The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
LAFAYETTE DIVISION
TARA FOGLEMAN-LAXEY CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-3038
VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.
MARK GARBER, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE WHITEHURST
MEMORANDUM RULING
Before the Court is a Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by
Defendant Sheriff Mark Garber (“Sheriff Garber”), who is appearing for purposes of this
motion in his individual and official capacities. See Record Document 129. Specifically,
Sheriff Garber seeks dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff Tara Fogleman-Laxey’s
(“Plaintiff”) claims against him and all unidentified employees of the Lafayette Parish
Sheriff’s Office (the “Sheriff Defendants”), pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See id. at 1. Plaintiff opposed the motion. See Record Document 133.
Sheriff Garber replied. See Record Document 138. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental
Authority (Record Document 140), to which Sheriff Garber filed a response (Record
Document 142). For the reasons set forth below, Sheriff Garber’s Rule 12(c) Motion is
hereby GRANTED, and all claims against him and the Sheriff Defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
This suit arises from Plaintiff’s arrest on August 29, 2020, at a BBQ protest (“the
protest”) outside the personal residence of Lafayette Mayor Josh Guillory (“Mayor
Guillory”). See Record Document 72 at 1–2. Plaintiff alleges the protest was in response
to Mayor Guillory’s unwillingness to address community concerns and was a peaceful
attempt at constructive dialogue. See id. at 2. Through Facebook and Facebook Live,
Plaintiff invited community members to join the protest. See id. at 2–3. In her broadcast,
Plaintiff revealed Mayor Guillory’s home address more than once. See id.
Lafayette police officers arrived on the scene, and Plaintiff was advised she was
obstructing the roadway. See id. at 4. After Plaintiff had been asked to terminate the
protest, she chose not to do so and was arrested and charged with a violation of Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 14:100.1, obstruction of a public passageway. See id. at 5. An
additional charge for disturbing the peace under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:103
was later added. See id.
The arresting officers removed all of Plaintiff’s personal property from her person,
conducted a pat-down search, handcuffed her, and placed her in a patrol car. See id.
Plaintiff was transported to a police station, where she claims she was “handcuffed to a
wall.” See id. She was then moved to Lafayette Parish Correctional Center (“LPCC”),
where she was detained for a period of several hours before being released. See id.
Plaintiff claims her detention violated LPCC’s COVID-19 intake policy, which limited the
detainees LPCC would accept to those who committed violent crimes or posed an
imminent threat to the public. See id. Furthermore, Plaintiff claims she was not provided
adequate COVID-19 protections during her time in LPCC, despite her notice to LPCC
staff that she was at an increased risk because of her weight and asthma diagnosis. See
id. at 5–6.
For approximately the next five months, Plaintiff claims to have had no further
interactions regarding her arrest. See id. at 6. On January 28, 2021, Plaintiff attended a
local civic meeting at which Mayor Guillory was speaking. See id. She publicly questioned
Mayor Guillory about his COVID-19 policies. See id. District Attorney Don Landry (“D.A.
Landry”) filed a Bill of Information against Plaintiff the following day formally charging her
with violations of Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 14:100.1 and 103. See id. At a February
8, 2021 hearing before District Judge Royal Colbert (“Judge Colbert”) in the 15th Judicial
District Court for the Parish of Lafayette, Plaintiff agreed to sign a civil stay-away order in
exchange for the dismissal of both charges with prejudice. See id.
Plaintiff filed suit on August 27, 2021, naming as defendants Mayor Guillory in his
individual and official capacities, former Chief of Police Scott Morgan (“Chief Morgan”) in
his official capacity, Sheriff Garber in his official capacity, D.A. Landry in his individual
and officially capacities, and Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated Government (“LCG”).
See id. at 6–7. Motions to dismiss were filed in response to Plaintiff’s Complaint by D.A.
Landry, Chief Morgan, LCG, Mayor Guillory, and Sheriff Garber. See id. at 7. Plaintiff filed
her First Amended Complaint on December 9, 2021, naming Mayor Guillory, LGC, Chief
Morgan, Sheriff Garber, D.A. Landry, Lieutenant Lisa Carstens (“Lt. Carstens”), and the
unidentified arresting officers as Defendants. See id. All pre-amendment motions to
dismiss were denied as moot. See id. at 10. Post-amendment motions to dismiss were
filed by D.A. Landry and Lt. Carstens only. See id. Magistrate Judge Hanna only
considered the post-amendment motions in his June 29, 2022 Report and
Recommendation. See id.
The June 2022 Report and Recommendation was adopted by the undersigned on
September 26, 2022, effecting the dismissal of the following claims with prejudice:
• All of Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims arising under Louisiana and federal
law and all official capacity claims arising under federal law against defendant
D.A. Landry;
• All of Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims against defendant D.A. Landry; and
• All of Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against defendant Lt. Carstens.
See Record Document 125 at 2; see also Record Document 86. Plaintiff was granted
leave to amend her Complaint to specify the remaining claims made as to each remaining
defendant. See Record Document 125 at 2. Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint was
filed on November 21, 2022. See id.; see also Record Document 98. On January 19,
2023, defendants Mayor Guillory, Chief Morgan, and LCG filed a motion to dismiss. See
Record Document 125 at 2. Magistrate Judge Hanna’s factual background in his June 29,
2022 Report and Recommendation was adopted in globo by Magistrate Judge
Whitehurst’s August 11, 2023, Report and Recommendation, supplemented as
necessary by Plaintiff’s additional factual allegations contained in her Second Amended
Complaint with respect to defendants. See id. Magistrate Judge Whitehurst’s Report and
Recommendation dealt with 11 claims against Mayor Guillory, LCG, and Chief Morgan.
See id. at 2–3. On September 25, 2023, the undersigned adopted Magistrate Judge
Whitehurst’s Report and Recommendation. See Record Document 128. As a result of
this adoption, the motion to dismiss filed by Mayor Guillory, LCG, and Chief Morgan was
granted in its entirety, and all claims against these defendants were denied and dismissed
with prejudice. See id.
The claims that remain before this Court today are against Sheriff Garber and the
Sheriff Defendants. See Record Document 98 at 1–2. In her Second Amended Complaint,
Plaintiff raises the following nine claims against Sheriff Garber and/or the Sheriff
Defendants:
• Count 1 – § 1983 claims against Sheriff Garber and Sheriff’s Office for
violations of her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
• Count 2 – Louisiana state law claims against Sheriff Garber and Sheriff’s Office
for violations of Article One, Sections Seven and Nine of the Louisiana
Constitution;
• Count 4 – § 1983 claims against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff’s Office for an
unlawful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments;
• Count 5 – Louisiana state law claims against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff’s
Office for deprivation of due process rights and right to be secure against
unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy under Article One,
Sections Two and Five of the Louisiana Constitution;
• Count 6 – § 1983 Monell claims against the Sheriff’s Office for violations of the
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments;
• Count 8 – Louisiana state law claims for false arrest/false imprisonment against
Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff’s Office;
• Count 9 – Louisiana state law claims for abuse of process against Sheriff
Garber and the Sheriff’s Office;
• Count 10 – Louisiana state law claims for negligent hiring, retaining, and
supervision against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff’s Office; and
• Count 11 – Louisiana state law vicarious liability claims against the Sheriff’s
Office.
See Record Document 129-2 at 5–6. In the instant motion, Sheriff Garber asserts that
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be
granted. See Record Document 129-2 at 2. This Court has previously found probable
cause for Plaintiff’s arrest by adopting Magistrate Judges Hanna and Whitehurst’s
Reports and Recommendations. See id. As such, Sheriff Garber argues all of Plaintiff’s
federal and state law claims must fail. See id. Sheriff Garber maintains that the allegations
raised against the Sheriff Defendants should be dismissed for the same reasons provided
in the dismissal of all claims against the LCG Defendants. See id.
Furthermore, Sheriff Garber contends Plaintiff does not allege any facts supporting
the Sheriff Defendants’ involvement in this matter beyond her post-arrest booking and
search. See id. Thus, these claims should be dismissed. See id. Due to this Court’s
probable cause determination, the Sheriff, as keeper of the jail, had the discretion to book
Plaintiff into the parish jail and perform a search incident to that booking. See id.
Accordingly, Sheriff Garber requests that all claims against him and the Sheriff
Defendants be dismissed with prejudice. See id. at 2, 6.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
I. Rule 12(c) Standard.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). “In evaluating whether a plaintiff’s complaint survives a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, [the court] is limited to reviewing: ‘(1) the facts set
forth in the complaint, (2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matter for which
judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.’” Jordan Props., Ltd. v.
City of Cleveland, Miss., No. 23-60625, 2024 WL 3771453, at *1 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2024)
(quoting Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F. 3d 724, 735 (5th Cir. 2019)).
“A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d
413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008); see Jordan Props., 2024 WL 3771453, at *1. Under the Rule
12(b)(6) standard, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level ... on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true
(even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1965 (2007). If a pleading only contains “labels and conclusions” and “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” the pleading is deficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Courts must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true. See id. However, courts do not have to accept legal
conclusions as facts. See id. A court does not evaluate a plaintiff's likelihood for success,
but instead determines whether a plaintiff has pleaded a legally cognizable claim. See
Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F. 3d 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014).
Courts considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are only obligated to
allow those complaints that are facially plausible under the Iqbal and Twombly standard
to survive such a motion. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. If the complaint
does not meet this standard, it can be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. See id.
II. Analysis.
The Court will analyze each count against Sheriff Garber and/or the Sheriff
Defendants individually to determine whether dismissal is appropriate.
(a) Count 1
In Count 1, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff
Defendants for violations of her rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Record Document 98 at 31. Sheriff Garber submits that following a probable cause arrest,
it is within his discretion to book an arrestee into the parish jail and perform a search
incident to that booking. See Record Document 129-2 at 7. Sheriff Garber contends
Plaintiff’s sole claim against him and the Sheriff Defendants relates to her booking and
search at LPCC. See id. Plaintiff argues Sheriff Garber violated her constitutional rights
and § 1983 by booking her for misdemeanor violations during COVID-19 in violation of
his own COVID-19 policy. See id. She states there was no probable cause for her arrest.
See Record Document 133 at 14. Plaintiff maintains that booking her placed her at a
significant risk of contracting COVID-19 and developing complications from it, constituted
a clear violation of the COVID-19 intake policy and Judge Castle’s directive, and had no
basis in law. See id. at 12.
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority as to the issue of whether Sheriff
Garber and/or the Sheriff Defendants violated her First Amendment rights by effecting a
retaliatory arrest. See Record Document 140 at 1. She cites to the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Gonzalez v. Trevino, No. 22-1025, 2024 WL 3056010 (June 20, 2024),
which held that to satisfy the exception in Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 139 S. Ct.
1715 (2019), a party is not required to present evidence of “virtually identical and
identifiable comparators.” See id. at 2. Sheriff Garber responded, arguing Gonzales is
distinguishable from the instant case and does not overcome the arguments asserted in
the instant Motion. See Record Document 142 at 1. Sheriff Garber contends Plaintiff
supports her argument by citing to local, unsupported new articles and presents no new
evidence she was the only person arrested pursuant to certain Louisiana statutes. See
id. at 1–2. Additionally, Sheriff Garber argues the other protestors were not similarly
situated to Plaintiff; she was the only protestor who placed a BBQ pit in the street and
invited around 1,500 people to come to Mayor Guillory’s residence. See id. at 2. Thus,
Sheriff Garber submits Gonzales is distinguishable, and his Motion should be granted.
See id. at 3.
The Court agrees that Gonzales is distinguishable from the instant case and does
not aid in the Court’s ruling. Plaintiff claims she was the only person arrested even though
at least two other people were participating in the peaceful protest. See Record Document
98 at ¶ 55. She fails to support her conclusory claims with specific facts. Additionally, she
is not similarly situated with other protestors because she started the BBQ protest and
posted it online, revealing Mayor Guillory’s home address. Thus, the narrow holding in
Gonzales does not apply to the First Amendment claim here.
The new factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are very
similar to those she has already pled. The issue of probable cause has already been fully
addressed by Magistrate Judges Hanna and Whitehurst. Magistrate Judge Hanna found
that based on the specific facts alleged, there were reasonable grounds to conclude
probable cause existed for the arrest and prosecution for the crimes charged; thus,
Plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing a predicate constitutional violation under
the First, Fourth, or Fourteenth Amendments. See Record Document 72 at 30–31. The
Court agrees with Sheriff Garber that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not
present any additional arguments or facts that have not been previously considered by
this Court. See Record Document 138 at 4. Magistrate Judge Hanna properly viewed the
facts within the totality of the circumstances, which included Plaintiff’s own actions, public
sentiment, and, as Plaintiff alleged, the air of unrest among citizens. See Record
Document 72 at 29. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to plead any additional facts
against Sheriff Garber or the Sheriff Defendants sufficient to overcome the Court’s prior
finding of probable cause. See Record Document 138 at 4. Thus, the claims underlying
Count 1 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(b) Counts 2, 4, and 5
In Count 2, Plaintiff asserts Louisiana state law claims against Sheriff Garber and
the Sheriff Defendants for violations of Article 1, Sections 7 and 9 of the Louisiana
Constitution. See Record Document 98 at 39. In Count 4, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims
against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants for unlawful search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 42. In Count 5, Plaintiff
asserts Louisiana state law claims against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants for
deprivation of due process rights and the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy under Article 1, Sections 2 and 5 of the
Louisiana Constitution. See id. at 47.
To succeed in her § 1983 claims under Count 4, Plaintiff must plausibly allege
Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants lacked probable cause when she was arrested
and booked. Magistrate Judge Hanna’s previous Report and Recommendation, adopted
by Magistrate Judge Whitehurst and this Court, found probable cause existed. See
Record Document 125, at 9–10. There is nothing in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint that supports a contrary finding. She has failed to plead additional facts that
change the analysis of this claim under the dismissal standard. Therefore, the claims
underlying Count 4 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
The Fifth Circuit has held that “any Louisiana law claims brought under Article I,
Sections 7 and 9 of the Louisiana Constitution should also be dismissed, since the
protections offered under Louisiana’s Constitution as to free speech and due process
mirror that of the federal constitution and are subject to the same analysis.” Haney v.
Roberts, 846 F. 3d 795, 801, n. 2 (5th Cir. 2017). See Cripps v. La. Dep’t. of Agric. &
Forestry, 819 F. 3d 221, 231 (5th Cir. 2016). Count 2 of Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint deals with claims brought under Louisiana Constitution Article I, Sections 7
and 9. See Record Document 98 at 39. Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution deals with
the Freedom of Expression, and Section 9 discusses the Right of Assembly and Petition.
LA. CONST. Art. 1, §§ 7, 9. Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claims in Count 2 resemble the First
Amendment claims above, which were dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff has failed to
submit additional facts supporting her claims against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff
Defendants. Thus, the claims under Count 2 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Additionally, Count 5 of Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims under Louisiana
Constitution Article I, Sections 2 and 5. See Record Document 98 at 47. Section 2
guarantees Due Process of Law, mirroring the Fourteenth Amendment. LA. CONST. Art.
1, § 2. Section 5 protects the Right to Privacy, similar to the Fourth Amendment. LA.
CONST. Art. 1, § 5. As stated previously, Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts in her
Second Amended Complaint demonstrating the viability of these claims. Magistrate
Judges Hanna and Whitehurst, along with this Court, have found probable cause incident
to Plaintiff’s arrest. Plaintiff’s facts within her Second Amended Complaint are insufficient
to overcome dismissal. Thus, the claims underlying Count 5 are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
(c) Count 6
In Count 6, Plaintiff asserts § 1983 Monell claims against the Sheriff Defendants
for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Record Document
98 at 48. As established in Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018
(1978), a claim that deals with maintaining, enforcing, and applying policies, practices, or
customs “regarding seizure and use of force, training, supervising, and disciplining police
officers” is often referred to as a Monell claim. Lewis v. Huval, No. 16-01280, 2020 WL
2544811, at *10 (W.D. La. May 4, 2020). The Fifth Circuit has held that “a plaintiff must
show that an official policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker was the moving force
behind the violation of a constitution right” to establish Monell liability. Henderson v. Harris
Cnty., Tex., 51 F. 4th 125, 130 (5th Cir. 2022). Furthermore, “to get past the pleading
stage, a complaint’s ‘description of a policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying
constitutional violation cannot be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.’” Id. (quoting
Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F. 3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted)).
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s allegations under Count 6 are
merely conclusory and speculative. Her allegations of unlawful policies, practices, and
customs of the Sheriff Defendants do not provide a connection to an underlying
constitutional violation beyond mere speculation. Since this Court has previously found
probable cause underlying Plaintiff’s arrest and has held that Sheriff Garber had
discretion to book Plaintiff, she fails to allege how these polices, practices, and customs
violated her constitutional rights. Plaintiff’s mere use of the words custom, policy, or civil
rights does not necessarily give rise to a successful Monell claim under § 1983. Since
she fails to specify particularized facts pointing to the unlawful, widespread customs or
policies Sheriff Garber or the Sheriff Defendants implemented, her claims under Count 6
are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(d) Counts 8, 9, 10, and 11
In Count 8, Plaintiff asserts Louisiana state law claims for false arrest/false
imprisonment against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants. See Record Document
98 at 55. In Count 9, Plaintiff asserts Louisiana state law claims for abuse of process
against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants. See id. at 56. In Count 10, she brings
Louisiana state law claims for negligent hiring, retaining, and supervision against Sheriff
Garber and the Sheriff Defendants. See id. at 59. In Count 11, she brings Louisiana state
law vicarious liability claims against the Sheriff Defendants. See id. at 62.
The Court finds Plaintiff’s detention was neither false nor unlawful because there
was probable cause underlying her arrest. In Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, she
claims she has suffered damages including physical pain, mental anguish, and continual
loss of reputation in the community. See id. at 56. She fails to put forth new evidence that
her arrest was made without probable cause; instead, her claims are conclusory and
insufficient. Thus, the claims in Count 8 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Since the Court has found probable cause existed to arrest and book Plaintiff, her
claims under Count 9 should also be dismissed. Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff
Defendants properly detained and booked Plaintiff. From the Second Amended
Complaint, there are no new facts supporting Plaintiff’s abuse of power claim. There are
no facts suggesting that Sheriff Garber or the Sheriff Defendants had an ulterior purpose
or a willful act. Therefore, the claims within Count 9 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
In Count 10, Plaintiff states conclusory claims that Sheriff Garber failed to properly
train police officers or deputies on adhering to established First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment principles. See id. at 60. Plaintiff does not point to additional facts supporting
her conclusory statements; rather, she simply submits Sheriff Garber was negligent in
hiring, retaining, and supervising other officers. These conclusory claims are insufficient
under the dismissal standard; thus, the claims in Count 10 are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Finally, Count 11 should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to overcome the
dismissal standard as to her previous claims. Sheriff Garber cannot be held vicariously
liable since neither he nor the Sheriff Defendants are liable under the other counts within
the Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s claims of vicariously liability are speculative
and conclusory. For example, she claims Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants
“intentionally, negligently, recklessly, directly, and/or proximately caused physical and
emotional injury to [her], including both acts of omission and acts of commission.” See id.
at 63. These legal conclusions are insufficient to overcome dismissal, and Plaintiff fails to
provide specific statements supporting her claims within Count 11. Therefore, the claims
underlying Count 11 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(e) Excessive Force Claim Against Sheriff Garber
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts an excessive force claim
against Sheriff Garber. See Record Document 98 at 45, 61. She claims the Sheriff
Defendants violated department policy in searching and booking her. See id. at ¶¶ 166,
173. Plaintiff submits these actions violated both § 1983 and state law. See id. at 47–67.
The Court disagrees. As stated in Magistrate Judge Whitehurst’s Report and
Recommendation, which has been adopted by this Court, these claims are improperly
pled and fail to state a claim. See Record Document 125 at 16. Section 1983 does not
provide a remedy for violations of a sheriff department’s policies. See id. (citing Sylvester
v. Cain, 311 Fed. Appx. 733, 735 (5th Cir. 2009)). Additionally, under Louisiana Civil
Criminal Procedure Article 288, Sheriff Garber had full discretion on whether to book
Plaintiff into LPCC. See id. at 17. Plaintiff’s allegations in her Second Amended Complaint
do not rise above mere conclusions and speculation. See id. Therefore, the excessive
force claims against Sheriff Garber are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
(f) Sheriff Garber’s Immunity
In his Motion, Sheriff Garber asserts that he is entitled to discretionary immunity
and qualified immunity. See Record Document 129-2 at 21, 22. He argues discretionary
immunity is applicable to those acts that are discretionary, including the hiring, training,
and supervising other officers and the decisions to book and search Plaintiff. See id. at
21. Additionally, he contends he is entitled to qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s allegations
of First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations. See id. at 22. In her opposition,
Plaintiff argues the Sheriff Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity for either the
strip search of Plaintiff or booking her into the correctional center. See Record Document
133 at 25. Additionally, she submits the Sheriff Defendants are not entitled to
discretionary immunity. See id. at 31.
Under qualified immunity, government officials are protected “from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). As stated above, Plaintiff
has failed to plead new, additional facts supporting her claims within her Second
Amended Complaint. Therefore, a discussion of whether discretionary or qualified
immunity applies in this case is irrelevant because Plaintiff has not successfully asserted
any claims against either Sheriff Garber or the Sheriff Defendants. Even if the Court found
a constitutional violation, Plaintiff fails to cite to clearly established law that would preclude
her arrest.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Sheriff Garber’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) (Record Document 129) is GRANTED. All claims asserted by
Plaintiff against Sheriff Garber and the Sheriff Defendants are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
An accompanying Judgment will issue herewith.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 3rd day of February,
2025. kl
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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