McCollum v. Newark Police Department

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

CHRISTOPHER T. MCCOLLUM,1 : Case No. 2:24-cv-2806

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Sarah D. Morrison

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Christopher T. McCollum, a resident of Newark, Ohio, has filed a Second

Amended Complaint,2 alleging violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and

Ohio state law against the Newark Police Department, Officer Alex Colles, Officer Stevens,

Officer Ulmer, Licking County Prosecutor William Hayes, the Licking County Prosecutor’s

Office, Licking County Prosecutor Cliff J. Murphy, Sergeant Clint Eskins, Doug Wells, and

Officer John Doe. (Doc. 12 at 2–3). By separate Order, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed

1Plaintiff’s last name is spelled “McCullom” in the caption of his Second Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 12 at 1).

This appears to be a typographical error.

2Plaintiff attaches various exhibits to his Second Amended Complaint. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

10, these exhibits are considered a part of the Complaint “for all purposes.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). Cf. Fishman

v. Williams, No. CV 14-4823, 2016 WL 11484591, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2016) (“When screening a pro se

plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court may consider facts drawn from the complaint and

supporting exhibits attached thereto.”); Johnson v. Buffalo Pub. Schools: Adult Educ. Div., No. 19-CV-1484, 2021

WL 9455714, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2021) (“The Court deems the attachments and exhibits attached to Johnson’s

Complaint part of the pleading and considers them, to the extent they are relevant, in its screening decision.”).

However, the Court declines to comb through the record to raise new claims or make legal arguments for Plaintiff.

Cf. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Furthermore, although this court has discretion

to more broadly review the record on appeal, we, like the district courts, have a limited and neutral role in the

adversarial process, and are wary of becoming advocates who comb the record of previously available evidence and

make a party’s case for it.”).

in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (See Doc. 5).

On October 8, 2024, the Court entered an Order (Doc. 9) allowing Plaintiff to file the

instant Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 12), which is now the operative complaint in this case.

See Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Michigan, Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir. 2000) (an amended

complaint is the legally operative complaint). In the October 8, 2024, Order, the Court also

withdrew the Report and Recommendation at Doc. 5 that considered Plaintiff’s initial Complaint.

(See Doc. 9 at 2). Although the Court withdrew the Report and Recommendation at Doc. 5, the

Order in Doc. 5 granting Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (see Doc. 5 at 9) remains in

effect.

This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the Second Amended

Complaint to determine whether the Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because

it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary

relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. Legal Standard

In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant

whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an

economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot

make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29; see

also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal

basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal

interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual

basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly

incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as

true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for

frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at

328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by

a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in

Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does

a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”

Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

B. Allegations in the Second Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges that, on the evening of May 23, 2022, the police pulled him over after he

dropped off one of his employees at home. Plaintiff states that, at the time, he was attempting to

start his own business. (Doc. 12 at 4).

More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, after he dropped the employee off, he noticed a

police cruiser coming up behind him on 11th Street at a fast rate of speed. He pulled over to let

the cruiser pass. Plaintiff avers that, unbeknownst to him, the police had earlier in the day

conducted a search of the home where he dropped off the employee and were attempting to locate

and arrest a suspect. When Plaintiff pulled over, the cruiser pulled up behind him and turned on

its lights. (Id.).

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Officer Stevens approached his truck on the passenger

side and began speaking to Plaintiff through the rolled-up window. Plaintiff’s truck did not have

automatic windows, and he was unable to comply with Stevens’ instructions to roll the window

down. Plaintiff states that he asked multiple times what he had done and why the officer wanted

him to identify himself. (Id. at 4–5).

Plaintiff alleges that, during this time, Defendant Officer Colles ran the truck’s license

plate. The results of the license plate search revealed that the truck was registered to Plaintiff, and

he did not have any active warrants. Plaintiff alleges that he did not in fact have any criminal

record. (Id. at 4). Colles then came up to the driver’s side of the truck. Plaintiff states that, while

he was asking Colles why he had to exit the vehicle, Colles tried to open the driver’s-side door,

surprising Plaintiff, and Plaintiff attempted to keep the door shut. Colles then opened the door,

punched Plaintiff in the face, pulled him out of the truck, slammed him onto the pavement, and

held his arm behind his back. Plaintiff states that at no time after he was pulled from the truck did

he resist. Officer Colles eventually told Plaintiff that he was pulled over because he was blocking

an intersection. (Id. at 5).

Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to the Licking County Jail but was not read his rights or

allowed a phone call. Plaintiff states that, as a result of the actions of Officer Colles, Officer

Stevens, and another officer, Defendant Ulmer, who Plaintiff alleges assisted in his forceful

removal from the truck, he injured his shoulder. Plaintiff immediately asked for medical attention

at the jail but had to wait several hours before getting an X-ray. Plaintiff states that, as a result of

his asking for medical attention, he was placed for several hours in a dirty cell with a clogged toilet

before being moved to another cell. (Id.). Plaintiff further states that he asked multiple times for

pictures to be taken of his face but was told that it was not necessary. (Id. at 6).

Plaintiff contends that the Licking County Prosecutor pursued criminal charges against him

for assault, even though there was no probable cause to believe that he committed a crime. (Id. at

6, 19). Further, Plaintiff contends that he later learned from Officer Colles’ case report that during

his arrest Defendant Sergeant Eskins asked the Officers to clear the scene because another vehicle

had left the house, and they were to attempt to stop it. According to Plaintiff, the other vehicle

was located, and Officers Colles and Stevens were able to determine visually that none of the

occupants was the suspect. (Id. at 5, 14). Plaintiff states that he also did not match the description

of the suspect but that the Officers harassed and intimidated him. (Id. at 6).

In his initial Complaint, Plaintiff additionally alleged that he was eventually found innocent

of the assault charge in Licking County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 22 CR 360. (Doc. 1-1

at 3–4). A review of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas docket indicates that Plaintiff

was found not guilty of assault on November 30, 2022.3

For relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Doc. 12 at 3, 9).

C. Analysis

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff brings the following six claims against

Defendants: “Violation of Right of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures—Fourth Amendment”

(Count I); “False arrest/Unlawful Detention/False Imprisonment—Fourth Amendment” (Count

II); “Excessive Force—Fourth Amendment Failure to Supervise” (Count III); “Excessive Force—

Fourth Amendment Ratification” (Count IV); “Battery” (Count V); and “Malicious Prosecution”

(Count VI).

At this stage in the proceedings, without the benefit of briefing by the parties to this action,

and in an abundance of caution, the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may proceed for further

development at this juncture on Counts I, II, and III against Defendant Officers Colles, Stevens,

and Ulmer, in their individual capacities.4

The Court has not yet determined whether it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

3Viewed at:

https://lickingcounty.gov/TAGCPM.PA.PublicPortal/faces/pages/case.xhtml?id=1&csqid=229175&return=results,

under Plaintiff’s name and case number. This Court may take judicial notice of court records that are available online

to members of the public. See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d

327, 332 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999)).

4The Court advises Plaintiff that this is only a preliminary determination. The Court has not made a determination as

to the merits of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor are Defendants precluded from filing a motion to dismiss,

motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,

Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-CV-220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).

Counts V and VI—raising state-law claims for battery and malicious prosecution—pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367. Although Plaintiff frames Counts V and VI as § 1983 claims (see Doc. 12 at 8),

§ 1983 does not provide redress for violations of state law, and the Court may not entertain these

claims unless supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. See Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215

(6th Cir. 1995) (“Unless a deprivation of some federal constitutional or statutory right has

occurred, § 1983 provides no redress even if the plaintiff’s common law rights have been violated

and even if the remedies available under state law are inadequate.”) (internal quotation omitted).

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court will not sua sponte dismiss Plaintiff’s state-law battery

and malicious prosecution claims against Defendant Officers Stevens, Colles, and Ulmer. The

Court will determine at a later stage in the proceedings whether the exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over the state-law claims is appropriate. For the reasons set forth below, however, the

remainder of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

As an initial matter, Plaintiff cannot proceed against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

“Section 1988 allows a federal Court to award the prevailing party in a civil rights action

reasonable attorney fees as part of costs. It does not create a separate federal cause of action for a

civil rights violation.” Thomas-El v. Smith, No. 20-CV-10128, 2020 WL 1888829, at *5 (E.D.

Mich. Apr. 16, 2020) (citing Henderson v. Reyda, 192 F. App’x 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff

has therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1988.

Next, although the Court is permitting Plaintiff to proceed for further development at this

juncture on Counts I, II, III, V, and VI against Defendant Officers Colles, Stevens, and Ulmer in

their individual capacities, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

against them in their official capacities or against Defendant Newark Police Department.

As this Court has previously explained:

“While ‘[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a

government official for actions he takes under color of state law,’ individuals sued

in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Alkire v.

Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 165 (1985)). Thus, “[a] suit against an individual in his official capacity is the

equivalent of a suit against the governmental entity.” Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d

1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when

execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional

“policy” or “custom” by demonstrating one of the following: “(1) the existence of

an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final

decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of

inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or

acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478

(6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.

2005)).

Kilkenny v. Gabriel, No. 2:19-CV-3661, 2019 WL 4601856, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2019),

report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 6609211 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2019).

Further, “[t]he inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983

liability ‘where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights

of persons with whom the police come into contact.’” Miller v. Sanilac Cty., 606

F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th

Cir. 2008) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted)). In order to establish

deliberate indifference, a plaintiff “‘must show prior instances of unconstitutional

conduct demonstrating that the [official and/or government entity] has ignored a

history of abuse and was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area

was deficient and likely to cause injury.’” Miller, 606 F.3d at 255 (quoting Fisher

v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005)).

Id.

Because Plaintiff has not plausibly pled facts demonstrating the existence of a policy or

custom of inadequate training or supervision, or that Defendant Officers Colles’, Stevens’, and

Ulmer’s employer, whom the Court understands from the Complaint to be the Newark Police

Department, ignored a history of abuse or was clearly on notice that its training was deficient and

likely to lead to civil-rights violations, Plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against Defendant

Officers Stevens, Colles, or Ulmer in their official capacities or the Newark Police Department.

Furthermore, although Defendants Cliff J. Murphy, Doug Wells, William Hayes, and

Officer John Doe are named as Defendants (see Doc. 12 at 2–3), the Second Amended Complaint

does not contain any factual allegations against them. Accordingly, Plaintiff has alleged no set of

facts that would constitute a cause of action against these Defendants and they should be dismissed.

See Sebestyen v. Gardner, No. 2:17-CV-550, 2017 WL 5629646, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2017),

report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4804662 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2018). Even if the

Court were to consider the fact that an attached exhibit apparently consisting of a case report

completed by Defendant Ulmer is marked “Reviewed By” Doug Wells (see Doc. 12 at 15–16) that

would not change this result. As noted above in footnote 2, the Court will not comb through the

record to raise new claims or make legal arguments for Plaintiff. In any event, for the reasons set

forth below in regard to Defendant Sergeant Eskins, Plaintiff has failed to state a supervisory

liability claim against Wells.

Turning now to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Eskins, the only allegations against

him are that he contacted Colles, Stevens, and Ulmer during Plaintiff’s arrest and asked them to

pursue another suspect. (Doc. 12 at 5). “The scope of supervisory liability in § 1983 cases is

limited.” Assi v. Hanshaw, 625 F. Supp. 3d 722, 747–48 (S.D. Ohio 2022). “Generally, the

doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 lawsuits to impute liability onto

supervisory personnel.” Farmer v. Phillips, No. 20-5730, 2021 WL 6210609, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct.

19, 2021). Instead, individuals sued in their personal capacity under § 1983 are liable only for

their own unconstitutional behavior. Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011).

To establish a supervisor’s liability, a plaintiff must show, “at the very least, ‘that the

supervisor encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly

participated in it.’” Assi, 625 F. Supp. 3d at 747 (quoting Sexton v. Cernuto, 18 F.4th 177, 185

(6th Cir. 2021)) (in turn quoting Doe v. Claiborne Cty., 103 F.3d 495, 511 (6th Cir. 1996)). Here,

there are no factual allegations that Eskins either encouraged or participated in any of the alleged

unconstitutional behavior. Defendant Eskins should therefore be dismissed. See Chappell v.

Morgan, No. 2:15-CV-1110, 2016 WL 738098, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 25, 2016) (Report &

Recommendation) (holding that in the absence of any allegation that supervisory prison officials

were involved in or encouraged an alleged assault by a correctional employee, the case could not

proceed against them based on the theory that they failed to take corrective action after they were

notified of the assault), adopted, 2016 WL 1109093 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2016); see also Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679 (“Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is

entitled to relief.”) (cleaned up).

Further, the Licking County Prosecutor’s Office is not sui juris and cannot be sued for

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Lenard v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:17 CV 440, 2017

WL 2832903, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 30, 2017); Rose v. Cuyahoga County Dep’t of Children and

Family Servs., No. 1:18-CV-2012, 2019 WL 2021716, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2019). Similarly,

Licking County Prosecutors William Hayes and Cliff J. Murphy “enjoy[] absolute immunity from

§ 1983 suits for damages when [they] act[] within the scope of [their] prosecutorial duties.” Grant

v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135, 1137 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,

420 (1976)). “A prosecutor’s decision to initiate a prosecution, including the decision to file a

criminal complaint or seek an arrest warrant, is protected by absolute immunity.” Howell v.

Sanders, 668 F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 467

(6th Cir. 2010) (same). Plaintiff alleges only that the charges against him were without evidentiary

support. (See Doc. 12 at 6). As a prosecutor’s decision whether to bring charges against a person

is entitled to absolute immunity, Defendants Hayes and Murphy are immune from suit for such

acts. Plaintiff’s claims against the Licking County Prosecutor’s Office, Hayes, and Murphy should

therefore be dismissed.

Finally, because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against the Newark Police

Department, the Licking County Prosecutor’s Office, or Licking County Prosecutors’ Hayes and

Murphy, Count IV’s “ratification” based Fourth Amendment claim against these Defendants (see

Doc. 12 at 7–8) necessarily also fails to state a claim for relief.

In sum, Plaintiff may PROCEED for further development at this juncture on Counts I, II,

and III, V, and VI against Defendant Officers Colles, Stevens, and Ulmer, in their individual

capacities. Having found that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief against the remaining

Defendants—the Newark Police Department, Licking County Prosecutor William Hayes, the

Licking County Prosecutor’s Office, Licking County Prosecutor Cliff J. Murphy, Sergeant Clint

Eskins, Doug Wells, and Officer John Doe—it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims

against those Defendants be DISMISSED.

Plaintiff, however, has not submitted the necessary service of process forms for Defendant

Officers Colles, Stevens or Ulmer to be served in this case. Therefore, within thirty (30) days of

the date of this Order and Report and Recommendation, Plaintiff is ORDERED to submit to this

Court a completed summons form and a United States Marshal Form for each of Defendant

Officers Colles, Stevens, and Ulmer so that service of process may be made in this case.

The CLERK OF COURT is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with three summons and

United States Marshal forms for this purpose. Upon receipt of the completed summons and United

States Marshal forms, the Court shall order service of process by the United States Marshal in this

case. Plaintiff is advised that failure to comply with this Order may result in the dismissal

of this action for want of prosecution.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The § 1988 claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint be DISMISSED with

prejudice as to all the Defendants, and that the § 1983 claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice as to Defendants the Newark Police Department,

Licking County Prosecutor William Hayes, the Licking County Prosecutor’s Office, Licking

County Prosecutor Cliff J. Murphy, Sergeant Clint Eskins, Doug Wells, and Officer John Doe for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

2. The Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3) over any state-law claims against dismissed Defendants the Newark Police

Department, Licking County Prosecutor William Hayes, the Licking County Prosecutor’s Office,

Licking County Prosecutor Cliff J. Murphy, Sergeant Clint Eskins, Doug Wells, and Officer John

Doe and DISMISS any such claims without prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff may PROCEED for further development at this juncture on Counts I, II,

III, V, and VI against Defendant Officers Colles, Stevens, and Ulmer, in their individual capacities.

2. To maintain clarity in the docket, the CLERK OF COURT is DIRECTED to

add Officer John Doe as a Defendant in this case. (See Doc. 12 at 2).

3. Within thirty (30) days of receipt of this Order and Report and Recommendation,

Plaintiff SHALL submit to the Court a completed summons and United States Marshal form for

each of Defendant Officers Colles, Stevens, and Ulmer.5

4. The CLERK OF COURT is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with three summons

and three United States Marshal forms for this purpose. Upon receipt of the completed summons

and United States Marshal forms, the Court shall order service of process by the United States

Marshal in this case.

5. Plaintiff shall inform the Court promptly of any changes in his address which may

occur during the pendency of this lawsuit.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

5In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff indicates that Officer Ulmer’s first name is “Steven.” (See Doc. 12 at

2). An exhibit attached to the Second Amended Complaint, however, appears to indicate that Ulmer’s first name is

abbreviated “Wm.” (Id. at 16). Another exhibit appears to indicate that Officer Stevens’ first initial is “C.” (Id. at

18).

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

Date: January 23, 2025 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE