In the Int. of: S.K., Appeal of: Chester Dept. C&Y

J-A21029-24

2025 PA Super 22

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.K., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: CHESTER COUNTY :

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, YOUTH :

AND FAMILIES :

:

:

: No. 1358 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered April 8, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):

CP-15-DP-0000032-2022

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and BECK, J.

OPINION BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2025

Appellant Chester County Department of Children, Youth and Families

(Agency) appeals from the trial court’s order determining that S.K. was in

placement prior to her eighteenth birthday. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this

appeal as follows:

On August 9, 2022, then Petitioner [A.M.] filed an application for

leave to file a private dependency petition pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P.

1321 and 1330. [Therein, A.M. alleged that she is the adult sister

of S.K., and that S.K. was residing with her. A.M. asserted that

Maternal Grandmother had legal custody of S.K., but S.K. had left

Maternal Grandmother’s home because she did not feel safe after

Maternal Grandmother had a mental health crisis. A.M. sought

custody of S.K. and to “become a kinship foster care resource for”

S.K.] On August 10, 2022, a hearing was scheduled before

Hearing Officer [Mary] Jones on August 17, 2022. On August 17,

2022, [Agency] filed a motion to intervene and to transfer venue

to Delaware County. It is unclear whether Hearing Officer Jones

ruled on [Agency’s] motion and permitted [Agency’s] involvement

in that hearing, as her August 17, 2022 recommended order

J-A21029-24

submitted to [the trial] court stated only that there were sufficient

facts alleged to support a petition of dependency, Petitioner [A.M.]

was a proper party, the petition of dependency may move

forward, and [Agency] was joined as a party. On August 17, 2022,

[the trial] court entered the recommended order. On August 23,

20[2]2, [A.M.] filed the private dependency petition . . . .

At the September 8, 2022 adjudication hearing, Hearing Officer

Jones orally placed her findings on the record, which included a

finding that clear and convincing evidence existed to substantiate

the allegations in the petition that S.K. was without proper care

or control. Hearing Officer Jones removed S.K. from the home of

her Maternal Grandmother, . . . and temporarily transferred legal

and physical custody to Guardian [A.M.]. Hearing Officer Jones

further ordered [Agency] to perform a home study of [A.M.’s]

residence. A dispositional hearing was scheduled for September

20, 2022.

On September 16, 2022, [Agency] filed a nunc pro tunc challenge

to recommendations and motion for reconsideration and/or

rehearing. [Agency] argued that S.K. was not presently without

proper care and control while in the care of Petitioner/Guardian

[A.M.] and should not have been adjudicated dependent; if S.K.

was dependent, the [trial] court can only award temporary legal

custody to a relative who is at least 21 years of age and

Petitioner/Guardian [A.M.] was 20 years of age . . . .

Guardian filed a response to [Agency’s] nunc pro tunc challenge

to recommendations and motion for reconsideration and/or

rehearing on September 21, 2022. Guardian argued that the

findings of fact made by the hearing officer were sufficient to find

that S.K. was dependent as she was “out of the care of her

[Maternal] Grandmother who is legal custodian in that no person

has authority to make medical appointments or address medical

needs on behalf of the child, the home that custodian Maternal

Grandmother was in at the time of custody being granted was no

longer habitable, that custodial Maternal Grandmother does not

currently have any income to support the child, that custodial

Maternal Grandmother does not currently reside in a place which

the child could reside in (she resided in a boarding home and rents

one room), and neither parent was able to take the child.” [The

trial] court granted [Agency’s] nunc pro tunc request and denied

the motion for reconsideration and/or rehearing on September 21,

2022.

-2-

J-A21029-24

The following findings of fact which were recommended by

Hearing Officer Jones were adopted by [the trial] court on

September 21, 2022:

Maternal Grandmother was granted legal and physical

custody of [S.K.] in Philadelphia Dependency Court in April

2019. At the time of the filing of [A.M.’s] Petition it was

believed that Maternal Grandmother resided in Delaware

County and that the residence was in foreclosure. Maternal

Grandmother confirmed in her testimony that her home in

Delaware County is in foreclosure and she further testified

that she is now renting a bedroom in a house in Kennett

Square. Two additional men rent rooms in this home in

Kennett Square. Maternal Grandmother only knows their

first names. The home in Delaware County was left unfit

and uninhabitable and [S.K.] would be unsafe in that home.

Maternal Grandmother’s rented one-bedroom [residence]

has not been seen by [] Agency as Maternal Grandmother

only disclosed her new residence at the hearing and

background checks have not been done on any individuals

residing in the Kennett Square home where Maternal

Grandmother now resides. Maternal Grandmother further

testified that she was uncertain as to whether she would be

a resource for [S.K.] and agreed [S.K.] could remain with

[A.M.,] who is [S.K.’s] sister.

[S.K.] is a 16-year-old female who is currently in the 11th

grade at Rustin High School in West Chester School District.

She is currently residing with her 20-year-old sister, [A.M.],

in an apartment in West Chester. [S.K.] has been residing

with her sister, [A.M.], since on or about June 1, 2022 when

she left Maternal Grandmother’s Delaware County home.

Her sister is providing for [S.K.’s] needs. [S.K.], as stated

above, was present at the adjudication hearing; she was

well groomed, appropriately dressed, and able to present

her position through her GAL that she wanted to remain with

her sister and did not want to live with Maternal

Grandmother.

Mother testified that she still has parental rights but has not

cared for [S.K.] since April 2019. . . . Mother states that

she is not interested in being a resource for [S.K.]. . . .

Mother believes it is in S.K.’s best interest to stay in the care

of her sister.

-3-

J-A21029-24

At the September 20, 2022 dispositional hearing, Hearing Officer

Jones made the following findings regarding [Agency’s]

reasonable efforts to prevent removal from the home which were

adopted by [the trial] court on October 4, 2022:

[S.K.] left Maternal Grandmother’s prior home in Delaware

County on June 1, 2022 and is currently residing with her

20 year old sister, [A.M.]. Maternal Grandmother now rents

a bedroom in a home in Kennett Square, PA. Both Maternal

Grandmother and Mother agree [S.K.] should remain with

her sister, [A.M.]. Neither Maternal Grandmother nor

Mother are resources for [S.K.] at this time as per their

testimony at the Adjudication Hearing on September 8th,

and the Disposition Hearing on September 20, 2022. []

Agency had no jurisdiction to prevent or eliminate the need

for removal of [S.K.] from Maternal Grandmother’s prior

home in Delaware County. Further, [S.K.] had already left

that home prior to the filing of the application for leave of

court to file a dependency petition and [] Agency had not

been contacted in Chester County prior to [S.K.] leaving

Maternal Grandmother’s home.

Further, the [trial] court finds that it would be contrary to

[S.K.’s] welfare to return to Maternal Grandmother’s prior

home in Delaware County as it is no longer an option per

findings made at the adjudication hearing on September 8,

2022. It would also be contrary to [S.K.’s] welfare to live

with Maternal Grandmother as Maternal Grandmother has

testified that she is not a resource for [S.K.] at this time.

Legal and physical custody of S.K. was to remain with Guardian

[A.M.] and a visitation schedule with Maternal Grandmother was

established. Neither the September 21, 20[2]2 adjudication order

[n]or October 4, 2022 dispositional order was appealed.

Permanency review hearings were held on a regular basis before

Hearing Officer Jones.

On March 12, 2024, S.K.’s [guardian ad litem (GAL), Cecil

Hoskins, Esq.,] filed an emergency relist request [(“emergency

motion”)] and further requested a hearing before [the trial court].

[The trial] court scheduled a permanency review hearing on March

28, 2024, which was bifurcated and concluded on April 5, 2024.

-4-

J-A21029-24

Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/24, at 2-6 (footnotes omitted and some formatting

altered).

On April 8, 2024, the trial court entered an order determining that S.K.

was in placement. The trial court further ordered that it would retain

jurisdiction over S.K. after her eighteenth birthday. Agency timely appealed

and simultaneously filed a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the

trial court issued a statement which adopted the reasoning of its April 8, 2024

order. See Trial Ct. Statement, 5/15/24. Pursuant to the order of this Court, 1

the trial court issued a supplemental opinion explaining that S.K. has always

been in placement and it was not appropriate for the trial court to revisit its

initial determination nearly two years later. See Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/24, at 8-

9.

Agency raises the following issue on appeal:

Did the trial court err in declining to classify [S.K.] as non-

placement when [S.K.] has never been in the physical and legal

custody of . . . Agency?

Agency’s Brief at ix (some formatting altered).

____________________________________________

1 We note that in its order, this Court denied A.M.’s application to quash

Agency’s appeal. See Order, 1358 EDA 2024, 7/2/24, at 2 (unpaginated) (per

curiam).

-5-

J-A21029-24

Appealability

Before we address the merits of Agency’s issue, we first examine

whether we have jurisdiction over the instant appeal. Agency contends that

the April 8, 2024 order is appealable as a collateral order. Agency’s Brief at

iii-iv.

A.M. responds that the April 8, 2024 order is not a collateral order

because it did not change S.K.’s status, and requests that this Court quash

this appeal. A.M.’s Brief at 5, 24.

Generally, “[f]or an order to be appealable, it must be (1) a final order,

Pa.R.A.P. 341-342; (2) an interlocutory order appealable by right or

permission, 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(a)-(b); Pa.R.A.P. 311-312; or (3) a collateral

order, Pa.R.A.P. 313.” Ashdale v. Guidi Homes, Inc., 248 A.3d 521, 525

(Pa. Super. 2021).

This Court has explained:

The “collateral order doctrine” exists as an exception to the finality

rule and permits immediate appeal as of right from an otherwise

interlocutory order where an appellant demonstrates that the

order appealed from meets the following elements: (1) it is

separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the

right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the

question presented is such that if review is postponed until final

judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.

See Pa.R.A.P. 313.

Our Supreme Court has directed that Rule 313 be interpreted

narrowly so as not to swallow the general rule that only final

orders are appealable as of right. To invoke the collateral order

doctrine, each of the three prongs identified in the rule’s definition

must be clearly satisfied.

-6-

J-A21029-24

In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 335 (Pa. Super. 2011) (some citations omitted and

formatting altered).

Case law has supported the argument, however, that certain

interlocutory, non-final permanency orders are appealable as

collateral orders under Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Compare In re N.E.,

787 A.2d 1040 (Pa. Super. 2001) (collateral order where DHS

appealed from order requiring it pay portion of dependent child’s

dental bills); In re Tameka M., 580 A.2d 750 (Pa. 1990) (CYS’s

appeal from order requiring it reimburse foster family for expenses

in sending child to private preschool is collateral order) with In

re H.K., 161 A.3d 331 (Pa. Super. 2017) (right to participate and

present evidence during dependency proceedings is not separate

from, or collateral to, those proceedings); In re J.S.C., 851 A.2d

189 (Pa. Super. 2004) (order granting parent’s petition to compel

visitation not collateral order where CYS did not possess “right” to

prevent parent from visiting with child).

In re N.M., 186 A.3d 998, 1007-08 (Pa. Super. 2018) (some formatting

altered); see also In re N.B., 260 A.3d 236, 242 (Pa. Super. 2021) (holding

that an order for the agency to pay for an alcohol-monitoring device for the

father was appealable as a collateral order).

Here, GAL requested that the trial court clarify S.K.’s placement status

because it affected S.K.’s eligibility for Medicaid. See GAL’s Emergency Mot.,

3/13/24, at 1 (unpaginated). Further, at the hearing, both S.K.’s GAL and

A.M. argued that classifying S.K. as being in placement would make her

eligible for Medicaid until she reaches the age of twenty-six as well as

independent living case management and Chafee educational grants. See

N.T., 4/5/24, at 49, 56-58. Although, the order did not change S.K.’s status,

we conclude that determining her eligibility for these benefits, similar to orders

requiring an agency to pay for services, is separable from the main cause of

-7-

J-A21029-24

action. See, e.g., N.B., 260 A.3d at 242; N.E., 787 A.2d at 1041 n.1.

Likewise, we find that S.K.’s eligibility for these benefits and Agency’s

obligation to provide services after S.K.’s eighteenth birthday are rights too

important to be denied review. See, e.g., N.B., 260 A.3d at 242. Lastly,

because S.K. has reached the age of eighteen, if review is postponed, Agency’s

right to review would be irreparably lost. See W.H., 25 A.3d at 335. For

these reasons, we conclude that the order appealed from is an appealable

collateral order. Therefore, we decline to quash and will address the merits

of Agency’s issue. See N.M., 186 A.3d at 1008.

Whether S.K. was in Placement

Agency argues that S.K. was not in placement at the time the trial court

entered its order because she was not in foster care and because the court

had not granted Agency physical and legal custody of S.K. Agency’s Brief at

1-7. Agency contends that when a child is placed in foster care or formal

kinship care, legal and physical custody of the child is transferred to the county

agency. Id. at 2. Agency claims that in either circumstance, the foster parent

or kinship care provider must be a licensed foster parent. Id. at 2-3 (citing,

inter alia, Department of Pub. Welfare (DPW), OCYF Bulletin-00-03-03).

Agency explains that under the Juvenile Act,2 a child is in “out-of-home

placement” when the child is in a setting that “provides 24-hour substitute

care for a child away from the child’s parents or guardians and for whom the

____________________________________________

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6375.

-8-

J-A21029-24

county agency has placement care and responsibility.” Id. at 3 (citing 42 Pa

C.S. § 6302).

Agency argues that when the trial court granted A.M. physical and legal

custody of S.K., A.M. was serving as an informal kinship resource, and not as

a licensed foster parent. Id. at 4, 6. Further, Agency contends that A.M. has

had physical and legal custody of S.K. throughout this case, and Agency has

never had physical and legal custody of S.K. Id. at 5-6. Therefore, Agency

concludes that S.K. has never been in placement, and S.K. is not eligible for

a Chafee educational grant or similar services available to youths who were in

foster care placement through the age of sixteen. Id. at 6-7.

A.M. responds that the trial court, not Agency, determines what form of

placement serves the best interests of a dependent child. A.M.’s Brief at 16.

A.M. also argues that the definition of “out-of-home placement” in the Juvenile

Act does not include a requirement that Agency be granted legal and physical

custody of a child. Id. at 16-17.3

Initially, we note that

the standard of review in dependency cases requires an appellate

court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations

of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but does not

require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s inferences

or conclusions of law. Accordingly, we review for an abuse of

discretion.

In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted).

____________________________________________

3 The GAL did not file a brief.

-9-

J-A21029-24

Further, to the extent that Agency’s issue requires this Court to interpret

the Juvenile Act, it is well-established that statutory interpretation presents

“a question of law. Therefore, our review is plenary.” In re L.C., II, 900

A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

It is well-established that:

“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to

ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.

Every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all

its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). The plain language of the

statute is generally the best indicator of legislative intent, and the

words of a statute “shall be construed according to rules of

grammar and according to their common and approved usage. . .

.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). We generally look beyond the plain

language of the statute only where the words are unclear or

ambiguous, or the plain meaning would lead to “a result that is

absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. §

1922.

In re C.L.P., 126 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some citations omitted);

see also In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 981 (Pa. Super. 2013) (explaining that

regarding DPW bulletins, “[i]t is well settled that when the courts of this

Commonwealth are faced with interpreting statutory language, they afford

great deference to the interpretation rendered by the administrative agency

overseeing the implementation of such legislation” (some citations omitted

and some formatting altered)).

Our Supreme Court has held:

In making any disposition pursuant to its authority under Section

6351, the [trial] court is guided by the overriding principle of

acting “to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental

and physical development of children coming within the provisions

of this chapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1). We, too, in construing

- 10 -

J-A21029-24

the Juvenile Act, are directed by Section 6301 to observe the same

stated purpose. Accordingly, that result which will encourage,

rather than discourage, action related to the best interests and

protection of the child, is preferred.

In re Lowry, 484 A.2d 383, 388 (Pa. 1984).

The Juvenile Act provides the following definitions:

“Dependent child.” A child who:

(1) is without proper parental care or control, subsistence,

education as required by law, or other care or control necessary

for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals. A

determination that there is a lack of proper parental care or

control may be based upon evidence of conduct by the parent,

guardian or other custodian that places the health, safety or

welfare of the child at risk, including evidence of the parent’s,

guardian’s or other custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled

substance that places the health, safety or welfare of the child

at risk; . . .

* * *

“Out-of-home placement.” A setting that provides 24-hour

substitute care for a child away from the child’s parents or

guardians and for whom the county agency has placement care

and responsibility. The term includes resource family homes and

supervised settings in which a child is living and, for a child who

has attained 18 years of age, a supervised setting in which the

individual is living independently.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6302.

Section 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides as follows regarding the

disposition of a dependent child:

(a) General rule.—If the child is found to be a dependent child

the court may make any of the following orders of disposition best

suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental, and moral

welfare of the child:

(1) Permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian, or

other custodian, subject to conditions and limitations as the

- 11 -

J-A21029-24

court prescribes, including supervision as directed by the court

for the protection of the child.

(2) Subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes

transfer temporary legal custody to any of the following:

(i) Any individual resident within or without this

Commonwealth, including any relative, who, after study by

the probation officer or other person or agency designated

by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive

and care for the child.

(ii) An agency or other private organization licensed or

otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for

the child.

(iii) A public agency authorized by law to receive and provide

care for the child.

* * *

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—At

each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the

placement.

* * *

(8) The services needed to assist a child who is 14 years of age

or older to make the transition to successful adulthood and

whether the services are being provided as required under 67

Pa.C.S. § 7505 (relating to transition plan and services).

(8.1) Whether the child continues to meet the definition of

“child” and has requested that the court continue jurisdiction

pursuant to section 6302 if the child is between 18 and 21 years

of age.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a)(1)-(2), (f).

The OCYF Bulletin on Kinship Care Policy provides the following

definitions:

- 12 -

J-A21029-24

Formal Kinship Care: Situations in which the county agency has

legal custody of the child and out of home placement is made with

a kinship caregiver who is an approved foster parent by a licensed

foster family care agency.

Informal Kinship Care: Situations in which arrangements are

made by the parents for the placement of their child with a kinship

caregiver.

Kinship Care: The full-time nurturing and protection of a child who

is separated from his/her parents and placed in the home of a

caregiver who has an existing relationship with the child and/or

the child’s family. . . .

* * *

Placement: Twenty-four hour out-of-home care and supervision

of a child.

OCYF Bulletin 00-03-03 at 5.

Our Supreme Court has explained:

Department of Public Welfare regulations require certification of a

home as an approved foster care home before a child may be

placed in the home by an agency . . . .

* * *

In ordering a disposition under Section 6351, the court acts not in

the role of adjudicator reviewing the action of an administrative

agency, in which case, the regulations promulgated to bind that

agency could not be ignored; rather the court acts pursuant to a

separate discretionary role with the purpose of meeting the child’s

best interests.

Moreover, a review of the plain language of Section 6351 supports

the view that departmental regulations are not binding upon the

court entering a dispositional order under Section 6351. . . . [I]n

the case of a transfer to an individual under subsection (i), the

legislature has not required a showing of licensure or authorization

by law to receive the child, but has required that the individual be

found “by the court to be qualified to receive and care for the

child.” Thus, Section 6351, facially, requires that the

qualifications of an agency are to be judged by its compliance

with law, but that the qualifications of an individual are to be

- 13 -

J-A21029-24

judged by the court, without regard to whether the individual is

as yet authorized by law, i.e. as an approved foster care home, to

receive and care for the child.

Lowry, 484 A.2d at 386-87 (emphases in original).

Further a county agency must comply with a trial court’s dispositional

order to supervise a child placed in a home that has not been certified or

licensed as a foster care home. See id. at 387-88.

Here the trial court explained:

At the outset, [the trial] court acknowledges that S.K. has never

been in physical and legal custody of the [] Agency, S.K. has never

been in foster care, and S.K.’s sister has maintained physical and

legal custody of S.K. through kinship care. However, [the trial]

court disagrees with [] Agency’s position that S.K. is not a

placement child as she was removed from her home and declared

dependent by clear and convincing evidence set forth at a

September 8,2022 adjudication hearing. An order to that effect

was entered on September 21, 2022. S.K. was placed in her

sister’s home, which was certainly the least restrictive placement

in a willing kinship home. [] Agency was ordered to perform a

home study of [A.M.’s] home, presumably to start the process of

foster kinship placement. However, it appears that [] Agency

failed to follow through with this process. . . .

* * *

[S.K.] was adjudicated dependent by Hearing Officer Jones on

September 8, 2022, and an order was entered on September 21,

2022. That order included findings of fact that supported the

Hearing Officer’s determination that by clear and convincing

evidence, S.K. was without proper parental care and control. The

Hearing Officer further found that it was in S.K.’s best interest to

be removed from the home of . . . Maternal Grandmother.

Temporary legal and physical custody was transferred to sister,

[A.M.]. [] Agency was ordered to perform a home study of

[A.M.’s] residence. [] Agency was further ordered to conduct a

home study of Maternal Grandmother’s new residence if she

decided that she wanted to be a resource for S.K. A disposition

hearing was scheduled on September 20, 2022.

- 14 -

J-A21029-24

On September 20, 2022, Hearing Officer Jones made findings

regarding [] Agency’s reasonable efforts to prevent removal from

the home. Hearing Officer Jones further found “that it would be

contrary to [S.K.’s] welfare to return to Maternal Grandmother’s

prior home in Delaware County as it is no longer an option per

findings made at the adjudication hearing on September 8, 2022.

It would also be contrary to [S.K.’s] welfare to live with Maternal

Grandmother as Maternal Grandmother has testified that she is

not a resource for [S.K.] at this time.” The hearing officer’s

recommendations were approved by the entry of an order on

October 4, 2022.

Based on that language, [the trial] court’s only interpretation is

that S.K. has always been a placement child. No appeals were

filed to either the adjudication or disposition. The language from

these orders clearly indicates that S.K. was removed from

Maternal Grandmother’s home, her home of origin, and placed

with Sister[, A.M.]. It would not be proper for [the trial] court to

revisit those findings over 22 months later. [] Agency

nevertheless asserts that S.K. is a non-placement child and has

internally handled this case as a non-placement case. [The trial]

court has no involvement in the internal decision-making of []

Agency, and the fact that [] Agency chose to classify S.K. as a

non-placement child in direct contravention of the adjudication

and disposition language does not make it so.

* * *

It is clear that S.K’s sister was a kinship care resource that was

substitute care for a child away from the child’s parents or

guardian and for whom the county agency has placement care and

responsibility. Further, it is the ultimate goal after removal of a

child from their home to place that child in the care of kin.

Placement with kin does not negate the fact of placement after

removal. Therefore, [] Agency’s arguments on appeal are without

merit and should be denied.

Trial Ct. Op., 7/19/24, at 6-10 (some formatting altered).

Based on our review of the record and the applicable law, we discern no

abuse of discretion or error of law by the trial court. See R.J.T., 9 A.3d at

1190. Further, we agree with the trial court that the adjudication of

- 15 -

J-A21029-24

dependency and the transfer of physical and legal custody of S.K. to A.M.

constitutes “out-of-home placement” under the Juvenile Act.

Neither the Juvenile Act nor OCYF Bulletin 00-03-03 limit the meaning

of “placement” to only dependent children who are in foster care or formal

kinship care. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining “out-of-home placement” as

“setting that provides 24-hour substitute care for a child away from the child’s

parents or guardians and for whom the county agency has placement care

and responsibility”). Further, Agency has not cited any authority to support

its argument that a dependent child is only in placement when the trial court

grants a county agency legal and physical custody when ordering the

placement of a dependent child. The Juvenile Act does not define “placement

care and responsibility.” Construing the plain language of the statute and

keeping in mind the purpose of the Juvenile Act is “to provide for the care,

protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children,” we

conclude that “placement care and responsibility” includes any court-ordered

supervision of a dependent child by an agency, not just circumstances where

an agency is granted legal and physical custody of a child. See Lowry, 484

A.2d at 388; C.L.P., 126 A.3d at 989.

Here, the trial court, in its September 21, 2022 order, adjudicated S.K.

dependent, removed her from Maternal Grandmother’s care, and granted A.M.

physical and legal custody of S.K. See Trial Ct. Order, 9/21/22, at 1-2; see

also Trial Ct. Order, 10/4/22, at 2; Trial Ct. Suppl. Op. at 7. Further, the trial

court ordered Agency to perform a home study of A.M.’s residence and

- 16 -

J-A21029-24

determine if S.K. was eligible for assistance with extracurricular activities and

life skills. See, e.g., Trial Ct. Order, 10/4/22, at 2; Trial Ct. Order, 9/21/22,

at 2. As our Supreme Court explained, a trial court may order a child to be

placed with an individual who is not a licensed foster care parent under Section

6351 of the Juvenile Act if the trial court determines that the individual is

qualified to receive and care for the child and the placement is in the best

interests of the child. See Lowry, 484 A.2d at 387-88. Further, a county

agency must comply with the trial court’s dispositional orders regarding the

placement of a child even if the placement conflicts with DPW regulations.

See id. at 386-88. On this record, we agree with the trial court in its

conclusion that S.K. was in out-of-home placement within the meaning of the

Juvenile Act effective September 21, 2022, the date of the trial court’s

dispositional order, issued more than twenty-two months ago; and that

Agency is obligated to provide the required services and support. Accordingly,

Agency is directed to provide S.K with the appropriate placement care and

responsibility, including any court-ordered supervision and services,

consistent with the trial court’s dispositional order of September 21, 2022.

See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6302, 6351(a)(2)(i), 6351(f)(1). For these reasons, we

affirm the trial court’s order.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

- 17 -

J-A21029-24

Date: 1/28/2025

- 18 -