The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
DEDRA LOUIS
CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
NO. 24-350-JWD-RLB
LEIDOS, INC.
RULING AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss
(“MTD”), (Doc. 12.), filed by Defendant Leidos, Inc., and the Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Venue
(“MTT”), (Doc. 17-1), filed by Plaintiff Dedra Louis. Defendant argues that this matter should be
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, while Plaintiff argues that the Court should transfer the
action to a more appropriate forum. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s MTT
and denies Defendant’s MTD.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that she is a domiciliary of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, employed as a Military
and Family Life Counselor by Defendant since November of 2021. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 5.) Defendant
argues that it is a business incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in Virginia,
(Doc. 12-1 at 5), which Plaintiff does not dispute, (Doc. 17-1 at 2).
Plaintiff alleges that in June of 2023, she was scheduled for a work assignment in Guam.
(Doc. 1 at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff, an African-American woman, was one of five employees in the same role
on the Guam assignment; of the others, two were white, one was also African-American, and one
was Filipino. (Id. at ¶ 7.) All were women. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that after staying in a hotel for her first week on assignment in Guam, she
and one of her white co-workers were given information on their proposed corporate housing. (Id.
at ¶¶ 10–12.) Both had concerns about safety conditions at the proposed housing, which they
voiced to their supervisors. (Id. at ¶¶ 13–20, 26.) Plaintiff alleges that while her white co-worker
was permitted to continue to stay at a hotel after voicing concerns about the proposed housing,
Plaintiff was told that she would still have to move into the proposed corporate housing. (Id. at ¶¶
24–29.) Plaintiff claims that her white co-workers and her Filipino co-worker were all permitted
to stay in housing other than the corporate housing following her co-worker’s complaint. (Id. at ¶¶
30–34.) Plaintiff asserts that only she and her African-American co-worker were expected to stay
in the corporate housing. (Id. at ¶ 39.)
Plaintiff claims that she attempted to file internal grievances with her supervisors and with
Defendant’s human resources department during her time on her Guam assignment. (Id. at ¶¶ 42–
44.) After approximately two months, Plaintiff was permitted to move to her preferred housing in
Guam. (Id. at ¶ 46.)
II. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS
In its MTD, Defendant argues that this Court “lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant
in this matter[]” because Defendant is an out-of-state corporation without minimum contacts in
Louisiana for the purposes of this suit. (Doc. 12-1 at 1, 4.) It argues that the Court cannot exercise
either general or specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this matter. (Id. at 4.)
First, Defendant argues, the Court cannot exercise general personal jurisdiction because
the Defendant corporation is not “at home” in Louisiana—it has neither its place of incorporation
nor its principal place of business in Louisiana. (Id. at 4 (citing Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp., 93
F.4th 879, 898 (5th Cir. 2024))). Instead, Defendant claims, its state of incorporation is Delaware,
and its principal place of business is Virginia. (Id. at 5.)
Second, Defendant argues, the Court cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
Defendant because it fails to meet the minimum contacts test as set forth by the Fifth Circuit. (Id.
at 5 (quoting Roussell v. PBF Consultants, LLC, No. 18-899-JWD-EWD, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123895, at *7, 2019 WL 3364321, at *3 (M.D. La. July 25, 2019) (deGravelles, J.) (quoting Guidry
v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999)))). Defendant argues that the Plaintiff’s
claims, arising entirely out of events that took place in Guam, fail to establish minimum contacts
with Louisiana. (Id. at 6.) The mere allegation that Defendant is registered to do business in
Louisiana, Defendant argues, is not sufficient. (Id.) In addition, Defendant argues, the fairness
prong weighs against Plaintiff. (Id. at 7.)
Defendant adds in a footnote an argument that because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction
over the Defendant in this case, it is also an improper venue for this matter. (Id. at 7 n.3.)
Plaintiff does not oppose this motion but has instead filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia. (Doc. 17-1.) Plaintiff argues that
“dismissal of this case is not warranted[]” and “requests a transfer to a district court that would be
a proper venue[.]” (Id. at 2.) She claims that “[a] transfer under § 1404(a) is permissible, even
when personal jurisdiction may be lacking, and is a more efficient and just outcome compared to
dismissal.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims that a dismissal at this stage would “require the Plaintiff to refile
her claims in another forum, causing loss of her rights, unnecessary delay, and inefficiency.” (Id.
at 3.)
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
When a nonresident defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the
court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 464
(5th Cir. 2013). “The court may consider ‘affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony,
or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery.’” Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union
No. 669, U.A. AFL-CIO v. CCR Fire Prot., LLC, No. 16-448-JWD-EWD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
103973, at *10–11, 2018 WL 3076743, at *4 (M.D. La. June 21, 2018) (deGravelles, J.) (citing
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185,
1192 (5th Cir. 1985))). “Moreover, on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, uncontroverted
allegations in the plaintiff's complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts between the facts
contained in the parties’ affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor for purposes of
determining whether” a plaintiff has met the burden of showing that personal jurisdiction exists.
Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int’l. Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
In a diversity action, a federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident if the state’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant and
if the exercise of jurisdiction would comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Sangha v. Navig8 ShipManagement Priv. Ltd., 882 F.3d 96, 101 (5th
Cir. 2018). Louisiana’s long-arm statute, La. R.S. 13:3201(B), permits courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over non-residents consistent with the Louisiana State Constitution and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A & L Energy, Inc.
v. Pegasus Grp., 791 So. 2d 1266, 1270 (La. 2001). Only a federal due process analysis is
necessary, then, to determine whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over the defendant.
A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant satisfies due
process “where the defendant ‘purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the
forum state by establishing minimum contacts with the forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction
over that defendant does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Savoie
v. Pritchard, 122 F.4th 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac
Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 867 (5th Cir. 2001)).
Personal jurisdiction may be either “general” or “specific.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–25 (2011). “Specific” jurisdiction requires an
“affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy” while “general” jurisdiction looks
at whether the defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render
them essentially at home in the forum state.” Id. at 919 (cleaned up).
“In deciding whether there is personal jurisdiction, the Court should first determine
whether the connection between the forum and the circumstances giving rise to the suit can justify
the exercise of specific jurisdiction.” O'Quin v. Fin. Servs. Online, Inc., No. 18-36-JWD-RLB,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183934, at *17–18, 2018 WL 5316360, at *6 (M.D. La. Oct. 26, 2018)
(deGravelles, J.) (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.20 (2014)). The Fifth Circuit
has outlined a three-step analysis to determine whether specific jurisdiction is appropriate. Nuovo
Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). First, the court must
inquire “whether the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state.” Id. Second, the court
must determine “whether the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or results from the defendant's
forum-related contacts.” Id. Third, “[i]f the plaintiff successfully satisfies the first two prongs, the
burden shifts to the defendant to defeat jurisdiction by showing that its exercise would be unfair
or unreasonable.” Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 271 (5th Cir. 2006).
B. Transfer
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1631 provides that “[w]henever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and
that court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have
been brought at the time it was filed[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides that “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice,
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. §
1406(a).
Finally, Title 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Such transfer “is only
authorized only if the movant establishes that: ‘(1) venue is proper in the transferor district; (2)
venue is proper in the transferee district; and (3) the transfer will serve the convenience of the
parties, the convenience of witnesses, and the interests of justice.’” MAPP, LLC v. Floor & Décor
Outlets of Am., Inc., No. 23-45-JWD-EWD, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40633, at *22, 2024 WL
944227, at *7 (M.D. La. Feb. 21, 2024) (deGravelles, J.) (quoting O'Quin, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
183934, at *30, 2018 WL 5316360, at *10).
IV. Analysis
A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant
There is no true dispute between the parties that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over
this action. With respect to general personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges merely that “Defendant
is a corporation registered to do business in Louisiana.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 4.) Defendant presents an
affidavit alleging that it is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in
Reston, Virginia. (Doc. 12-2 at 1.) In Plaintiff’s MTT, she acknowledges that Defendant’s principal
place of business is in Virginia. (Doc. 17-1 at 2.) She further acknowledges that “this Court may
lack personal jurisdiction over the Defendant[.]” (Id.)
With respect to specific jurisdiction, all of the alleged facts of this case took place in Guam.
(Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 6–46.) Even if Defendant’s registration to do business in Louisiana may establish
minimum contacts in the state, Plaintiff does not allege that her cause of action in any way arises
out of Defendant’s contacts with Louisiana. Plaintiff has failed to establish either general or
specific jurisdiction over Defendant, and therefore fails to establish personal jurisdiction over
Defendant. However, Plaintiff requests that rather than dismiss the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the Court transfer this matter to the Eastern District of Virginia, where Defendant has
its principal place of business. (Doc. 17-1 at 2.)
B. A Transfer Is Statutorily Permitted and Will Serve the Interests of Justice
While Plaintiff has invoked only the permissive change of venue statute, § 1404, in light
of Plaintiff’s request to transfer in lieu of dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court
looks to Fifth Circuit jurisprudence.
The Fifth Circuit has pointed to multiple statutory grounds for transferring a case in the
absence of personal jurisdiction. Most recently, in Franco v. Mabe Trucking Co., the appellate
court delved into the statutory interpretation, historical context, and cross-circuit case law
surrounding 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 3 F.4th 788, 792–95 (5th Cir. 2021). The Fifth Circuit held that “the
use of the term ‘jurisdiction in § 1631 encompasses both subject-matter and personal
jurisdiction[,]” and that “[t]he statute therefore requires a transfer when a district court lacks either
type of jurisdiction and the other statutory prerequisites are met.” Id. at 795. The appellate court
further found that § 1631 and § 1406(a) may work in tandem where “there is both a lack of
jurisdiction and a lack of proper venue and the interests of justice weigh in favor of transfer rather
than dismissal[.]” Id. at 796.
The Fifth Circuit has held that “[w]here a court finds it lacks personal jurisdiction, it may
dismiss the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). In the alternative, a federal
court is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to transfer the action to ‘any district or division in
which it could have been brought’ if the court finds that it is ‘in the interest of justice’ to transfer
the action.” Herman v. Cataphora, Inc., 730 F.3d 460, 466 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Dubin v. United
States, 380 F.2d 813, 816 (5th Cir. 1967)).
Finally, with respect to § 1404, the Fifth Circuit “construe[s] the discretionary transfer
language of § 1404(a) to permit transfer for the convenience of the parties and in the interest of
justice of cases with proper venue even if no personal jurisdiction existed in the transferring court.”
Aguacate Consol. Mines, Inc. v. Deeprock, Inc., 566 F.2d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1978). In Aguacate,
the Fifth Circuit held that this remained true even where the “case was originally removed from a
[] state court without personal jurisdiction.” Id. at 525.
Here, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. Likewise, the Middle
District of Louisiana is not a proper venue for this action. See § 1391(b). Defendant is not a
“resident” of this judicial district, (Doc. 12-2 at 1), nor did the events giving rise to the claim occur
in this district, (see Doc. 1). No party disputes that this action could have been brought in the
Eastern District of Virginia, given that Defendant has stated to the Court that its principal place of
business is in Reston, Virginia. (Doc. 12-2 at 1.)
Plaintiff argues that a transfer is appropriate under § 1404(a). Fifth Circuit precedent,
however, leads the Court to examine this matter under § 1631. See Franco, 3 F.4th 788. “The sole
issue therefore becomes whether the interests of justice are promoted by transfer as opposed to
dismissal.” Withers v. City of Aberdeen, No. 23-01510-BAJ-SDJ, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 229186,
at *9, 2024 WL 5159887, at *3 (M.D. La. Dec. 18, 2024) (Jackson, J.) (citing Harutyunyan, No.
19-41, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186104, at *9, 2019 WL 5551901, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2019)
(Morgan, J.)). The Court looks to whether “(1) the transferee court would have been able to
exercise its jurisdiction on the date the action was misfiled; (2) the transferor court lacks
jurisdiction; and (3) the transfer serves the interest of justice.” Id. (quoting Harutyunyan, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186104, at *9, 2019 WL 5551901, at *4). Here, the Court finds that the interests
of justice favor transfer. A dismissal without prejudice would adversely affect judicial economy.
In addition, as Plaintiff argues, a dismissal that permits Plaintiff to refile in the Eastern District of
Virginia could still present harm to the private interests as well—delays could put Plaintiff at risk
of statutory limits to filing, Plaintiff would be obligated to pay an additional filing fee, and both
parties would face additional burdens to their time and resources. A transfer best serves both the
public and private interests in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 17-1) filed by
Plaintiff Dedra Louis is GRANTED. The Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12)
is DENIED AS MOOT. This matter is hereby TRANSFERRED to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on January 30, 2025.
S
JUDGE JOHN W. deGRAVELLES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA