automatic stay under section 362 prohibits various forms of debt collection efforts and “functions as one of the fundamental protections afforded to debtors by the bankruptcy laws.”
How later courts described this case
- automatic stay under section 362 prohibits various forms of debt collection efforts and “functions as one of the fundamental protections afforded to debtors by the bankruptcy laws.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
AYN CANDACE DOWNEY,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 3:25-CV-00064-NJR
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN
ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY,
Appellee.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, Chief Judge:
Before the Court is Appellant Ayn Candace Downey’s pro se Emergency Motion
for a Stay pending her bankruptcy appeal.1 (Doc. 4). This motion is a two-sentence
request, which states in relevant part: “I need this as an emergency motion due to
extenuating circumstances to request the stay be reimposed for the duration of this
bankruptcy case.” Id. Based on this Court’s review of the Bankruptcy Court’s docket,
Appellant appears to dispute the Bankruptcy Court’s order lifting the automatic stay that
is ordinarily imposed at the beginning of a bankruptcy case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; In re
Grede Foundries, Inc., 651 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2011) (automatic stay under section 362
prohibits various forms of debt collection efforts and “functions as one of the
fundamental protections afforded to debtors by the bankruptcy laws.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also In re Ayn Candace Downey, No. 24-40360 at Doc. 80
1 Appellant’s motion is reflected on the docket as an “Emergency Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis.” Although she requests a “fee waiver,” she also requests a “stay” to prevent Appellee from
evicting her.
(Bankr. S.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2024) (Order Granting Relief from Stay); & Id. at Doc. 85 (Order
Overruling Objections to Lifting of Stay).
Because of the paucity of relevant information she provided, the Court granted
Appellant until February 10 to file a supplemental motion explaining the legal relief she
seeks in more detail. (Doc. 5). In response, Appellant filed a one-sentence letter yesterday
asking the Court to take “immediate action” on her case because Appellee the Board of
Trustees of Southern Illinois University was supposedly prepared to evict her on January
31, 2025. (Doc. 6). In effect, Appellant seeks to preserve the status quo for herself while
her bankruptcy case proceeds.
This Court is authorized to reimpose the stay that was lifted in the Bankruptcy
Court. 11 U.S.C. §158(d)(2)(D); see also In re Miles, 436 F.3d 291, 294 (1st Cir. 2006). It is
apparent that this Court does not have the information it needs to make an informed
judgment about this appeal. Thus, considering Appellant’s alleged imminent eviction,
the Court GRANTS her request for a brief stay to allow it to consider further briefing. See
In re Koleszar Farm LLC, No. 21-5145, 2022 WL 1291506, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2022)
(granting temporary stay and ordering further briefing under similar circumstances).
Appellant’s motion for a temporary stay pending appeal is GRANTED. The
Bankruptcy Court’s order lifting the automatic stay, In re Ayn Candace Downey, No. 24-
40360 at Doc. 80, is TEMPORARILY STAYED. Appellant and Appellee are DIRECTED
to submit supplemental briefing outlining the procedural history of this case and the legal
bases for the relief they seek on or before Monday, February 10, 2025.2 Appellee shall
take no steps to evict Appellant until the Court has considered this supplemental briefing.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 30, 2025 Tl ( ) t.. 0
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
Chief U.S. District Judge
? Appellant's supplemental brief in response to this order will satisfy her obligation to brief the merits of
this case under the Court’s Order dated January 27, 2025. See (Doc. 5). Appellant is still required to file a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis or to pay the required filing fee. Id.
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