The opinion
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0017p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐
LOUIS CHANDLER,
│
Petitioner-Appellant, │
> No. 23-1270
│
v. │
│
MIKE BROWN, Warden, │
Respondent-Appellee. │
┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Marquette.
No. 2:19-cv-00263—Paul Lewis Maloney, District Judge.
Argued: April 30, 2024
Decided and Filed: January 24, 2025
Before: WHITE, STRANCH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Matthew A. Monahan, STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICE, Detroit,
Michigan, for Appellant. Jared D. Schultz, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY
GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Matthew A. Monahan, STATE
APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICE, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Jared D. Schultz,
OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-Appellant Louis Chandler, a Michigan
prisoner, is serving concurrent terms of twenty-five to seventy-five years in prison for two
convictions of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.520b(2)(b).
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 2
After exhausting his state-court appeals, Chandler filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that the trial court infringed his right to present a complete defense.
The district court denied the petition, and Chandler appeals. We REVERSE, conditionally
GRANT Chandler’s habeas corpus petition, and REMAND to the district court.
I. Background
A. Factual History
For twelve years, Chandler and his wife, Darlene Chandler (“Darlene”), cared for more
than twenty foster children without incident. In 2010, the Chandlers decided to foster A.C., an
eight-year-old girl.1 Because a prior Child Protective Services (“CPS”) report had concluded
that A.C. had a “history of false allegations,” R. 9-10, PID 728, the foster-care agency warned
the Chandlers to “watch” A.C. closely, R. 9-5, PID 382.
Roughly three months after the initial foster placement, the Chandlers informed A.C. that
they intended to adopt her. Days later, A.C. told Darlene that Chandler had touched her
inappropriately. Darlene was confused because, shortly after reporting this incident to Darlene,
A.C. “laugh[ed] around the room . . . and climbed on [Chandler’s] lap.” R. 9-5, PID 380. Still,
Darlene called the adoption agency to report A.C.’s allegations, and Chandler voluntarily left the
home to give law enforcement, CPS, and the foster-care agency time to investigate.
A.C. told investigators that Chandler sexually abused her every day, and sometimes
multiple times per day, both inside the home and at a local movie theater.2 The foster-care
agency concluded that it had serious doubts regarding A.C.’s assertions, which were
compounded by A.C.’s history of false allegations. The prosecutor also declined to charge
Chandler at the time. However, the CPS investigator assigned to the case, Jennifer Schmidt,
concluded that the allegations were substantiated under a preponderance of the evidence
standard. Schmidt had not read A.C.’s file, which detailed her history of false allegations, but
1
The State’s brief uses the initials “A.H.” instead of “A.C.,” perhaps because the child’s last name changed
after adoption. For consistency, we use “A.C.”
2
CPS also interviewed other foster children who were staying with the Chandlers at the time, but the
interviews did not turn up anything of note.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 3
another foster-care worker had told Schmidt that A.C. had made allegations of physical abuse in
the past. After Schmidt’s investigation, CPS removed A.C. from the Chandlers’ home, and a
new family eventually adopted her.3 In the following years, a dispute arose within the Chandler
family. During the dispute, the Chandlers’ son—Louis Chandler Jr. (“Lou Jr.”)—allegedly
threatened to kill his mother, and Darlene testified that she was afraid of her son.
In 2014, Lou Jr.’s eight-year-old stepdaughter, Z.B., told her mother, Stephanie Chandler
(“Stephanie”), that Chandler had touched her inappropriately. Lou Jr. and Stephanie filed a
police report, which triggered a second criminal investigation, and told police that they knew of
two other victims: Stephanie’s best friend, Josefina Harden, and Norma Chandler (“Norma”),
Chandler’s sister.
Police also re-interviewed A.C., who was then twelve years old. Detective Svoboda, who
authored a report following the interview, testified that A.C.’s account was inconsistent with the
one she gave previously. In 2010, A.C. alleged that Chandler abused her every day, both at
home and at the movie theater. But in her 2014 interview, A.C. told the detective that Chandler
abused her four times total, including once after a church party, but never at a movie theater.
Police then obtained a search warrant for Chandler’s computer, which yielded written
stories of a sexual nature, including one containing child sexual abuse. Several other individuals
used the computer in addition to Chandler, however, and Darlene testified that she once caught
her adopted teenage son looking at “real[ly] bad” pornography on the computer. R. 9-5, PID
380. Darlene also testified that pornography would pop up randomly on its own when she used
the computer. In 2015, the Kent County prosecutor charged Chandler with four counts of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct stemming from the alleged sexual abuse of A.C., but he
dismissed two of the charges before trial.
3
CPS also filed a petition requesting jurisdiction of Austin, the Chandlers’ adopted son. R. 9-4, PID 331.
Although no record document discloses whether the petition was successful, Austin still lived with the Chandlers at
the time of trial.
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B. Chandler’s Motions
The case had an “accelerated” timeline. People v. Chandler, No. 329605, 2017 WL
6502801, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017). On April 10, 2015, the court appointed Jonathan
Schildgen as Chandler’s public defender. Chandler entered a not-guilty plea on April 22, and
discovery began a day later. Schildgen received the first batch of discovery documents in mid-
May. On May 26, the court set the case for trial on July 6—just seventy-five days after Chandler
entered his not-guilty plea.
As Schildgen went through the initial document disclosure, he found the CPS report
concluding that A.C. had a “history of making false allegations” against foster parents. R. 9-3,
PID 256. Based on this new information, Chandler successfully requested funds on June 11 to
hire an expert on child-sexual-abuse allegations.
On June 16, Chandler moved to compel additional discovery, seeking “all Kent County
DHS and CPS reports for [A.C.] containing and regarding references to prior false and prior
unsubstantiated sexual abuse allegations.” R. 9-10, PID 519. The court held a hearing on June
26 and denied the motion, concluding that Chandler was only entitled to records related to A.C.’s
allegations against him and that the prosecution did not need to disclose any evidence of A.C.’s
allegations against others.4
At the same hearing, Schildgen also requested an adjournment of the trial date,
explaining that he still needed to obtain additional evidence and that his expert needed time to
review the records. The court denied the request. On June 29, Chandler moved for
reconsideration, arguing that the expedited timeline deprived him of the right to present a
defense and made it impossible for Schildgen to represent him effectively. The court denied the
request.
On the morning of the July 6 trial, Chandler again moved for an adjournment. Schildgen
told the court that he had received additional discovery from the foster-care agency just a week
earlier, including a report raising “serious doubts” as to whether sexual abuse occurred. Id. at
4
The court told Schildgen to “go out and talk to [the CPS workers], you can sit down and meet with
them. . . . [T]hat burden is on your shoulders.” R. 9-10, PID 520.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 5
521. The new documents included the names of other foster parents who A.C. had falsely
accused of misconduct. Schildgen argued that, because he received the records only a week
earlier, he needed additional time to go through them, to provide them to the expert, and to
prepare for trial.
Schildgen also found a probate case involving A.C., in which Judge Kathleen Feeney
issued an order with factual findings useful to Chandler. Judge Feeney’s order concluded that
A.C. had issues with lying and making false allegations, motivated in large part by her desire to
be removed from foster care and returned to her birth parents. Schildgen told the trial court that
Judge Feeney had agreed to make the records available for Chandler’s proceedings, but she
could only do so after returning from a two-week vacation. Schildgen thus explained that
delaying trial would give him time to pick up Judge Feeney’s records, go through them, and
make them available to the expert.
The trial court rejected Chandler’s arguments, concluding that any evidence of A.C.’s
prior allegations was inadmissible because it was “extrinsic.” R. 9-3, PID 258. Chandler could
only raise the topic through cross-examination of A.C., but he would be “stuck with her
answers.” Id. The court also barred Chandler’s expert from testifying at trial because Chandler
had not complied with the court rule requiring disclosure of an expert’s name “no later than
28 days before trial.”5 See Mich. Ct. R. 6.201(A)(1). Finally, the trial court found no legitimate
reason to postpone trial and denied Chandler’s motion.
The trial court also barred Chandler’s remaining proposed witnesses from testifying—
more than twenty of them—because their names were not disclosed at least ten days before trial.
Chandler argued that, because he was still receiving discovery until the day of trial, it would
have been impossible to comply with this rule. Among those that Chandler told the trial court he
intended to call to testify were: (1) three of A.C.’s previous foster families—the Hamblins,
Nickersons, and Lamberts—who would have testified regarding A.C.’s character and her history
of false allegations, including that a foster parent heard A.C. tell her therapist that “it’s fun to
5
The court authorized funding for the expert twenty-five days before trial, so it was impossible for
Chandler to comply with the rule. Still, Chandler failed to disclose the expert’s name until the day of trial, which he
argued was because the expert had insufficient time to review the relevant evidence and create a report.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 6
lie.” (2) Amanda Fraly, who would have testified that Lou Jr. pressured her to make a false
allegation against Chandler before he contacted police; and (3) five foster-care-agency
employees, who would have testified about A.C.’s false allegations and Chandler’s twelve years
as a “model caregiver.” R. 9-5, PID 348. Chandler again tried to call witnesses on the second
day of trial, arguing that he was denied his “constitutional right to present a defense,” R. 9-4,
PID 340, but the court refused to permit any witnesses not already “endorsed by the
prosecution,” id. at 339. In sum, the court’s orders limited Chandler’s time to prepare for trial,
stymied his discovery, and prevented him from calling any witnesses.
C. Trial Testimony
A.C. testified at Chandler’s trial and provided inconsistent testimony. At first, A.C.
testified that (1) she was unable to recognize Chandler or Darlene, (2) she did not remember
making any allegations against Chandler, (3) she did not remember any CPS investigation,
(4) she did not remember any foster placement before her current home, and (5) she did not
remember any time when she was touched inappropriately. Moments later, A.C.’s testimony
changed. She testified that Chandler sexually abused her twice—both times in the Chandlers’
home. A.C.’s testimony contradicted her 2010 allegations that Chandler abused her daily, both
at home and elsewhere, and the account she gave Svoboda four months earlier that Chandler
abused her four times, including once after a church party.
When asked about the inconsistent accounts on cross-examination, A.C. denied alleging
in 2010 that Chandler’s abuse happened daily, both inside and outside the home, and did not
remember making the inconsistent statements to Svoboda months earlier. A.C. also reiterated
that Chandler’s abuse occurred twice in total. Schildgen attempted to challenge A.C.’s honesty
by questioning her about her history of stealing from retail establishments, but the court cut off
this line of questioning.
Finally, Schildgen asked A.C. about a lengthy list of allegations that she had purportedly
made in the past. Schildgen learned of these prior allegations after obtaining CPS and foster-
care-agency records in the days before trial. The records included allegations that (1) a foster
family’s dog had attacked her, (2) a foster parent abused her by swinging her around by her
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 7
ponytail, (3) a foster parent refused to give her clothing, shoes, or bedding, (4) a foster parent hit
her with a wooden spoon, (5) a cousin abused her, (6) a daycare provider had hit her, (7) a foster
parent sexually abused her, (8) a foster parent made her eat soap, and (9) a foster-care worker
raped her. R. 9-4, PID 321–24; R. 9-7, PID 413; R. 9-10, PID 619. In her testimony, A.C.
admitted to making only two of these allegations, but she testified that both were true.6 For the
others, A.C. either denied or did not remember making the allegations. Because the court had
barred the defense from calling witnesses and citing the CPS records directly, there was no
evidence at trial to contradict A.C.’s claim that she never made false allegations.
The prosecution then called three other witnesses who testified that Chandler had touched
them inappropriately in the past.
Z.B. first testified that, over the span of two years, Chandler sexually abused her once or
twice on each day they spent together. However, in a prior proceeding, Z.B. had given
contradictory testimony. On cross-examination, Z.B. testified that she did not remember making
the inconsistent statements.7
Then, Norma testified that Chandler had molested her nearly fifty years earlier when they
were both children. R. 9-5, PID 350. At the time of the alleged abuse, Norma was eight to ten
years old and Chandler was “eleven or twelve.” R. 9-5, PID 351.
Finally, Josefina Harden, Stephanie’s “best friend,” described an incident that occurred
roughly seventeen years earlier. R. 9-4, PID 338. Harden testified that when she was about ten
years old, she went to the Chandlers’ home for dinner. Because Harden had just been playing in
a sprinkler, she was wearing a bathing suit and had sand all over her body. Chandler took
Harden to the bathroom to clean the sand off her body and allegedly used his hands to brush off
the sand between her legs, including a “quick swipe” to clean the sand “just outside of . . . the
genital area.” Id. at 337.
6
Of these, the only substantiated allegation was that a foster parent put a dab of soap in A.C.’s mouth after
A.C. called the foster parent “a fucking bitch.” R. 9-10, PID 812.
7
Evidence that Chandler passed a polygraph test concerning Z.B.’s allegations was disallowed.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 8
The prosecution also called Thomas Cottrell for expert testimony. Cottrell was a
professor at Western Michigan University and the executive of a company providing counseling
to survivors of sexual assault. Cottrell testified that children often wait to disclose sexual abuse,
and roughly half of survivors wait until adulthood. He explained that late disclosures generally
occur for one of three reasons: the victim (1) realizes in adulthood that abuse occurred,
(2) disassociates from the memory due to trauma, or (3) believes that the costs of disclosure
outweigh the benefits. Although victims’ memories may degrade over time, Cottrell testified
that memories can “become enriched” as an individual discusses them repeatedly. Id. at 370.
Cottrell also testified that, because children have difficulty with chronology, they can “confound
multiple occurrences of abuse,” making it difficult to distinguish them. Id.
On cross-examination, Schildgen asked about false allegations of sexual abuse, and
Cottrell testified that young children could come to believe lies by repeating them. Schildgen
also asked about Reactive Attachment Disorder (“RAD”), a condition that occurs in children
who have been deprived of a relationship with their parents at a young age. Cottrell explained
that children diagnosed with RAD resist relationships, have difficulty trusting others, and are not
“tuned into the consequences of their choices.” Id. at 372. Schildgen asked about an incident
where A.C. allegedly told a therapist that she enjoyed lying, which Cottrell said was “not
atypical of [a RAD] diagnosis.” Id.
The jury convicted Chandler on two counts of first-degree criminal sexual assault, and
the trial court sentenced him to concurrent sentences of twenty-five to seventy-five years in
prison. During sentencing, the judge said that he was “absolutely convinced that [Chandler is] a
pedophile” and that he did not “ever want [Chandler] out of prison.” R. 9-7, PID 420.
D. Remand
Chandler appealed, arguing that the trial court denied him his right to present a complete
defense and incorrectly applied the state’s evidentiary and procedural rules. The Michigan Court
of Appeals remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, which was held on August 24, 2017.
At the hearing, Schildgen testified that he had intended to call A.C.’s former foster
parents and caseworkers to discuss specific instances of A.C.’s false allegations. Schildgen had
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 9
also planned to call an expert witness to testify about Reactive Attachment Disorder, proper
interviewing techniques, and false accusations of sexual assault. Schildgen argued that, because
he was unable to call any witnesses, the jury had only A.C.’s answers without any consideration
of evidence impeaching her credibility.
Sandy and Randy Hamblin, the foster parents who cared for A.C. before the Chandlers,
also testified. Sandy testified that although A.C. had difficulty attaching to her, she was
comfortable with the men in her family. A.C. “wanted to sit on their lap[s] all the time,” but
Sandy discouraged this behavior because she had heard about A.C.’s prior allegations. R. 9-10,
PID 763. Sandy also detailed several allegations that A.C. made against the Hamblins, which
were later determined by CPS to be “unfounded.” Id. at 764. As with Chandler, A.C. made
allegations against the Hamblins days after she learned that they intended to adopt her. Randy
corroborated Sandy’s testimony and, when asked his opinion of A.C.’s character, testified that
she “could not tell the truth.” Id. at 766.
Jeff Kieliszewski, Chandler’s expert witness, then testified about “confabulation,” a type
of memory error where an individual produces fabricated, distorted, or misrepresented memories.
Id. at 768. He explained how a child in A.C.’s position could come to believe things that were
not true, particularly after repeating the story many times, id., and that, because memory
degrades over time, it was a “red flag” that A.C. added additional details to her story years after
it allegedly occurred. Id. at 770. Kieliszewski also discussed the ways in which the investigators
failed to follow standard interviewing procedures with A.C. For example, because a parent may
influence a child’s answers or pressure them to say something untrue, the guidelines for child
forensic interviews “highly discourage” the presence of a support person. Id. at 769. But A.C.’s
adoptive mother was allowed to sit next to her for the interview, which the defense would have
argued made the answers unreliable. Id. The guidelines also recommend recording interviews as
a “best practice,” but the detectives did not do so with A.C. Id. Instead, the detectives wrote a
one-and-a-half-page report, which the expert said was “quite short” for a ninety-minute
interview. Id. After reviewing A.C.’s record and the investigators’ interviewing techniques,
Kieliszewski concluded that there was a “substantial possibility of a false allegation report of
sexual abuse.” Id. at 774.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 10
After the testimony concluded, the prosecution argued that a new trial was unnecessary
because (a) the documents Schildgen received on the eve of trial had no new information
compared to the documents he received earlier, (b) Chandler successfully made his core
arguments by cross-examining the government’s witnesses, and (c) the evidence and testimony
that Chandler sought to present at trial was inadmissible.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution and rejected Chandler’s request for a new
trial, concluding that all the evidence Schildgen had sought to introduce was inadmissible, except
for the expert’s testimony regarding proper interviewing procedures. It also determined that, to
the extent any testimony was wrongly excluded, the error did not prejudice Chandler because the
“evidence was clearly overwhelming.” Id. at 779.
E. Appeal
Chandler’s case returned to the Michigan Court of Appeals, where he again argued that
the trial court had violated the state’s trial rules and denied him the right to present a complete
defense. In a brief footnote, the court rejected Chandler’s constitutional claim, concluding that
Chandler had a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense because (1) he was
represented by counsel at trial and (2) his counsel could argue through cross-examination that
A.C. fabricated the allegations. Chandler, 2017 WL 6502801, at *4 n.3.
However, the court of appeals found Chandler’s evidentiary and procedural claims
meritorious. It first concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Chandler’s
repeated requests for an adjournment without any “reasonable or principled basis.” Id. at *3.
The trial court further abused its discretion by barring all of Chandler’s lay and expert witnesses
from testifying because it was a disproportionally “extreme sanction” for a minor procedural
violation. Id. Finally, because the trial court “employed the wrong framework when considering
the admissibility of extrinsic evidence,” it abused its discretion by excluding evidence of A.C.’s
prior false allegations. Id. at *4. Instead, the trial court should have considered admitting the
evidence under Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b), id., which allows admitting extrinsic
evidence “for a[] purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan,
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 11
or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident,” Mich. R.
Evid. 404(b). Thus, the jury should have heard evidence of A.C.’s prior false allegations.
Despite the trial court’s multiple abuses of discretion, the court of appeals affirmed
Chandler’s conviction under the state’s forgiving test for non-constitutional errors, which allows
a court to overturn a conviction only if “it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not
that the error was outcome determinative.” Chandler, 2017 WL 6502801, at *4 (quoting People
v. King, 824 N.W.2d 258, 262 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012)). The court concluded that reversal was
unwarranted because (1) Chandler challenged A.C.’s credibility during cross-examination by
asking her about her prior inconsistent statements, (2) Chandler’s expert would have discussed
the same topics as the prosecution’s expert, and (3) the testimony of Chandler’s other instances
of alleged sexual misconduct “bolstered the victim’s credibility and supported a propensity
inference.” Id. at *5.
F. District Court
On December 30, 2019, Chandler filed this petition for habeas corpus in federal district
court, arguing that he was denied several due process rights—including the right to present a
complete defense, to call witnesses on his own behalf, and to a fair trial. On February 3, 2023,
the magistrate issued a report and recommendation to deny Chandler’s petition. Chandler
objected to the report and recommendation, but the district court overruled the objections and
adopted the recommendation. Although the district court concluded that Chandler could not
establish that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established law, it granted a certificate
of appealability because a reasonable jurist could disagree. R. 15, PID 1021–22.
Chandler appeals.
II. Constitutional Claim
A. Standard of Review
“AEDPA requires habeas petitioners to exhaust their claims in state court before turning
to a federal court for relief.” Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 720 (6th Cir. 2020). A state
court’s resolution of a claim on the merits receives deference in federal habeas proceedings. Id.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 12
Accordingly, a federal court may grant relief to a petitioner only when a state court’s decision is
“(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. at
720–21 (alterations in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). “A state court’s determination
that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,
101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).
An “unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of
federal law.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). A federal court may grant the writ
under the “contrary to” clause “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached
by th[e] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than th[e] Court
has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412–13. Under the “unreasonable
application” clause, a federal court may grant the writ “if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from th[e] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to
the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. In determining whether the state court applied a rule
unreasonably, a federal court must consider the rule’s specificity. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664.
“The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.” Id.
“In a habeas appeal, we review questions of law de novo, including the ultimate decision
to grant or deny the petition.” Stermer, 959 F.3d at 720. Absent an evidentiary hearing, the
district court’s factual findings are also reviewed de novo. Id. We take care to consider the
“entire record” in the case, including both the trial and remand hearing transcripts. Mays v.
Hines, 592 U.S. 385, 392 (2021); see also Adams v. Holland, 330 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2003)
(holding that federal courts must consider habeas petitions “in light of the full record”).
B. Right to Present a Complete Defense
The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.” California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). This right is rooted in
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 13
several constitutional provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and the Sixth Amendment’s various trial rights. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986);
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984) (“The Constitution guarantees a
fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic elements of a fair trial largely
through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment.”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273
(1948) (“A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be
heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and
these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.”).
1. Key Precedents
Because Chandler must show that the state court contradicted or unreasonably applied
clearly established federal law as established by the Supreme Court, we begin by surveying the
key precedents concerning the right to present a complete defense. We survey both Supreme
Court cases defining the right to present a complete defense and our own cases applying this
clearly established federal law under the AEDPA standard.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
Jackie Washington was charged with murder. Id. at 15. The only eyewitness was
Charles Fuller, an alleged accomplice who had already been tried and convicted for the same
crime. Id. at 16. Although Fuller shot the victim, not Washington, he was barred from
testifying due to a Texas evidentiary rule that prohibited accomplices from testifying on behalf of
the defense. Id. at 16–17. The Supreme Court explained that Texas’s rule “arbitrarily denied
[Washington] the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of
testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense.” Id. at 23. Because criminal defendants have the right to
present their own “version of the facts,” including the “right to present [their] own witnesses to
establish a defense,” the Court held that Texas’s rule unconstitutionally denied Washington a fair
trial. Id. at 19.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 14
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
Leon Chambers was charged with murder, but no physical evidence tied him to the crime.
Id. at 287, 289. Another man, Gable McDonald, confessed to the murder on four occasions and
was arrested, but he later repudiated the confession. Id. at 287–88. At trial, Chambers tried to
show that it was McDonald who had committed the murder. Id. at 289. One witness testified
that he saw McDonald shoot the victim, and another witness testified that he saw McDonald
immediately after the shooting with a gun in his hand. Id. A third witness testified that he was
with Chambers during the shooting and did not see him holding a firearm. Id. Chambers called
McDonald to testify, but he again repudiated his confession. Id. at 291. Due to a state rule of
evidence, the trial court prevented Chambers from treating McDonald as an adverse witness and
from impeaching his testimony. Id. Chambers was also prohibited from calling other witnesses
to testify that they heard McDonald’s confession. Id. at 292.
The Court overturned Chambers’s conviction, explaining that by excluding evidence
“critical to Chambers’ defense,” the trial court “denied him a trial in accord with traditional and
fundamental standards of due process.” Id. at 302. (“Few rights are more fundamental than that
of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”). Notably, Chambers had competent
counsel and called several strong eyewitnesses to support his alternate-suspect theory—including
one who saw McDonald shoot the victim and another who saw him holding a gun—but the Court
still held that Chambers was entitled to a new trial because he was denied the opportunity to
present a complete defense.
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964)
Sidney Ungar was charged with criminal contempt after giving witness testimony, and
the court scheduled his contempt hearing roughly three weeks later. Id. at 580–81. On the day
of the hearing, Ungar requested a continuance because he had hired a new lawyer five days
earlier who was unfamiliar with the facts of the case. Id. at 590. The trial court rejected Ungar’s
request. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the denial of a continuance did not violate
due process because the facts of the case were very simple—implicating only a single sentence
of Ungar’s testimony. Id. However, the court explained that, in a more complicated case, “a
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 15
myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render
the right to defend with counsel an empty formality.” Id. at 589.8 Accordingly, a court may not
arbitrarily deny a defendant’s request to delay trial when it impedes the right to a fair trial.
O’Neal v. Balcarcel, 933 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2019)
Tyson O’Neal was charged with second-degree murder. Id. at 620. At trial, O’Neal
attempted to argue that another man, Parish Hickman, shot the victim. Id. However, the trial
court excluded two statements supporting defendant’s theory: (1) a jailhouse confession that
Hickman made to another inmate and (2) the victim’s dying declaration to a police officer
identifying Hickman as the shooter. Id. at 622. The trial court excluded both statements—the
first because it was not timely disclosed to the prosecution and the second because it was
hearsay. Id. Because the excluded evidence was critical to O’Neal’s defense, a panel of this
court granted habeas relief on the grounds that the trial court acted contrary to the Supreme
Court’s precedent in Chambers and this violation was not harmless under the “grave doubt”
standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Id. at 628.
Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469 (6th Cir. 2007)
Robert Ferensic was tried on charges related to armed robbery and home invasion. Id. at
470. The entirety of the direct evidence against Ferensic consisted of two eyewitness
identifications made by the victimized couple. Id. Ferensic intended to call two witnesses in his
defense, but the trial court barred them from testifying. Id. at 471. The first would have
testified that he saw the two culprits right before the crime and that Ferensic did not resemble
either one. Id. The second witness, an expert on eyewitness identifications, would have testified
about the potential unreliability of victim identifications. Id. at 471–72. Because the
eyewitnesses’ identifications were the strongest evidence against Ferensic, the panel concluded
8
Chandler v. Fretag is one such case where the denial of a continuance violated due process. 348 U.S. 3
(1954). There, a defendant originally waived his right to counsel, but then changed his mind once he learned he
would be charged as a habitual offender. Id. at 4–5. The defendant requested a continuance so that he would have
time to find new counsel, but the trial court denied the request. Id. The Court held that the denial violated due
process. Id. at 10 (“A necessary corollary [of the right to counsel] is that a defendant must be given a reasonable
opportunity to employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little
worth.”).
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 16
that the most important issue at trial was whether the identifications were accurate. Id. at 475–
80. But the trial court’s exclusions significantly undermined Ferensic’s ability to cast doubt on
the identifications. Id. Relying on Chambers, Washington, and other relevant Supreme Court
precedents, the panel concluded that the state court acted contrary to clearly established federal
law in denying Ferensic a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Id.
2. Chandler’s Defense
Other than A.C.’s testimony, there was no direct evidence supporting the charges against
Chandler. Accordingly, the decisive issue at trial was the reliability of A.C.’s testimony, and
Chandler’s defense hinged on challenging her credibility. Chandler attempted to present a
complete defense. Before trial, Chandler repeatedly requested an adjournment—both to obtain
crucial documents, like Judge Feeney’s order discussing A.C.’s credibility, and to give his
counsel sufficient time to read through last-minute discovery. Chandler intended to call more
than twenty witnesses at trial—including A.C.’s previous foster parents and foster-care
workers—who would have discussed A.C.’s history of false allegations. The defense also
secured an expert, who would have testified about false allegations of child sexual abuse and
explained how the investigators’ interviewing methods may have been faulty. However, the trial
court hampered Chandler’s efforts on all fronts, preventing him from challenging A.C.’s
credibility in any meaningful way. When A.C. denied ever having made false allegation on
cross-examination, the trial court told Chandler he was “stuck” with her answers and could not
challenge them with contradicting evidence. R. 9-3, PID 258. Chandler repeatedly asked the
trial court to reconsider the exclusion of his witnesses, but the court refused to permit any
witnesses not “endorsed by the prosecution,” R. 9-4, PID 339.
States have “broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence
from criminal trials,” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998), but the state appellate
court here concluded that the trial court violated the state’s rules by improperly excluding
evidence, barring witness testimony, and refusing to delay the trial, Chandler, 2017 WL
6502801, at *3–4. Accordingly, we begin with the premise that the trial court’s rulings were not
justified by any of the state’s evidentiary or procedural rules.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 17
The State argues that we should afford no deference to a state court’s “pro-petitioner”
resolution of an issue, citing Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 740 (6th Cir. 2007). The State
misreads Daniels, a case in which the state court considered the defendant’s constitutional
challenge hypothetically. Id. at 739–40. The state court did not decide the constitutional issue
on the merits, nor did it make any evidentiary rulings that were decisive in the case. Id. A panel
of this court reviewed the constitutional issue de novo because AEDPA deference “applies only
to claims ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,’ and the standard of review it
mandates depends on an assessment of an actual decision made by the state court.” Id. at 740
(quoting Eddleman v. McKee, 471 F.3d 576, 583 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006)). By contrast, the state
court’s holdings in Chandler’s case were not hypothetical—they were adjudications on the
merits. Accordingly, we accept the state court’s holdings that the trial court repeatedly abused
its discretion by violating the state’s evidentiary and procedural rules.
But even if the trial court’s actions were sanctioned by state rules, at least some of its
rulings would not have withstood constitutional scrutiny. A trial court “abridge[s] an accused’s
right to present a defense” when its exclusion of evidence is “‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to
the purposes . . . serve[d].’” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
56 (1987)). Exclusion of evidence is “unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only
where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.” Id. Accordingly, reviewing
courts are required to apply a proportionality test, carefully balancing the state’s interests in
exclusion against the “weighty interests” of the defendant. Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 476–77
(quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308). However, excluding evidence is an excessive penalty in
most cases where there is a discovery violation. See Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152
(1991) (holding that, “in most cases,” exclusion would be unnecessary because “alternative
sanctions would be ‘adequate and appropriate’” (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 413
(1988)). Accordingly, excluding evidence in response to a discovery violation is appropriate
“only [in] egregious violations involving, for example, ‘willful misconduct’ on the part of the
defendant or his counsel.’” Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 476 (quoting Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152). In order
words, “the exclusion of a defendant’s evidence should be reserved for only those circumstances
where ‘a less severe penalty would perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the State and the
harm to the adversary process.’” Id. (quoting Lucas, 500 U.S. at 152).
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 18
Here, much of Chandler’s evidence was purportedly excluded due to violations of
discovery rules—for failing to disclose the names of witnesses ahead of trial. These late
disclosures were not the result of willful misconduct or other bad-faith reasons; they occurred
because Chandler continued to receive discovery until right before his trial. Thus, the trial
court’s sanctions were likely inappropriate and disproportionate under the Supreme Court’s case
law because of the weighty interests Chandler had at stake.
Although the state court of appeals chastised the trial court for its procedural and
evidentiary errors, it rejected Chandler’s constitutional claim on two bases.
First, the court concluded that Chandler had a fair trial because he was represented by
counsel. Chandler, 2017 WL 6502801, at *4 n.3. To be sure, denying Chandler counsel would
have been unconstitutional, but the mere presence of counsel does not necessarily make a trial
constitutionally adequate. Indeed, each of the defendants in Chambers, Washington, and
Ferensic had counsel at trial—but the mere presence of competent counsel was insufficient to
render their trials fair. Thus, as this court has recognized, the Supreme Court’s case law clearly
establishes that Chandler’s claim may not be defeated on the basis that he was represented by
counsel at trial.
Second, the state court determined that Chandler had a fair trial because defense counsel
“presented defendant’s argument that the victim fabricated the allegations against defendant.”
Id. It is true that defense counsel tried to present Chandler’s side of the story through cross-
examination—by suggesting that A.C. had a history of false allegations and had a motive to
accuse Chandler of abuse. But at every step, the trial court prevented Chandler from producing
any evidentiary support for his position, making his defense appear unsubstantiated and perhaps
even manufactured. And from the outset, the trial court clearly indicated that that it believed
Chandler’s defense to be baseless, telling him: “You’re trying to base a defense here on the fact
that, well, she’s lied about all these other things, so that’s my defense for the jury. She’s lying
about this. You can argue that if there’s a basis to argue that, but there isn’t at this point.” R. 9-
3, PID 258.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 19
Chambers, Washington, and O’Neal make clear, however, that simply allowing a
defendant to raise a defense—even with some evidentiary support—is not always sufficient to
ensure a fair trial. In Chambers, for example, eyewitnesses confirmed the defendant’s alibi and
testified that McDonald was the shooter. 410 U.S. at 288–89. In Washington, the defendant
testified on his own behalf that the accomplice was the actual shooter—testimony that was
strengthened by the fact that the accomplice was already convicted of the murder. 388 U.S. at
16. And in O’Neal, where a panel of this court relied on Chambers to grant habeas relief, the
defense successfully called several crucial witnesses—one to confirm the defendant’s alibi, a
second who witnessed Hickman shoot the victim, and a third who heard the victim’s dying
declaration identifying Hickman as the shooter. 933 F.3d at 621–22. Still, in each case, the
defendant was denied his right to present a complete defense because the trial court excluded
“critical evidence” implicating “constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of
guilt.” Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
Chandler’s right to present a complete defense was clearly circumscribed even more
severely than in Chambers, Washington, and O’Neal. Unlike in those cases, the trial court
barred Chandler from calling any witnesses or introducing any evidence on the most critical
element of his defense—whether A.C.’s testimony was credible given her history of false
allegations. Thus, the state appellate court unreasonably applied the Supreme Court’s governing
principles to Chandler’s case and improperly denied his constitutional claim.9 See Williams,
529 U.S. at 413.
The State’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
a. Prior Precedent
The State first argues that Chambers and Washington do not govern Chandler’s case
because they are distinguishable. In Chambers and Washington, the court wrongly excluded
evidence showing that another person had committed the charged crime. By contrast, the
evidence in Chandler’s case concerned the credibility of the accuser, and there is no precise
9
Because Chandler’s rights were violated by the trial court’s exclusion of Chandler’s witnesses and
evidence, we do not decide whether its refusal to delay trial also constituted a constitutional violation.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 20
Supreme Court precedent holding that “the right to present a defense is violated if witnesses are
precluded from testifying about an accuser’s past conduct consistent with a common plan or
scheme.” Appellee’s Brief at 34. But, as Chandler correctly points out, the State’s argument is
better suited to a qualified-immunity analysis, where the “contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear” to put state actors on notice. Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir.
2015).
By contrast, AEDPA does not require an “identical factual pattern before a legal rule
must be applied.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007)). To the contrary, AEDPA assumes that “[c]ertain principles are
fundamental enough” to apply to “new factual permutations.”10 Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 666;
see also Woodall, 572 U.S. at 427 (“[S]tate courts must reasonably apply the rules ‘squarely
established’ by this Court’s holdings to the facts of each case.” (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance,
556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009))). Thus, the State may not defeat Chandler’s constitutional claim
simply because it is premised on new facts. Rather, the State must show that the fundamental
principles of the right to present a complete defense that the Supreme Court applied in Chambers
and Washington apply differently (or not at all) to Chandler’s case. As we explained above,
however, the State is unable to make this showing because the fundamental principle established
in Chambers, Washington, and their progeny—that a defendant has the right to present a
complete defense—applies with force in Chandler’s case.
b. Duplicative Evidence
The State next argues that Chandler had a fair opportunity to present a defense because
the trial court excluded only duplicative or marginal evidence.11 For support, the State cites
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), a case that clarified Chambers’s holding that a
constitutional violation occurs when a trial court “significantly undermine[s] the fundamental
10
In Ferensic, for example, the panel granted habeas relief even though the trial court did not exclude
evidence of a confession, like in Chambers and Washington, but rather evidence undermining the veracity of the
victims’ identifications. Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 475–80.
11
Below, we discuss in detail why the evidence excluded in Chandler’s trial was neither duplicative nor
marginal. See infra, Part III(C)(1). That analysis is equally applicable here.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 21
elements of the defendant’s defense.” Id. at 315. In Scheffer, the court-martialed defendant was
prohibited from admitting polygraph evidence to bolster his own credibility, but he was allowed
to introduce other factual evidence. Id. at 306, 317. The Court concluded that because the
“court members heard all the relevant details of the charged offense from the perspective of the
accused,” the exclusion of the polygraph did not “implicate any significant interest of the
accused.” Id. at 316–17. The State argues that, like in Scheffer, the jury had the opportunity to
hear Chandler’s side of the story.
However, Scheffer differs from this case in important ways. Crucially, the Scheffer court
excluded only a single piece of evidence, and it had a good reason to do so: polygraph evidence
is of questionable reliability. Id. at 306–07, 312 (“Although the degree of reliability of
polygraph evidence may depend upon a variety of identifiable factors, there is simply no way to
know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain
doubts and uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams.”). Aside from a single piece of
potentially unreliable evidence, Scheffer still presented the rest of his defense. Id. at 317. By
contrast, the trial court here rushed Chandler to trial, prohibited him from calling any witnesses,
and curtailed his ability to acquire and present key evidence. And unlike the polygraph ban in
Scheffer, there was no sound rationale to justify the trial court’s actions. See Chandler, 2017 WL
6502801, at *3–4. Thus, the trial court hindered Chandler’s defense far more significantly than
in Scheffer.
The question at this stage is not whether Chandler was able to make some of his
arguments, but whether the trial court “significantly undermined [the] fundamental elements of
[his] defense.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 315. Here, there was no physical evidence to support the
allegations against Chandler, so A.C.’s testimony was indispensable to his conviction. The trial
court, however, “significantly undermined” Chandler’s ability to present evidence casting doubt
on her credibility. Id. Chandler’s constitutional claim cannot be defeated simply because the
prosecution’s witnesses may have made a few helpful admissions during cross-examination, all
of which Chandler was barred from supporting with evidence of his own. Ultimately, the trial
court allowed the prosecution to present its side of the story but prevented Chandler from doing
the same.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 22
III. Eligibility for Relief
A. Standard of Review
In this circuit we “always” apply Brecht’s “actual prejudice” test in habeas proceedings
to assess whether constitutional errors are prejudicial. O’Neal, 933 F.3d at 625. Additionally,
we apply the AEDPA standard to a state court’s “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”
assessment of constitutional errors pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
See Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 127 (2022). But we can do so only when the state court
actually conducted a Chapman analysis. Here, because the state court concluded that no
constitutional error occurred in the first place, it never applied Chapman to Chandler’s case. See
Chandler, 2017 WL 6502801, at *4 n.3. Instead, the state court assessed the trial court’s errors
under the state’s more forgiving test for non-constitutional errors. Chandler, 2017 WL 6502801,
at *4. Under that test, the state court could overturn Chandler’s conviction only if “it
affirmatively appear[ed] that it [was] more probable than not that the error was outcome
determinative.” Id. (quoting King, 824 N.W.2d at 262). Because we are conducting habeas
review of a state-court decision that lacked any analysis under Chapman, we analyze Chandler’s
eligibility for relief under the Brecht test alone. See Davenport, 596 U.S. at 138.
Under Brecht, Chandler is entitled to relief if we have “grave doubt[,] not absolute
certainty,” Davenport, 596 U.S. at 135, “about whether a trial error of federal law had substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257,
267–68 (2015) (quoting O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)), see also McAninch,
513 U.S. at 436 (“When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a
trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless. And, the petitioner must win.”). If, “in the judge’s
mind, the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the
harmlessness of the error,” then there is “grave doubt” about whether the error affected the jury’s
verdict. McAninch, 513 U.S. at 435; see also Davenport, 596 U.S. at 136 (“[W]here AEDPA
asks whether every fairminded jurist would agree that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only
whether a federal habeas court itself harbors grave doubt about the petitioner’s verdict.”).
“[P]rosecutors bear the burden of proof” to show that a constitutional error did not have a
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 23
substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. Stoner v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209, 213 (6th
Cir. 1993); see also Jaradat v. Williams, 591 F.3d 863, 869 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Under the Brecht
standard, the Government has the burden of showing that the error was harmless.”).12
In applying Brecht, we consider “the whole body of law”—including lower-court cases—
to determine whether an error was prejudicial. Davenport, 596 U.S. at 136. And in determining
whether the jury’s deliberation was affected by the error, we review the entire record de novo.
See Jaradat, 591 F.3d at 869 (“The analysis should result from ‘examination of the proceedings
in their entirety.’” (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762 (1946))). The impact
of the trial court’s errors depends in part on the strength of the evidence supporting a conviction.
Thus, “a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251,
260 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696).
B. Grave Doubt
Ferensic’s facts are very similar to those here. See Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 470. In
Ferensic, the only direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt was the identifications made by the
victimized couple. Id. The defense intended to undermine the veracity of the identifications by
calling two witnesses, but the trial court barred both from testifying. Id. at 471. The first would
have testified that he saw the two culprits on the night of the crime, and that Ferensic resembled
neither one; and the second would have testified about the potential unreliability of victim
identifications. Id. A panel of this court had grave doubt as to whether the errors affected the
jury’s verdict because, without the excluded witnesses, “the jury had no basis beyond defense
counsel’s word to suspect the inherent unreliability of the [victims’] identifications.” Id. at 482.
Likewise, the central evidence of Chandler’s guilt came from the testimony of the alleged
victim, A.C. As a result, the jury’s verdict likely hinged on the truthfulness of A.C.’s testimony.
12
“[B]ecause ‘[t]he prejudice inquiry is not the same as the sufficiency of the evidence analysis,’”
a petitioner cannot be denied relief simply because there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Ferensic,
501 F.3d at 474 (quoting Richey v. Mitchell, 395 F.3d 660, 687 (6th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by
Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (2005)). We are thus prohibited “from simply focusing on the sufficiency of the
evidence, especially where it entails ‘stripping the erroneous action from the whole’ and determining the sufficiency
of what is left ‘standing alone.’” Id. at 483 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 24
However, the trial court prohibited Chandler from introducing evidence that may have cast
reasonable doubt on the reliability of her testimony. In particular, the trial court prevented the
jury from considering the following evidence: (1) CPS records detailing at least eight
purportedly false allegations that A.C. had made previously, including false allegations of sexual
abuse, see supra; (2) testimony from three sets of foster parents—the Hamblins, Nickersons, and
Lamberts—who would have discussed A.C.’s prior false allegations; (3) records from another
proceeding where Judge Feeney concluded that A.C. had problems with lying and making false
accusations; (4) testimony from five foster care workers who had worked with A.C. in the past,
all of whom were charged with protecting A.C.’s best interests and still had authored reports
detailing her prior false allegations; (5) expert testimony that investigators’ interviewing
procedures were faulty, potentially rendering the results unreliable; and (6) expert testimony that
it is a “red flag” when a child adds additional details to a story years later, R. 9-10, PID 770. As
a result of the trial court’s rulings, the jury had almost “no basis beyond defense counsel’s word
to suspect the inherent unreliability” of A.C.’s allegations.13 Ferensic, 501 F.3d at 482.
Weighing the evidence of A.C.’s past allegations against the limited direct evidence
supporting Chandler’s conviction, we have grave doubt about the verdict because we think that
the excluded evidence could have introduced reasonable doubt into a juror’s mind. See O’Neal,
933 F.3d at 625.
C. The State’s Arguments
The State argues that any error was harmless because (1) the excluded testimony was
largely duplicative of testimony given by the prosecution’s witnesses and (2) there was
overwhelming evidence to convict Chandler. Neither of these arguments alleviates our grave
doubt about whether the trial court’s errors were harmless.
13
The only evidence the jury heard of A.C.’s potential unreliability was the fact that her testimony at trial
differed from the accounts she gave investigators in two prior interviews.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 25
1. Duplicative
The State first argues that the trial court’s errors did not affect the jury’s verdict because
the excluded evidence was duplicative of other trial testimony. This argument fails for two
reasons.
First and foremost, duplicative evidence may strengthen rather than weaken a petitioner’s
argument that he was prejudiced by a trial court’s error. For example, the trial court in O’Neal
unconstitutionally excluded testimony supporting the defendant’s argument that Hickman shot
the victim. 933 F.3d at 627. The Warden in O’Neal argued that the trial court’s errors were not
prejudicial because other witnesses gave similar testimony and because O’Neal had the
opportunity to cross-examine Hickman. Id. A panel of this court disagreed, explaining that
“testimony that mirrors the content of other testimony . . . can still have considerable impact by
bolstering the credibility of the other testimony.” Id. In O’Neal, the purportedly duplicative
evidence “could have been the straw that broke the camel’s back in establishing a reasonable
doubt as to [the defendant’s] guilt.” Id. The panel also rejected the Warden’s argument that
cross-examination could cure any potential prejudice, explaining that O’Neal’s ability to
impeach witnesses was significantly weaker without the excluded evidence. Id. at 628. Because
O’Neal’s logic applies with the same force to Chandler’s case, we reject the State’s assertion that
Chandler was not prejudiced simply because the excluded evidence was duplicative or because
he had the opportunity to cross-examine A.C.
But even if duplicative evidence were somehow less consequential, the State’s argument
would fail because most of the excluded evidence was not duplicative. For example, the State
argues that evidence of A.C.’s allegations would have been duplicative at trial because (1) a CPS
investigator testified that she was aware that A.C. “had made prior allegations of physical abuse,
not of sexual abuse,” and (2) A.C. admitted on cross-examination that she had made two
allegations against the Hamblins. R. 9-4, PID 333. However, Chandler was not just trying to
show that A.C. made allegations in the past, but also that the allegations were false. Although a
CPS investigator testified that she was aware that A.C. had previously made allegations of
physical abuse, she did not acknowledge that the allegations were false. Similarly, although
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 26
A.C. acknowledged that she made two allegations against the Hamblins, she testified that both
were true. Accordingly, the jury heard no evidence that A.C. previously made false allegations.
Had the Hamblins testified, they would have identified specific false allegations that A.C.
made. For example, A.C. had alleged that the Hamblins’ dog had attacked her. But when A.C.
made this allegation to her counselor, she had no visible bitemarks. Sandy would have testified
that, when the counselor confronted A.C., she “giggled, admitted that she lied,” and said, “it’s
fun to lie.” R. 9-9, PID 437. The Hamblins would have directly contradicted A.C.’s testimony
that she never falsely accused prior foster parents of misconduct. Had Chandler obtained a copy
of Judge Feeney’s records in time for trial, the jury would have seen a probate court’s factual
findings that A.C. had made false accusations in the past and knew how to “manipulate the
system.” R. 9-10, PID 578. And if the foster-care workers were permitted to testify, they would
have discussed A.C.’s history of false allegations. Contrary to the State’s argument, this
evidence would not have been duplicative, but would have been critical to the jury’s
consideration of whether A.C.’s testimony was credible.
The State also argues that the testimony of Kieliszewski, Chandler’s expert, would have
mirrored Cottrell’s, the prosecution’s expert. Kieliszewski would have testified that because
memories typically degrade rather than strengthen, remembering memories in greater detail over
time is a “red flag.” R. 9-9, PID 443. But Cottrell testified during cross-examination that
memories generally “degrade” and that people, “particularly young children,” could theoretically
come to believe a story that was originally told as a lie. R. 9-5, PID 371. And although
Kieliszewski would have discussed RAD, Cottrell answered basic questions about the condition
during cross-examination.
However, notwithstanding this overlap, the experts differed in important ways. Although
the prosecution’s expert admitted that it is possible for memories to degrade, his testimony was
used to advance the argument that memories can become “enriched” as a survivor of assault
recounts them repeatedly. R. 9-5, PID 370. The defense expert, by contrast, would have
testified that it is a “red flag” for memories to strengthen or change over time because it could
indicate that “the alleged victim [has] been coached” or that “they decided to add more to their
story because there’s some type of reinforcement they’re getting.” R. 9-10, PID 770.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 27
Kieliszewski would also have testified that this concern is particularly heightened when a victim
is re-interviewed several times over the course of years, as occurred with A.C., because
“confabulation” could occur with each retelling—where a person may subconsciously fill in the
blanks of the memory. R. 9-9, PID 442.
Additionally, Kieliszewski planned to testify about the best practices for conducting
forensic interviews with potential victims of child sexual assault, a topic Cottrell did not discuss.
The protocols “highly discourage” allowing a support person at an interview because it could
affect an interviewee’s answers, but the investigators allowed A.C.’s adoptive mother to sit next
to her for the interview. R. 9-9, PID 442. The guidelines also recommend recording forensic
interviews, because an investigator’s notes are frequently insufficient to describe an interview
comprehensively. The investigator’s report for A.C.’s final interview was just 1.5 pages long,
which Kieliszewski said was “quite short” for a ninety-minute interview. Id. Kieliszewski
would have also testified that forensic interviews should occur “early after the allegations occur”
because they are considered the most reliable. Id. But here, A.C.’s final interview took place
years after she made the allegations and differed greatly from her original account.14
As for the RAD-related testimony, the State is correct that the two experts gave
overlapping accounts of the condition, which causes children to resist forming bonds with other
people. But the testimony about RAD lost its value because the trial court excluded so much
other relevant evidence. Chandler attempted to show that A.C. had a motive for making false
accusations in the past—she wanted to be removed from each foster family and returned to her
biological parents. By explaining the symptoms of RAD, combined with A.C.’s history of
making false accusations, Chandler intended to show that A.C.’s accusation was motivated by a
desire to avoid adoption and be removed from foster care. Had the trial court allowed the other
evidence in, the RAD-related testimony would have played a more significant role.
14
Kieliszewski would have also explained that the guidelines require interviewers to ask questions in a
neutral way and to test several different hypotheses with a child interviewee. The purpose of the alternative-
hypothesis testing is to avoid bias and to pinpoint the source of potentially unreliable memories—for example, if the
allegation is based on something the child saw in a dream or a movie. In the context of child sexual abuse, an
interviewer could ask the child about whether the abuse occurred in various environments or whether different
people were responsible. By testing alternative hypotheses, investigators can better identify sources of potentially
inaccurate memories. Here, A.C.’s interviewers may not have followed the alternate-hypothesis protocol, and
Kieliszewski’s testimony would have highlighted concerns about the inconsistency of A.C.’s repeated retellings.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 28
In sum, most of the evidence that the trial court erroneously excluded was not
duplicative. Combined with the fact that A.C.’s account changed with each new retelling, we
have grave doubt about whether the jury would have convicted Chandler had Chandler been able
to present his excluded evidence.
2. Overwhelming Evidence
Finally, the State argues that there was overwhelming evidence of Chandler’s guilt.
Three of Chandler’s other alleged victims testified: (1) Chandler’s sister Norma, who alleged that
he molested her nearly fifty years prior when they were both children, (2) Z.B.—Stephanie and
Lou Jr.’s eight-year-old daughter—who testified that Chandler abused her once or twice each
time he saw her, and (3) Harden—Stephanie’s best friend—who testified that Chandler used a
“quick swipe” to clean sand “just outside of . . . the genital area” when she was young. R. 9-4,
PID 337. Darlene also testified that she once saw Chandler touch A.C.’s leg in a way that
“didn’t look right.” R. 9-5, PID 379. Finally, the Chandlers’ family computer contained a
written story of child sexual abuse.
However, a juror could reasonably doubt the strength or relevance of this circumstantial
evidence after considering the excluded evidence challenging A.C. and others’ credibility. The
abuse Norma alleges would have occurred when she and Chandler were children. Harden’s
allegation was that Chandler cleaned sand off her, potentially in an inappropriate way, but not
that he touched her in the same way as A.C. As for Z.B., her parents were in the middle of a
family dispute with Chandler and Darlene. Chandler contends that Lou Jr. was trying to use his
parent’s land to begin a marijuana-grow operation and had threatened to kill his mother.
Chandler claims that, because of the prosecution, which was triggered by Z.B.’s allegations, he
was forced to sell his land. Thus, Chandler argues that Lou Jr. and Stephanie had a motive to
urge their daughter to testify against him. Further, one of the witnesses the trial court excluded
was Amanda Fraly, who assertedly would have testified that Lou Jr. had pressured her and others
to make false allegations against Chandler. And Z.B.’s testimony, like A.C.’s, was inconsistent
with the account she gave at an earlier date.
No. 23-1270 Chandler v. Brown Page 29
The evidence from the Chandlers’ computer is alarming, but Darlene testified that
pornography popped up randomly while she used the computer. Darlene also pointed out that
the computer was shared with the couple’s teenage sons, including one who had a history of
looking at “real[ly] bad stuff.” R. 9-5, PID 380.
Although the evidence the State cites could support Chandler’s conviction, this is not a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence case. As a result, we are “prohibit[ed]” from “focusing on the
sufficiency of the evidence, especially where it entails ‘stripping the erroneous action from the
whole’ and determining the sufficiency of what is left ‘standing alone.’” Ferensic, 501 F.3d at
483 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765). Instead, to determine whether the constitutional errors
had a “substantial and injurious” effect on Candler’s verdict, we must use a “wider lens” to
“ponder[] all that happened” at trial. Id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765). The paucity of
direct evidence inculpating Chandler on this record, coupled with the considerable excluded
evidence casting serious doubt on A.C.’s credibility leaves us with grave doubt about whether
Chandler’s verdict was affected by the trial court’s errors.
IV. Conclusion
We REVERSE the district court, conditionally GRANT Chandler’s habeas corpus
petition, and REMAND to the district court with instructions to order Chandler’s release from
custody unless the State of Michigan grants him a new trial within ninety days.