Bellard v. Frank Aguillera

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

. January 27, 2025

. Nathan Ochsner; Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

REGINALD WHITFIELD BELLARD, §

_ a/k/a REGINALD DeWAYNE § .

WHITFIELD a/k/a REGINALD §

DeWAYNE BELLARD, §

(Inmate # 01839127), .. | §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

Vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-1076

THE HONORABLE FRANK § .

AGUILAR, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Reginald Whitfield Bellard a/k/a Reginald DeWayne Whitfield a/k/a

Reginald DeWayne Bellard, (Inmate # 1839127), proceeding pro se and in forma —

pauperis, filed a prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging

violations of his constitutional rights by Harris County District Judge Frank Aguilar,

Harris County Sheriffs Officers J. Tzaquitzal and Steven Castaneda, and one

Dianne Colar Coleman. (Dkt. 1). At the Court’s request, Bellard filed a more

definite statement of his claims. (Dkt. 24). After judicial screening under 28 U.S.C.

‘Bellard’s complaint identifies one of the defendants as “Frank Aguillera,” who he

says is the judge of the 228th District Court in Harris County. (Dkt. 1). The correct name

of the judge is “Frank Aguilar.” The Court will use the judge’s correct name in this Order.

§ 1915A, the Court iemiseed Bellard’s claims against Judge Aguilar and Coleman □

with prejudice, stayed Bellard’s claims against Tzaquitzal and Castaneda for false

arrest and malicious prosecution, and allowed Bellard’s excessive force claims

against Tzaquitzal and Castaneda to proceed. (Dkt. 25).. Tzaquitzal and Castaneda

answered the complaint, (Dkts. 29, 31), and filed a joint moron for summary

judgment supported by various documents. (Dkt. 34). Bellard has not responded to

the motion, and his time to do so has now expired.

Based on the Court’s review of the motion, the pleadings, all matters of record, □

and the law, the Court lifts the stay on the false arrest and malicious prosecution

claims, grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and dismisses this

action with prejudice. The reasons for these rulings are explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

Bellard filed his initial complaint when he was in the Harris County Jail

awaiting trial on a charge of robbery with bodily injury in Harris County Cause

Number 1844071. (Dkt. 1). ‘He later filed a more definite-statement of his claims.

(Dkt. 24). Neither of these pleadings are a model of clarity. “+

Publicly available records, together with the summary judgment evidence,

show that on November 14, 2023, Coleman called the police to her apartment and

reported that Bellard had robbed her and injured her in the process. (Dkt. 34-1, p.

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1). An Officer ay . Tzaquitzal” of the City of Houston Police Department responded

to the scene and took a report from Coleman. (/d.).

Bellard was not arrested at that time. See hedistrictelerk.com (visited

Jan. 23, 2025). Instead, Officer Tzaquitzal filed:a criminal complaint that initiated

Harris County Cause Number 1844071. (Dkt. 34-1, pp. 1-2). City of Houston Peace

Officer Steven Castaneda signed the complaint as a witness Ud. at 2). On

November 15, 2023, a magistrate found probable cause and issted an arrest warrant

for Bellard. (/d. at 4). See also www.hedistrictclerk.com (visited Jan. 23, 2025).

On January 17, 2024, Bellard was arrested on the warrant’when he was again at

Coleman’s apartment. (Dkt. 34-4, p. 1). The arresting officer was City of Honeon

Police Officer Rodolfo Trevino. (/d.). Neither an Officer Tzaquitzal nor an Officer

Castaneda were involved in Bellard’s arrest. (/d.). .

In his § 1983 complaint, Bellard alleges that “J. ‘Tzaquitzal” and “Steven -

Castaneda” were the officers who arrested him and “roughed him up.” (Dkt. 1, p.

3). In his more definite statement, Bellard alleges that the arresting officers were

from the Harris County Sheriff's Office. (Dkt. 24, pp. 1-2). Bellard explains that

when he was told he was under arrest, he questioned it, telling the officers that his

arrest did not make sense and that he needed to call his mother. (Id. at 1). While

Bellard was on the phone, the two arresting officers grabbed his arms and wrists to

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try to handcuff him. (Id at 1-2). In doing so, they twisted his wrists and arms, which

prompted Bellard to grab onto a gate. (/d.). The officers continued to “rough up”?

Bellard, ultimately “slamming” him to the ground. (/d. at 1). Bellard alleges that

the arresting officers continued using force against him even after he stopped □

resisting and agreed to go with them voluntarily. (Id.).

Bellard contends that he suffered injuries to his arms and wrists during the

incident, and he alleges that he still takes pain medication for those injuries. (Jd. at

1-2). He alleges that he also suffered mental fiealth injuries as a result of the arrest.

(id. at 2). Bellard asserts that the arresting officers—who he again identifies as

Tzaquitzal and Castaneda of the Harris County Sheriff s Office—used excessive

force while falsely arresting him, and he contends that their actions constitute

malicious prosecution. (/d. at 5). on,

Based solely on the allegations in Bellard’s complaint and more definite

statement, the complaint was served on Harris County Sheriff's Officers Juan

Tzaquitzal and Steven Castaneda. (Dkts. 26, 27, 28). Tzaquitzal and Castaneda

answered the complaint, (Dkts. 29, 31), and then filed a joint motion for summary □

jadoment (Dkt. 34). They each deny that they have ever been employed by the

City of Houston Police Department; they deny that they filed the complaint against

Bellard in November 2023; and they deny that they arrested him in January 2024.

(Id. at 8). They attach authenticated documents to their motion showing that the

criminal complaint was filed by an Officer julio Tzaquitzal of the City of Houston

Police Department and that Bellard was arrested by an officer from the City of

Houston Police Department rather than any officer from the Harris County Sheriff's

Office. (Dkts. 34-1, 34-4). In addition, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda have filed

affidavits stating that they have never worked for the City of Houston Police

Department and that they did not arrest Bellard in January 2024. (Dkts. 34-2, 34-3).

They ask the Court to dismiss all of Bellard’s claims against them with prejudice.

(Dkt. 34, p. 10). Bellard has not responded to the motion for summary judgment,

and his time to do so has now expired. _

Publicly available records show that Bellard pleaded guilty in Harris County

Cause Number 1844071 to the lesser charge of assault on a family member on July

2, 2024. See www.hcdistrictclerk.com (visited Jan. 23, 2025), He was sentenced to

180 days’ confinement with credit for 168 days already served. Id. ‘He is no longer

confined in the Harris County Jail. See Find Someone in Jail,

www harriscounty so.org (visited Jan. 23, 2024). □

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS ne

A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 rr

Bellard sues Tzaquitzal and Castaneda under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.: “Section

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1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to provide a

remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v..Texas Dep’t

of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a valid claim under § 1983, a

plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed

by a person acting under color of state law. See West 7 Atkins, 487 US. 42, 48

(1988); Gomez v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). The

dispute in this case focuses on the first element: whether either Tzaquitzal or

Castaneda violated Bellard’s constitutional rights.

B. The Summary-Judgment Standard .

Tzaquitzal and Castaneda have filed a motion ‘for. summary judgment.

“Summary judgment is appropriate only if ‘the movant shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.’” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S.-650, 656-57.(2014) (per curiam) (quoting

FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “The movant bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., 485 F.3d 253, 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-25 (1986)). “A fact is material if its resolution

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could affect the outcome of the action.” Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 379 (Sth

Cir. 2020) (quoting Sierra Club, Inc. v. Sandy Creek Energy Assocs., L.P., 627 F.3d □

134, 134 (Sth Cir. 2010)). “A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Westfall v. Luna,

903 F.3d 534, 546 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (cleaned up).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all

evidence and draw all inferences “in the light most favorable to the [nonmoving]

party.” Tolan, 572 U.S. at 657 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157 (1970)); see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 380. When both parties have submitted

evidence that tends to show conflicting facts, “the evidence of the nonmovant is to

be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be.drawn in his favor.” Willis v.

Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (Sth Cir. 1995). However, if record

evidence clearly contradicts a party’s version of events, the Court “should not adopt

that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”

Waddleton v. Rodriguez, 750 F. App’x 248, 253-54 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)

(quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). Further, the Court will not

consider the nonmoving party’s conclusory allegations and unsubstantiated -

assertions as evidence. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (Sth Cir.

1994) (en banc).- After viewing the offered evidence in the light most monte to

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the nonmoving party, summary judgment may be granted only ifno penuine disputes

of fact exist and no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

See, e.g., Rubinstein Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (Sth

Cir. 2000).

C. Pro Se Pleadings .

Because Bellard is proceeding pro se, the Court pennies his filings liberally,

subjecting them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers|.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But even

under this lenient standard, pro se litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern

the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (5th Cir. 2014).

“Pro se litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed,

state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present

summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.”

Id. (footnotes omitted). .

Il. DISCUSSION

A. Bellard’s Excessive Force Claims oo □

Bellard alleges that Tzaquitzal and Castaneda violated his constitutional rights

by using excessive force against him during his arrest in J anuary 2024. Tzaquitzal

and Castaneda contend that the undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that

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they were not the arresting officers in January 2024, were not present when Bellard

was arrested, and had nothing to do with his arrest or any excessive force that may

have been used. .

To be entitled to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove that the

defendant was personally involved in the alleged niolion of the plaintiffs

constitutional rights. “Because [§] 1983 imposes liability only upon those who

actually cause a deprivation of rights, personal involvement of defendants in alleged

constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” 7

Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned cD see also

Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Personal involvement is an

essential element of a civil rights cause of action.” (citing Rizzo ». Goode. 423 US. |

362, 371-72 (1976))). .

The undisputed summary judgment evidence shows that City of Houston

Police Officer Julio Tzaquitzal responded to Coleman’s November 14 call about the

robbery with injuries. He prepared the criminal complaint, which was witnessed by □

City of Houston Peace Officer Steven Castaneda and which was used to initiate

Harris County Cause Number 1844071. The undisputed summary judgment

evidence also shows that City of Houston Police Officer Rodolfo Trevino is the

officer who arrested Bellard. Neither Harris County Sheriff's Officer Juan

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Tzaquitzal nor Harris County Peace Officer Steven Castaneda were involved in any

violation of Bellard’s civil rights that may have occurred.

Once Tzaquitzal and Castaneda presented evidence demonstrating that they

were not personally involved in the alleged violation of Bellard’s constitutional

rights, the burden shifted to Bellard to show that disputed issues of fact exist that are

material to Tzaquitzal and Castaneda’s personal involvement. ‘Bellard has not met

this burden. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment filed by Tzaquitzal and

Castaneda is granted, and Bellard’s excessive force eine against them are □

dismissed with prejudice. . 7 a □

B. Bellard’s False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution Claims

Bellard’s initial complaint included claims against Teaquitzal and Castaneda

for false arrest and malicious prosecution. The Court stayed these claims, but

Tzaquitzal and Castaneda ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their favor ©

despite the stay. .

Because Bellard’s complaint was filed while the state-court criminal action

against him was still pending, the Court stayed the false arrest and. malicious

prosecution claims under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Heck

bars a civil-rights action challenging the legitimacy of the plaintiff's arrest and

subsequent detention on criminal charges if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in

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the civil action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the charges and potential

conviction in the criminal action. In that situation, the civil action is stayed until the

plaintiff can prove that the criminal charges have been dismissed or otherwise

resolved in his favor. Jd. at 487; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94

(2007); Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (Sth Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (when a

plaintiff files a civiktights action while a related criminal prosecution is pending, a □

= pending the disposition of the criminal prosecution may be appropriate, but

dismissal is not).

Tzaquitzal and Castaneda ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their

favor on Bellard’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims as well as the

excessive force claims. Publicly available records show that the criminal

proceedings against Bellard have now been resolved. See www.hodistrictolerk.com

(visited Jan. 23, 2024). Bellard pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, he was sentenced

to county jail time, he has served that time, and.he has been released. Id. There is

no indication that he has filed an appeal.

Under Heck, “Tilt the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil

suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal: otherwise, the civil

action will proceed absent some other bar to suit.” Wallace, 549 US. at 394

(citations omitted). Because Bellard has been convicted prelbecerce the false arrest

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and malicious prosecution claims would impugn that conviction, Heck requires the

Court to lift the stay and dismiss the claims.

Normally, a dismissal under Heck would be without prejudice. See Cook v.

City of Tyler, Tex., 974 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); Clarke v. Stalder,

154 F.3d 186, 191 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). But as explained in connection with

Bellard’s claim for excessive force, the undisputed summary judgment evidence

shows that neither Tzaquitzal nor Castaneda were personally involved in any alleged

violation of Bellard’s constitutional rights. Therefore, they are entitled to summary

judgment in their favor on his claims for false arrest and meets proceesion The

motion for summary judgment is granted, and Bellard’s false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims are dismissed with prejudice.

C. Qualified Immunity oe

In the alternative, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda move for summary judgment

based on qualified immunity. “Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless

their conduct violates a clearly established right.” Austin y. City of Pasadena, Tex.,

F.4th 312, 322 (Sth Cir. 2023) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621,

623 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 21,735 (2011)). When

the defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that the defendants are not entitled to that immunity. See Ti hompson

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v. Upshur County, Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (Sth Cir. 2001). And “[a] plaintiff seeking

to overcome qualified immunity ‘must specifically identify each defendant’s

personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.’” Jimerson v. Lewis, 94 F 4th 423,

428 (Sth Cir. 2024) (quoting Thomas v. Humfield, 32 F.3d 566, 1994 WL 442484,

at *5 (5th Cir. Aug. 2, 1994)). ee

As explained above, the undisputed summary judgment evidence conclusively

shows that neither Tzaquitzal nor Castaneda were personally involved in any of the

alleged wrongdoing. Bellard has not met his burden to show that either was

personally involved in the alleged constitutional violations Tzaquitzal and

Castaneda are therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and Bellard’s action against □

them is dismissed with prejudice.

D. Request for Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda request that the Court sanction Bellard for

filing a frivolous complaint against them by awarding them attorney’s fees. (Dkt.

34, pp. 9-10). They appear to seek these fees as a sanction under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11. (/d.). This request is denied because it is procedurally improper.

Rule 11(c)(2) requires that any motion for sanctions under Rule 11 “be made

separately from any other motion.” FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(2). Courts will not

entertain a request for Rule 11 sanctions that is improperly included in another

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motion or pleading. See, e.g., Berry v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., Civil No. 4:19-

024, 2019 WL 3562150, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2019); Diggs v. Citigroup, Inc.

No. 3:12-cv-1612-L, 2013 WL 124110, at *3 (ND. Tex. Jan. 8, 2013); Estate of

Keys vy. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 578 F. Supp. od 629, 638 (SDNY. 2008)

(“Because the request for [Rule 11] sanctions was improperly included in plaintiff's

cross-motion for summary judgment, this Court cannot entertain it.”).

In addition, Rule 11 requires the party moving for 'saictions to serve their

motion seeking such sanctions on the opposing party at least 21 days before filing

the motion with the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2). This 21-day petiod Operates

as a safe harbor, allowing the opposing party time to either correct the deficiency or

withdraw the claim. See Elliott v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 216 (Sth Cir. 1995). A Rule

11 motion is properly denied if the moving party fails to pore with this statutory

safe-harbor provision. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 788 (Sth Cir. 2000)

(“Compliance with the service requirement is a mandatory prerequisite to an award

of sanctions under Rule 11.”). .

Here, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda have not filed a a motion for sanctions

_but instead have. improperly included their request for Rule 11 sanctions in their.

motion for summary judgment. In addition, they do nor allege, much less offer

evidence to show, that they served a separate motion for Rule 1 1 sanctions on Bellard

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at least 21 days before filing the motion with the Coutt, as required by Rule 11(c)(2).

For both reasons, Tzaquitzal and Castaneda’s request for attorney’ 5 fees under Rule

11, included in their motion for summary judgment, is denied. To the extent that

Tzaquitzal and Castaneda are inviting the Court to erercice its discretion to impose

sanctions under Rule 11(c)(3), the Court declines the invitation,

IV. CONCLUSION an

Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows: . . .

1. The stay previously imposed on Bellard’s claims for false arrest and malicious

prosecution is LIFTED. . . □

2. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendants Tuan Tzaquitzal and

Steven Castaneda, (Dkt. 34), is GRANTED. —

3. Bellard’s civil-rights action is DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. The defendants’ request for an award of Rromeyis fees is DENIED.

5. Final judgment will be separately entered. . oo

The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties...

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on War wT __, 2025.

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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