Chapman v. Allen

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

)

BILLIE JOE CHAPMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-01042-SHM-tmp

)

DONALD ALLEN, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY DOCKET,

DISMISSING CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE,

DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND, DENYING PENDING MOTIONS,

CERTIFYING THAT APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,

NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF APPELLATE FILING FEE,

NOTIFYING PLAINTIFF OF COURT’S STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(G), AND CLOSING CASE

On February 20, 2024, Plaintiff Billie Joe Chapman, Tennessee Department of Correction

prisoner number 633331, an inmate incarcerated at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility

(the “HCCF”), in Whiteville, Tennessee, filed a pro se civil complaint under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and under § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act (the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794. (ECF No. 1.) Chapman moved for leave to proceed in forma

pauperis. (ECF No. 2.) The Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the

civil filing fee in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”), 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915, et seq. (ECF No. 4.)

On May 15, 2024, Chapman filed a motion seeking to amend his complaint to add

defendants. (ECF No. 11.) The Court GRANTS Chapman’s motion to amend (ECF No. 11) as

a matter of course. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). For purposes of screening Chapman’s ADA and

RA claims under the PLRA, the Court CONSOLIDATES the original complaint (ECF No. 1) and

the motion to amend (ECF No. 11) as the “Consolidated Complaint.”

Chapman sues the following Defendants:

(1) the Honorable Donald Allen of the 26th Judicial District of the Circuit Court of the

State of Tennessee;

(2) Madison County Assistant District Attorney F/N/U Boyd (“ADA Boyd”);

(3) Madison County Assistant Attorney General F/N/U Earls (“Assistant AG Earls”);

(4) Joshua Phillips, Public Defender;

(5) Jack Collin Morris, Appointed Counsel;

(6) Jerry Wardlow, Warden;

(7) the State of Tennessee;

(8) Madison County Jail;

(9) Madison County Circuit Court;

(10) Jackson General Hospital;

(11) Hardeman County Sheriff’s Department; and

(12) Western State Mental Institution

(ECF No. 1 at PageID 1 & ECF No. 11 at PageID 81-82). Chapman sues Defendants (1)-(6) in

their individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) The Clerk is DIRECTED to

modify the docket to add Defendants (7)-(12).

Chapman seeks an “immediate injunction” for his release from custody. (Id. at PageID 9.)

Chapman requests $1,500 a day for every day that Chapman has been “illegally held” at the HCCF.

(Id.)

Chapman filed a motion for the appointment of counsel on March 6, 2024, and six other

motions between March 6, 2024, and July 17, 2024. (ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15.) Those

motions (referred to collectively as the “Pending Motions”) request relief as follows:

(1) Motion for the Court to Take Judicial Notice, asking the Court to take notice that

Chapman is proceeding under the ADA and not 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 8);

(2) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction, seeking access to the HCCF

law library (ECF No. 9);

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(3) Motion for Court to Intervene, asking the Court to intervene in the lawsuit based

on Chapman’s allegation that he was “taken advantage of” as a “mentally disabled

person” during his criminal prosecution (ECF No. 12 at PageID 85-86);

(4) Motion for Miscellaneous Relief, reiterating that Chapman is proceeding under the

ADA, not § 1983 (ECF No. 13 at PageID 91);

(5) Motion for the Court to Intervene, asking the Court to intervene in the lawsuit

because “Defendants and their employers . . . lie [and] avoid the issues of a mentally

disable[ed] American” (ECF No. 14 at PageID 97);

(6) Motion for the Clerk to Modify the Docket, asking the Court to direct the Clerk to

modify the docket to change the cause from “42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights” to

ADA (ECF No. 15).

The Consolidated Complaint (ECF Nos. 1 & 11) and the Pending Motions (ECF Nos. 7-9

& 12-15) are before the Court.

For the reasons explained below: (1) the Consolidated Complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE in its entirety; (2) leave to amend is DENIED; and (3) all Pending Motions are

DENIED.

I. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the Court accepts

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the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the

allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory

allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must

be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). It also requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’

rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Id. at 555 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2)).

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming

dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and

stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”

(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER THE ADA & THE RA

Chapman sues under the ADA and § 504 of the RA. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state

a claim under either the ADA or § 504 of the RA, Chapman must show that he is “(1) disabled

under the statute, (2) otherwise qualified for participation in the program, [services, or activities],

and (3) being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or subjected to discrimination

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under[,] the program, [services, or activities] by reason of his . . . disability.” S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ.,

532 F.3d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Chapman alleges that he was arrested on October 20, 2020, for a theft offense. (ECF No.

1 at PageID 2.) Chapman alleges that the police “illegally talk[ed] to [Chapman] without an

attorney” despite knowing that Chapman was “mentally disabled.” (Id.) Chapman alleges that

he was “abused” in the Madison County Jail, including being “tied to a chair,” placed in a “strip

cell,” and sprayed with mace. (Id. at PageID 3.)

Chapman alleges that on February 25, 2021, he was “kidnapped” from the Madison County

Jail and taken to Jackson General Hospital where he was “tied to a bed [and] forced [to take] mind-

altering drugs.” (Id.) Chapman alleges that in March 2021, he was assaulted by unidentified

employees of the Madison County Jail while “tied to the [hospital] bed.” (Id.)

Chapman alleges that during “the first week of March 2021,” he was “kidnapped” from the

Jackson General Hospital “without judge or court order” and taken to the Western State Mental

Institution. (Id. at PageID 3-4.) Chapman alleges that he was “forced” to take “anti-psychotic

medication” and was threatened with “physical force” and “takedowns” if he refused the

medication. (Id. at PageID 4.) Chapman alleges that he was civilly committed “without judge

or court order” in violation of his constitutional rights. (Id.)

Chapman alleges that in March 2021 Chapman “complained” to Judge Allen about

Chapman’s civil commitment. (Id. at PageID 5.) Chapman alleges that he had a hearing before

Judge Allen and that Judge Allen “had knowledge of everything that took place.” (Id.)

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Chapman alleges that in May 2021, he was released from the Western State Mental

Institution and returned to the Madison County Jail. (Id.) Chapman alleges that he was “kept

under mental health care” at the Madison County Jail and confined naked in a “strip cell.” (Id.)

Chapman alleges that, while confined at the Madison County Jail, he was “still being forced

[to take] mind-altering drugs.” (Id. at PageID 6.)

Chapman alleges that on September 7, 2021, Judge Allen sent Chapman to prison without

authority because “there was no plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” (Id.) Chapman alleges that

ADA Boyd engaged in malicious prosecution, but Chapman does not allege any facts to support

this allegation. (See id.)

Chapman alleges that his appointed counsel Phillips failed to protect Chapman’s rights and

liberties. (See id.) Chapman alleges that Phillips and ADA Boyd conspired with Judge Allen to

coerce Chapman’s guilty plea on September 7, 2021, and that Chapman did not “kn[o]w what was

going on” at the plea hearing. (Id. at PageID 7.) Chapman alleges that he was “tricked” and “led

to believe that [if he pleaded guilty,] he would get out of jail and go to a special place for help.”

(Id.)

Chapman alleges that Judge Allen appointed Morris to serve as Chapman’s post-conviction

counsel. (Id.) Chapman alleges that, because Morris was Judge Allen’s friend and former

colleague, Morris refused to bring any “complaints” against Judge Allen. (Id. at PageID 8.)

Chapman alleges that Morris refused to raise Chapman’s desired claims in the state post-conviction

application. (Id.) Chapman alleges that, instead, Morris raised claims that Chapman’s trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that Chapman “was not competent” to plead

guilty. (Id.)

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Res Judicata

On July 24, 2023, Chapman filed a civil rights action under § 1983 against many of the

same defendants that Chapman sues in his Consolidated Complaint. (See Chapman v. Allen, No.

1:23-cv-1146-SHM-tmp (W.D. Tenn.), ECF No. 1.) The factual allegations in Chapman’s

previous § 1983 lawsuit are almost identical to the allegations raised in his Consolidated

Complaint.

For example, Chapman alleged in his § 1983 lawsuit that Judge Allen “sentenced

[Chapman] to prison without authority on September 7, 2021” because “no plea [was] ever made

on a plea agreement.” (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.) Chapman alleged that, while his criminal case

was pending, he was taken from the Madison County Jail and sent to the Western State Mental

Institution where he was forced to take antipsychotic drugs without his consent and without a

“judge or court order.” (Id. at PageID 7.)

Chapman alleged that ADA Boyd and ADAG Earls “acted in concert to illegally

restrain/kidnap [Chapman].” (Id. at PageID 3.) Chapman alleged that his attorneys Phillips and

Morris did “not protect [the] rights of [Chapman] [and] caus[ed] [Chapman’s] illegal conviction

[by] refus[ing] to protect [Chapman] with ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id. at PageID 3-4.)

Chapman alleged that, “before and after September 7, 2021” and “through November 1,

2021,” employees at the Madison County Jail: (1) assaulted Chapman; (2) left Chapman naked in

his cell; (3) refused to provide pen, paper, and mail service to Chapman; (4) prohibited Chapman

from calling his public defender; (5) denied bedding to Chapman; (6) sprayed Chapman with mace

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and pepper spray when he refused to take his medication; and (7) subjected Chapman to

“mistreat[ment] and cruel and unusual punishment.” (Id. at PageID 8-9.)

On February 15, 2024, the Court dismissed Chapman’s § 1983 lawsuit with prejudice for

failure to state a claim to relief. (See Chapman v. Allen, No. 1:23-cv-1146-SHM-tmp (W.D.

Tenn.), ECF No. 15.) The Court construed Chapman’s complaint to allege 10 claims under

§ 1983 and determined that 9 of those claims were barred by the statute of limitations. (Id. at

PageID 150, 155-57.) The Court determined that Chapman’s remaining claim of false

imprisonment against Judge Allen was subject to sua sponte dismissal because, among other

reasons, the claim was barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity and by Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). (Id. at PageID 157-60.)

Although Chapman did not raise claims under the ADA and the RA in his previous lawsuit,

the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars Chapman from litigating a new legal theory

based on the same operative facts. “[P]laintiffs cannot avoid the effects of claim preclusion by

merely repacking their grievances into alternative theories of recovery or by seeking different

remedies.” Heike v. Cent. Mich. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 573 F. App’x 476, 482 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing

Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2006)).

In Heike, the Sixth Circuit held that the dismissal of a plaintiff’s prior § 1983 lawsuit

precluded her from bringing a new lawsuit challenging the same conduct as violative of Title VI

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Id. at 477.

The Sixth Circuit explained that, “to constitute a bar under the doctrine of claim preclusion, there

must . . . be an ‘identity of the causes of action.’” Id. at 482-83 (citing Westwood Chem. Co. v.

Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981)). “Causes of action share an identity where the facts

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and events creating the right of action and the evidence necessary to sustain each claim are the

same.” Id. at 483. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s “initial § 1983 claims share[d]

an identity to those asserted in her second lawsuit because all of her claims stem[med] from the

same set of operative facts.” Id. As the Sixth Circuit explained, had the plaintiff “brought her

Title VI and IX claims alongside her § 1983 claims, she necessarily would have relied on the same

evidence in support of those claims,” and it was “of no moment that the statutory elements of Titles

VI and Title IX claims differ from those of an equal protection or due process claim raised under

§ 1983.” Id.

Res judicata bars Chapman’s claims under the ADA and the RA because his claims, which

rely on the “same set of operative facts” should have been raised in Chapman’s previous § 1983

lawsuit.1 See id. Chapman’s claims under the ADA and the RA are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

B. ADA & RA Claims

Even if Chapman’s claims under the ADA and the RA were not barred by the doctrine of

res judicata, the Consolidated Complaint would be subject to dismissal because Chapman’s

conclusory allegations do not “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams, 631 F.3d at

383.

1 Although the Consolidated Complaint includes additional defendants, res judicata bars

Chapman’s claims against them because Chapman had a full and fair opportunity to raise his

claims against those defendants in his prior lawsuit. See Georgia-Pacific Consumer Prods. LP v.

Four-U-Packaging, Inc., 701 F.3d 1093, 1098 (6th Cir. 2012) (explaining that, “[w]here a litigant

brings repeated actions based upon the same operative facts,” res judicata may still apply “despite

a change in legal theory or the ‘cast of characters-defendants’”) (quoting Randles v. Gregart, 965

F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1992).

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Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Under § 504 of the RA any “otherwise qualified individual with a disability”

is protected from “be[ing] excluded from the participation in, be[ing] denied the benefits of, or

be[ing] subjected to discrimination” under specified programs “solely by reason of . . . his

disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Because claims brought under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of

the RA require proof of substantially similar elements, courts analyze ADA and RA claims

together. See, e.g., S.S., 532 F.3d at 452-53 (analyzing ADA and RA claims together).

The Supreme Court has held that Title II of the ADA applies to state prisons and inmates,

Penn. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212 (1998). The RA also applies to state prisons

and inmates. See Wright v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that

“[b]oth the ADA and the RA undoubtedly apply to state prisons and their prisoners”).

Chapman makes the conclusory allegation that he is “mentally disabled.” (ECF No. 1 at

PageID 2.) Chapman alleges that he received anti-psychotic medication while treated at the

Western State Mental Institution, but he fails to provide specific details about the nature of his

disability. (See id. at PageID 4.)

“Mental illnesses of various sorts can certainly qualify as a disability under the ADA [and

the RA], but where . . . a party alleges that he is disabled under the ADA [and the RA], courts have

generally required the party to plead the disability with some factual specificity.” Adams v.

Vanderbilt Univ., No. 3:23-cv-00001, 2024 WL 1182861, at *17-18 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 19, 2024)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Chapman does not describe his mental illness

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with any specificity and has failed to allege sufficient facts to show that he has a qualifying

disability under the ADA or the RA. See id.

Even if Chapman had alleged sufficient facts to show that he has a disability under the

ADA and the RA, Chapman’s allegations would not show that he was excluded from a service or

program, denied accommodation, or discriminated against due to his disability. See § 12132

(ADA); see also § 794(a) (RA). All of Chapman’s allegations are based on or related to his state

court criminal proceedings. His allegations are insufficient to state any covered discrimination

based on his unspecified mental illness.

Chapman’s conclusory allegation of violations of the ADA and the RA without specific

supporting factual allegations fail to state a claim to relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79;

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Chapman’s claims under the ADA and the RA are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th

Cir. 2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013)). Leave to amend

should not be granted where a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in his complaint. See Gonzalez-

Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending

the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry,

246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal

of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and

does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

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The Court DENIES leave to amend the Consolidated Complaint. Amendment would be

futile because Chapman’s claims under the ADA and the RA are barred by the doctrine of res

judicata and fail to state to claim to relief.

V. APPELLATE ISSUES

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), it is

CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Chapman would not be taken in good faith. If

Chapman nevertheless chooses to file a notice of appeal, he must either: (1) pay the entire appellate

filing fee or, if he is confined at that time, (2) submit a new in forma pauperis affidavit and a

current, certified copy of his inmate trust account statement for the last six months, in compliance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(b).

VI. NOTICE OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting

in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated

or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court recommends that the dismissal of this case be

treated as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2021).

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

A. Chapman’s ADA claim and his claim under § 504 of the RA are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous because they are barred by res judicata and, in the

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alternative, for failure to state a claim to relief. See §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) &

1915A(b)(1).

B. Leave to amend the Consolidated Complaint is DENIED.

C. The Court recommends that this dismissal be treated as a strike pursuant to

§ 1915(g). See Simons, 996 F.3d 350.

D. The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and DENIES

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

E. All Pending Motions (ECF Nos. 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15) are DENIED.

F. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 31st day of January, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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