Kindle v. Kinkaid Reeds Conservation District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EDWARD KINDLE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-CV-02703-SPM

KINKAID REEDS CONSERVATION

DISTRICT & SCOTT WILMOUTH,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McGLYNN, District Judge:

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) filed by Plaintiff Edward Kindle. (Doc. 4). The pro se Complaint

names Kinkaid Reeds Conservation District and Scott Wilmouth (the superintendent

of the district) as defendants in this action. (Doc. 3). Kindle now seeks to proceed in

this Court without prepayment of the required filing fees.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), an indigent party may commence a federal court

action without paying required costs and fees upon submission of an affidavit

asserting the inability “to pay such fees or give security therefor” and stating “the

nature of the action, defense or appeal and [the] affiant’s belief that the person is

entitled to redress.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Destitution is not required to proceed IFP;

an affidavit demonstrating that the plaintiff cannot, because of his poverty, provide

himself with the necessities of life is sufficient. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &

Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1948).

Here, the Court is satisfied from Kindle’s affidavit that he is indigent. (Doc. 4).

Kindle asserts that he is unemployed and has no monthly wages. (Id.). Kindle

indicates that he receives monthly social security disability payments in the amount

of $1,601, but he has monthly housing, utility, and medical costs totaling roughly

$1,200. (Id.). In terms of assets, Kindle claims to have $312 in savings and to own real

estate worth $3,000. (Id.). Based on this financial information, the Court finds that

Kindle is indigent under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

But that does not end the inquiry. Under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must also

screen the indigent plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss the complaint if it is clearly

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or is a claim for money damages against

an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d

761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003) (“District judges have ample authority to dismiss frivolous or

transparently defective suits spontaneously, and thus save everyone time and legal

expense.”). Thus, resolution of the motion to proceed IFP requires the undersigned to

review the allegations of the complaint.

In reviewing the complaint, courts construe pro se claims generously. Buechel

v. United States, 746 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court accepts the factual

allegations as true, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v.

Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements and labels,

however, are not enough. The complaint must allege enough facts to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422-23

(7th Cir. 2013). That means “a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on

paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614

F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead, “the plaintiff must give enough details about

the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Id. at 404.

Here, Kindle initiated this action for infringement of his Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. (Doc. 2, p. 1). His sole allegation is that in 2009, the Circuit Court

of Jackson County granted the Kinkaid Reeds Conservation District a prescriptive

easement via adverse possession over an unnamed piece of property. (Id., p. 5). Kindle

alleges that each defendant personally participated in causing his injuries and that

an official policy or custom of each defendant’s government agency violated his rights.

(Id., pp. 1-3). As relief, Kindle seeks compensatory damages in the amount of

$2,000,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $6,000,000. (Id., p. 6).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff may bring an action against a person acting

under color of state law who has deprived him of a federal constitutional right. See 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Municipalities and local governing bodies can be sued directly as

persons under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. Monell v. Dep’t of

Social Serv’s, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). “[A] civil rights plaintiff must specify whether

suit is brought against the defendant in his official capacity or in his individual

capacity.” Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1372 (7th Cir. 1991).

Generally, individual-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions taken under color of state law, whereas official-capacity

suits represent another way of pleading an action against an entity of which the

defendant is an agent. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). Given that the

government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, “an official-capacity

suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id.

at 166. To establish liability in an official-capacity suit under § 1983, the plaintiff must

show that the action performed under color of state law is linked to the entity’s policy

or custom. Hill, 924 F.2d at 1372. In an individual-capacity suit, the plaintiff must

establish that the individual is personally responsible for the constitutional

deprivation. Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 439-40 (7th Cir. 2015).

Taking each alleged constitutional deprivation in turn, the Court can discern

no basis for a cause of action. As to a Fifth Amendment violation, the Takings Clause

of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not “be taken for public

use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend V. This clause is incorporated to

the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544

U.S. 528, 536 (2005). To state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of Fifth Amendment

rights within the Takings Clause, a plaintiff must allege that a state or government

actor deprived him of a protected property interest without just compensation. Knick

v. Township of Scott, Pa., 588 U.S. 180, 185 (2019). A direct government appropriation

or physical invasion of private property is “[t]he paradigmatic taking requiring just

compensation.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537. Kindle fails to allege how the granting of the

prescriptive easement by the district court deprived him of a protected property

interest. Next, liberally construing the Complaint, the Court assumes that Kindle

attempts to raise a claim of violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

But even if the Court so assumes, the Complaint does not contain enough factual detail

to determine whether Defendants could be liable for any deprivation of his

constitutional rights related to the granting of the easement.

Simply put, the factual detail provided does not state a claim for any

constitutional violation. The Court needs more information. For example, what

particular actions did each defendant take to personally deprive Kindle of a

constitutional right, under which City ordinances or regulations did the defendants

operate to infringe upon Kindle’s rights, or how did they deny him a proper

opportunity to be heard or seek redress at the local or state level.

Because Kindle has failed to state a claim with the requisite particularity, the

Court DISMISSES the Complaint (Doc. 3) without prejudice. Kindle shall have until

February 24, 2025, to file an amended complaint that properly states a claim for relief.

Until then, the Court RESERVES RULING on Kindle’s Motion for Leave to Proceed

in forma pauperis (Doc. 4). Failure to file an amended complaint within the time

permitted will result in the dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 23, 2025

s/ Stephen P. McGlynn

STEPHEN P. McGLYNN

U.S. District Judge