Swift Response, LLC v. Routt

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2023-0785

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SWIFT RESPONSE, LLC,

Petitioner,

v.

LANCE R. ROUTT,

Respondent.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari—Original Proceeding.

January 29, 2025

TANENBAUM, J.

Swift Response, LLC, asks for our extraordinary intervention

in an ongoing product liability suit, that intervention being to

resolve a scope-of-discovery dispute between the parties.

Discovery, however, is a procedural, litigation-management device

under the trial court’s supervision. The order issued by the trial

court—now challenged by the present petition—merely regulates

the breadth of the discovery that Lance Routt may seek from Swift.

Swift does not point to any material harm flowing from the order,

the only type of harm that—if the order were shown to be a

significant deviation from established procedures or legal

requirements—could entitle it to some immediate redress from

this court. There being no identification of a substantive right

(constitutional or statutory) infringed by that order, we lack

jurisdiction to proceed further on the petition, and we dismiss it. 1

I

Routt sued Swift (along with other defendants), seeking to

recover for bodily injury he suffered when a can of “FlexSeal Clear”

spray he was using (a product Swift distributes) allegedly

combusted without warning. The accident occurred in 2021, but as

part of the discovery process, Routt sought product information

dating back to 2011. Waiting until the last day of the response

period, Swift produced nearly nothing and instead served several

boilerplate general objections, including the following two:

1. “[Swift] objects to each and every request to the extent

it is not limited to a specific time and appropriately

defined terms.”

2. “Swift Response’s undersigned counsel objects to each

and every Interrogatory to the extent it calls for the

production of privileged information or documents,

including information or documents protected by the

attorney-client privilege, investigative privilege,

consulting expert exemption, information or documents

containing or pertaining to work product and documents

prepared in anticipation of litigation or trial. Swift

Response’s counsel further objects to each and every

Interrogatory to the extent it seeks the disclosure of the

identities of, or any work generated by, non-testifying

consulting experts retained by or at the direction of Swift

Response’s attorneys in anticipation or preparation for

this and/or other threatened or pending litigation or in

connection with the rendering of legal advice to Swift

Response. No restatement of, or failure to restate, any

1 We deny Swift’s motion for voluntary dismissal, filed just

under two weeks after we took oral argument—after this court

already expended considerable judicial labor in this matter. See

Pino v. Bank of N.Y., 76 So. 3d 927, 927 (Fla. 2011) (holding an

appellate court may in its discretion deny motion for voluntary

dismissal).

2

specific objection in the context of these answers shall be

construed to imply a waiver of any unstated privilege

objections addressed by this General Objection.”

(emphases supplied). Specific objections from Swift were not any

more informative, those objections instead setting out the usual

tropes: that, to varying degrees, the requests were “overbroad,”

“vague,” “ambiguous,” and/or “unduly burdensome.” Swift did not

provide a log or some other specification of documents it was

withholding from production based on a claim of privilege or

immunity.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Routt’s motion to

compel, ordering Swift to produce information from January 1,

2011, forward, but only as that information “relate[s] specifically

to FlexSeal Clear” spray—not “other FlexSeal colors,” and not any

FlexSeal product other than the spray. The trial court later denied

Swift’s motion for reconsideration and clarification, directing Swift

in the same order “to submit a privilege log for in camera

inspection as to any documents it believes are responsive to the

[order compelling production] but which it claims are privileged.”

From what we can tell, looking at the record certified to us, no such

log or similar catalog of privilege claims was provided. Nothing in

the record certified to us via the appendices indicates Swift abided

by this instruction, Swift apparently choosing not to make a claim

of privilege or immunity with respect to specific documents or

information or a specific category of either.

The current petition tries to invoke this court’s writ authority

to get relief from the order compelling discovery. 2 Swift contends

that because the accident involved a product made in 2021, Routt

was not entitled to information about any chemical composition of

FlexSeal Clear manufactured before then, which would have used

different formulae, making that information irrelevant to the

2 We do not read the petition as also challenging the trial

court’s subsequent order denying reconsideration and directing

Swift to identify those documents or information for which it

claims a privilege- or immunity-basis for non-production. Swift

certainly does not point to any cognizable harm flowing from this

direction from the trial court.

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issues in the litigation. Swift seems to point to the broad scope of

Routt’s requests as the source of its harm—the production of

irrelevant information (including what it apparently believes

would include unspecified documents subject to the attorney-client

privilege and a claim of attorney work product) being, in its words,

“‘cat out of the bag’ information.” The petition, however, is

jurisdictionally flawed. It characterizes Swift’s supposed harm as

a deprivation “of its legal right to be free from ‘carte blanche’

disclosure of legally irrelevant information,” a claimed legal right

lacking any basis in substantive law, a claim finding root in neither

a constitution nor a statute.

II

A writ of certiorari is a form of extraordinary relief the Florida

Constitution authorizes this court to grant as “necessary to the

complete exercise of its jurisdiction.” Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.

The writ is considered “extra-ordinary” because it is outside the

ordinary means by which we wield our power vis-à-vis trial courts,

which typically will be through review of their orders on direct

appeal. Cf. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. (authorizing direct

appellate review of “final judgments or orders of trial courts” and

“interlocutory orders in such cases to the extent provided by rules

adopted by the supreme court”). A district court’s certiorari review,

in other words, deviates from the constitutional pathways

provided for direct review so that it can consider—and where

appropriate, correct—a seriously harmful irregularity that must

be addressed immediately, making “certiorari relief [] an

extremely rare remedy that will be provided in very few cases.” Bd.

of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr. Fund v. Am. Educ. Enters.,

LLC, 99 So. 3d 450, 455 (Fla. 2012) (internal quotations omitted);

see also Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Ray, 42 So. 714, 715 (Fla. 1906)

(explaining that certiorari, as a common-law writ, is “not to take

the place of a writ of error or appeal,” but to bring a “certified copy”

of the trial court’s record up “for inspection” and determination of

whether the trial court “exceeded its jurisdiction” or failed to

proceed “according to the essential requirements of the law”—

“where no direct appellate proceedings” would be available);

Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So. 2d 1097, 1098 (Fla. 1987)

(emphasizing “that common law certiorari is an extraordinary

remedy and should not be used to circumvent the interlocutory

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appeal rule which authorizes appeal from only a few types of non-

final orders”).

While extraordinary by nature, certiorari still is “necessary to

the complete exercise of [our] jurisdiction” because the Florida

Constitution mandates the State’s courts “be open to every person

for redress of any injury,” that mandate in turn imposing a

commensurate duty on this court, in our supervisory capacity, to

be available for relief, as justice requires, from a trial court’s order

causing substantial and material harm, provided there is no

constitutional pathway to full relief via direct appellate review.

Art. I, § 21, Fla. Const. (guaranteeing access to courts); Art. V,

§ 4(b)(3), Fla. Const. (granting district courts jurisdictional writ

authority); see Mut. Ben. Health & Acc. Ass’n v. Bunting, 183 So.

321, 324 (Fla. 1938) (“The power to issue writs of certiorari, and,

in appropriate cases, writs of prohibition or mandamus, enables

the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over other

courts, in conformity with the command of section 4 of the organic

Declaration of Rights that ‘all courts in this State shall be open, so

that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods,

person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and

right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or

delay.’”).

The access-to-courts provision in the Florida Constitution’s

Declaration of Rights exists to ensure a means to remedy “an

injurious invasion of any right of the individual which is recognized

by or founded upon any applicable principle of law, statutory or

common,” plus “our organic [] law.” Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243,

250 (Fla. 1944) (emphasis supplied); see also Slatcoff v. Dezen, 76

So. 2d 792, 794 (Fla. 1954) (“We have held that the word ‘injury’ as

used in this section implies the doing of some act which constitutes

an invasion of legal rights under statute or common law.”); cf.

Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (linking the “right of

access to the courts for redress for a particular injury” to remedies

“provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the

Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or

where such right has become a part of the common law of the State

pursuant to Fla.Stat. s 2.01, F.S.A.”). To invoke this court’s

extraordinary jurisdiction in certiorari, then, a petitioner at the

threshold must identify real injury—of a type covered by the

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access-to-courts guarantee. See Kilgore v. Bird, 6 So. 2d 541, 544

(Fla. 1942) (describing the type of “injury” certiorari is available to

remedy as that “which section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the

Florida constitution [predecessor to current section 21] commands

shall be remedied by the due course of law in order that right and

justice shall be administered”); see also Martin-Johnson, Inc., 509

So. 2d at 1099 (“In Kilgore v. Bird, this Court recognized the

distinction between discovery orders that merely violate rules of

evidence and may be corrected by a reversal, and those that violate

fundamental rights causing harm that cannot be remedied on

appeal.” (emphasis supplied)). This requires the petitioner to plead

“a substantial invasion of rights,” an injury that is “not merely de

minimis.” Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood, 120 So. 317, 318 (Fla.

1929); see also Cason, 20 So. 2d at 250 (“The word ‘injury,’ however,

does imply the doing of some act which constitutes an invasion of

a legal right.”).

Neither abstract, hypothetical, or inchoate harm; nor harm

flowing from mere technical failures to abide by a court-created

process or rule; could satisfy this jurisdictional harm

requirement. 3 Cf. Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275, 1276

(Fla. 1987) (explaining that “[a] substantive vested right is an

immediate right of present enjoyment, or a present fixed right of

future enjoyment” and “[t]o be vested a right must be more than a

mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an

existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the

3 This is not to say a trial court’s failure to follow established

procedural rules—or even its own case-management order—never

could be the subject of a certiorari petition. Our point is that the

failure to follow a rule—by itself, without more context—cannot

cause substantive harm because rules do not establish rights, so

infringement of a rule is not necessarily an infringement of a right.

If the trial court announces, for no good reason, it will not be

following the rules of procedure in a case; or it arbitrarily chooses

not to follow or enforce litigation parameters it set by order; at that

point, a petitioner might be able to point to substantive harm by

averring the trial court has infringed on the constitutional right to

a fair trial before an impartial judge; or, if there is a liberty or

property interest at stake, the right to due process.

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present or future enforcement of a demand” (internal citations

omitted)); State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045, 1048–49 (Fla. 2005)

(distinguishing between “practice and procedure” and “substantive

law,” the former being “the course, form, manner, means, method,

mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive

rights or obtains redress for their invasion” or “the method of

conducting litigation involving rights and corresponding defenses”;

the latter being that “which creates, defines, and regulates rights,”

including “those rules and principles which fix and declare the

primary rights of individuals with respect to their persons and

property,” thereby bringing it “within the Legislature’s domain”).

For this reason, certiorari is not usually available to address

discovery problems. See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr.

Fund, 99 So. 3d at 456 (“Certiorari jurisdiction does not lie to

review every erroneous discovery order.” (internal citation

omitted)). Discovery in civil litigation is a function of court

procedure, an historically equitable tool now imported by the

supreme court into the civil rules. See Igou v. Jimmie’s Truckstop,

Inc., 372 So. 3d 1292, 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023) (Tanenbaum, J.,

concurring); cf. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered

Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical

Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (same); Stephen N.

Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background

of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998);

John H. Beisner & U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, The

Centre Cannot Hold: The Need for Effective Reform in the U.S.

Civil Discovery Process (May 2010), available online at

https://instituteforlegalreform.com/research/the-centre-cannot-

hold-the-need-for-effective-reform-of-the-u-s-civil-discovery-

process/; Richard Marcus, “Looking Backward” to 1938, 162 U. PA.

L. REV. 1691 (2014) (tracing origin of pre-trial discovery to

incorporation of equity practice into consolidated federal rules of

civil procedure). Discovery being procedural, it cannot be the

source of a substantive right, so there is neither a right to discovery

nor against discovery. Discovery is simply what the supreme court

allows by rule and what the trial court allows by order to compel

or order of protection.

Inconvenience, embarrassment, or discomfort flowing from

such procedural decisions does not implicate any substantive right

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and is not cognizable as certiorari injury. 4 Cf. Jaye v. Royal Saxon,

Inc., 720 So. 2d 214, 215 (Fla. 1998) (rejecting “(1) the substantial

injury caused when aggrieved parties must ‘show their hand’ in a

preliminary nonjury trial; (2) a situation in which the age of the

parties and witnesses affects whether a second trial is feasible; and

(3) the time, effort, and expense of trying a case twice” as harm to

be remedied through certiorari); but cf. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So. 2d

693, 695 (Fla. 1957) (suggesting that discovery could be so far-

reaching and invasive as to violate a party’s “constitutional rights

against deprivation of liberty and property without due process of

law and against unreasonable searches and seizures would be

violated,” injury cognizable in certiorari). The supreme court

emphasized this point when it stated—at least five times—that

“overbreadth” is not sufficient to establish the harm required for

certiorari jurisdiction. See Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Tr.

Fund, 99 So. 3d at 456 (“Overbreadth is not a proper basis for

certiorari review of discovery orders.”); id. (“This Court and other

district courts of appeal have restated with frequency that

overbreadth is not sufficient, nor is it a basis, for certiorari relief.”);

id. (noting “overbreadth alone is not a basis on which such

[certiorari] jurisdiction will be granted”); id. at 457 (explaining

that the court was quashing the district court’s decision, “which

held that relief was appropriate solely because the discovery order

at issue was overbroad”); id. (“Overbreadth is not a basis for

[certiorari] relief.”). Bottom line: “Overbreadth” in discovery

cannot serve as a substitute for the threshold requirement—

applicable to any certiorari petition filed in this court—that

“material harm of an irreparable nature” be shown. See id. at 456.

III

How odd it is, then, that Swift would seek certiorari relief

based on the argument that discovery requests from Routt

ostensibly were “overbroad”—claiming that the trial court’s

“overbroad Discovery Order would cause irreparable harm to

4Again, arbitrary decisions by the trial court as to these

procedural matters—if they become serious enough—could

implicate a constitutional right, the infringement of which might

support certiorari jurisdiction.

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Defendant”; and asking that we direct “discovery be limited to the

particular model of Flex Seal Clear spray used by [Routt], and

protect[] attorney-client and work-product privileged

information”—information not identified by any sort of log but

mentioned only in terms of generalities. Swift does not even cite

Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.

American Educational Enterprises, LLC in its petition. In its reply

(after Routt pointed out the omission), Swift attempts to turn the

supreme court’s use of “overbreadth” in that decision on its head,

contending the reference is to harm “with respect to relevant

information that is discoverable in the first instance,” rather than

what an “overbroad” objection necessarily presumes—harm

because the objectionable request seeks information that is not

discoverable. (first emphasis supplied). Swift doubles down on this

approach by arguing—without citation to any constitutional or

statutory provision—there is a “substantive prohibition of

discovery in a products liability action regarding dissimilar

products not used by the plaintiff,” then characterizing this

principle as “a categorical rule of law” that establishes “a plaintiff

is not entitled to any discovery regarding models of a product other

than the one the plaintiff used unless the plaintiff first comes

forward with evidence affirmatively establishing a substantial

similarity among them.”

It is here that Swift’s jurisdictional argument falls apart.

Swift contends that “Florida courts have long recognized that

certiorari is the appropriate vehicle to challenge orders allegedly

compelling discovery improperly.” (quotation and citation

omitted). While in a way this is true, it misses the point. When

certiorari jurisdiction has been found, it has been rooted not in the

scope of the discovery order but in a right—cognizable separately

under substantive law rather than in the civil rules themselves—

infringed or impeded by that order. See Bd. of Trs. of Internal

Improvement Tr. Fund, 99 So. 3d at 457 (identifying the “material

injury” flowing from a discovery request that could support

certiorari jurisdiction as follows: “‘cat out of the bag’ material that

could be used to injure another person or party outside the context

of the litigation, and material protected by privilege, trade secrets,

work product, or involving a confidential informant may cause

such injury if disclosed”); cf. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 42 So. at 715

(suggesting that a court’s order in excess of its jurisdiction being a

9

basis for cognizable certiorari injury); Brooks, 97 So. 2d at 695

(noting deprivation of liberty and property without due process

and unreasonable search or seizure as constitutional injuries that

could support certiorari); Belair v. Drew, 770 So. 2d 1164, 1166

(Fla. 2000) (approving certiorari jurisdiction based on alleged

unconstitutional infringement of “personal parental rights” and

citing infringements of First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights

as other injuries cognizable in certiorari); Beverly Enterprises-

Florida, Inc. v. Ives, 832 So. 2d 161, 162 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)

(considering a claim based in a privilege against discovery of

information involving “self-critical analysis or quality assurance

information” under section 766.101, Florida Statutes); Gomillion

v. State, 267 So. 3d 502, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (basing certiorari

jurisdiction on injury flowing from “the impairment of [a] legally-

recognized privacy interest” rooted in article I, section 23 of the

Florida Constitution).

Swift, at all events, cannot identify a substantive right—one

rooted in a constitution or statute—that has been infringed or

violated by the trial court’s discovery order. If Swift is suggesting

there is a special substantive right against “overbroad” discovery

in product-liability suits, we do not see it, and Swift fails to cite to

a constitutional or statutory provision that supports the

suggestion. Swift relies instead on several pre-Board of Trustees

district court decisions to support its claim. Holding aside the point

that the courts are without authority to create a new substantive

right—and the point, as we already explained, that discovery

procedures themselves cannot be the source of a harm to be

remedied as a matter of right (in the absence of some arbitrariness

implicating a constitutional right to procedural fairness)—each of

those decisions rested on a premise that certiorari relief was

available to address overbroad discovery, a premise no longer valid

following the supreme court’s abrogation of it in Board of

Trustees. 5 Board of Trustees makes quite clear what is not included

5 The supreme court went so far as to catalog its disapproval

“of other decisions that have provided certiorari relief on the basis

of overbreadth,” noting the list was not exhaustive. Bd. of Trs. of

Internal Improvement Tr. Fund, 99 So. 3d at 459. While not on the

list, these three decisions—on which Swift relies to varying

10

in this category: orders going too far in the scope of discovery

compelled. Simply put, a party in civil litigation—be it a product-

liability suit or otherwise—has no free-standing substantive right

against overbroad discovery enforceable through certiorari. We

reject Swift’s jurisdictional argument on this front.

Swift’s attempt, in the alternative, to frame its injury claim as

a matter of privilege or immunity fares no better. Seemingly, Swift

contends the court’s order compelling discovery is so broad that it

invariably will require the disclosure of information subject to a

privilege or immunity; such a contention overlooking the trial

court’s direction that any such claim be recorded in a log, as well

as Swift’s own reservation of right to claw back any inadvertently

disclosed privileged or immune information. Suffice it to say here,

Swift cannot repackage its objection to Routt’s discovery requests

(and to the trial court’s order compelling their fulfillment) this way

to circumvent the supreme court’s admonishment against

overbreadth as a basis for certiorari. Moreover, we agree with the

other district courts of appeal that have held a privilege or

immunity claim is not ripe for review until a log or other

description of withheld documents and information is provided and

the trial court has ruled on the entitlement to protection for each

claim. See Gosman v. Luzinski, 937 So. 2d 293, 296 n.1 (Fla. 4th

DCA 2006) (“Obviously, if the sole objection to discovery were that

degrees to support both its jurisdictional and merits arguments—

indubitably fall within the supreme court’s disapprobation—

rendering them of no use to salvage Swift’s petition, their arising

out of product-liability suits being a distinction without a

difference for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis. See Mazda

Motor Corp. v. Quinn, 524 So. 2d 1021, 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)

(distinguishing prior supreme court decision because it “did not

involve a direct challenge to an overbroad discovery order”

(emphasis supplied)); Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Osborne, 651 So. 2d

209, 210 & n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (granting “certiorari because

the order compelling answers to certain interrogatories is

overbroad,” noting that “[c]ertiorari is a proper remedy for

overbroad discovery orders”); Nissan Motors Corp. v. Espinosa, 716

So. 2d 279, 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (relying on Osborne to address

court-ordered, overly “broad discovery”).

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it sought privileged documents, then compliance with Rule

1.280(b)(5) would be required prior to any hearing on the objection

as the information contained in the privilege log would be

necessary to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.”

(internal quotation omitted)); Dade Truss Co. Inc. v. Beaty, 271 So.

3d 59, 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (“Based on the record before us, we

treat the circuit court’s order as a preliminary ruling that the

information is discoverable, noting that privileges claimed with

regard to specific documents must be affirmatively asserted

through the filing of a privilege log, or the segregation of

documents claimed to be privileged by the non-party for further

consideration by the trial court.” (internal quotation omitted));

Hertz Corp. v. Sider, 311 So. 3d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021)

(explaining that “[a] claim of work-product protection or attorney-

client privilege is not mature for review when a privilege log has

not been filed,” and until “a privilege log identifying documents

and other information that have been withheld from production on

the basis of privilege,” claims of privilege and immunity “are not

ripe for review” in certiorari).

We do note there does not have to be a formal log. See

Andreatta v. Brown, 330 So. 3d 589, 590 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). But

Swift does first need to “withhold[] information otherwise

discoverable” and then “make the claim [of privilege or work-

product protection] expressly.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280(c)(6). That

claim must “describe the nature of the documents,

communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner

that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected,

will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege

or protection.” Id. The claim need not be “document-specific”; it can

be “category specific” if “the category itself is plainly protected.”

Nevin v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd., 958 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Fla.

1st DCA 2007) (holding that a privilege claim was not waived,

despite the absence of a log, because the party consistently

asserted the claim as “to all findings and opinions of an expert

retained by counsel in anticipation of litigation and who is not

going to testify at trial,” which “clearly [was] a categorical claim of

privilege, [] the category referenced [] undeniably protected by

work-product immunity” based on “the very nature of the

individual who prepared the findings, documents, reports, and

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opinions”). No document-specific or category-specific claim appears

in the record certified to us via the parties’ appendices.

Because Swift did not make a document-specific or a category-

specific claim of privilege or immunity, based in a constitution or

statute—as the trial court invited Swift to do—there is no rejection

of such a claim, causing harm, that we could remedy on this

petition. Absent some disposition in the order rejecting a

specifically claimed privilege or immunity regarding identified

documents or information, Swift cannot rely on such a claim in

certiorari to support jurisdictional harm.

* * *

It is a simple enough proposition: We, as a district court of

appeal, have no jurisdiction under the Florida Constitution to

entertain a petition for relief on certiorari where the trial-court

order being challenged does not infringe or impede a right rooted

in a constitution or statute. This means there is no certiorari

jurisdiction to review discovery orders not causing this kind of

demonstrable, material harm. That harm does not appear on the

face of Swift’s petition, so we have no jurisdiction to reach its

merits.

DISMISSED.

B.L. THOMAS, J., concurs; LONG, J., concurs in result only with an

opinion.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or

9.331.

_____________________________

LONG, J., concurring in result only.

I would dismiss this case, but for a different reason. On June

23, 2023, Petitioner filed a notice of voluntary dismissal under

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.350(b). Because the

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Petitioner is no longer seeking the writ from this Court, I would

grant the voluntary dismissal.

_____________________________

Sylvia Walbolt and Christopher James Norris of Carlton Fields,

P.A., Tallahassee; Matthew J. Conigliaro of Carlton Fields, P.A.,

Tampa, for Petitioner.

Bryan S. Gowdy, Rebecca Creed, and Nicholas McNamara of Creed

& Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondent.

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