The opinion
2025 IL 130509
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 130509)
CANDICE MARTIN, Appellee, v. GOODRICH CORPORATION et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed January 24, 2025.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford,
and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case requires us to construe sections 1(f) and 1.1 of the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1(f), 1.1 (West 2022)) regarding a
wrongful-death and survival action. Specifically, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified three related questions of state law to this
court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). Martin v.
Goodrich Corp., 95 F.4th 475 (7th Cir. 2024). Those questions are:
(1) Is the period referenced in section 1(f) a “period of repose or repose
provision” for purposes of the exception provided in section 1.1?
(2) If section 1(f) falls within the section 1.1 exception, what is its temporal
reach—either by its own terms or through section 4 of the Statute on Statutes
(5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2022))?
(3) Would the application of the exception in section 1.1 to past conduct
offend Illinois’s due process guarantee?
We accepted these certified questions, and for the following reasons, we answer the
first question in the affirmative, find the exception in section 1.1 applies
prospectively under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes, and as such, find it does
not violate Illinois’s due process guarantee.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 The facts of this case, as provided by the Seventh Circuit in its certification
ruling and the district court in its order, are as follows. Rodney Martin worked for
B.F. Goodrich Company (Goodrich) from 1966 to 2012, when he retired. Martin,
95 F.4th at 480-81. During his employment, Rodney was exposed to vinyl chloride
monomer and products containing vinyl chloride until 1974. Id. at 481. These
chemicals are alleged to be known causes of angiosarcoma of the liver. Id. at 480.
On December 11, 2019, Rodney was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver, and
he died on July 9, 2020. Rodney’s widow, Candice Martin, filed a civil action in
November 2021 and amended her complaint on July 1, 2022. In her amended
complaint, Martin asserted a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act (740
ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2022)) and the Survival Act (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West
2022)), alleging Rodney’s occupational exposure to hazardous levels of vinyl
chloride monomer caused his illness and death. Martin named Goodrich as
defendant, along with PolyOne, as a successor-in-interest to Goodrich. Because
Martin filed a civil suit outside the compensation system provided under the
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2022)), she
invoked the exception in section 1.1 of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act
(id. § 1.1) to avoid its exclusivity provisions for work-related exposures to
hazardous materials. Martin, 95 F.4th at 481.
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¶4 In response, PolyOne filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
while Goodrich filed a motion to dismiss under the exclusivity provisions. Id.
Goodrich argued the exception in section 1.1 did not apply because section 1(f)
(820 ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2022)) was not a statute of repose and section 6(c) (id.
§ 6(c)) did not bar Martin’s claim. Martin, 95 F.4th at 481. In the alternative,
Goodrich argued that using section 1.1 to revive Martin’s claim would infringe its
due process rights under the Illinois Constitution. Id.
¶5 The district court denied these motions. Id. Goodrich asked the court to certify
two legal questions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Id. The district court then certified two questions for interlocutory appeal:
(1) whether section 1(f) is an applicable statute of repose for purposes of section
1.1, and (2) if so, whether applying section 1.1 to allow plaintiff’s civil case to
proceed would violate Illinois’s constitutional substantive due process. The
Seventh Circuit agreed to take the appeal. Id.
¶6 After reviewing the statutory provisions of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases
Act, the Seventh Circuit found, “[g]iven the number of cases where this roadmap
will chart the course for courts and litigants—plus Illinois’s policy interests in its
contours—we find each question fit for certification” to this court. Id. The Seventh
Circuit thus certified the questions from the district court and added an additional
question asking, if section 1(f) falls within the section 1.1 exception, what is its
temporal reach—either by its own terms or through section 4 of the Statute of
Statutes? Id. at 483.
¶7 This court accepted the certified questions pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). Because the due process question concerns the
constitutionality of section 1.1, the Attorney General filed a motion for leave to
intervene as an appellee, which we allowed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(c) (eff. Sept. 1,
2006).
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 As stated, the Seventh Circuit certified three questions to this court. First, the
court asked whether the period referenced in section 1(f) of the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act is a “ ‘period of repose or repose provision’ ” for
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purposes of the exception provided in section 1.1. Martin, 95 F.4th at 482 (quoting
820 ILCS 310/1.1 (West 2022)). Second, the court asked, if section 1(f) falls within
the section 1.1 exception, what is its temporal reach—either by its own terms or
through section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Id. at 483. Third, the court asked
whether the application of the exception in section 1.1 to past conduct offends
Illinois’s guarantee of due process. Id. at 484. We answer each question in turn.
¶ 10 A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 Certified questions are questions of law that this court reviews de novo. Moore
v. Chicago Park District, 2012 IL 112788, ¶ 9. To answer the questions before us,
we are asked to interpret the related provisions of the Workers’ Occupational
Diseases Act, which we do under de novo review. Accettura v. Vacationland, Inc.,
2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11 (“The standard of review for questions of statutory
interpretation is de novo.”). The constitutionality of a statute is also reviewed
de novo. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada v. Manna, 227 Ill. 2d 128, 136 (2007).
Generally, the scope of our review is limited to the certified question. Moore, 2012
IL 112788, ¶ 9. “Certified questions must not seek an application of the law to the
facts of a specific case.” Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21.
¶ 12 B. Compensation for Employment-Related
Injuries and Diseases
¶ 13 The Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act was enacted to provide compensation
for diseases “arising out of and in the course of the employment or which [have]
become aggravated and rendered disabling as a result of the exposure of the
employment.” 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2022). In enacting the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act and the related Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS
305/1 et seq. (West 2022)), which provides financial protection for accidental
injuries arising out of, and in the course of, employment, the legislature “established
a new framework for recovery to replace the common-law rights and liabilities that
previously governed employee injuries.” Folta v. Ferro Engineering, 2015 IL
118070, ¶ 11. As a result of this statutory framework, when Illinois workers are
injured or are diagnosed with a disease in the course of their employment, they
receive compensation with the employer being liable on a no-fault basis. This
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compensatory system represents a “ ‘legislative balancing of rights, remedies, and
procedures that govern the disposition of employees’ work-related injuries.’ ” Id.
(quoting Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 44 (1994)).
¶ 14 As the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act allows an employee to receive
compensation for work-related illnesses and disease on an employer no-fault basis,
the statute places limits on an employee’s ability to seek compensation outside the
structure it establishes. See id. ¶¶ 12-13. There are two exclusivity provisions in the
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act that outline the terms of these limitations.
Under section 5(a),
“Except as provided in Section 1.1, there is no common law or statutory right
to recover compensation or damages from the employer, his insurer, his broker,
any service organization retained by the employer, his insurer or his broker to
provide safety service, advice or recommendations for the employer or the
agents or employees of any of them for or on account of any injury to health,
disease, or death therefrom, other than for the compensation herein provided or
for damages as provided in Section 3 of this Act.” 820 ILCS 310/5(a) (West
2022).
Similarly, under section 11,
“Except as provided in Section 1.1, the compensation herein provided for shall
be the full, complete and only measure of the liability of the employer bound
by election under this Act and such employer’s liability for compensation and
medical benefits under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all
other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to any employee
or his legal representative on account of damage, disability or death caused or
contributed to by any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the
employment.” Id. § 11.
¶ 15 A key part of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act is that employees are
also required to seek compensation within the applicable time frame provided under
sections 1(f) and 6(c), with the failure to do so resulting in a claim or compensation
being barred. Id. §§ 1(f), 6(c). The function of these sections is to extinguish the
employer’s liability for a work-related injury at some definite time. See Folta, 2015
IL 118070, ¶ 35. The reference to section 1.1 in sections 5(a) and 11 is relatively
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new and accounts for an exception the legislature added to the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act in 2019 (see Pub. Act 101-6, § 10 (eff. May 17, 2019)
(adding 820 ILCS 310/1.1)). The amendment to add section 1.1 came after this
court’s decision in Folta, and it addresses the concerns in that case that the
application of the statute of repose under section 6(c) led to a “harsh result” for the
employee. Folta, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 43. However, the amendment does not
explicitly state which provisions in the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act are
covered under section 1.1. The first certified question thus asks us to determine
whether section 1(f), like section 6(c), is a statute of repose under section 1.1. We
answer this question in the affirmative.
¶ 16 C. Section 1(f) Is a Period of Repose
¶ 17 In Folta, before the legislative amendment to add section 1.1, this court was
asked to determine whether an employee could bring a cause of action outside the
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act for a
work-related injury that first manifested after the expiration of certain time periods
under those acts. Id. ¶ 1. The plaintiff in Folta was exposed to asbestos during his
employment as a shipping clerk and product tester for the defendant. Id. ¶ 3. More
than 40 years after he ceased his employment with the defendant, plaintiff was
diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos exposure. Id. To
recover damages for the mesothelioma he alleged he developed due to his
employment, plaintiff filed a civil suit against multiple defendants, including his
former employer. Id. After the plaintiff passed away during the pendency of the
litigation, his widow continued the case and amended the complaint to include a
claim for wrongful death. Id. ¶ 5.
¶ 18 The defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Workers’ Occupational
Diseases Act. Id. ¶ 4. The plaintiff maintained that he could seek a civil action
despite the exclusivity provisions because his claim was not covered as his claims
were not “compensable” under those acts, where his symptoms of his injury did not
manifest until more than 40 years after his last exposure to asbestos. Id. He
discovered his asbestos-related injury long after the 25-year limitation provision in
section 6(c) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, which meant he could not
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be compensated under the statute and could instead file a civil action. Id. (citing
820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2010)). The circuit court found the plaintiff’s civil action
was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases
Act and the running of the limitations period did not render the cause of action
noncompensable. Id. ¶ 6. Thus, the court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id.
¶ 19 The appellate court reversed after concluding that the civil action could
continue because the plaintiff’s claim was not compensable under the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act because the
plaintiff had no ability to recover under the statute due to the time limitations. Id.
¶ 7. On appeal before this court, the question presented was “whether [the
exclusivity] provisions bar an employee’s cause of action against an employer to
recover damages for a disease resulting from asbestos exposure which arose out of
and in the course of employment even though no compensation is available under
those acts due to statutory time limits on the employer’s liability.” Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 20 To answer this question, we recognized that, under the exclusivity provisions
of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act,
these statutes provided the exclusive means by which an employee could recover
against an employer for work-related injuries except in four instances. Id. ¶ 14
(recognizing an “employee can escape the exclusivity provisions of the Act if the
employee establishes that the injury (1) was not accidental; (2) did not arise from
his employment; (3) was not received during the course of employment; or (4) was
not compensable under the Act” (citing Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill.
2d 455, 462 (1990), and Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill. 2d 229, 237
(1980))). We concluded that the plaintiff’s disease was the type of disease intended
to fall within the purview of the statute even though the plaintiff could not be
compensated due to the time limitations under the statutes. Id. ¶¶ 24, 34-36.
¶ 21 In arriving at this conclusion, we construed section 6(c) of the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act and determined that, based on its plain language, “this
provision acts as a statute of repose and creates an absolute bar on the right to bring
a claim.” Id. ¶ 33. We distinguished a statute of repose, which “extinguishes the
action after a defined period of time, regardless of when the action accrued,” from
a statute of limitations, “which determines the time within which a lawsuit may be
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brought after a cause of action has accrued.” Id. We further explained that a statute
of repose
“begins to run when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether an action has
accrued or whether any injury has resulted. [Citation.] Thus, the statute of
repose limit is not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need
not have occurred, much less have been discovered. [Citation.] The purpose of
a repose period is to terminate the possibility of liability after a defined period
of time. After the expiration of the repose period, there is no longer a recognized
right of action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 22 Given the definitive 25-year time period in the statute for bringing claims for
compensation for asbestos-related diseases, we concluded the plaintiff’s claim was
barred. Id. ¶ 34. “Although the statute barred [the plaintiff’s] claim before it had
yet accrued, that is the purpose of such a provision.” Id. We also found
consideration of section 1(f) would not lead to a different result. Id. ¶ 37.
¶ 23 We were not blind to the harsh result to the plaintiff in that case, who was
without relief through no fault of his own. However, we recognized that “whether
a different balance should be struck under the acts given the nature of the injury
and the current medical knowledge about asbestos exposure is a question more
appropriately addressed to the legislature. It is the province of the legislature to
draw the appropriate balance.” Id. ¶ 43.
¶ 24 In 2019, the legislature responded when it enacted section 1.1, which provides
that the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act
“do not apply to any injury or death resulting from an occupational disease as
to which the recovery of compensation benefits under this Act would be
precluded due to the operation of any period of repose or repose provision. As
to any such occupational disease, the employee, the employee’s heirs, and any
person having standing under the law to bring a civil action at law, including an
action for wrongful death and an action pursuant to Section 27-6 of the Probate
Act of 1975, has the nonwaivable right to bring such an action against any
employer or employers.” 820 ILCS 310/1.1 (West 2022).
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Under the plain language of this statute, when a statute of repose would operate to
bar an employee from seeking compensation under the Workers’ Occupational
Diseases Act based on an occupational disease, as it did in Folta, the employee
would be allowed to seek compensation by filing a civil action.
¶ 25 The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to
the legislature’s intent. Mosby v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 30.
The language of the statute is the best indication of legislative intent, and we give
that language its plain and ordinary meaning considered in light of other relevant
provisions of the statute. Id. We may also consider the reason for the law, the
problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences
of construing the statute one way or another. Id. ¶ 31. We therefore look to section
1(f) in conjunction with section 6(c) to determine if section 1(f) is a statute of
repose.
¶ 26 The plain language of section 1(f) provides:
“No compensation shall be payable for or on account of any occupational
disease unless disablement, as herein defined, occurs within two years after the
last day of the last exposure to the hazards of the disease, except in cases of
occupational disease caused by berylliosis or by the inhalation of silica dust or
asbestos dust and, in such cases, within 3 years after the last day of the last
exposure to the hazards of such disease and except in the case of occupational
disease caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment, and in such
case, within 25 years after the last day of last exposure to the hazards of such
disease.” 820 ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2022).
Compensation is not possible under section 1(f) unless an employee is disabled
within the applicable period of time. As noted above, we determined in Folta that
section 6(c), as a statute of repose, “extinguishes the action after a defined period
of time, regardless of when the action accrued.” Folta, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 33.
Unlike section 6(c), section 1(f) does not bar the right to file a claim after the
applicable time period passes. However, section 1(f) bars compensation after a
defined period of time regardless of whether a claim has accrued or injury has
resulted. The consequences for an employee who cannot receive compensation as
a result of the application of section 1(f) are similar to those for one whose claim is
barred under section 6(c). For purposes of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act,
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barring any compensation by application of section 1(f) effectively extinguishes an
employee’s right to file a claim under the statute.
¶ 27 Like section 6(c), the bar to compensation in section 1(f) does not relate to the
accrual of a cause of action. The time runs whether or not the employee has
discovered the injury or been diagnosed with a disease.
“A statute of repose gives effect to a policy different from that advanced by a
statute of limitations insofar as it is intended to terminate the possibility of
liability after a defined period of time, regardless of a potential plaintiff’s lack
of knowledge of his or her cause of action.” DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d
49, 61 (2006).
This policy is effectuated under section 1(f), which terminates the employer’s
compensatory liability after a period of time regardless of when the employee
discovers he has a claim. Therefore, by its plain language, section 1(f) is a statute
of repose.
¶ 28 We note that reading section 1(f) as a statute of repose is consistent with section
1.1’s reference to “any period of repose or repose provision.” 820 ILCS 310/1.1
(West 2022). Section 1.1 does not limit its application to periods of repose or repose
provisions under section 6(c). Presumably, as the legislature enacted section 1.1
after Folta and was aware of our discussion of section 6(c), it would have limited
section 1.1 to section 6(c) had that been its intention. See People v. Fort, 373 Ill.
App. 3d 882, 889 (2007) (“The legislature is presumed to know how courts have
interpreted a statute and may amend the statute if it intended a different
construction.”). We do not rewrite statutes to add provisions or limitations the
legislature did not include. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Workers’
Compensation Comm’n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 28. Because the General Assembly did
not limit the application of section 1.1 to section 6(c), we will not do so either. We
apply this section to all statutes of repose under the Workers’ Occupational
Diseases Act, which includes section 1(f).
¶ 29 Reading section 1(f) as a statute of repose is also consistent with findings by
some districts of our appellate court, which we find persuasive. In these cases,
section 1(f) is interpreted as a statute of repose because it is not subject to the
discovery rule, under which section 1(f) would begin to run only after the employee
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discovers his injury. See Dickerson v. Industrial Comm’n, 224 Ill. App. 3d 838, 841
(1991) (“[Section 1(f)] does not contain a discovery rule, and we refuse to read one
in because section 1(f) operates as a statute of repose rather than one of
limitations.”); see also Whitney v. Industrial Comm’n, 229 Ill. App. 3d 1076, 1078
(1992) (“Section 1(f) operates as a statute of repose rather than one of limitations,
and Illinois courts have not hesitated to apply repose provisions despite the
acknowledgement that an individual with a long latency disease may be barred from
recovery.”).
¶ 30 The question of whether section 1(f) is a statute of repose stems, in part, from
our statement in Folta that “section 1(f) has functioned as a temporal limitation on
the availability of compensation benefits and not as a basis to remove occupational
diseases from the purview of the Act.” Folta, 2015 IL 118070, ¶ 42. Defendants
argue that this statement means that section 1(f) differs from section 6(c) and, as a
temporal limitation, it is a condition precedent to recovery under the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act, not a statute of repose. Defendants cite appellate court
decisions supporting this argument. See Goodson v. Industrial Comm’n, 190 Ill.
App. 3d 16, 18 (1989); Plasters v. Industrial Comm’n, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6-8
(1993); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 263 Ill. App. 3d
478, 486 (1994); Docksteiner v. Industrial Comm’n, 346 Ill. App. 3d 851, 856
(2004). We find these cases distinguishable because of the questions involved.
Additionally, these cases were decided before our decision in Folta. As a result,
these cases refer to section 6(c) as a statute of limitations and distinguish it from
section 1(f), which they find to be a “condition precedent to recovery.” See, e.g.,
Plasters, 246 Ill. App. 3d at 7-8; Docksteiner, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 856.
¶ 31 We do agree with these cases that sections 6(c) and 1(f) should be read together
to effectuate the legislative intent. Having done so, we do not find the legislature
intended these sections to be read differently in terms of the application of the time
requirements to employee claims. Compliance with both sections is a condition
precedent to recovery, but this does not mean they are also not statutes of repose.
A condition precedent is something that must be done before something else can
happen. Under sections 1(f) and 6(c), before an employee can file a claim or receive
compensation, he must apply for compensation within the time period specified in
section 6(c) for occupational diseases that caused disablement within the time
period specified in section 1(f). Failure to satisfy either requirement extinguishes
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the employee’s claim and his ability to seek compensation. Therefore, both sections
are conditions precedent to recovery. However, as explained above, the sections
also meet the definition we set forth in Folta for statutes of repose. See Folta, 2015
IL 118070, ¶ 33.
¶ 32 Defendants argue that our finding that section 1(f) is a statute of repose would
“eviscerate the well-balanced framework” of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases
Act and allow employees or their heirs to bypass the exclusivity provisions if their
claim is barred under section 1(f) but not under section 6(c). We recognize that this
may be the case for some employees who could meet the requirements of one
section but not the other. However, reading the plain language of sections 1.1, 1(f),
and 6(c) together, we find that the legislative intent was to ensure that employees
like the one in Folta were able to seek compensation even if they did not discover
their injury within the time limits provided under the Workers’ Occupational
Diseases Act. As we found in Folta, “ultimately, whether a different balance should
be struck under the acts” given the enactment of section 1.1 “is a question more
appropriately addressed to the legislature. It is the province of the legislature to
draw the appropriate balance. It is not our role to inject a compromise but, rather,
to interpret the acts as written.” Id. ¶ 43. Any change to address defendants’
concerns must once again come from the General Assembly.
¶ 33 D. Section 1.1 Is a Substantive Change
to the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act
and Applies Prospectively
¶ 34 Having concluded that section 1(f) is a statute of repose and thus covered under
section 1.1, we turn to the second certified question, which asks us to determine the
temporal reach of section 1.1. If the temporal reach of an amended statute is set
forth in the statute, then that expression of legislative intent must be given effect,
absent a constitutional prohibition. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Howard, 2016 IL
120729, ¶ 19. If the temporal reach of the amendment is not set forth in the statutory
amendment itself, then it is provided by default in section 4 of the Statute on
Statutes. Id. ¶ 20 (citing 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)). Section 1.1 does not explicitly
set forth its temporal reach in the language of the statute because it does not indicate
whether the amendment was retroactive or prospective. See 820 ILCS 310/1.1
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(West 2022). We therefore look to section 4 of the Statute on Statutes to determine
the reach of the amendment.
¶ 35 Under section 4 of the Statute on Statutes,
“No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former
law is expressly repealed or not, as to any offense committed against the former
law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or
any right accrued, or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever
to affect any such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture
or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued, or claim arising before the new
law takes effect, save only that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far
as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceeding.” 5 ILCS 70/4
(West 2022).
Section 4 is a general savings clause, which this court has interpreted as meaning
that procedural changes to statutes will be applied retroactively, while substantive
changes are prospective only. Perry v. Department of Financial & Professional
Regulation, 2018 IL 122349, ¶ 43. After determining that a change is substantive,
we need not reach the issue of whether application of the substantive change would
have a retroactive impact or operation. Id. ¶ 44.
¶ 36 Generally, a procedural change in the law prescribes a method of enforcing
rights or involves pleadings, evidence, and practice. Schweickert v. AG Services of
America, Inc., 355 Ill. App. 3d 439, 442 (2005) (citing Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill.
591, 596 (1953) (This court defined “ ‘procedure’ as including in its meaning
whatever is embraced by the three technical terms—pleading, evidence and
practice. Practice means those legal rules which direct the course of proceedings to
bring parties into court and the course of the court after they are brought in.”)) In
contrast, a substantive change in law establishes, creates, or defines rights. Id. at
443. Section 1.1 changed the statutory framework to allow employees who could
not seek compensation under the statute due to the statutes of repose to seek
compensation through civil actions. This was a substantive change to the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act, as it gave employees the ability to seek compensation
outside the act for work-related injuries and diseases that are otherwise covered
under the statute. As a result, the answer to the second certified question is that
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application of section 1.1 must be prospective through section 4 of the Statute on
Statutes.
¶ 37 The parties agree on this point. However, the parties disagree on what it means
to apply section 1.1 prospectively. Martin argues that applying section 1.1
prospectively means to apply it to new actions filed after the amendment was
enacted based on claims that accrued after the amendment was enacted. Defendants
argue that to apply section 1.1 prospectively means that it would not apply to this
case because Rodney’s last exposure to vinyl chloride monomer occurred in 1976
and defendants gained a vested right to assert the defenses provided by section 1(f)
and the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act.
Defendants argue that a contrary finding, allowing section 1.1 to apply to cases
where a claim was barred prior to the amendment, would violate the due process
guarantees of the Illinois Constitution. Our resolution of this issue thus implicates
the third certified question.
¶ 38 E. Section 1.1 Does Not Violate
Illinois’s Due Process Guarantee
¶ 39 The Illinois Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of
the laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Defendants argue the application of section
1.1. to this case would deprive employers of a vested right to a defense under the
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. Statutes are presumed to be constitutional,
and the party challenging the validity of the statute has the burden to clearly
establish constitutional invalidity. Burger v. Lutheran General Hospital, 198 Ill. 2d
21, 31 (2001). A court must construe a statute to affirm its constitutionality if the
statute is reasonably capable of such a construction. Id. at 32.
¶ 40 In this case, after 1976, under section 1(f), Rodney no longer had the ability to
seek compensation under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act for his
employment-related exposure to vinyl chloride monomer. See Folta, 2015 IL
118070, ¶ 33 (“The purpose of a repose period is to terminate the possibility of
liability after a defined period of time. After the expiration of the repose period,
there is no longer a recognized right of action.”). Had the legislature amended the
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act to revive this claim and make compensation
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under it possible, defendants’ due process claim would be meritorious. As we have
previously recognized, once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has
a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of
action. M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 214 (1997). That right cannot be taken away
by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our constitution.
Id. at 214-15. This rule applies to statutes of repose in equal measure because, in
terms of a defendant’s due process rights, the situations are the same. Id. at 215. If
the claims were time-barred under the old law, they remain time-barred even after
a repose period is abolished by the legislature. Id.
¶ 41 However, section 1.1 did not revive Rodney’s ability to seek compensation
under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. The amendment gave him and his
heir the ability to seek compensation through a civil action. The question therefore
becomes whether defendants and other employers have a vested right to the
protections offered by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Occupational
Diseases Act, such that section 1.1 violates their right to due process under our
constitution.
¶ 42 The exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act are an
affirmative defense to a common-law action brought by an employee for a work-
related injury. See Braye v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 175 Ill. 2d 201, 207
(1997) (applying this rule to the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et
seq. (West 1992))). As such, an employer’s potential for tort liability exists unless
and until the defense of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act is established. See
id. The application of this defense to bar a civil action is not automatic. An
employer may choose not to invoke the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act based
on its expectation that the plaintiff will fail to establish the elements of a civil claim.
See id. at 208. Generally, a party’s right to a defense accrues when the plaintiff’s
right to a cause of action accrues. See Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill.
2d 381, 405 (1998) (finding a school district’s right to the total immunity as a
defense vested when the cause of action accrued). A cause of action “accrues” when
facts exist that authorize the bringing of a cause of action. Thus, a tort cause of
action accrues when all its elements are present, i.e., duty, breach, and resulting
injury or damage. Khan v. Deutsche Bank AG, 2012 IL 112219, ¶ 20. This means
that any right to a defense based on the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act accrues when the employee discovers his injury. In this
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case, Rodney was diagnosed with angiosarcoma of the liver in 2019, and his
complaint was initially filed in 2021. This was after the enactment of section 1.1.
Because defendants did not have a vested right in an exclusivity defense, to apply
section 1.1 prospectively would allow claims such as Rodney’s to proceed without
violating due process.
¶ 43 Additionally, the cardinal rule of interpreting statutes, to which all other canons
and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and
meaning of the legislature. Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304, 311 (2001).
Applying section 1.1 prospectively means to apply it to cases where an employee’s
claims under the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act were barred due to the
discovery of an illness after section 1.1 was enacted. This was the harsh result the
General Assembly sought to address after our decision in Folta. To hold otherwise
would be to undermine the legislative intent in amending the Workers’
Occupational Diseases Act to include section 1.1.
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified questions as follows:
¶ 46 First certified question: section 1(f) is a period of repose or repose provision for
purposes of section 1.1.
¶ 47 Second certified question: section 1.1 should be applied prospectively under
section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.
¶ 48 Third certified question: application of section 1.1 prospectively does not
offend Illinois’s due process guarantee.
¶ 49 Certified questions answered.
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