Ordonye v. Clement

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

RYAN ORDONYE, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 24-2084

KEVIN CLEMENT, ET AL., SECTION: “E” (4)

Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court are Defendants: Kevin Clement, individually and in his official

capacity as Mayor of the City of Thibodaux (“Mayor Clement”), and the City of Thibodaux

(“the City”) (collectively referred to as “the Defendants.”). Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.1

Plaintiff, Ryan Ordonye,2 opposes the motion.3 Defendants filed a reply.4

BACKGROUND

On August 24, 2024, Plaintiff, a former police officer in Thibodaux, Louisiana, filed

a civil rights action against the Defendants.5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “undertook

a campaign of defamation and violation of privacy rights against the Plaintiff,” “violat[ed]

various administrative policies and constitutional laws,” and constructively discharged

Plaintiff from his position as a Thibodaux police officer.6 Plaintiff asserts causes of action

1 R. Doc. 13; FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s name has been spelled differently throughout the pleadings. In the

complaint and amended complaint, Plaintiff’s name is spelled “Ordonye.” R. Doc. 1, R. Doc. 10. In the

newspaper article, Loudermill notice, and resignation letter attached to the complaint, as well as in the

EEOC charge letter attached to the opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s name is spelled as

“Ordoyne.” R. Doc. 10, pp 23-25; R. Doc. 15-1, p. 1. For purposes of this order and reasons, the Court will

use the spelling as stated in Plaintiff’s complaint.

3 R. Doc. 15.

4 R. Doc. 16.

5 R. Doc. 1.

6 Id.

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;7 the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) at 42 U.S.C. §

12112;8 and state law claims for defamation and invasion of privacy. 9 Plaintiff also seeks

to recover from the City for the alleged state law torts under theories of respondeat

superior and vicarious liability. 10

Plaintiff alleges that he began working for the Thibodaux Police Department in

August 2020 as a “Supervisor of Trustees, Police Guard.”11 Plaintiff alleges that, “[a]t all

times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff was a full-time commissioned-police officer,” and the

position was “qualified as a Civil Service position under the Civil Service system, meaning

that the Plaintiff could be terminated from his position only for good cause.”12 Plaintiff

alleges that, as a result, he possessed a “constitutionally protected property interest in his

job,”13 which is also recognized in the “Louisiana Police [Officer] Bill of Rights.”14 Plaintiff

alleges his “statutory entitlement to pre-termination substantive procedures give rise to a

protected due process interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.”15 As to the City and

Mayor Clement, Plaintiff alleges the City has the right to exercise its police power due to

its Home Rule Charter,16 which “vested all executive powers and functions of the City of

Thibodaux in the Mayor,” including the power to “[a]ppoint, suspend, or remove all City

employees and officers.”17

7 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

8 42 U.S.C. § 12112.

9 See generally R. Doc. 1; R. Doc. 10. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for emotional distress under his

state law claims.

10 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to identify whether the respondeat superior and vicarious liability

theories are pursuant to his state or federal claims. R. Doc. 13-1, p. 2. See R. Doc. 10, p. 17. It is clear to the

Court that Plaintiff seeks to recover under his state law claims against the City when he raises these theories

of recovery. R. Doc. 10, pp. 17-18.

11 R. Doc. 10, p. 5.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id.; LA. R.S. 40:2531.

15 R. Doc. 10, p. 10.

16 Id. at p. 3.

17 Id. at p. 4.

Plaintiff alleges that, on August 28, 2023, while “experiencing a mental health

crisis,” he was working a security position at the Thibodaux City Courthouse.18 Plaintiff

alleges “an unfortunate incident arose” where he was “allegedly seen on security video

footage taking about $200 . . . from a lost-and-found purse” at the courthouse.19 Shortly

after the incident, Plaintiff alleges he told another Thibodaux police officer about his

mental health challenges.20 On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff alleges he was placed under an

Order of Protective Custody and transported to Thibodaux Regional Medical Center,

where it was determined he required more intensive mental health treatment.21 Plaintiff

alleges he was transported to Universal Behavioral Health Hospital that same evening.22

Plaintiff alleges he remained at the behavioral health hospital for fifteen days prior to his

release on September 14, 2023.23 Plaintiff alleges that, while at the hospital, few people

knew of his whereabouts or actively communicated with him.24

Plaintiff alleges that, at some point during his stay at the hospital, he was “charged

with theft after taking money from the purse in the lost-and-found.”25 As a result, Plaintiff

alleges he was placed on administrative leave by the Thibodaux Police Department.26

Plaintiff alleges that his placement on administrative leave triggered his procedural due

process rights, including his “right to notice and an opportunity to be heard” prior to any

final employment decision being reached.27

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that, on October 16, 2023, the Houma Courier-Daily

18 Id. at p. 6.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id. at p. 7.

24 Id.

25 Id. at p. 6.

26 Id.

27 Id. at p. 7.

Comet published an article titled “Thibodaux Police officer charged with theft in incident

caught on security camera.”28 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement, “[d]espite being

subject to the Louisiana Police [Officer] Bill of Rights with an ongoing investigation . . .

disclosed extremely private information regarding [Plaintiff’s] mental health, which he

was not priv[y] to or had permission to release to the public.”29 Plaintiff alleges that,

speaking to whether Plaintiff would ever work for the Thibodaux Police Department

again, Mayor Clement stated:

“He can't, I mean he can't,” Clement said. “It's our policy to act on that stuff,

and any time that happens to anyone, if they commit a crime, there's

automatic termination. Our hands are kind of tied right now, because we

acted on some mental-health issues that he was having to protect his rights

and make sure things were done in a proper fashion. We have to wait until

those 20 days are up, and we have to wait until he is cleared by the

physician. But no, he won’t be coming back to work for our police

department.”30

Plaintiff alleges that, on January 10, 2024, the Thibodaux Civil Service Director

sent a letter to Mr. Ordonye notifying him that a Loudermill31 hearing had been

scheduled.32 The letter attached to Plaintiff’s complaint included a statement that the

hearing would be held on January 17, 2024 and that Plaintiff would “have the opportunity

to make a reply in writing or orally at this informal hearing . . . . fail[ure] to appear for the

set hearing . . . [suggests] you are waiving your right to this informal hearing and do not

wish to rebut any of the reasons listed for this action.”33 Plaintiff alleges that, on or about

January 17, 2024, he was forced to resign from the Thibodaux Police Department.34 The

28 Id. Plaintiff attached a copy of the article to his amended complaint. R. Doc. 10, p. 23.

29 Id. at p. 8 (sic).

30 See id. at p. 23.

31 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). Loudermill hearings represent “[t]he essential

requirements of due process” in allowing civil service employees “notice and an opportunity to respond”

prior to termination. Id. at 546.

32 R. Doc. 10, p. 19.

33 Id. at p. 24.

34 Id. at p. 19.

letter is attached.35

Plaintiff alleges that, “[w]hen Defendant Clement disclosed Mr. Ordonye’s mental

health [status], he created a working condition that was intolerable for him, giving him

no choice but to resign.”36 Plaintiff alleges he lost job opportunities at the Thibodaux

Police Department as a result of the incident.37 Plaintiff also alleges he was never

convicted of misdemeanor theft.38

Defendants filed their first motion to dismiss on November 4, 2024.39 Plaintiff

requested leave to amend his complaint in response to the motion to dismiss.40 The Court

granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint to “address[], fully and

completely, all arguments raised in the Defendants’ motion to dismiss.”41 After Plaintiff

timely filed his first amended complaint,42 the Court denied Defendants’ first motion to

dismiss without prejudice.43

Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss on December 30, 2024.44 Relevant to

the instant motion, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Mayor Clement in both his

individual and official capacities, (2) Monell v. Department of Social Services45 claim

against the City of Thibodaux, and (3) ADA claim against both Mayor Clement and the

City.46 Defendants also request that, “in the event this [m]otion is granted, . . . .

35 Id. at p. 25.

36 Id. at p. 10.

37 Id. at p. 8.

38 Id.

39 R. Doc. 6.

40 R. Doc. 7, p. 11.

41 R. Doc. 9, p. 3.

42 R. Doc. 10.

43 R. Doc. 11.

44 R. Doc. 13.

45 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

46 See R. Doc. 13.

Defendants respectfully request the Court deny exercising supplemental jurisdiction over

the state law claims and remand the case to state court.”47

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court may dismiss

a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if the plaintiff

has not set forth factual allegations in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.48 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”49 “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”50

The Court, however, does not accept as true legal conclusions or mere conclusory

statements, and “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual

conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”51 Indeed, “threadbare recitals

of elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” or “naked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” are not sufficient.52

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not show[n]’—that

the pleader is entitled to relief.”53 However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework

47 R. Doc. 13-1, p. 16.

48 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir.

2007).

49 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

50 Id.

51 S. Christian Leadership Conf. v. Sup. Ct. of the State of La., 252 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993)).

52 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (citations omitted).

53 Id. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).

of a complaint, [if] they [are] supported by factual allegations.”54 “Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”55 “Although

detailed factual allegations are not required,” “[d]ismissal is appropriate when the

complaint ‘on its face show[s] a bar to relief.’”56 Whether a plaintiff “will be able to offer

sufficient proof to support [his or her] claims is more appropriate in the context of a

motion for summary judgment or a trial on the merits” rather than in a motion to

dismiss.57 “[I]ntensive disputes of material fact . . . are usually more appropriate for

summary judgment . . . .”58

For plaintiffs alleging municipal liability claims, the complaint’s “description of a

policy or custom and its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot

be conclusory; it must contain specific facts.”59 “’[T]he complaint need only allege facts

that show an official policy, promulgated or ratified by the policymaker, under which the

municipality is said to be liable.’”60

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .61

54 Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555.

55 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

56 Cutrer v. McMillan, 308 F. App’x 819, 820 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

57 Smith v. GE Healthcare, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00492, 2019 WL 4565246, at *7 (W.D. La. Sept. 4, 2019).

58 Dong Phuong Bakery, Inc. v. Gemini Soc'y, LLC, No. CV 21-1109, 2022 WL 898750, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar.

28, 2022).

59 Pena v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 (5th Cir. 2018).

60 Id. at 622-23 (citing Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 284, 286 (5th Cir. 2016)).

61 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 confers no substantive rights, but merely provides a remedy for the

violation [by a person acting under color of state law,] of rights secured under the

Constitution and laws of the United States.”62 “To prevail on a Section 1983 claim, a

plaintiff must prove that a person acting under the color of state law deprived him of a

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”63 “A municipality or other

local government may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself

‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such

deprivation.”64

I. Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against Mayor Clement in his

official capacity is duplicative of his claims against the City, and

this claim will be dismissed.

As an initial matter, a suit against a government official in his official capacity, as

Plaintiff brings against Mayor Clement in this case, is treated as a suit against the entity.65

“Because official capacity suits are really suits against the governmental entity, . . . an

official capacity [claim] is subsumed with[ the] identical claim against [the municipality].

[A] § 1983 claim against [the official] must be viewed as one asserted . . . in his personal

capacity if it is to survive independently.”66 “When, as in this case, the government entity

itself is a defendant in the litigation, claims against specific individuals in their official

capacities are redundant, and for that reason, courts in this circuit have found it is

62 Broussard v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 45 F. Supp. 3d 553 (W.D. La. 2014) (quoting

Southwestern Bell Telephone, LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2008)).

63 Barker on Behalf of Barker v. City of Plaquemine, No. CV 17-340-SDD-RLB, 2019 WL 4580047, at *3

(M.D. La. Sept. 20, 2019) (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997)); Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 330 (1986)).

64 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 692, (1978)).

65 See, e.g., Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009).

66 Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2009).

appropriate to dismiss them.”67

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against “the City of Thibodaux”

and against “Kevin Clement, in his individual[], as well as his official capacity as the

Mayor of the City of Thibodaux.”68 Defendants point out that the “Amended Complaint

again fails to establish the difference between the official capacity claims and the claims

against the City . . . .”69 Because the Court finds the claims asserted against Mayor Clement

in his official capacity are duplicative of the claims against the City, the claims against

Mayor Clement in his official capacity will be dismissed.70 Plaintiff’s only remaining

claims against Mayor Clement are those asserted against him in his individual capacity.

II. Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against the City of

Thibodaux, and this claim will be dismissed.

To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege an underlying constitutional

violation.71 In Count Two of his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges the underlying

constitutional violation he suffered was the “pattern [of] disseminating false information

and privileged information regarding Plaintiff’s privacy regarding his mental health as

well as his constitutionally protected rights.”72 The underlying constitutional violation on

which Plaintiff’s Monell claim is based is unclear. In this case, the Court need not

determine whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged an underlying constitutional violation

because the Monell claim fails for other reasons.

To prevail at trial on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must establish that (1) an official

67 Broussard, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (citing Castro Romero v. Becken, 256 F.3d 349, 355 (5th Cir. 2001)).

68 R. Doc. 10, p. 2.

69 R. Doc. 13-1, p. 9.

70 See Castro Romero, 256 F.3d at 355 (“The district court was also correct in dismissing the allegations

against all of the municipal officers and two of the employees of the Corps of Engineers in their official

capacities, as these allegations duplicate claims against the respective governmental entities themselves.”).

71 See Albert v. City of Petal, 819 F. App'x 200, 203 (5th Cir. 2020).

72 R. Doc. 10, p. 12.

policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) was the moving force behind the

violation of the constitutional right.73 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to meet the first

prong of the Monell analysis because he does not allege facts that, if accepted as true,

would establish that the City had a policy, practice, custom, or procedure of disclosing

false, private health information in violation of an identified constitutional right.74

Defendants argue that Plaintiff makes only a conclusory statement that there was a

“pattern” of unconstitutional conduct but does not identify the specific policy, practice,

custom, or procedure of which he complains.75 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has

failed to meet the third element of the test for Monell liability because he does not allege

facts that, if accepted as true, would establish that a relevant “City policy or custom that

was the moving force behind a constitutional violation.”76

In opposition to the Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has not alleged facts to

establish the City had a policy, practice, or custom of disclosing health information,

Plaintiff argues that, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need not plead a relevant

policy or widespread practice in “exhaustive detail.”77 Even if, as Plaintiff correctly argues,

the relevant policy or widespread practice need not be described in “exhaustive detail” at

this stage, it still must be described. To identify the existence of an official policy, a

plaintiff may allege the existence of “written policy statements, ordinances, or

73 Hicks–Fields v. Harris Cnty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017); Henderson v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th

125, 130 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom., Henderson v. Harris Cnty., 143 S. Ct. 2661 (2023);

Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).

74 R. Doc. 13-1, p. 12.

75 Id.

76 Id. (emphasis added).

77 R. Doc. 15, p. 2. The Court notes, as Defendants point out, that Plaintiff untimely filed his opposition to

the motion to dismiss pursuant to Local Rule 7.5. The motion was set for submission on January 15, 2025,

R. Doc. 13-2, and Plaintiff’s opposition was due January 7, 2025. Plaintiff filed his opposition on January

9, 2025. R. Doc. 15.

regulations,”78 or may allege the existence of “‘[a] persistent, widespread practice of City

officials or employees . . . so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly

represents municipal policy.’”79 In either case, “[t]he description of a policy or custom and

its relationship to the underlying constitutional violation . . . cannot be conclusory; it must

contain specific facts.”80

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges only that “Defendant Clement engaged

in a pattern [of] disseminating false information and privileged information regarding

Plaintiff’s privacy regarding his mental health as well as his constitutionally protected

rights.”81 The Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of a specific written City policy

that allows the release of information regarding an employee’s health. Neither has the

Plaintiff pointed to a custom of allowing the release of information regarding an

employee’s health so common it represents municipal policy.82

Even if Plaintiff had adequately alleged a City policy or custom, his Monell claim

would fail because he fails to meet the third element of the test for Monell liability—that

the City policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Under

Monell, the causation standard requires a plaintiff to allege that the unconstitutional

policy was the “moving force” behind the violation of the constitutional right.83 To

sufficiently allege “moving[-]force causation,” “a plaintiff must show that the municipal

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct

78 Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019).

79 Velazquez v. City of Westwego, 531 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1161-62 (E.D. La. 2021) (citing Webster v. City of

Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc)).

80 Spiller v. City of Tex. City, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

81 R. Doc. 10, p. 12.

82 Nor as a practical matter does Plaintiff allege that the City has routinely released such information.

83 Hicks–Fields v. Harris Cnty., 860 F.3d 803, 808 (5th Cir. 2017).

causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.”84 The

municipal decision must reflect “deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a

particular constitutional or statutory right will follow.”85 “‘[A] showing of simple or even

heightened negligence will not suffice’ to prove municipal culpability.”86 “The ‘moving

force’ inquiry imposes a causation standard higher than ‘but for’ causation.”87 The

Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Mayor Clement took actions with the requisite

degree of culpability and, as a result, has failed to plead that a City policy or custom was

the moving force behind the constitutional violation.

The Court notes that Plaintiff was given the opportunity to amend his complaint to

fully address the arguments made in the Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, including

arguments that Plaintiff failed to plead the existence of an unconstitutional pattern or

practice under Monell and failed to plead facts showing the Defendants’ behavior was the

moving force behind a constitutional violation.88 Because Plaintiff failed to remedy these

deficiencies in his amended complaint, the Court notes that “[o]n this ground alone, the

Monell claims can be dismissed as waived.”89

In any event, Plaintiff does not argue that he has identified a written City policy,

84 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)).

85 Id.

86 Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of the County Comm'rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).

87 Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 806 F.3d 268, 281 (5th Cir. 2015).

88 See R. Doc. 6-1, p. 9.

89 Jordan v. Gautreaux, No. CV 21-48-JWD-SDJ, 2023 WL 1491213, at *19 (M.D. La. Feb. 2, 2023) (citing

JMCB, LLC v. Bd. of Com. & Indus., 336 F. Supp. 3d 620, 634 (M.D. La. 2018) (deGravelles, J.) (finding

that claims could be deemed waived for failure to timely oppose); JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v.

United States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016) (stating that, “[t]o avoid waiver, a party must identify

relevant legal standards and ‘any relevant Fifth Circuit cases’ ” and holding that, because appellant “fail[ed]

to do either with regard to its underlying claims, . . . those claims [were] inadequately briefed and therefore

waived.”); Jordan v. Gautreaux, No. 21-48, 2022 WL 897549, at *15 n.2 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2022) (finding

that certain claims against CorrectHealth could also be dismissed as waived because “Plaintiffs fail[ed] to

substantively oppose dismissal of” them).

practice, custom, or procedure that caused the violation of his constitutional rights.

Instead, Plaintiff argues he has pleaded a Monell claim against the City because he alleges

that the “Home Rule Charter vested all executive powers and functions of the City of

Thibodaux in the Mayor,”90 and that the action taken by Mayor Clement “as a lawmaker

and policymaking official is consider[ed] force of law.”91 Thus, Plaintiff relies on the

“single-incident” theory to establish liability under Monell. Under this theory, “[a] single

decision by a policy maker may, under certain circumstances, constitute a policy for which

a [municipality] may be liable.”92

Because Plaintiff alleges a single act by Mayor Clement as the official policymaker

for the City constitutes the policy for which the City may be held liable, Plaintiff must

allege facts that, if accepted as true, will establish the single incident exception.93 A “single

decision . . . constitute[s] municipal policy in ‘rare circumstances’ when the official or

entity possessing ‘final policymaking authority’ for an action ‘performs the specific act

that forms the basis of the § 1983 claim.’”94 “The single incident exception is a narrow one,

and one that [the Fifth Circuit has] been reluctant to expand.”95 Unless the actor is the

final policymaker for the municipality, “[a]llegations of an isolated incident are not

sufficient,”96 as “there is a particular danger that a municipality will be held liable for an

injury not directly caused by a deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself.”97

In addition, the Plaintiff must allege facts necessary to establish the action by the final

90 R. Doc. 15, p. 6.

91 Id.

92 Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 219 F.3d 450, 462 (5th Cir. 2000).

93 The parties do agree that Mayor Clement is the final policymaker for purposes of Plaintiff’s Monell claim.

94 Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 2019).

95 Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 2003).

96 Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992).

97 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

policymaker was the moving force behind the constitutional violation because it was

intentional and malicious and/or committed with deliberate indifference.

To support his single-incident theory argument, Plaintiff alleges the specific action

by Mayor Clement was his statement to the press, including his reference to Plaintiff’s

“mental-health issues,” as well as his statement that it is “our policy to act on that stuff,

. . . if they commit a crime, there’s automatic termination.”98 Even though Plaintiff

identifies Mayor Clement as the final policymaker for the City,99 and the Defendants do

not contest this characterization, the single incident exception is inapplicable. First,

Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of pleading moving-force causation. To adequately plead

the “extremely narrow” single-incident exception, the plaintiff must allege that the

constitutional violation was a “highly predictable consequence” of the defendant

policymaker’s conduct,100 such that the policymaker was in “complete disregard of ‘the

risk that a violation of a particular constitutional . . . right [would] follow the decision.’”101

It is true that, elsewhere in his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory

fashion that Mayor Clement’s actions were “intentional and malicious” and/or committed

with deliberate indifference,102 but he pleads no facts in support of these barebones

allegations. The factual allegations found in Plaintiff’s amended complaint are at the most

negligence, but “a showing of heightened negligence is insufficient . . . to prove municipal

liability.”103 Plaintiff has made only conclusory statements and has failed to support his

98 R. Doc. 10, p. 8, 12.

99 See generally R. Doc. 10.

100 Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 549 (5th Cir. 2010).

101 Liggins v. Duncanville, 52 F.4th 953, 955 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Bd. of the County Comm'rs v. Brown,

520 U.S. at 411 (alterations in original)). This is often referred to as the “deliberate indifference framework.”

Id.

102 See R. Doc. 10, p. 10.

103 Mason v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov't, 806 F.3d 268, 280 (5th Cir. 2015).

allegation that Mayor Clement was deliberately indifferent or made a malicious statement

in complete disregard of the known or obvious fact that his conduct would result in a

violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As a result, Plaintiff fails to allege Mayor

Clement had the culpability necessary to establish moving-force causation. Plaintiff’s

Monell claim also fails under the single incident theory.

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against the City,

and this claim will be dismissed.

III. Plaintiff has pleaded 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Mayor

Clement in his individual capacity.104

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Mayor Clement in his

individual capacity for violations of his privacy and due process rights under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments.105 Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Clement engaged in a

pattern disclosure in order to retaliate against the Plaintiff and to create an intolerable

work environment . . . . to have him quit his employment. These activities, which were

taken under color of law, violated Plaintiff’s right to substantive and procedural due

process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”106 Plaintiff further alleges

“Defendant Clement . . . violated Plaintiff’s privacy and due process rights by obtaining

104 In his amended complaint, Plaintiff states under the “Jurisdiction and Venue” section that he “brings

this action . . . to vindicate his rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” R.

Doc. 10, p. 2. Plaintiff does not mention the Sixth Amendment elsewhere in his complaint or in any of his

factual allegations against the Defendants. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants state in a footnote that

“Defendants assume this was asserted in error. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the

right to counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5, 10-12

(2016). There are no factual allegations in the Amended Complaint addressing a Sixth Amendment

violation.” R. Doc. 13-1, p. 9, n.2. Further, Plaintiff does not support his Sixth Amendment claim in his

opposition to the motion to dismiss and thus, has abandoned any such claim. See generally R. Doc. 15;

Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist., 461 F.3d 584, 588 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (explaining that failure to pursue a

claim beyond the complaint by failing to brief the claim in response to arguments made in a motion to

dismiss constitutes abandonment). As a result, the Court also believes the reference to the Sixth

Amendment was inadvertent and will not address any purported Sixth Amendment claim.

105 R. Doc. 10, pp. 9-10. Plaintiff entitles “Count One” of his amended complaint “Violation of the 4th and

14th Amendments of the United States Constitution.”

106 Id. at p. 10.

Mr. Ordonye’s private mental health information under knowingly false pretenses” and

disclosing the information to the newspaper.107

Specifically as to his due process claim, Plaintiff alleges that, as a “full-time

commissioned-police officer with the Thibodaux Police Department,” his position

qualified as a civil service position, and he could be terminated only for good cause.108

Plaintiff alleges that before he could be discharged, he was entitled to notice and an

opportunity to be heard under Loudermill and the “Louisiana Police [Officer] Bill of

Rights.”109 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement “disclosed a pre-determined outcome of

termination [of] Mr. Ordonye’s status as a police officer despite the fact no Loudermill

hearing had been conducted.”110 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that, “[w]hen Defendant

Clement disclosed Mr. Ordonye’s mental health, he created a working condition that was

intolerable for him, giving him no choice but to resign.”111 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor

Clement “attempted to undermine Plaintiff in order to have him quit his employment.”112

Plaintiff points to the emotional distress allegations in his complaint to argue that he

adequately pleaded facts demonstrating his humiliation to support his constructive

discharge claim.113

As to his privacy claim, Plaintiff alleges that he has “privacy rights” in his

confidential medical information.114 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement violated his

privacy rights by obtaining his private mental health information under “false pretenses”

107 Id. at pp. 10-11.

108 Id. at p. 5.

109 Id. at p. 7.

110 Id. at p. 8.

111 Id. at p. 10.

112 Id.

113 See id. at p. 11.

114 See id. at p. 1, 10.

and sharing the information with the Houma newspaper.115 Plaintiff alleges he was

“mortified” that his mental health information was disclosed to unauthorized third

parties.116 Plaintiff attached to his complaint the article published by the Houma Courier-

Thibodaux Daily Comet containing the statement made by Mayor Clement, which

publicly revealed Plaintiff’s mental health issues.117

At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must allege a “(1) deprivation of a right

secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law, (2) that occurred under color of state law,

and (3) was caused by a state actor.”118 To state a § 1983 claim against a public official in

his individual capacity, a plaintiff must “establish that the defendant was either personally

involved in a constitutional deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally

connected to the constitutional deprivation.”119

The Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pleads both (1) a procedural due process

claim and (2) a right to privacy claim against Mayor Clement in his individual capacity,

arising out of the same set of factual allegations. Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement, as

Mayor of the City of Thibodaux, State of Louisiana120 was “designated as the Chief

Executive Officer” of the City and had “the authority to exercise any power and perform

any function necessary.”121 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement was “either personally

involved in a constitutional deprivation or that his wrongful actions were causally

connected to the constitutional deprivation.”122

115 Id. at p. 10.

116 Id. at p. 8.

117 Id. at p. 23.

118 Sterling v. Narcisse, No. CV 23-44, 2024 WL 3635538 (E.D. La. June 11, 2024) (quoting Victoria W. v.

Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)).

119 Jones v. Lowndes Cnty., 678 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2012).

120 R. Doc. 10, p. 2.

121 Id. p. 4.

122 Jones, 678 F.3d at 349.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is “viewed with disfavor and is rarely

granted.”123 On a motion to dismiss, asserted claims are construed in favor of the

claimant, and all facts pleaded are taken as true.124 Individual capacity claims require

“allegations of . . . personal involvement or some other form of causation to connect him

to a violation.”125 “[I]ndividual liability for a government official who violates

constitutional rights . . . turns on traditional tort principles of ‘but-for’ causation,”126

which is lower standard than moving-force causation. At the motion to dismiss stage,

Plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts that if true would satisfy the “but-for” causation

standard by alleging that Mayor Clement was personally involved in violating his

constitutional rights and alleging the nature of that involvement. For the foregoing

reasons, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges § 1983 claims against Mayor Clement in his

individual capacity.127

IV. Plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust his claims under the

ADA; Plaintiff’s ADA claim will be dismissed without prejudice.

In Count Eight of Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts ADA claims

against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 12112.128 Section 12112(a) of the ADA protects

123 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir.

1982).

124 See Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 752 (5th Cir. 2024); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &

Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).

125 Davis v. Lopinto, No. CV 22-2521, 2022 WL 5292451, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2022), report and

recommendation adopted, No. CV 22-2521, 2022 WL 5241937 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 2022); Marks v. Hudson,

933 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 2019).

126 Sims v. City of Madisonville, 894 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2018).

127 The Court notes that “[s]ection 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the

Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law.”127 To the extent Plaintiff asserts

federal claims against Mayor Clement based on factual allegations of defamation, which affected his ability

to secure employment and form the basis of his state law defamation claim, these allegations cannot support

his § 1983 claims. 127 Dean v. City of New Orleans, 2012 WL 2564954, at *12 (E.D. La. 2012) (quoting

Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1996) (“‘[S]o long as such damage flows from injury caused

by the defendant to a plaintiff's reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but it is not

recoverable in a [federal civil rights] action.’”)).

128 R. Doc. 10, pp. 17-18.

individuals with qualified disabilities from employment discrimination on the basis of

their disability.129 Section 12112(d) prohibits employers from releasing employees’

confidential medical information acquired during an entrance exam or a disability-related

inquiry.130 Plaintiff alleges that Mayor Clement violated the ADA through committing an

unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s medical information to the press, which resulted in

“tangible injury” to him, including his forced resignation.131

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s ADA claims should be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies because, on the face of the complaint, Plaintiff failed to timely

file an EEOC charge and obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to commencing the action.132

Defendants argue that, while Plaintiff’s amended complaint includes an EEOC charge

number,133 “[t]here is no way to verify the timeliness or subject matter of the alleged

charge,” and the amended complaint “does not allege whether Plaintiff received a right-

to-sue letter.”134 Defendants further argue that substantively, Plaintiff also fails to

adequately allege a viable ADA claim under both § 12112(a) and (d).135 Defendants argue

that Plaintiff fails to allege he was discriminated against based on a qualified disability

under § 12112(a).136 Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim under §12112(d) for

release of confidential medical information because he fails to allege that the information

was confidential and obtained through a disability-related inquiry as required by the

statute.137 Defendants argue the complaint is devoid of factual allegations as to how

129 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).

130 Id. § 12112(d).

131 R. Doc. 10, pp. 18-20.

132 Id. at pp. 12-13.

133 See R. Doc. 10, p. 18.

134 Id. at p. 13.

135 Id.

136 Id.

137 Id. at p. 14.

Defendants acquired the medical information, nor does Plaintiff sufficiently allege how

the disclosure resulted in a tangible injury to Plaintiff because he chose to resign.138

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that unauthorized disclosure of confidential medical

information to the press “may constitute a violation of the ADA.”139 In response to

Defendants’ exhaustion arguments, Plaintiff concedes in his conclusion section that “he

would like the opportunity to obtain the Right to Sue from DOJ, which [he] still has not

received.”140

“The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals requires that an employee comply with the

ADA's administrative prerequisites prior to commencing an action in federal court against

his employer for violation of the ADA.”141 “The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when

plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory right-to-sue

notice.”142 “This requirement is strictly construed, and courts have routinely dismissed

cases in which the plaintiff did not allege that they received a right-to-sue letter or failed

to present evidence that such a letter had issued.”143

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he filed an EEOC charge, charge

number 461-2024-03858, under the ADA.144 Plaintiff makes no allegation that he ever

received a right-to-sue letter, nor does he attach a right-to-sue letter to his complaint.

Plaintiff concedes in his opposition to the motion to dismiss that he has not received a

138 Id. at pp. 14-15.

139 Id. at p. 14.

140 Id. at p. 15.

141 Wesley v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3-08-CV-2025-K, 2009 WL 193786, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27,

2009) (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-789 (5th Cir. 1996)).

142 E.E.O.C. v. Res. for Hum. Dev., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 688 , 697 (E.D. La. 2011).

143 Banks v. Hazlehurst City Sch., No. 3:15CV355-DPJ-FKB, 2016 WL 2654369 (S.D. Miss. May 4, 2016)

(citations omitted) (citing Hall v. Ouachita Parish Corr. Center, No. 07-2187, 2008 WL 724230, at *2 (W.D.

La. Mar. 17, 2008) (dismissing claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where plaintiff did not

provide evidence of receipt of right-to-sue letter or allege that he received the letter)).

144 R. Doc. 10, p. 18.

right-to-sue letter.145 As a result, Plaintiff has failed to plead that he exhausted his

administrative remedies with respect to his ADA claims, preventing him from pleading

plausible claims for relief under the ADA. The Court will dismiss these claims without

prejudice.146

V. The Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims.

Finally, Defendants argue that, if the Court dismisses all of Plaintiff’s federal

claims, the Court should refrain from exercising supplemental jurisdiction and remand

the case to state court.147 Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has stated 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claims against Mayor Clement in his individual capacity, the Court will, for the

time being, continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims.148

Accordingly;

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss149 is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with

respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against Mayor Clement in his individual

capacity.

145 R. Doc. 15, p. 15.

146 The Fifth Circuit has held that dismissal for failure to exhaust an ADA claim is nonjurisdictional.

Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 826 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 2016). The Court does not consider

Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff's allegations fail to state claims under the ADA because Plaintiff has

failed to meet the prerequisite of exhausting his administrative remedies.

147 R. Doc. 13-1, p. 16.

148 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005) (Section 1367(a) “is a broad grant

of supplemental jurisdiction over other claims within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is

one in which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.”). The Court reserves the right to forego

the exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction if summary judgment is granted on all federal law claims.

149 R. Doc. 13.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with

respect to the following claims:

Plaintiff's claim against the City of Thibodaux under Monell v. Department of

Social Services is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Plaintiffs claim against Mayor Clement in his official capacity is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Americans with Disabilities Act

claims against Mayor Clement in his individual capacity and the City are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to

filing suit.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will, at this time, continue to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims.

New Orleans, Louisiana, on this 3rd day of February, 2025.

SUSIE woRGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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