State of Tennessee v. Larry E. Scales

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

MAY 2000 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. LARRY E. SCALES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Warren County

No. F-7555 Charles D. Haston, Judge

No. M 1998-00142-CCA-R3-CD - Filed September 15, 2000

JOE G. RILEY, J., dissenting.

I agree with the majority’s disposition of all issues with the exception of the erroneous jury

instruction as to range of punishment. I would find any errors relating to this jury instruction to be

harmless in this case.

As noted by the majority, the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant “would be

sentenced to serve thirty-five percent (35%) of any sentence imposed by the court as a Range II

offender.” I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Range II reference was erroneous;

however, I find it to be harmless in this case.

I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the erroneous range of punishment

instruction in this case requires reversal. In my view, State v. Cook, 816 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1991),

is distinguishable.1 In Cook, the jury was instructed under the 1982 Sentencing Act only as to Range

I (20 to 40 years), whereas a Range II sentence (40 years to life) was mandated by statute due to the

nature of the offense. Id. at 323. Thus, the defendant had to receive a sentence that had a range that

far exceeded the maximum as charged by the trial court.

Under the present 1989 Sentencing Act, “the actual decision whether to permit enhancement

does not occur until after conviction at the sentencing hearing.” State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586, 590

(Tenn. 1998). Thus, the trial court could not assume in this case that the defendant would be

sentenced as an upper range offender. The trial court should have given the full range of punishment

from Range I through career offender. See id. at 590-91.

1

I also find State v. Meyer, 994 S.W.2d 129 (Tenn. 1999), distinguishable. There the trial court charged the

defendant would be eligible for release upon serving 5.73 years, whereas the law required service of the entire sentence

for child rap e. The min imum senten ce was 25 years.

However, unlike Cook, the trial court charged the jury that the maximum possible sentence

was six years, which in fact is the maximum and only punishment for a career offender. Thus, the

instruction was accurate as to the maximum sentence, and, unlike Cook, the jury understood the

defendant could possibly receive a sentence of six years.

The statute in effect at the time of this trial required the trial court to charge “possible

penalties” to “include an approximate calculation of the minimum number of years a person ... must

serve before reaching such person’s earliest release eligibility date.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-

201(b)(2)(A)(i)(1997)(emphasis added). The errors in the instruction in this case were stating the

minimum sentence was two years instead of one year,2 and giving a “thirty-five percent (35%)

service of any sentence imposed” instead of a lower amount. The trial court did specifically instruct

the jury, pursuant to the statutory requirement, that actual release was discretionary with the parole

board, and the board had the authority “to require a defendant to serve the entire sentence imposed

by the Court.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-201(b)(2)(A)(ii)(1997). Clearly, the defendant was

not prejudiced by instructions on these higher amounts regarding the minimum sentence instead of

lower amounts since the jury would also have convicted based on an even lesser possible sentence.

As the majority noted, the defendant did not contest the 2 to 6 year range in the charge.

A jury charge concerning the range of punishment is a statutory right and not a constitutional

one. Cook, 816 S.W.2d at 326. I would conclude this defendant, unlike Cook, suffered no prejudice

under this charge. Thus, I believe it constituted harmless error and did not constitute prejudice to

the judicial process. See State v. Winford Lee Pipkin, C.C.A. No. 01C01-9605-CR-00210, Davidson

County (Tenn. Crim. App. filed December 4, 1997, at Nashville); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Tenn R.

Crim. P. 52(a).

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

___________________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE

2

Where the minimum punishmen t is one year, the trial c ourt also has the option o f sentencing the d efendant to

the county jail fo r “any period of time less than o ne year.” T enn. Cod e Ann. § 4 0-35-21 1(2).

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