United States v. Younes Ali

USCA11 Case: 22-13407 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 01/29/2025 Page: 1 of 13

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13407

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

YOUNES ALI,

Interested Party-Appellant,

JONATHAN CRUZ,

a.k.a. Big Man,

a.k.a. Boss Man,

a.k.a. Chico Li,

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13407

Defendant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20487-MGC-1

____________________

____________________

No. 23-10398

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JONATHAN CRUZ,

a.k.a. Big Man,

a.k.a. Boss Man,

a.k.a. Chico Li,

ERIC ORTIZ MELENDEZ,

a.k.a. E,

JORGE APONTE FIGUEROA,

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22-13407 Opinion of the Court 3

Defendants,

YOUNES ALI,

Interested Party-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20487-RNS-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated appeals, Younes Ali challenges several

rulings made by the district court before and during the trial of Ali’s

acquaintance, Jonathan Cruz.1 Ali challenges the district court’s

refusal to quash several subpoenas issued to Google 2 requesting the

subscriber and account information associated with Ali’s e-mail and

YouTube accounts and the district court’s striking of Cruz’s

motion to enjoin the enforcement of Florida’s two-party consent

1 Ali was not a defendant in the criminal proceedings, but claims he was an

interested third-party.

2 In addition to hosting Ali’s email accounts, Google is also the parent

company of YouTube.

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law for recording conversations in violation of the First

Amendment. After review, we conclude that all Ali’s claims fail to

confer subject-matter jurisdiction.

I. Background

The present appeal arises from the trial and conviction of

Jonathan Cruz for his participation in a string of robberies between

2016 and 2017. However, Cruz is not a participant in these

proceedings. Indeed, none of the present issues involve his

conviction in any way. Instead, Younes Ali has chosen to make

Cruz’s criminal case the stage for airing his grievances against the

federal government. 3

Ali is a self-described “investigative journalist” who became

involved in Cruz’s case in the summer of 2019 while they were

jointly incarcerated in the Miami Federal Detention Center. After

speaking with Cruz, Ali became convinced that Cruz was the

subject of a widespread federal conspiracy and became involved in

Cruz’s case with the intention to document Cruz’s prosecution and

assist in Cruz’s defense.

Discovery in Cruz’s case was expansive. It included searches

of the defendant’s cell phone as well as personal identifying

3 Given the unusual procedural posture of adjudicating an appeal from a non-

party in a criminal case, we note at the outset that both the district court and

this Court have previously granted Ali permission to pursue his appeal, despite

Cruz being previously dismissed from this appeal and despite the

government’s prior motion to dismiss Ali from the case for lack of standing.

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information regarding Cruz’s victims. Due to the sensitive nature

of this information, the court issued an order that the parties “shall

not provide the material responsive to the Standing Discovery

Order to any person except as specified in the Court’s order or by

prior approval of the Court.”

After receiving several e-mails sent by Ali allegedly

containing exonerating evidence Ali obtained while investigating

the case for Cruz and learning that Ali might be called as a witness,

the government issued two subpoenas to Google seeking

“Subscriber Information, Account Information, and Account

History” for a Gmail address beginning in “younesali” and for a

phone number allegedly connected to Ali. Cruz filed a pro se

motion 4 to quash the subpoenas and requested an injunction

immunizing Ali from any investigation or prosecution resulting

from Ali’s alleged violation of “Florida’s Two-Party Consent” law.5

The district court denied the motion in a paperless order, and

thereafter entered a second paperless order striking Cruz’s motion

because Cruz had violated local rules by filing the motion pro se

while he was represented by counsel. Cruz, again acting pro se,

moved for reconsideration of the order striking his motion to

4 Cruz asserted that Ali “join[ed]” in the motion.

5 Florida’s two-party consent law states in relevant part: “It is lawful under this

section . . . for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication

when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such

interception.” Fla. Stat. § 934.03(2)(d).

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quash the subpoenas,6 and Ali filed an independent motion to

quash the subpoenas, asserting that he was incorporating by

reference the contents of Cruz’s previously struck motion to quash.

The district court denied the motions, emphasizing that in addition

to Cruz’s violation of local rules by filing documents pro se while

counseled, Ali did not have standing to challenge the subpoenas

because he was not the party to whom the subpoenas were

directed. Meanwhile, Google complied with the subpoenas and

provided the requested account information. Cruz was ultimately

convicted.

In January 2023, while Cruz was awaiting sentencing, the

government notified the district court of a YouTube video that

violated the court’s protective order and moved for an order

directing Google to remove the video. The video contained

portions of a codefendant’s statement to FBI agents and was

uploaded on a YouTube channel called “The Investigation.” In

that motion, the government noted that it had issued a third

subpoena to Google in November 2022 for records providing proof

of who controlled “The Investigation” channel. The district court

granted the motion. Google complied with the subpoena for

records relating to the ownership of the YouTube channel in

question, but did not comply with the court order directing it to

remove the video.

6 Cruz asserted that Ali joined the motion for reconsideration.

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Prior to Cruz’s sentencing, Ali filed an initial notice of

appeal, asserting that he was challenging (1) the orders denying the

motions to quash the first two subpoenas issued regarding his

Gmail accounts and phone number; and (2) the order denying the

motion for reconsideration. Following the filing of the third

Google subpoena, he filed an additional motion with the district

court seeking leave to appeal the video removal order and

requesting that the district court quash the November 2022

subpoena requesting account information for his YouTube

channel. The district court granted the motion in part, stating Ali

could appeal without seeking approval of the court, and denying

his motion to quash the subpoena. Ali then filed a second notice of

appeal, challenging the removal order and the denial of the motion

to quash the latest subpoena, which was docketed as a separate

appeal in this Court.

The government moved to dismiss Ali’s second appeal,

arguing that we lacked jurisdiction over the video removal order

and the order denying the motion to quash the November 2022

subpoena and moving to dismiss that portion of Ali’s appeal. We

granted the motion to dismiss in part, concluding that Ali lacked

standing to appeal the video removal order because the order was

directed at Google and not Ali. However, we concluded that we

had jurisdiction over the denial of his motion to quash the

November 2022 subpoena because Ali alleged a “reporter’s

privilege” to the information sought from Google and was

otherwise “powerless to prevent Google” from releasing it to the

government, thus granting him standing at that time to seek to

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preserve his alleged privilege. See Doe No. I v. United States, 749 F.3d

999, 1006 (11th Cir. 2014).

We then consolidated Ali’s appeals. With this procedural

background in mind, we turn to the arguments on appeal.

II. Discussion

Ali argues that the district court erred in denying his motions

to quash the subpoenas issued to Google relating to his email and

YouTube accounts because he alleges they were intended to

interfere with his journalism. He also argues that the district court

erred in striking instead of granting Cruz’s motion to enjoin the

enforcement of Florida’s two-party consent law for recording

conversations in violation of the First Amendment. The

government in turn argues that Ali’s motions to quash are moot

and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the requested

injunction against Florida. We find jurisdiction lacking for each of

Ali’s claims and therefore dismiss his appeal.

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A. We lack subject matter jurisdiction over Ali’s appeal of Cruz’s

request for injunctive relief against Florida’s two-party consent

laws.

Ali challenges the district court’s order striking Cruz’s

motion to enjoin enforcement of Florida’s two-party consent law

against him. The government argues that the district court lacked

jurisdiction to “entertain such a challenge” during Cruz’s trial

because Ali has not filed any claim in federal court against the state

of Florida alleging a constitutional violation. But before analyzing

the jurisdiction of the district court, we must determine whether

an appeal sits within our own jurisdiction as established by

Congress. United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 970 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“this Court must satisfy itself of its jurisdiction before we can

address whether the district court had jurisdiction.”).

As a general rule, only the “final decisions of the district

courts” are appealable unless an exception applies. 28 U.S.C. §

1291; United States v. Shalhoub, 855 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2017)

(“[w]e apply the final judgment rule with utmost strictness in

criminal cases.”) (quotations omitted). In criminal cases, we have

stated that the lone exception to a challenge under § 1291’s final

order requirements is if the “the challenged order falls within the

collateral order doctrine, which permits appellate review of an

interlocutory order” when certain “narrow” exceptions apply.

Shalhoub, 855 F.3d at 1260. Alternatively, this court also possesses

jurisdiction to entertain certain interlocutory challenges under 28

U.S.C. § 1292 related to “refusing or dissolving injunctions” by the

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district court. 7 Because Ali’s appeal does not relate to any final

order, it is best understood as appealing an interlocutory order or

an alleged denial of the request for an interlocutory injunction

against enforcement of Florida’s two-party consent law.

However, essential to the application of either the collateral

order doctrine or a challenge to a refusal of injunctive relief under

28 U.S.C. § 1292 is the existence of an order. Shalhoub, 855 F.3d at

1260 (the collateral order doctrine applies to appeals challenging

“an order”) (emphasis added). Thus, in the present case, we lack

jurisdiction to address Ali’s request for equitable relief against

Florida under the plain language of § 1292 because no such order

exists. Cruz purportedly made the request for relief on behalf of

Ali as part of a pro se motion, which the district court properly

struck as impermissible while Cruz was represented by counsel.

While it is true that failing to rule on a motion for injunctive relief

can constitute a “refusal” for purposes of § 1292, it cannot be said

7 28 U.S.C. § 1292 states, in relevant part, the following:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d) of this section,

the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:

(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United

States, the United States District Court for the District of the

Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District

Court of the Virgin Islands, or of the judges thereof, granting,

continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or

refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a

direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;

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that the district court “refused” to grant an injunction where the

district court struck the motion in lieu ruling on the merits. Cf.

United States v. Lynd, 301 F.2d 818, 822 (5th Cir. 1962) ( “the movant

. . . was clearly entitled to have a ruling from the trial judge [on his

motion], and since he did not grant the order his action in declining

to do so was in all respects a ‘refusal’”). Once struck, the motion

was not denied or ignored, but instead was no longer part of the

record at all.

Though Ali twice moved for reconsideration and stated that

he was incorporating by reference Cruz’s struck pro se motion, the

substance of Ali’s motions instead focused solely on the motions to

quash. Indeed, in its paperless order denying Ali’s motions, the

district court mentioned only the motions to quash. Thus, it does

not appear that the district court ever considered, much less ruled

on, the merits of the request for injunctive relief. Accordingly,

there is no interlocutory order denying injunctive relief from

which Ali can appeal, and we lack jurisdiction to entertain his

appeal. 8

8 To the extent Ali’s brief maintains his challenge to the protective order

prohibiting dissemination of any discovery materials by requesting for the first

time on appeal that we enjoin the FBI and the district court from

“imprisoning” him for contempt without first “permitting him an adversarial

hearing and an opportunity” to challenge the validity of the protective order,

jurisdiction is likewise lacking to address this claim. Ali lacks standing to make

such a request because any threat of prosecution for violating the protective

order is purely hypothetical and it is unclear whether Cruz’s criminal case is

an appropriate venue to sustain this challenge at all. Baughcum v. Jackson, 92

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B. Ali’s appeal of the motions to quash the Google subpoenas and

related motion for reconsideration is moot.

Ali argues that the district court erred in denying his motions

to quash the subpoenas relating to his email and YouTube accounts

issued to Google. The government argues that his claims are

moot. We agree with the government.

We begin by noting that we have jurisdiction to consider

Ali’s appeal relating to the district court’s denial of his motions to

quash. As we previously held in our order regarding Ali’s challenge

to the November 2022 Google subpoena, we have jurisdiction to

consider Ali’s appeals relating to the district court’s denial of his

motions to quash due to his claim of a “reporter’s privilege.”

However, “a federal court has no authority to give opinions

upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare

principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in

the case before it.” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662

F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). Thus, “[i]f,

during the pendency of an appeal, an event occurs that makes it

F.4th 1024, 1031 (11th Cir. 2024) (“An injury in fact must be concrete and

particularized and actual or imminent, rather than conjectural or

hypothetical.”). While a credible threat of prosecution in violation of the

Constitution may be sufficient to satisfy the injury in fact requirement, a

“highly attenuated chain of possibilities” resting “on speculation about the

decisions of independent actors” fails to “satisfy the requirement that

threatened injury must be certainly impending,” particularly where this appeal

does not involve a case, hypothetical or real, against Ali at all. City of S. Miami

v. Governor of Fla., 65 F.4th 331, 637 (11th Cir. 2023).

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impossible for this court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a

prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed as moot.” In re

Grand Jury Proc., 142 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation

omitted).

Ali’s appeal of the subpoenas is moot because Google has

already complied with the subpoenas and no “effectual relief” can

be granted by this Court. We have held that where no tangible

property is at issue, the mere loss of information is not an injury

that is redressable by this Court once a subpoena has been

complied with. See In re Grand Jury Proc., 142 F.3d at 1422 (“Physical

property can be retrieved; words, once uttered, cannot.”). In this

case, Google has not turned over any of Ali’s property to the

government. Instead, Google has conveyed information in their

own possession relating to Ali’s Google accounts to the

government. No remedy we can provide can alleviate Ali’s alleged

harm, so his claim is therefore moot.

III. Conclusion

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. It is essential

that the right parties and right issues are presented for jurisdiction

by this Court to be appropriate. Ali’s appeals are therefore

dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE