s marriage request. Hope

v. Harris, 861 F. App’x 571, 578 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); see Valentine v.

Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021). McLane and Marsh are thus

proper defendants under Ex parte Young. Further, McLane and Marsh’s role

enforcing the policy satisfy standing’s causation and redressability

requirements.

Defendants assert that the only proper defendants under Ex parte

Young would be Washington’s case manager and treatment provider because

the challenged policy vests them with authority to endorse marriage

applications. This unduly narrow view ignores McLane’s and Marsh’s roles

in enforcing the policy.

In addition, Washington sued a case manager—Amanda Beltran. As

a case manager who failed to endorse Washington’s marriage request, even

after speaking to Washington about the request, Beltran has enforcement

authority and neither Ex parte Young nor standing preclude suit against her.

That leaves one remaining defendant: Rachel Kingston. She can be

dispensed of quickly. Washington does not make the case for why we have

jurisdiction over the claims against Kingston (with respect to sovereign

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immunity or standing), so we must dismiss those claims without prejudice,

as opposed to the with-prejudice dismissal below. See Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“[T]he plaintiff

constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist”);

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (explaining that a plaintiff

“invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing” standing);

Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Our precedents also

make clear that a jurisdictional dismissal must be without prejudice to refiling

in a forum of competent jurisdiction.”).

In sum, we dismiss Washington’s claims against Beltran for lack of

jurisdiction. But Washington’s suit against McLane, Marsh, and Beltran

clears the jurisdictional hurdles of standing and sovereign immunity, so we

proceed to the merits.

III. Discussion

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Playa Vista

Conroe v. Ins. Co. of the W., 989 F.3d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 2021). Summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

In evaluating the motion for summary judgment, we distinguish

between disputed issues of fact and disputed issues of professional judgment:

For the former, we draw all reasonable inferences in Washington’s favor. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). For the latter, given

that civil confinement institutions are better equipped to run their facilities

than courts, we defer to TCCO. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530

(2006).

Washington raises one issue on appeal—the constitutional validity of

TCCO’s policy preventing him from marrying another resident. Our

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inquiry is based on, but not identical to, similar inquiries in the context of

prisons. Turner propounds the standard for adjudging alleged constitutional

violations in prisons: “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’

constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

Four factors are relevant in determining the regulation’s reasonableness:

(1) whether a “valid, rational connection exists between the

prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest

put forward to justify it,”

(2) whether there exist “alternative means of exercising the

fundamental right that remain open to prison inmates,”

(3) what “impact accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,

and on the allocation of prison resources generally,” and

(4) whether there is an “absence of ready alternatives” to the

regulation in question.

Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 2004) (alteration omitted)

(quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90). The burden “is not on the State to

prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). This deferential standard

recognizes that prison administrators—rather than the courts—are best

suited to make the difficult judgments associated with daily prison

administration.

Importantly, Turner addresses the constitutional rights of prisoners,

not civilly committed residents like Washington, so we apply a modified

standard. Bohannan v. Doe, 527 F. App’x 283, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2013) (per

curiam); Dunsmore v. McLane, No. 21-50541, 2022 WL 3210681 (5th Cir.

Aug. 9, 2022) (per curiam). We still ask whether a regulation that impinges

on civilly committed residents’ constitutional rights is reasonably related to

legitimate interests, but the legitimate interests of prisons and civil

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confinement facilities are different. Punishment is a permissible goal of

prisons; not so in civil confinement. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–

16 (1982) (noting that civilly confined persons “may not be punished at all”).

Instead, rehabilitation and security are permissible aims under Turner.

Bohannan, 527 F. App’x at 294–95. With that in mind, we evaluate the

policy’s constitutionality on its face and as applied.

A. Constitutionality of the Policy

Civilly committed residents retain the right to marry. See Turner, 482

U.S. at 95 (concluding that prisoners retain the right to marry). The question

is whether TCCO’s infringement on that right passes constitutional muster.

To answer that question, we look to the Turner factors.

1. Valid, rational connection between challenged policy and governmental

interest

TCCO maintains “twin goals of ‘long-term supervision and

treatment of sexually violent predators.’” Brown v. Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 243

(5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (quoting Tex. Health & Safety Code

§ 841.001)). Based on the evidence before us, which consists of several

declarations from TCCO officials and employees, the policy is validly and

rationally connected to those goals.

According to those declarations, which are entitled to deference,

experts broadly agree that resident-resident relationships should be

forbidden given many residents’ inability to be appropriate partners for each

other. Many residents have “not yet mastered the management of deviant

impulses, fantasies, distorted thinking or controlling behavior,” which

precludes such residents from engaging in a healthy relationship with another

resident. Further, allowing resident-resident relationships would be

complicated, resulting in “differing privileges” that “could result in a power

imbalance” and “unhealthy behaviors” such as manipulation or coercion.

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TCCO also forbids intra-facility relationships “due to the potential

for disruption of both clients’ treatment”; this potential disruption “is

further intensified in a confined facility environment.” Past instances of

unapproved intra-facility relationships resulted in physical altercations over

jealousy issues, requests for protection after ending the relationship, and a

resident taking his GPS monitor off, which is a felony, after a relationship

ended.

The judgment of TCCO officials is entitled to deference, Thornburgh

v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407–09 (1989), and TCCO’s evidence displays

legitimate concerns associated with allowing residents to be in a relationship

with each other. Washington fails to produce contrary evidence, and his

attempts to rebut Defendants’ rationale do not overcome the deference to

which TCCO’s judgment is entitled. Thus, this factor favors Defendants.4

2. Alternative means of exercising the right

The parties agree that no alternative means of exercising the right to

marry exist.

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4

Washington points to Turner for support. In Turner, the Court held

unconstitutional a policy forbidding marriage except in the case of pregnancy or to

legitimize a child. 482 U.S. at 96. However, Turner is distinguishable. First, the population

of TCCO is different than the population of the prison in Turner. TCCO houses SVPs,

an identifying characteristic of which is difficulty forming appropriate relationships.

Marriage necessarily implicates that characteristic, so regulating the marriage right at

TCCO may have therapeutic value that it may not have for the general population of a

prison. Second, Turner never propounded an absolute right to marry in prison; instead,

Turner acknowledged that the right to marry may be subject to certain restrictions. Id. at

95 (“The right to marry, like many other rights, is subject to substantial restrictions as a

result of incarceration.”). Because the restriction at issue here is rationally related to

legitimate interests, Turner does not stand in Defendants’ way.

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3. Impact of accommodating asserted right on guards, other residents, and

allocation of prison resources

Defendants’ evidence shows that allowing intra-facility marriage

would require increased coordination between security, mental health, and

health services staff, along with increased administrative burdens. SVPs are

often incapable of entering into healthy relationships, and when those

relationships fail, facilities receive requests for transfers and additional

accommodations. Specific instances of resident interactions corroborate

TCCO’s concern that allowing residents to marry each other could cause

institutional disruption. Cf. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407 (observing that

“officials may well conclude that certain proposed interactions, though

seemingly innocuous to laymen, have potentially significant implications for

the security and order of the prison”). Defendants have shown that, at a

small facility like TCCO, which has limited resources, the policy change

would have too large a ripple effect. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90; Stauffer v.

Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 2014). This factor favors Defendants.

4. Absence of ready alternatives at de minimis cost

Washington points to one potential alternative—evaluate intra-

facility marriage requests case by case. However, that alternative would not

“fully accommodate[] the asserted right” because, as discussed above, the

evidence suggests that SVPs in TCCO custody are, by definition, still

undergoing treatment, and are not appropriate partners for each other.

Overton, 539 U.S. at 136; cf. Beard, 548 U.S. at 528 (“[C]ourts . . . owe

substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, Washington

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does not meet his burden of showing a ready alternative at de minimis cost.

See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132.5

In sum, three of four factors favor the constitutionality of banning

resident-resident marriage. Balancing the factors, the one in Washington’s

favor does not outweigh the other three, so Washington’s facial challenge

fails.

B. As-Applied Challenge

For an as-applied challenge, the question is whether application of the

regulation to Washington is rationally related to the legitimate interests

asserted by the facility. See Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 215

(5th Cir. 2012). It is Washington’s burden. See id.

Turning to the Turner factors: Again, there are no adequate

alternatives to marriage, so the second Turner factor weighs in favor of

Washington.

However, the remaining Turner factors weigh in Defendants’ favor.

As discussed above, the policy serves Defendants’ legitimate interests, and

Washington does not provide a persuasive reason that his relationship should

be treated differently from other intra-facility relationships. See Prison Legal

News, 683 F.3d at 216 (displaying the high standard for succeeding on an as-

applied challenge under Turner by framing the inquiry as whether plaintiff

has “produced evidence that contradicts the rationality” of the policy).

Washington highlights the benefits of his relationship with Layton, but that

does not undercut the legitimate reasons to apply the policy to Washington.

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5

Defendants assert that Washington’s concession that some intra-facility marriages

may be appropriately disallowed is incompatible with the nature of facial challenges, which

generally require that a statute be unconstitutional in all applications. Wash. State Grange

v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008).

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As discussed above, Defendants’ evidence tends to show that

Washington and Layton, as SVPs, are not capable of being appropriate

partners for each other, and their partnership may undermine their treatment

and strain administrative resources. Indeed, Washington’s relationship with

Layton has already caused emotional strife for Washington, and he has

prioritized his relationship with Layton above following other TCCO

policies. Because Washington’s evidence does not contradict the rationality

of TCCO’s application of the ban, the as-applied challenge fails.

IV. Conclusion

We are without jurisdiction as to Kingston, so we must VACATE in

part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND with instructions to dismiss claims

against Kingston without prejudice. We AFFIRM the grant of summary

judgment as to the remaining defendants.

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