Mendoza v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

S.M., by and through MARIO RENE CIVIL ACTION

MENDOZA, ET AL.

VERSUS

DAN CASEY, ET AL. NO. 23-01499-BAJ-SDJ

RULING AND ORDER

Now before the Court is Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)

Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Failure To

State A Claim (Doc. 22, the “Motion”), filed by Defendants James M. LeBlanc and

Dan Casey, each in their official capacities (hereinafter, “Defendants”). The Motion is

opposed. (Doc. 27). For reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For present purposes, the following facts are taken as true:

Plaintiff S.M. is sixteen years old, and a U.S. citizen. (Doc. 18 at 5). S.M., like

other named Plaintiffs under the age of eighteen, is participating in this litigation

through her parent, Mario Rene Mendoza. (/d.). Plaintiff Elvis Nunez is nineteen

years old, and a permanent resident. (/d.). Plaintiff E.B. is sixteen years old, and a

U.S. citizen. /d.). Plaintiff S.T. is seventeen years old, and a permanent resident. (Id.

at 6). Plaintiff K.G. is sixteen years old, and a U.S. citizen. (Ud. at 5). Plaintiff

Asociacion de Familias Unidas en Accién is a membership-based non-profit

corporation under Louisiana law, with a principal place of business in Orleans parish.

(Id.).

James M. LeBlanc was the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public

Safety and Corrections (the “Department”) responsible for the lawful licensing of

motor vehicle operators in Louisiana at the time of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.

(Id.).1 Defendant Casey, as Commissioner of the Louisiana Office of Motor Vehicles

(the “OMV”), is responsible for the policies and practices of the OMV. Cd. at 7).

The federal REAL ID Act standardized state requirements for the issuance of

driver's licenses or identification cards. Ud.). To obtain a REAL ID license or

identification card, applicants must present various identifying documents that

include, for example, a photo identity document or non-photo identity document that

includes the person’s full legal name and date of birth, documentation of the person’s

date of birth, proof of social security account, and documentation of the person’s name

and address. Ud. at 8 (citing 6 C.F.R. §§ 87.11(c)-(g)). The REAL ID Act does not

mandate a minimum age to obtain a driver’s license or identification card. (Id. at 9).

The Department has established rules for the issuance of licenses to minors,

which allow for, in limited circumstances, the issuance of a temporary instructional

permit (“TIP”) to a minor who is fourteen years and nine months and is in the eighth

grade or higher. Ud. at 9). A TIP is a required first step to obtaining a driver’s license.

(Doc. 27 at 3).

The OMV has adopted a policy requiring first-time applicants for a driver’s

license (including TIPs) or identification card to show proof of identification by

providing (1) a U.S. state or territory-issued birth certificate or a U.S. passport, and

1 The Department has since seen a change in leadership, and LeBlanc’s duties have passed

to Gary Wescott.

(2) a Social Security card, Louisiana middle or high school identification card, health

insurance card or school records. (Doc. 18 at 11). Proof of residence can be established

by a utility bill, an unexpired driver's license or identification card issued to a minor’s

parent, the minov’s school transcript, or other documents. (/d.). Critically, at the time

of Plaintiffs’ original driver’s license application, the applicant’s parent purportedly

needed to “be present and provide his/her Louisiana driver’s license, permit or

identification card in person.” (/d. at 12 (citing OMV Policy 3.04)).

The minor’s parent must also verify his or her identity by presenting some form

of identification. (Doc. 28-1, hereinafter “OMV Policy 6.00”). The OMV application for

a driver’s license or identification card, which a minor and parent must complete and

sign, required the parent to present an “ID” or “DL” therewith at the time the

Amended Complaint was filed. (Doc. 18 at 12). This application has since been

amended to remove this requirement. (Doc. 27 at 15).

The individual Plaintiffs further allege the following.

S.M.

On June 5, 2023, S.M., a sixteen-year-old, applied for a TIP. (Doc. 18 at 13).

She and her father presented S.M.’s Louisiana birth certificate, her father’s

unexpired Honduran passport, S.M.’s original Social Security card, her school

identification card, and an electric utility bill. (d.). The OMV requested her father’s

ID or driver’s license—documents that he does not possess. Ud. at 13-14). The OMV

denied $.M.’s request, and did not inform her of any right to appeal the decision. (Id.

at 14). S.M. visited three additional OMV offices, with similar results. (/d.).

On January 38, 2024, the OMV issued S.M. the requested TIP. Ud. at 15). She

has not yet been issued a driver’s license, as she has not yet applied. (fd. at 16). S.M.

states that applying for a permanent driver’s license would result in the OMV

requesting her parent’s ID or driver’s license, and would risk losing the driving

abilities she currently possesses. (/d.).

K.G.

On May 24, 2023, K.G., a sixteen-year-old, applied for a TIP. (/d.). K.G. and

her father presented K.G.’s Louisiana birth certificate, her father’s unexpired

Guatemalan passport, a water utility bill, and an electric utility bill, along with K.G.’s

U.S. passport, original Social Security card, school ID, and Louisiana Department of

Health Medicaid card. Ud. at 17). K.G. was denied a TIP because her father lacked a

driver's license or state ID. Ud.). K.G. was not informed of any right to appeal the

decision. (/d.).

On December 27, 2028, the OMV issued K.G. a TIP. (/d. at 18). Similar to S.M.,

K.G. has not applied for a permanent driver’s license, and fears that she will lose her

ability to drive if she does do so. (d.).

Elvis Nunez

Elvis Nunez was issued a permanent resident card on December 18, 2015. He

is now nineteen years old. (/d.). In or about June 2022, Nunez completed a driver’s

education course. Ud. at 19). However, Nunez was not permitted to take the in-class

course or participate in the road instruction component because he did not possess a

TIP. Udd.). After the conclusion of the course, Nunez was issued a certificate to obtain

a TIP from the OMV. (d.).

Nunez and his father went to the OMV that month, where they were informed

that Nunez was not eligible for a TIP because his father lacked a driver’s license or

state ID. dd.). After Nunez turned 18, and in or around January 2023, he went again

to the OMV office to obtain a TIP. Ud.). He was denied, because the OMV determined

that he “looked young” on his permanent resident card, which was a photo of Nunez

when he was approximately ten years old. (/d.). The OMV did not provide Nunez with

information concerning his appeal rights. (Id. at 20).

On December 29, 2023, the OMV issued Nunez a TIP. (/d.). Nunez has yet to

apply for a permanent driver’s license, and fears that when he does so the OMV could

reject his application based on his appearance in his permanent resident card. (Id. at

20-21).

E.B.

E.B., a sixteen-year-old, lives in Orleans Parish with his mother, who does not

possess a drivev’s license or state ID. Ud. at 21). E.B. had never applied for a TIP,

because he believed an application would be futile, (id. at 22). However, since the

Amended Complaint was filed, E.B. went to an OMV office to obtain a TIP with his

mother. (Doc. 29). E.B. was denied a TIP because his mother lacked a driver’s license

or state ID. dd.). E.B. was not informed as to his appeal rights. (/d.).

S.T.

S.T. is a seventeen-year-old permanent resident, and lives in Jefferson Parish

with his mother. In or around Fall 2022, S.T. and his mother applied for a state ID at

the local OMV office. (Doc. 18 at 22.).S.T. and his mother presented S.T.’s permanent

resident card, S.T.’s employment authorization, 8.T.’s unexpired Honduran passport,

his mother’s unexpired Honduran passport, and an electric utility bill. (Id. at 23).

S.T.’s application was denied because S.T.’s mother did not have a state ID.

S.T. was not issued a rejection letter and was not informed of any right to appeal

the OMV’s decision. (/d.).

Asociacion de Familias Unidas En Accién (“FUA”)

FUA is a membership organization seeking to empower immigrant

communities. Ud.). FUA alleges that its members have been unlawfully denied

driver’s licenses, permits, and identification cards by the OMV’s policy of requiring

parental U.S. driver’s license or identification cards in support of first-time driver’s

license applications. (/d. at 25). FUA alleges that “to meet the needs of its members

whose U.S.-born and lawfully present children cannot obtain driver’s licenses and

identification cards because of the OMY’s discriminatory policy and practice, FUA

has had to divert resources away from its mission-related work.” (Id. at 26).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 12, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint, setting forth the

factual allegations outlined above and bringing claims for violations to Plaintiffs’

constitutional and statutory rights as set forth by the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination under any

program or activity receiving federal financial assistance on the grounds of race, color,

or national origin, and La. R.S. § 32:419. Ud. at 38-88). Plaintiffs argue that

Defendants’ requirement that parents possess a U.S. driver's license or identification

card to support first-time minor driver’s license applications discriminates on the

basis of parental alienage, national origin, and/or immigration status, and denies

Plaintiffs’ equal protection of the law on account of the same. (Id. at 34).

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ right to due process

by failing to offer Plaintiffs an opportunity to appeal their respective denials. (Id. at

36). In support of their claims under Title VI, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants’ policies

unlawfully discriminate and deny Plaintiffs access to driver’s licenses and

identification cards despite receiving federal grant money. (/d. at 37-88). Finally,

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant violated La. R.S. § 32:419, which provides that those

whose license-applications are rejected are to be given an opportunity to file an

appeal, within thirty days, with the district court of the parish in which the applicant

resides. Ud. at 38). Plaintiffs’ requested relief includes declaring Defendants’ policy

and practice of denying otherwise eligible U.S.-citizens and lawfully present minors

driver's licenses to be illegal and unconstitutional, to declare that Defendants’ policy

and practice of not affording notice and an opportunity for a hearing to U.S.-citizens

and lawfully present minors after their applications are rejected is unconstitutional,

and to declare that Defendants’ policy and practice violate La. R.S. § 32:419.

Plaintiffs’ request injunctive relief that mirrors this declaratory relief in the form of

an order that requires Defendants to cease with the above. (/d. at 39-40).

Defendants have now filed the Motion that is presently before the Court,

arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot given certain changes enacted by the

Department and the OMV,? that certain Plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim,

and that other Plaintiffs have failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

(Doc. 22-1 at 5-12).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants invoke dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

and Rule 12(b)(6). The analysis under both Rules is functionally the same. The critical

issue is whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that 1s plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); accord

Home Builders Ass'n of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 148 F.3d 1006,

1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (“A motion under 12(b)(1) should be granted only if it appears

certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that

would entitle him to relief.”).

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is]...

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679. “[Flacial plausibility” exists

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

be described infra.

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When conducting its inquiry, the Court must “accept|] all

well-pleaded facts as true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Bustos v. Martini Club Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal

citations omitted). Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions are insufficient

defenses to a well-pled motion to dismiss. Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678,

685 (5th Cir. 2017).

Concerning the issue of mootness, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit has instructed that:

“Mootness is ‘the doctrine of standing in a time frame. The requisite

personal interest that must exist at the commencement of litigation

(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Ctr. for

Indiwidual Freedom v. Carmouche, 449 F.3d 655, 661 (5th Cir.

2006) (quoting U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100

S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980)). If a case has been rendered moot, a

federal court has no constitutional authority to resolve the issues that it

presents. In re Scruggs, 892 F.3d at 128. Therefore, before considering

any other matters raised by the parties, we are obliged to “resolve the

standing question as a threshold matter of jurisdiction.” Cole v. Gen.

Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2007).

Env't Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants have provided various reasons for the Court to grant the Motion.

The Court finds merit in each.

a. Equal Protection and Title VI Claims

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Title VI claims are now

moot, as the requested relief—the issuance of TIPs—has been completed. (Doc. 22-1

at 5). Plaintiffs disagree, and contend that a live controversy exists between Plaintiffs

and Defendants, notwithstanding Defendants’ voluntary amendment to the driver’s

license application, because of OMV Policy 6.00. (Doc. 27 at 7). According to Plaintiffs,

OMV Policy 6.00 requires a minor applicant for a driver’s license to be accompanied

by a parent or legal guardian, and for this parent or legal guardian to present a U.S.

“DL or ID.” Ud. at 15).

The Court has examined OMV Policy 6.00, and cannot ascertain the basis for

Plaintiffs’ contention. There is no section to OMV Policy 6.00 that requires a parent

or legal guardian to present a U.S. “DL or ID.” (See OMV Policy 6.00). Rather, driver’s

license applicants aged seventeen and under must be accompanied by a custodial

parent or legal guardian, who shall have: “[d]ocumentation. . . to prove custody or

legal guardianship” and “identification.” (d.). Identification can be proven by

supplying the OMV with “[o]ne primary and two secondary documents,” “[t]wo

primary documents,” or “[i]f applicant has a Louisiana identification card/driver’s

license with a photo which clearly identifies the applicant and the Social Security

number is part of the file, additional identification is not required.” (Id. (emphasis in

original)).

Primary documents include: (1) a U.S. birth certificate, or a “Certificate of

Birth Abroad issued by the U.S. Department of State,” or a “Certificate of

Naturalization,” (2) a U.S. passport, (8) a foreign passport, appropriately stamped

and accompanied by proper immigration documents, (4) a permanent residence card,

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(5) a Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Refugee travel document, and (6) a

DHS Permit to reenter the United States. (d.).

Secondary documents include: (1) a DL or ID issued by an out-of-state or out-

of-country motor vehicle department, (2) a social security card or number verification,

(3) an identification card (with photo), which may be from any Louisiana educational

center, any employment from the State of Louisiana, or from an individual’s

Employment Authorization Document issued by the Department of Health and

Hospitals, or other qualifying sources, (4) an educational diploma, (5) medical

documentation, such as a Medicare or Medicaid Card, and (6) miscellaneous

documents, such as adoption papers, baptismal certificates, U.S. marriage licenses,

Louisiana property deeds, vehicle registrations, motor vehicle lien instruments,

utility statements, payroll stubs, W-2 forms for two years, prison release documents,

and more. (/d.).

Thus, by the plain terms of OMV Policy 6.00, U.S. IDs or DLs are not the

exclusive documents required from custodial parents or legal guardians in support of

a minor’s application for a driver’s license. (See id.). To the contrary, a parent or

guardian who has immigrated to the United States can furnish, for example, their

foreign passport, properly stamped, a payroll stub, and a local utility statement in

support of their minor’s driver’s license application. (See id.).

The source of Plaintiffs’ issues therefore, as Defendants note, appears to have

been the notation in the Louisiana driver’s license application form that required a

parent or legal guardian to provide a DL or ID. Plaintiffs concede that this application

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form has been amended to remove this requirement. (Doc. 27 at 15). The majority of

Plaintiffs’ complaints therefore, at least facially, appear moot. See Freedom From

Religion Found., Inc. v. Abbott, 58 F.4th 824, 832 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[t]he mootness

issue often arises where, as here, a statute or regulation is amended or repealed after

plaintiffs bring a lawsuit challenging the legality of that statute or regulation. In that

case, mootness is the default.”).

A look at Plaintiffs’ requested relief supports this conclusion. See id. (plaintiffs

injury “necessarily parallels its requested relief’). Plaintiffs’ requested relief for the

Equal Protection and Title VI claims amount to a declaratory judgment that a U.S.

driver's license or identification card for parents or legal guardians in conjunction

with a minor’s driver's license application is not required, along with accompanying

injunctive relief in the form of an order to Defendants to cease rejecting Plaintiffs’

driver's license applications for lack of a U.S. driver’s license or identification card.

(Doc. 18 at 39-41).

But OMV Policy 6.00, by its plain terms, already mandates Plaintiffs’ desired

result. Further, the accompanying injunctive relief has already been meted out by

Defendants themselves, at least as to those named Plaintiffs who have submitted

additional driver’s license applications. Plaintiffs contend that the Court’s reading of

OMV Policy 6.00 is not being adhered to by Defendants, and that E.B.’s recent denial

is proof. However, even assuming this is Defendants’ continued practice, a conclusion

that is belied by Defendants’ issuance of TIPs to other named Plaintiffs, it does not

necessarily follow that the Court must conclude that Defendants’ explicit policies are

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flawed. Alternatively, this Court lacks the authority to enjoin the State of Louisiana

to follow its own laws or policies—which is what Plaintiffs request given the Court’s

understanding of OMV Policy 6.00. See Valentine v. Collier, 956 F.3d 797, 802 (5th

Cir. 2020) (citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104

(1984)).

Plaintiffs also argue that the driver’s license requirement issue is not mooted

because of the voluntary cessation doctrine. This doctrine provides that “a defendant’s

voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its

power to determine the legality of the practice.” City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,

Inc., 455 U.S. 288, 289 (1982). The central issue for application of the voluntary

cessation doctrine is whether a party asserting mootness can “show that the practice

cannot ‘reasonably be expected to recur.” Fed. Bureau of Investigation v. Fikre, 601

U.S. 234, 241 (2024) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental

Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).

The Court finds that Defendants have done so. Defendants have unequivocally

amended the driver’s license application form to remove the requirement that a

parent or legal guardian must submit a U.S. driver’s license or identification card.

There is no indication that Defendants are likely to restore this requirement to the

application form. To the contrary, Defendants have assisted Plaintiffs in processing

their driver’s license applications, and if OMV Policy 6.00, effective as of May 1986,

is to be given primary importance, the inclusion of the offending requirement in the

application form was always erroneous.

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The State of Louisiana’s actions are dissimilar from those at issue in Ftkre.

Here, the State of Louisiana has not cabined their removal of the problematic

requirement to a “for now’ basis, and, unlike in Fikre, the conditions underlying

Defendants’ denial of Plaintiffs’ application may not be revived through additional

action by Plaintiffs. See 601 U.S. at 242 (“government placed [plaintiff] on the No Fly

List for... his religious beliefs. .. the government may relist [plaintiff] if he does the

same or similar things in the future—say, attend a particular mosque or refuse

renewed overtures to serve as an informant.”). For these reasons, the Court finds that

Defendants have carried their burden of showing that a reneging on the removal of

the U.S. DL or ID requirement from their policies cannot reasonably be expected to

occur, and concludes that Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Title VI claims have been

rendered moot.’

b. Due Process and State Law Claims

As to Plaintiffs’ due process and state law claims, Defendants contend that

such claims are mooted, time-barred, or that certain Plaintiffs lack standing. The

Court agrees.

Beginning with the state-law claims brought under La. R.S. § 32:419, the Court

concludes that it is without jurisdiction. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

3 Of course, should Defendants in fact renege on their policy updates, Plaintiffs can refile

their suit and, in this suit, alert the Court to Defendants’ previous actions to defeat

jurisdiction. Alternatively, should Plaintiffs continue to be denied driver’s licenses despite

the plain language of Defendants’ policies, Plaintiffs may refile and restyle the present suit

under other possible theories of liability, including a failure-to-train theory of liability, and

may include allegations as to Defendants’ de facto policy to deny licenses to those similarly

situated.

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over suits brought against a state absent the consent of that state under the Eleventh

Amendment. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-98 (1984).

There is no indication in La. R.S. § 32:419 or La. B.S. § 32:414(F)(4) that the State of

Louisiana has consented to have Plaintiffs’ state-law claims heard in federal court.

The Ex Parte Young doctrine, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), an exception to Eleventh

Amendment immunity, allows for states to be sued for violations of federal law. Young

v. LeBlanc, No. CV 23-681-SDD-RLB, 2024 WL 4157948, at *5 (M.D. La. Sept. 11,

2024) (citing Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir.

1998)). The doctrine applies to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection, Title VI, and due process

claims, as such claims are based on violations to federal law. See id. Plaintiffs’ claims

under La. R.S. § 32:419 are state-law claims, against state officers in their official

capacities, and seek equitable relief. (Doc. 18 at 38). Absent the consent of the State

of Louisiana, which is not present here, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

over such claims. See Hanna v. LeBlanc, 716 F. App’x 265, 268 (5th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiffs’ claims under La. R.S. § 32:419 will therefore be dismissed.

Regarding Plaintiffs S.M., K.G., and Nunez’s due-process claims, Defendants

argue that said Plaintiffs have suffered no continuing injury, given that each has

been issued a TIP, and that no future injuries are anticipated. (Doc. 22-1). Plaintiffs

respond by arguing that the Court nevertheless has standing because “Plaintiffs

reasonably expect Defendants will again deny them due process should they be

rejected when they surrender their temporary permits or apply for permanent

driver’s licenses.” (Doc. 27 at 29).

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“Article III grants jurisdiction to federal courts only over actions involving an

‘actual case or controversy.” Abdullah v. Paxton, 65 F.4th 204, 208 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 1448. Ct. 188, 217 L. Ed. 2d 75 (2028) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,

461 U.S. 95, 101 (1988)). For an actual case or controversy to exist, there must be an

injury in fact that Plaintiffs “ha[ve] sustained or [are] immediately in danger of

sustaining.” Id. (quoting City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. at 101). This injury may not be

“speculative, conjectural, or hypothetical.” Jd. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA,

568 U.S. 398, 409 (2018)). To this point, allegations “of only a ‘possible’ future injury.

.. will not suffice.” Id. (citing Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409).

Plaintiffs S.M., K.G., and Nunez, by their own admission, assert injuries for

their due process claims that are doubly hypothetical. Plaintiffs argue that “should”

Defendants deny their yet-to-be submitted driver’s license applications, Defendants

can be “reasonably expected” to deny them due process. (Doc. 27 at 29). The Court

concludes that, because of this mere possibility, Plaintiffs S.M., K.G., and Nunez lack

standing to bring their due process claims, as the injury-in-fact requirement is not

satisfied by Plaintiffs’ speculation that their driver’s license applications will be

denied.4

4 While the Court concludes that this is the proper result given the relevant precedent and

the changes Defendants have made to the driver’s license application forms, Plaintiffs’

allegations, if taken as true, shine a light on Defendants’ consistent failure to provide

individualized notice of review rights to those whose driver’s license applications are rejected.

While the Court concludes below that this lack of notice is not a due process violation because

publicly available statutes inform applicants as to their rights, best practice would be for the

State of Louisiana to provide applicants with information as to their review rights

contemporaneously with any license application rejection.

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As to the remaining Plaintiffs’ due process claims, the Court concludes that,

even if Plaintiffs are correct in that applicants possess a liberty interest in the

application and issuance of driver’s license, (Doc. 27 at 30 (citing Raper v. Lucey, 488

F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1978)), the real gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims, that

Defendants’ failed to provide notice to applicants of their review rights, does not

supply a base upon which Plaintiffs’ due process claims may stand, since applicants

are given notice of their appeal rights via publicly available state statutes. See La.

R.S. § 32:419; see La. R.S. § 32:414; see, e.g., LeBeouf v. Manning, No. CIV.A. 12-

2583, 2015 WL 3650797, at *11 (E.D. La. June 11, 2015) ([defendant’s] appeal

procedures are readily available to the public, and the Supreme Court has held that

‘individualized notice of state law remedies, which. . . are established by published,

generally available state statutes and case law’ is not necessary to satisfy

postdeprivation due process.” (quoting City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 284,

241 (1999))); Reams v. Irvin, 561 F.8d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2009) (plaintiffs

“contention that she was entitled to personal notice of her right to challenge” a

deprivation was rejected because the state had established remedial procedures by

publicly available state statutes); M_A.K. Inv. Grp., LLC v. City of Glendale, 897 F.3d

1303, 1818 (0th Cir. 2018) (same).

This conclusion is not in tension with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit's holding in Raper, given that here, unlike in Raper, Plaintiffs have been made

aware of the reasons underpinning Defendants’ license application rejections, and

Plaintiffs therefore have the information necessary to lodge attacks on such decisions

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in the appropriate state court venue. See 488 F.2d at 753 (“we are at a loss to

comprehend how such a hearing could be said to be ‘meaningful’ if prior thereto the

plaintiff was unaware of the grounds for the [defendant’s] decision”). Plaintiffs have

provided no further authority for the proposition that individualized notice of appeal

rights is constitutionally required in the license application process. Remaining

Plaintiffs’ due process claims will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion (Doc. 22) be and is hereby

GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUCIDE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Doc. 17) be and is hereby TERMINATED AS

MOOT.

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 30 of January, 2025

An ah

JUDGE BRIAN A. JAGKSON

UNITED STATES DtSTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

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