The opinion
2025 IL App (1st) 231028-U
FIFTH DIVISION
January 24, 2025
No. 1-23-1028
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 13 CR 15179
)
DASHONTI WILEY, ) Honorable
) Carl B. Boyd,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Oden Johnson and Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in declining to appoint new counsel for further
proceedings following a preliminary inquiry pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.
2d 181 (1984), because defendant did not establish trial counsel’s possible neglect
of the case premised on counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress witness
identifications.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant Dashonti Wiley was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to 55 years in prison. On direct appeal, Mr. Wiley argued that his case should be
remanded due to the trial court neglecting to hold a preliminary inquiry into his pro se claim of
ineffective assistance pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). That claim was based
on trial counsel’s failure to file a pretrial motion to suppress witness identifications. This court
No. 1-23-1028
agreed and remanded for such inquiry. People v. Wiley, 2020 IL App (1st) 172323-U. After a
hearing, the trial court did not appoint new counsel.
¶3 In this appeal, Mr. Wiley argues that the trial court erred in not finding possible neglect by
trial counsel for failing to move to suppress the witness identifications as suggestive. In the
alternative, Mr. Wiley argues that the trial court erred in not sua sponte appointing counsel to
develop the record regarding the offender’s age provided to the police by the witnesses and how a
particular witness described the offender to police. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Mr. Wiley was charged in the shooting death of Keithen Rupert. The State proceeded on
four counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2012)), alleging that Mr. Wiley
personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused Mr. Rupert’s death.
¶6 At trial, Deandre Boatman testified that on July 18, 2013, at approximately 1 p.m., he and
Mr. Rupert were “standing outside *** selling weed.” A woman, Tunisha, who sold marijuana
from her home, approached Mr. Boatman and Mr. Rupert and was angry that they were selling
marijuana “three houses down” from her. She began “poking” Mr. Rupert in his face. Mr. Rupert
then engaged in a “fist fight” with Tunisha’s younger son. A man, whom Mr. Boatman identified
in court as Mr. Wiley, approached, and Mr. Boatman punched him in the face. Mr. Boatman had
never seen Mr. Wiley before.
¶7 Mr. Boatman and Mr. Rupert eventually went to the home of brothers Deshawn Mayo
(Deshawn) and Desmond Mayo (Desmond) and spoke with them about the altercation with
Tunisha. As Mr. Boatman and Mr. Rupert left the Mayo home, Mr. Boatman noticed a white Astro
van and heard “multiple” gunshots from an alley. When the shots stopped, Mr. Rupert lay on the
ground and stated that he could not breathe. Mr. Rupert was eventually taken to the hospital where
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he died.
¶8 Mr. Boatman spoke with officers at the police station and gave a statement to an assistant
state’s attorney. Prior to giving the statement, Mr. Boatman viewed a lineup and identified Mr.
Wiley as the individual he had punched. The State showed Mr. Boatman a photograph of the lineup
where he identified Mr. Wiley and asked him to circle the individual he identified. The photograph
is included in the record on appeal. In the photograph, five black males are sitting on what appears
to be a bench. The first and second individuals are medium-complected and the third, fourth, and
fifth individuals are dark-complected. The third and fifth individuals are slightly shorter than the
others, and the second and fourth individuals have a heavier build than the others. The fifth
individual has longer hair, the first, third, and fourth individuals have shorter hair close to their
scalp, and the second individual is shaven or bald. Mr. Boatman circled the second individual. On
cross-examination, Mr. Boatman stated that he did not see who did the shooting.
¶9 Deshawn testified that on July 18, 2013, at approximately 3 p.m., he and Desmond were
outside their home speaking with Mr. Boatman and Mr. Rupert about the previous altercation with
Tunisha. Deshawn noticed a van driving down the alley and saw a man running in a “crouched”
position from the van toward Deshawn’s home. Deshawn eventually saw the man’s face and
identified him as Mr. Wiley in court. Deshawn had never seen Mr. Wiley before. Deshawn could
see Mr. Wiley’s face as he was shooting as nothing obstructed his view. Mr. Wiley held a “big”
firearm in both hands and fired 7 to 10 shots before retreating to the van. Mr. Rupert was shot, fell
to the ground, and could not move.
¶ 10 Deshawn described Mr. Wiley as “light” skinned with a “heavy” build and “close to” a
bald head. Deshawn went to the police station and viewed a lineup. He was separated from Mr.
Boatman and Desmond when he viewed the lineup. He identified Mr. Wiley in the lineup as the
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shooter. The State showed Deshawn an unmarked copy of the same lineup photograph that had
been shown to Mr. Boatman and asked him to circle the individual he identified. The photograph
is included in the record on appeal. Deshawn circled the second individual.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, Deshawn clarified that he could not see the firearm in Mr. Wiley’s
hands as he crouched down, but Deshawn could tell from Mr. Wiley’s hands when he was running
that he had a firearm. Prior to going to the police station, Deshawn had been with Mr. Boatman
and Desmond for about an hour. On redirect, Deshawn stated that no trees blocked his view of Mr.
Wiley. As Mr. Wiley approached, Deshawn stared at Mr. Wiley’s face and not the firearm.
¶ 12 Desmond testified that on July 18, 2013, in the “afternoon,” he and Deshawn were walking
to the corner store when he noticed a white van, driven by Mr. Wiley, exiting the alley. Desmond
had never seen Mr. Wiley before. Desmond and Deshawn encountered Mr. Boatman and Mr.
Rupert and discussed the previous altercation they had outside Desmond and Deshawn’s home.
Desmond saw the same white van drive into the alley and then saw Mr. Wiley running with a “big”
firearm toward them from the direction of the van. Desmond could see Mr. Wiley’s face. Mr.
Wiley squatted down, began shooting, and Desmond ran. Once the shots stopped, Desmond saw
Mr. Wiley run toward the van and “[take] off.”
¶ 13 Desmond heard Mr. Rupert say, “I’m hit.” Mr. Rupert was transported to the hospital and
Desmond stayed behind to speak with officers who had arrived on the scene. He gave them a
description of the vehicle and of Mr. Wiley. Desmond went to the police station to speak with
police and an assistant state’s attorney. There, he viewed a lineup alone and identified Mr. Wiley
as the shooter. The State showed Desmond an unmarked copy of the same lineup photograph that
had been shown to Mr. Boatman and Deshawn and asked him to circle the individual he identified.
The photograph is included in the record on appeal. Desmond circled the second individual.
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No. 1-23-1028
Desmond said his view of Mr. Wiley while Mr. Wiley was crouched down was not obstructed and
that he would “never forget that face.”
¶ 14 Harvey police officer Wallace testified that he responded to the scene on July 18, 2013,
and spoke to witnesses who described the offender. The offender was described as a black male,
five feet nine inches tall, and 225 pounds, who fled in a white minivan. Officer Wallace learned
from Tunisha that her brother, Mr. Wiley, owned a white van. Officer Wallace and other officers
searched the Secretary of State’s records and discovered that Mr. Wiley owned a white Chevrolet
minivan. Mr. Wiley was eventually arrested.
¶ 15 Officer Wallace requested that Mr. Boatman, Deshawn, and Desmond come to the police
station to view an in-person lineup. Officer Wallace tried to fill the lineup with individuals who
matched the description of the offender. The witnesses viewed the lineup one by one and were not
allowed to speak to other witnesses afterwards. They were also informed that the offender may or
may not be in the lineup and that they were not required to make an identification. Deshawn and
Desmond identified Mr. Wiley as the shooter and Mr. Boatman identified Mr. Wiley as the
individual he had punched.
¶ 16 On cross-examination, Officer Wallace testified that lineups can be compiled using
individuals already at the police station or from individuals off the street. Mr. Wiley was born in
1974 and the other four lineup participants were born in 1985, 1993, 1995, and 1993.
¶ 17 In closing, trial counsel argued that Mr. Boatman, Deshawn, and Desmond had the
opportunity to speak with one another prior to making their identifications. Counsel also argued
that one lineup participant was over 20 years younger than Mr. Wiley and the closest person in age
to Mr. Wiley was 11 years his junior. None of the other lineup participants had a “shaved *** bald
head” like Mr. Wiley and, according to counsel, the lineup was set up to encourage the witnesses
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to pick Mr. Wiley.
¶ 18 The jury found Mr. Wiley guilty of first degree murder.
¶ 19 Trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. Mr. Wiley also
wrote a handwritten letter to the court requesting that the court grant a new trial or overturn the
jury verdict due to “several issues” not addressed at trial, including that he was “suggested” as
being the perpetrator during the lineup.
¶ 20 At sentencing, Mr. Wiley requested to ask a question, which the judge refused. Mr. Wiley
told the judge he had written letters to the court, but the judge stated that he did not read them. Mr.
Wiley then read a letter in allocution where he stated that he should be granted a new trial, or the
verdict should be overturned in part due to the suggestive identifications.
¶ 21 Mr. Wiley was subsequently sentenced to 55 years in prison for one count of first degree
murder, which included a 25-year enhancement for the use of a firearm, with all other counts
merging into that count. Mr. Wiley filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which was denied.
¶ 22 On direct appeal, Mr. Wiley alleged that the trial court failed to conduct any inquiry into
his pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance as required by Krankel. Wiley, 2020 IL App
(1st) 172323-U, ¶¶ 2, 16. This court found that Mr. Wiley’s letters required a preliminary Krankel
inquiry and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Mr. Wiley’s claims showed “possible
neglect of the case warranting appointment of counsel.” Id. ¶¶ 21, 28.
¶ 23 On February 24, 2023, the trial court held a preliminary Krankel inquiry into Mr. Wiley’s
pro se claims of ineffective assistance. At that hearing, Mr. Wiley asserted that trial counsel failed
to file a pretrial motion to suppress the lineup as suggestive. Specifically, Mr. Wiley alleged he
was placed in a lineup with “a group of younger guys nowhere near matching [his] description.”
The person closest to him in age in the lineup was 11 years his junior and no one else had a “shaved
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*** bald head” like him.
¶ 24 Trial counsel responded that the issue was a “good trial issue,” which he argued as such,
but he did not believe the lineup was “unduly suggestive or unconstitutional” or else he would
have filed a motion to suppress. Counsel stated he challenged the identifications in several ways
including arguing that the witnesses had an opportunity to speak with each other prior to making
their identifications.
¶ 25 The trial court ruled that counsel’s decisions were objectively reasonable and his
performance was not so deficient as to lead to a reasonable probability that the result of the
proceeding would have been different had he filed a motion to suppress. The court then denied the
Krankel claim and declined to appoint new counsel.
¶ 26 II. JURISDICTION
¶ 27 The trial court denied Mr. Wiley’s Krankel claim on February 24, 2023, and Mr. Wiley
timely filed his notice of appeal on March 8, 2023. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under
article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021), governing appeals from final
judgments in criminal cases.
¶ 28 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 On appeal, Mr. Wiley argues the trial court erred, on remand from this court, in not finding
possible neglect by trial counsel for failing to move to suppress the pretrial lineup identifications
of Mr. Wiley. According to Mr. Wiley, counsel should have filed a motion based on Mr. Wiley
being the only lineup participant who exhibited all the physical characteristics in the witnesses’
descriptions of the offender. In the alternative, Mr. Wiley argues that new counsel should have
been appointed to further investigate what the witnesses said about the offender’s age and how
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Desmond described the offender to the police.
¶ 30 Inquiries into a defendant’s pro se posttrial claim alleging ineffective assistance of trial
counsel are governed by Krankel and its progeny. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 1. The goal
of a Krankel proceeding is to “facilitate the trial court’s full consideration of a defendant’s pro se
claim.” Id. ¶ 13. A defendant is only required to “bring his or her claim to the trial court’s
attention,” which may be done through a written motion, letter, or note to the court, or orally.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 11. During the preliminary inquiry, the trial court may
reach “not only the factual basis of a defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective assistance, but also
the legal merits of such claims.” People v. Little, 2021 IL App (1st) 181984, ¶ 46. The purpose of
this inquiry is to allow the court to decide whether to appoint independent counsel to argue the
defendant’s pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Ayers, 2017 Il 120071, ¶ 11. If the court
determines that the “claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy,” it need not
appoint new counsel and should deny the pro se claim. People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35.
If the allegations show “possible neglect of the case,” new counsel should be appointed. Id.
¶ 31 Whether a trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry is reviewed
de novo. Little, 2021 IL App (1st) 181984, ¶ 48. In conducting the inquiry, the trial court may
discuss the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations with the defendant and trial counsel
and rely on “its knowledge of [trial] counsel’s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the
defendant’s allegations.” Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. Here, there is no dispute that, on remand,
the trial court properly conducted the Krankel hearing. The trial court discussed the claim with
both Mr. Wiley and trial counsel, and allowed Mr. Wiley to argue his claims at length.
Furthermore, the court allowed trial counsel to respond and questioned counsel about his trial
decisions extensively, including probing into how counsel challenged the identifications at trial.
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Therefore, the court complied with the requirements of a preliminary Krankel inquiry.
¶ 32 Mr. Wiley’s argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in not finding possible neglect
by trial counsel and appointing new counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to move to suppress
the lineup identification. A trial court’s decision declining to appoint new counsel following an
adequate inquiry is reviewed for manifest error. People v. McCarter, 385 Ill. App. 3d 919, 941
(2008). Manifest error is error that is “clearly evident, plain, and indisputable.” People v. Jackson,
2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. We do not find any manifest error in this case.
¶ 33 Allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
the Strickland standard, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to
the defendant. People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326 (2011).
¶ 34 For the first prong, a defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the challenged
action or inaction was sound trial strategy. People v. Elliott, 2022 IL App (1st) 192294, ¶ 37.
Counsel’s decision on whether to file a motion to suppress is generally a matter of trial strategy
entitled to great deference and, as such, is “generally immune” from a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. People v. Rodriguez, 2022 IL App (1st) 200315, ¶ 114; People v. Dupree,
2018 IL 122307, ¶ 44. In this case, Mr. Wiley’s trial counsel told the judge at the hearing that he
did not file a motion to suppress because he did not believe the identification procedure was
unnecessarily suggestive and thought it was a better strategy to challenge the credibility of the
identifications at trial through cross-examination. During trial testimony and closing argument,
counsel highlighted the witnesses’ opportunity to speak to one another prior to making their
individual identifications. The court determined that this strategy was not unreasonable. The trial
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court properly relied on the fact that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to file a motion to
suppress in rejecting Mr. Wiley’s claim that there was possible neglect.
¶ 35 In addition, it is unlikely that such a motion would have been successful. To establish that
counsel’s deficient performance resulted in prejudice under the second prong of Strickland, Mr.
Wiley would need to show “that the unargued suppression motion is meritorious, and that a
reasonable probability exists that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence
been suppressed.” People v. Lobdell, 2019 IL App (3d) 180385, ¶ 11.
¶ 36 If counsel for Mr. Wiley had filed a motion to suppress, he would have borne the burden
of proving that the procedure was “unnecessarily suggestive and created a substantial likelihood
of misidentification.” People v. Joiner, 2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 39. The individuals selected
for a photo array or lineup need not be identical and “differences in their appearance go to the
weight of the identification, not to its admissibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v.
Allen, 376 Ill. App. 3d 511, 521 (2007). An identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive
when a defendant “is more or less spotlighted by the authorities.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Smith, 2023 IL App (1st) 181070, ¶ 37. Courts consider the totality of the
circumstances when reviewing a claim of an unnecessarily suggestive identification. Joiner, 2018
IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 39.
¶ 37 At the Krankel proceeding in this case, Mr. Wiley argued that the lineup was unnecessarily
suggestive because he was “spotlighted” by being the only lineup participant with the weight,
height, skin complexion, and hairstyle as described. Mr. Wiley stated that he was placed in a lineup
with men who were shorter and younger—with the oldest being 11 years his junior—and that none
of the other men had lighter skin or a shaved or bald head.
¶ 38 We have reviewed a photo of the lineup and do not find it so suggestive that we can say a
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motion to suppress it was likely to succeed. At trial, Officer Wallace, who compiled the lineup,
testified that the description of the offender he received was a five-foot-nine-inch, 225-pound black
male. The photo depicts five black men, all sitting, which minimized their height differences.
While there are also differences in terms of skin tone, hair style, and weight, the differences do not
“spotlight” Mr. Wiley nor are they so pronounced as to have singled him out from the others.
¶ 39 In addition, as the State argues here, even if a motion to suppress had been filed and was
successful, the State would have been permitted to call the three witnesses who identified Mr.
Wiley in court because the record showed that those witnesses’ prior observations of Mr. Wiley
were sufficient to serve as an independent basis for their in-court identifications. People v.
Underwood, 263 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786 (1994). This, too, undermines any possibility that Mr.
Wiley’s claim in the Krankel hearing demonstrated possible neglect under the required Strickland
showing.
¶ 40 In short, because the decision not to file a motion to suppress was one of reasonable trial
strategy and because such a motion was not likely to succeed—and even if did, was unlikely to
change the trial outcome—there was an insufficient basis for suggesting that this claim could have
satisfied either prong of Strickland. The trial court did not commit error that was “clearly evident,
plain, and indisputable” in finding that there was no showing of possible neglect and therefore not
appointing Mr. Wiley new counsel for further proceedings. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.
¶ 41 In the alternative, Mr. Wiley argues that remand is needed so independent counsel can
investigate what description Desmond gave of the offender, which is not in the record, as well as
the age of the offender as described by the witnesses. We disagree. This is evidence that Mr. Wiley
believes might further support his claim that the lineup was unduly suggestive because of
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differences between him and the other men with whom he was sitting. But, as we have already
recognized, the fact that there were some differences amongst the lineup participants, including
age, does not equate to unnecessary suggestiveness. Rather, “differences in their appearance go to
the weight of the identification, not to its admissibility,” as the participants need not be identical.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 521.
¶ 42 Moreover, Mr. Wiley never asked the court below to appoint new counsel for the purposes
of doing this further investigation. The trial court’s failure to sua sponte appoint new counsel to
look into possible additional differences between the witnesses’ description of the offender and
the line-up participants was clearly not manifest error. This alternative argument does not provide
any basis for reversing the trial court in this case.
¶ 43 In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry
to ascertain the factual allegations surrounding Mr. Wiley’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel and the court’s finding that there was an insufficient showing of possible neglect
to require appointment of new counsel was not manifestly erroneous. Mr. Wiley’s alternative
argument that the trial court should have, without any request to do so, appointed new counsel to
further investigate his claim is without merit.
¶ 44 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 46 Affirmed.
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