The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RICHARD HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:21-cv-646-SPC-NPM
JAMES COTTE and JOHN DOE,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant James Cotte’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint (Doc. 166). The Court has also reviewed the filings relevant to
Plaintiff Richard Harris’s claim against Defendant John Doe.
Background
Harris is a prisoner of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC),
and he sued three FDOC officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court dismissed
the claim against Defendant Gilbert Noe, Cotte defaulted, and Harris has not
identified John Doe. In his motion to dismiss, Cotte argues Harris fails to state
a claim, raises immunity defenses, and asks the Court to dismiss Harris’s
requests for declaratory judgment and punitive damages. The Court recounts
the factual background as pled in Harris’s Amended Complaint, which it must
take as true to decide whether the Complaint states a plausible claim. See
Chandler v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).
On September 21, 2017, officer James Cotte was escorting Harris
between dormitories in Charlotte Correctional Institution. Cotte and Harris
had a “verbal altercation” during the trip, and Cotte told Harris he’d “whoop
his ass.” (Doc. 132 at 6). When Harris realized what cell Cotte was taking him
to, Harris said he could not be housed on the top floor due to medical issues.
Cotte and another official identified as John Doe each grabbed an arm and
began dragging Harris towards the stairs. Harris resisted by sitting on the
ground and telling Cotte and Doe to verify his medical passes. Harris accuses
Cotte and Doe of responding by “forcefully mashing [Harris] into the floor,
dropping their weight on plaintiff, while bending and pulling his limbs at odd
angles.” (Id.). Harris was handcuffed and did not resist.
By the time the officer-in-charge arrived with a camera to document the
use of force, Harris was in severe pain and was screaming that he could not
feel his right leg. A nurse evaluated Harris at the scene and recorded a blood
pressure of 240 over 180, and Harris was taken to the infirmary in a
wheelchair.
Dr. Noe evaluated Harris, prescribed him a walker, and ordered that he
remain in the infirmary for observation. Four days after the incident, Harris’s
leg was still numb, and the veins in his leg had started turning black. Harris
was discharged on October 4, 2017. After Harris left the infirmary, security
officers took the walker away from Harris and told him to walk to his cell.
Harris could walk on his own before the incident, but at this point he needed
the walker. Harris sat on the ground and asked the officers to contact medical.
Harris claims the officers used force—he does not elaborate on that—and
escorted him back to the medical unit in a wheelchair. After speaking with
medical staff, the security officers gave Harris a walker and housed him in an
“ADA/single man cell.” (Id. at 8).
Harris was then transferred to the South Florida Reception Center for
further treatment. He told the medical director, Dr. Abia, that he began using
the walker after the September 21, 2017 use of force, and that his right leg was
completely numb. Dr. Abia referred Harris to an outside specialist because
Harris’s condition seemed to be getting worse. By January 31, 2018, the veins
in Harris’s legs were black, he had no feeling in either leg, and he was confined
to a wheelchair. Outside specialists treated Harris from December 2017,
through December 2019. Harris became so hopeless and depressed about his
condition that he attempted suicide three times in 2019.
Legal Standard
“The entry of default against a defendant, unless set aside pursuant to
Rule 55(c), severely limits the defendant’s ability to defend the action.” Tyco
Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007). A defaulted
defendant is deemed to have admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations, so
he cannot contest them. Hornady v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 118
F.4th 1367, 1382 (11th Cir. 2024). But before a court enters default judgment,
it must ensure there is a “substantive, sufficient basis in the pleadings for the
relief sought.” Tyco Fire, 218 F. App’x at 863. At that point, the defaulted
defendant “is still entitled to contest the sufficiency of the complaint and its
allegations to support the judgment being sought.” Id.
A district court should dismiss a claim when a party does not plead facts
that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a court can draw a
reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing party is liable for
the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This plausibility standard
requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (internal quotation marks omitted)). And
a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions amounting to a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555.
Harris files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983
claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right
secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In
addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v.
Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).
Discussion
A. James Cotte
1. Pleading sufficiency
Harris accuses Cotte of excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The core judicial inquiry in an excessive-force claim is “whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d
1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010)).
A prisoner asserting an excessive force claim must establish two elements: “the
official must have both ‘acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ (the
subjective element), and the conduct must have been ‘objectively harmful
enough to establish a constitutional violation.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
A claim satisfies the subjective element if the excessive force was
“sadistically and maliciously applied for the very purpose of causing harm.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit has identified several factors courts should consider
when determining whether force was applied sadistically of maliciously: “(1)
the need to apply force, (2) the relationship between that need and the amount
of force applied, (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,
and (4) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.” Sears
v. Warden Okeechobee Corr. Inst., 762 F. App’x 910, 915 (2019) (citing Skrtich
v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002).
The objective component “focuses on whether the official’s actions were
harmful enough or sufficiently serious to violate the constitution.” Sconiers,
946 F.3d at 1265 (cleaned up). A de minimis use of force do not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment unless it is “of a sort repugnant to the conscience of
mankind.” Id. at 1265-66. “Instead, the Eighth Amendment prohibits force
that offends ‘contemporary standards of decency,’ regardless of whether
‘significant injury is evidence,’ though the extent of injury may shed light on
the amount of force applied or ‘whether the use of force could plausibly have
been though necessary.’” Id. at 1266 (quoting Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 37).
The Court finds that Harris has sufficiently pled an Eighth Amendment
claim. Cotte’s threat to “whoop his ass” suggests malicious intent, and the
Court can reasonably infer from the factual allegations that Cotte did not
perceive Harris as a threat and applied an unnecessary amount of force. What
is more, the alleged injuries are significant. Harris reports he immediately
experience severe pain and elevated blood pressure, plus a persistent loss of
feeling in his leg. He received medical treatment for years following the injury,
and he lost the ability to walk on his own. The Court denies Cotte’s request
for dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim.
2. Immunity defenses
Aside from challenging the sufficiency of the complaint and the
jurisdiction of the court to enter judgment against him, “a defendant, once a
default has been entered against him, is not entitled to raise any other
defenses.” Tyco Fire, 218 F. App’x 860, 864. By defaulting, Cotte waived the
defense of qualified immunity.
On the other hand, Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional, so
the Court will address it. Cotte argues Eleventh Amendment Immunity bars
Harris from suing him in his official capacity. The Eleventh Amendment
states, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Absent an abrogation of immunity
by Congress or a waiver of immunity by the state being sued, the Eleventh
Amendment is an absolute bar to suit by an individual against a state or its
agencies in federal court. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662 (1974).
“When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke
its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants.” Id., 415 U.S. at 663. “Thus, the rule has evolved that a suit by
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public
funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id.
Congress has not abrogated Florida’s immunity and Florida has not waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521,
1525 (11th Cir. 1990). Consequently, Harris cannot sue Cotte for monetary
damages in his capacity as a state official, and the Court will dismiss that
claim.
3. Declaratory judgment
Harris’s amended complaint seeks a declaration that the acts described
therein violated his rights. The general rule in the Eleventh Circuit “is that a
transfer or release of a prisoner from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims
for injunctive and declaratory relief.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th
Cir. 2007). Because Harris is no longer incarcerated at Charlotte Correctional
Institution, his request for declaratory relief is moot.
4. Punitive damages
Harris’s amended complaint also seeks punitive damages against Cotte.
Cotte argues the Prison Litigation Reform Act—specifically 18 U.S.C. §
3626(a)(1)(A)—bars punitive damages in civil actions challenging the
constitutionality of prison conditions. But the Eleventh Circuit has
consistently held that the PLRA allows for punitive damages to punish
defendants for willful or malicious conduct. See Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d
1353 (11th Cir. 2021). The Court will not dismiss Harris’s claim for punitive
damages.
B. John Doe
On November 30, 2022, Magistrate Judge Nicholas Mizell granted
Harris’s request for a third-party subpoena to discover John Doe’s identity,
ordered the Clerk to issue a blank subpoena to Harris, and extended the
deadline to serve him to February 28, 2023. (Doc. 79). Harris directed the
subpoena to officials at Suwannee Correctional Institution and returned it to
the Clerk for service. (Doc. 91). The Clerk then served the subpoena on the
officials. In February 2023, an FDOC attorney notified Harris and the Court
that the department was unable to identify John Doe after a thorough review
of the relevant records. (Doc. 102). John Doe’s identity remains unknown.
The deadline to serve the defendants has long since passed, and it does
not appear Harris will be able to identify John Doe. “Proper service of process
is a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Fuqua v. Turner, 996 F.3d 1140, 1154 (11th
Cir. 2021). If service is not perfected within 90 days after the complaint is filed
or by a court-established deadline, the claims against the unserved defendant
must be dismissed. Because John Doe has not been identified and served, the
Court does not have jurisdiction over him. Harris’s claims against John Doe
must be dismissed.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
Defendant James Cotte’s Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc.
166) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1. Plaintiff Richard Harris’s official-capacity and declaratory-judgment
claims against Cotte are DISMISSED.
2. Harris’s claims against John Doe and DISMISSED without
prejudice.
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate John Doe as a party to this
case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on January 28, 2025.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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