Brown v. Secretary, Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

BYRON JAMAAL BROWN,

Petitioner,

v. CASE NO. 8:17-cv-465-TPB-SPF

SECRETARY, Department of Corrections,

Respondent.

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O R D E R

Brown applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus

(Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for robbery with a firearm, for which

conviction Brown is imprisoned for twenty-five years. Both the conviction

and the sentence accord with the plea agreement. Numerous exhibits support

the response. (Doc. 26) The Respondent admits the petition’s timeliness

(Response at 2, Doc. 26)1 and correctly argues (1) that each ground for relief

either fails to assert a ground reviewable under § 2254 or lacks merit and

(2) that the petition asserts no ground based on the ineffective assistance of

counsel.

1 This case was previously closed. After Brown did not oppose the Respondent’s earlier

response, an order (Doc. 13) determined that the Respondent correctly argued that this action

was untimely, which determination was reversed because the circuit court ruled that Brown’s

first of several post-conviction motions was “properly filed” and tolled the limitation. (Doc. 22)

I. BACKGROUND2

In 2005 Brown pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and was sentenced

to probation. Four months later in 2006 (1) Brown pleaded guilty to uttering a

forged instrument and was sentenced to imprisonment for three years,

(2) Brown’s probation for the 2005 conviction was revoked, and (3) he was

sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for the 2005 conviction to run

concurrent with the 2006 conviction. Brown was released from imprisonment

in August, 2008.

Less than a year later, specifically, June 5, 2009, Brown and a

co-defendant entered a Metro P.C.S. store, Brown brandished a firearm at the

store clerk and demanded money from the cash register, and Brown reached

across the counter and grabbed nearly $600 from the cash register. The store

security cameras captured both the armed robbery and the robbers flight in a

van. Later the store clerk identified the abandoned van a few blocks away, and

she subsequently identified the co-defendant from a “photo-pak.” Upon being

advised that an arrest warrant was issued, the co-defendant surrendered to

police, provided a full confession, and implicated Brown as his accomplice.

Later Brown was arrested and asserted as an alibi that he was at his

grandmother’s house, but she denied that he was at her house on that date.

2 This summary of the facts derives from Brown’s Anders brief and Brown’s pro se

briefs on direct appeal. (Respondent’s Exhibits 12 and 13)

Brown was charged with robbery with a firearm and the prosecutor filed a

notice that Brown faced a sentence as both a prison releasee re-offender (“PRR”)

and a habitual felony offender (“HFO”). (Respondent’s Exhibit 4) Because the

robbery occurred within one year of his release from prison, Brown qualified for

a sentence as a PRR, and he qualified for a sentence as an HFO because he had

the two predicate prior felony convictions. If sentenced as a PRR, Brown’s

sentence was a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The plea agreement

avoided a PRR sentence and, although life imprisonment was still the

maximum possible sentence as an HFO, under the terms of the plea agreement

the prosecutor agreed to limit Brown’s sentence to only twenty-five years

imprisonment with a ten-year minimum mandatory followed by fifteen years’

probation. At sentencing Brown stated “that he was tak[ing] the plea deal

rather than take a risk at catching life.” (Respondent’s Exhibit 6 at 22)

On appeal Brown’s counsel filed an initial brief under Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Brown pro se filed both an initial and a

supplemental initial brief, and Brown filed a pro se reply brief. (Respondent’s

Exhibits 12, 13, 15, and 16) The state court record shows that Brown filed

several motions under Rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, to

correct an illegal sentence but no timely motion for post-conviction relief under

Rule 3.850. The six grounds for relief in this action challenge Brown’s sentence;

the petition alleges no ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”)

governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210

(11th Cir. 1998). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard

for federal court review of a state court adjudication, as Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000), explains:

In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal

habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.

Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two

conditions is satisfied — the state court adjudication resulted in a

decision that (1) “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “involved

an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Under the

“contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the

“unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from

this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts

of the prisoner’s case.

“The focus . . . is on whether the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable

application is different from an incorrect one.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693

(2002). “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see

White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014) (“The critical point is that relief is

available under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable-application clause if, and only if, it

is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that

there could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question . . . .”) (citing

Richter); Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is the

objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision

that we are to decide.”). The phrase “clearly established Federal law”

encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court “as of the

time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412.

A federal court must afford due deference to a state court’s decision.

“AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal

habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of

state courts.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010); see also Cullen v.

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“This is a ‘difficult to meet,’ . . . and ‘highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt’ . . . .”) (citations omitted).

When the last state court to decide a federal claim issues a reasoned and

explanatory opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as

stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson

v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). When the relevant state-court decision is

not accompanied with reasons for the decision, the federal court “should ‘look

through’ the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision

adopted the same reasoning.” Id.

In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate

court on direct appeal affirmed Brown’s convictions and sentence. (Respondent’s

Exhibit 17) Similarly, in other per curiam decisions without a written opinion

the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Brown’s subsequent Rule 3.000

motions to vacate. (Respondent’s Exhibit 28, 34, and 40) The state appellate

court’s per curiam affirmances warrant deference under Section 2254(d)(1)

because “the summary nature of a state court’s decision does not lessen the

deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002).

The state post-conviction court’s rejection of Brown’s claims warrants deference

in this case. (Orders Denying Motions to Correct Illegal Sentence, Respondent’s

Exhibits 23, 31, and 37)

III. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF

Brown alleges six grounds for relief; one ground challenges his plea and

the other grounds challenge his sentence. Brown is not entitled to relief under

any of the alleged grounds.

A. Challenge to the Guilty Plea

In Ground One Brown questions the validity of his guilty plea. Brown

must overcome the “well settled [premise] that a voluntary and intelligent plea

of guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by competent

counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508

(1984). And, as Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), explains, a

guilty plea waives a non-jurisdictional defect:

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has

preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has

solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense

with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to

the entry of the guilty plea.

This waiver of rights precludes most challenges to the conviction. E.g., United

States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1217, 1320 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, a voluntary,

unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the

proceedings.”); Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A

defendant who enters a plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to

the constitutionality of the conviction, and only an attack on the voluntary and

knowing nature of the plea can be sustained.”).

In his petition (Doc. 1 at 3) Brown recognizes that, “to be valid, a guilty

plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Brown, as the petitioner,

must identify a basis for challenging the constitutionality of his guilty plea.

Brown fails to identify a basis for challenging his guilty plea. In his reply

Brown argues that the state should have been required (1) to determine if he

was competent and (2) to afford him a “hearing to determine whether or not

his guilty plea was voluntary even though he had declared in open court that

his plea was voluntarily and knowingly.” (Doc. 29 at 4) Brown identifies no

basis for contesting either the voluntariness of his plea or his competency. On

the contrary, “the representations of the defendant . . . [at the plea proceeding]

as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73–74 (1977). Ground One has no merit.

B. Challenges to the Sentence

Grounds Two through Six challenge the validity of Brown’s sentence

under state law, specifically, that the trial court’s factual findings are

insufficient to impose a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence (Ground Two);

that the trial court failed to find both that an HFO sentence was needed to

protect the public and that Brown had the requisite two predicate prior

convictions (Grounds Three and Four); that the trial court failed to require a

pre-sentence investigation report (Ground Five); and that the ten-year

minimum mandatory sentence is illegal because it was not part of the plea

agreement (Ground Six).

A sentence within legislatively mandated guidelines is presumptively

valid. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). If a sentence is within the

statutory limits, state courts have wide discretion in determining “the type

and extent of punishment for convicted defendants.” Williams v. New York,

337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). Consequently, federal habeas corpus review of an

asserted violation of state sentencing law is limited, as McCullough v.

Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535–36 (11th Cir. 1992), explains:

A federal habeas petition may be entertained only on the ground that a

petitioner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A state’s interpretation of its

own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since

no question of a constitutional nature is involved. Bronstein v.

Wainwright, 646 F.2d 1048, 1050 (5th Cir. 1981). State courts are the

ultimate expositors of their own state’s laws, and federal courts

entertaining petitions for writs of habeas corpus are bound by the

construction placed on a state’s criminal statutes by the courts of the

state except in extreme cases. Mendiola v. Estelle, 635 F.2d 487, 489 (5th

Cir. 1981).[3]

See also Branton v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 796 F. App’x 635, 638 (11th Cir.

2019)4 (“Branton has articulated no cognizable claim for federal habeas corpus

relief because the federal courts are limited to correcting errors of federal law,

and Branton never brought a federal claim, either in state court or in federal

3 Unless later superseded by Eleventh Circuit precedent, a Fifth Circuit decision issued

before October 1, 1981, binds this court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc).

4 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited

as persuasive authority.” 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.

court.”); Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) “[F]ederal

courts cannot review a state’s alleged failure to adhere to its own sentencing

procedures.”) (citations omitted).

Nevertheless, each claim in Grounds Two through Six is refuted by the

record and, to the extent that he raised the claims in state court, each claim

was rejected by the post-conviction court. “Defendant waived his right to a

presentence investigation pursuant to his plea agreement, and the Court made

the necessary findings to qualify Defendant as an HFO [and] the Court then

sentenced Defendant according to the terms of his negotiated plea agreement,

including the 10 year minimum mandatory provision.” (Respondent’s Exhibit

37 at 2–3) Brown is not entitled to relief based on Grounds Two through Six.

CONCLUSION

Brown fails to meet his burden to show that the state court’s decision was

either an unreasonable application of controlling Supreme Court precedent or

an unreasonable determination of fact. As Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 19–20

(2013), recognizes, a petitioner’s burden under § 2254 is very difficult to meet:

Recognizing the duty and ability of our state-court colleagues to

adjudicate claims of constitutional wrong, AEDPA erects a formidable

barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been

adjudicated in state court. AEDPA requires “a state prisoner [to] show

that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court

was so lacking in justification that there was an error . . . beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

[86, 103] (2011). “If this standard is difficult to meet” — and it is — “that

is because it was meant to be.” Id., at [102]. We will not lightly conclude

that a State’s criminal justice system has experienced the “extreme

malfunctio[n]” for which federal habeas relief is the remedy. Id., at [103]

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Brown’s motion “to hear and rule” (Doc. 33) is GRANTED. Brown’s

petition for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The clerk must

enter a judgment against Brown and CLOSE this case.

DENIAL OF BOTH

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Brown is not entitled to a certificate of appealability (“COA”). Under

§ 2253(c)(1), a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute

entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition. Rather, a district

court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA “only if

the petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” To merit a COA, Brown must show that reasonable jurists would find

debatable both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues he

seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478

(2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because he fails to

show that reasonable jurists would debate either the merits of the claims or the

procedural issues, Brown is entitled to neither a COA nor leave to appeal in

forma pauperis.

A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma

pauperis is DENIED. Brown must obtain permission from the circuit court to

appeal in forma pauperis.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 23rd day of

January, 2025.

TOM BARBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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